Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia. pendents*. To do this, we have only to prevent the republic possessing herself of the Missisipi, from putting garrisons in the Havannab, Carthagena, and from approaching Brasil. Nothing is more practicable. The United States, certain of our assistance in good faith, will possess themselves of Louisianat, and garrison Cuba; we can ourselves protect Brasil, open the trade, and explore the treasures of that invaluable, and to the shame of the civilized world, unknown country; and then the Spanish settlements, as well as the rest of the world, will have but little to apprehend from the naval power of France. *It certainly requires no great share of geographical knowledge, to see and be convinced, that the sources of maritime trade now possessed by Great Britain, when compared to those of France, are no more able to maintain a marine equal to what she may maintain, than Holland is at present able to maintain a navy equal to that of England; and every Englishman knows, that should the navies of our enemies be suffered to rise nearly to a level with our own, their preponderance on the land, and the immensity of their possessions, would soon make our scale on the balance of political Europe, kick the beam. It is therefore the duty of every man who prefers British liberty, to the heaviest malediction that ever cursed mankind, (we mean the dominion of France), to exert all his powers, while it is yet time, to secure the independence of his country. To rely upon the superior address and bravery of our generous and noble seamen, is criminal; others may learn address, and despotism can drive them to the fight; but we must provide effectual and lasting sources to maintain a sufficiency of men who fight for glory, to a grateful country, and for a beloved king. It would seem as if the leading men in America were no better geographers than ether folks. Or perhaps their political organization is something like our own now-8days, that every province, county, borough, and sea-port town, have their provident patriots, and the state has none. The Missisippi and the Floridas in the hands of the French, by what route or conveyance are half the settlers in America to get to the sea? Nothing more simple, says Talleyrand, "by becoming French citizens.” To take possession of Brasil would be, says honest John Bull, "an unjust thing, for the Queen of Portugal has done us no harm." It might, however, not be amiss to inform him, that Portugal has forfeited Brasil and Goa, by exactly the same misdemea nour that Spain and Holland lost Trinidad and Ceylon; unable to protect her capital, and certain that we would not do it for her, she committed her dominions to the discretion of the French republic. The First Consul, perhaps not certain what the issue of his war in St. Domingo may be, knows, that charged as he is, with the government of France, it is his indispensable duty to secure for the republic possessions sufficient to give her a preponderance by sea, proportionate to the rank he has given her on land." To do this, the most eligible country on the globe is Brasil: and to have a plausible pretext to garrison that settlement, Buonaparte has, it is said, instructed his ambassador of peace, General Lasnes, to make a French footman quarrel with the Queen of Portugal's prime minister, or rather with her majesty's ministre de finance. Now, if our worthy neighbour get once possession of Brasil, he will, very soon after, make our credulous cockneys buy their rum and turtle, their sugar and muslin, at Bourdeaux and Rouen! Amongst our definitions of political morality, the following answer of the late Empress of Russia to a Polish bishop, might, on some occasions, make a useful ingredient. Prior to the final partition of Poland, a prelate of high rank in that country, endeavoured to Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia. To conclude these sketches, in as far as they relate to France and Russia, we shall now only observe, that as these two great continental monarchies were seen to improve their national consistence at home, and to extend their political influence abroad, it should have been the most invariable system of Great Britain, as it was the sacred duty of her government, to have directed all the power and influence of the British nation, towards the support and augmentation of the lesser states of Europe, whose situation was such, as could warrant the possibility of their being rendered permanent. These: were, prior to the peace of Utrecht, Holland, Spain, and Austria; and, until the capitulation of Nystad in 1721, Denmark and Sweden came under the same description. To raise and keep up the maritime states, to extend their dominions at home, and their possessions abroad, should have been our peculiar care; their interests were our own, and upon our prosperity depended their existence. This sort of policy was, however, too wide, and its principle too liberal for our contracted views; the spirit of commerce seldom looks. beyond the prospect of immediate gain; instead of guiding, as the legislature should have done, the national spirit of commercial enterprise, towards the consolidation of the British empire, and the independence of Europe, the British government itself has long been influenced by the narrow. projects of mercantile speculation: thus we have lost our natural maritime allies without having gained a nutmeg by their fall. On the contrary, instead of having increased the sources of our commerce, wealth, and power, we have greatly declined; the powers of the British empire, compared to those of France alone, bear a far less proportion now, than they did a hundred years ago. When compared to those of France and Russia united, our inferiority appears still more alarming. However, although the secondary powers of Europe, and amongst them. our maritime allies, are subjugated, or rendered dependent upon France and Russia, the world must not be given up for lost. The Russian nation cannot yet have forgotten what it owes to the glorious memory of its great founder, and to that of Catherine II. Nor can the court of Petersburgh compromise the dignity of a sovereign, and so far divest royalty of honour, honesty, and of all the attributes of a legitimate government, as to countenance the crimes of the rulers of France. Besides, Great Britain herself, now brought to the alternative, tamely to submit to the domineering spirit of France, or, to un convince Catherine II. that the monarchical republic of Poland was a sovereign state, independent of all other earthly power; and that there was an injustice in her majesty's proceedings against it. The empress answered, "Reverend father, if Poland was an independent state, you would not have been here to intercede for it. As it is, you can give me no security that your country will not fall under the dominion of those who may one day attempt to disturb the peace of my people. To care for the present, and to provide for the future safety of this empire, the Almighty has imposed upon me the heavy duty of a sovereign; and you know, reverend father, that to the accomplishment of our divine mission, all earthly considerations must give way." Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia. shackle the natural vigour of the nation, by adopting a liberal system of politics, may yet confine the dominion of those rapacious republicans within such frontiers as may secure the peace of the world. In extraordinary cases, to use extraordinary means is not only lawful, but it is a duty. In the present political state of the civilized world, France is in Europe already too powerful; it is therefore the duty of all other powers, and of Great Britain in particular, to prevent that republic augmenting its force by the acquisition of foreign settlements. If the courts of Lisbon and Madrid cannot be roused up to a sense of the duty they owe to the great commonwealth of polished nations, their possessions must be taken from under the leaden hands of their torpid governments, and made subservient, as nature designed them, to the happiness of mankind, and to the independence of Europe. Likewise those luxuriant countries, that may be said to groan under the chilling authority of that monstrous government of Turkey and the Barbary states, should forthwith be appropriated to the same beneficial purpose. Instead of that comnion-place phrase, balance of power, which never existed but on sheep-skin treaties, Great Britain has yet the means to raise, in Europe, in America, and on the ocean, such powers as would establish a real balance or barrier, which all the force and frantic rage of disappointed jacobinism, could never break down. Then we would have no need to proclaim ourselves the saviours of Europe! A grateful world would do it for us. It should, however, not be forgotten, that we have only one alternative now remaining; to wit, to consign our children and the nation to a state, of all others the most repugnant to the feelings of men, and the most degrading to human nature, that of a subordination to the French: or, to break through those contemptible formalities which bind the hands of government, and render all the glorious efforts of our irresistible powers of no effect. Are the King of Spain, and the Prince of Brasil, as vassals to Buonaparte, more related to us, than were the King of Sardinia, and the Prince of Orange, who both fought our battles? And is the correspondence of the Grand Signior, of the Emperor of Morocco, and the Dey of Algiers, with the First Consul, less hostile to our interests, than that of the Nabob of Arcot was with Tippoo Sultan? What are Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and Morocco to us, when com pared to the safety of the British empire? or what are all our miserable cal. culations on financial economy compared with British liberty? Rather than risk the possibility of ever being obliged to acknowledge a superior on earth, our last shilling, the moveable property of the empire, the national debt, and if necessary the blood of our darling children, must be to Britons no consideration. State of French and Spanish Armies. STATE OF FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES. Woolwich, July 15.-SIR, IF the following observations on the state of affairs in Spain, are worth inserting in the Military Chronicle, you are very welcome to them. H. K. The French forces which have lately occupied the Austurias; those opposed to the Galician army, and the troops under the immediate command of Marmont at Salamanca, do not exceed 35,000 effective men. The French army in the south, under Soult, Drouet, &c. is not more than 30,000 strong. Suchet, who occupied Valencia with an army of 20,000 men, has sustained so many losses by battles and sieges, by sending 7,000 men into Arragon and Catalonia, and by the garrisons he is obliged to maintain in Valencia, Penascola, &c. that he is unable to advance into Murcia. The French hold strong garrisons in Madrid, Tortosa, Pampeluna, Sarragossa, &c. which may amount to near 20,000 men. Thus the French force in Spain appears to be 100 or 110,000 men, which is a formidable force, if the state of their affairs would allow the French generals to act offensively; but that is denied them. In the present diminished state of their armies, neither Marmont, Soult, or Suchet, are able to strike any blow (and indeed they dare not attempt it) that might give them the upper hand in the peninsula. For instance, if Lord Wellington moves into Andalusia to attack Soult, Marmont cannot create any serious diversion, by advancing upon Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida, without exposing all that part of Spain, which is north of the Douro, to the Galician army, which would then be able to threaten the communication of Madrid with France. If, on the contrary, Lord Wellington advances along the valley of the Tagus, upon Madrid, Soult cannot move any very considerable force from Andalusia, without risking the loss of the whole province. Hence, it is evident, that the French marshals are reduced to the severe necessity of acting on the defensive; and that all they can possibly do, is to watch Lord W's movements, endeavour to counteract his plans, aud to preServe what they hold till their mester can spare them a reinforcement sufficient to restore their affairs. If Lord Wellington advances into Andalusia with a large force, Soult will not dare to risk a general action; he will be obliged to abandon the whole country as Lord W. advances; for, if he fights at Seville, he might be driven back upon Grenada, and consequently lose his line of retreat through the Sierra Morena. If he fights at Cordova and is beat, he is utterly ruined; Cordova is but two or three days march from Sierra Morena; an army, dri Marmont, when he lately entered Portugal, had not 16,000 men with him; which proves that the French force in the north of Spain is very small; or that a great propos tion of it is required to keep the Galicians in check. 2 N VOL. IV. No. 22 State of French and Spanish Armies. ven in confusion into the defiles of those mountains, and incumbered by its baggage, artillery, &c. would not be in a condition of making any resistance to a superior force pursuing. At any rate, all the artillery, baggage, and wounded, must be left to the mercy of the conqueror. The British force in Portugal, in the field, is not short of 45,000 men. The Portuguese bring nearly 35,000 into the field. The Spanish force in Murcia is near 10 or 12,000 strong. Ballasteros commands about 5000. Cadiz contains near 7000 British and Spanish. In Catalonia, upwards of 20,000 men appear in arms, some of which are tolerably disciplined. Under the orders of Villamur, Sanchez, &c. 7 or 8000 Spaniards are acting in conjunction with Lord W's army. The Spanish troops in Galicia have been stated at different times from 15 to 20,000 strong. The Guerilla parties under Mina, Empicinado, &c. are strong in numbers, and well trained to arms. From this statement (which from the sources 1 derive it, I have reason to think is not very incorrect) there appear to be nearly 150,000 men acting against the French, besides many small partizan corps which keep moving in every direction. Unless Buonaparte speedily recruits his exhausted armies in Spain, we may confidently expect, that before next year, the French in Spain will be confined behind the Ebro. I will now venture to give an opinion upon the operations likely to take place. It is copfidently stated that Lord Wellington will shortly enter Andalusia with his army: I presume his lordship's motives are good for so doing, yet I cannot but think, that a movement upon Madrid would be more advisable. According to the last accounts, General Hill has taken possession of Almaraz, which is 120 miles from Madrid. If Lord W. advances upon Madrid, Marmont will be under the necessity of leaving Salamanca, with every mau under his orders, and marching by Avila towards Toledo, (a distance of 160 miles) in order to place himself between Lord W. and Madrid, and even then without being certain of having preserved the place; for, before Soult could reinforce him by any considerable force, Marmont might be attacked by very superior numbers, and driven entirely from that part of Spain. There is another reason that renders an attack upon Madrid desirable. Every body knows the importance it would be of, both in a military and political view, to date even a single dispatch from Madrid. The effect it would have upon the Spaniards is incalculable; it might occasion a general rising against the French throughout the peninsula. By the capture of Madrid, Soult's army would be obliged to effect its retreat to the Ebro, by the province of Valencia, without having the power of chu sing any other line of march; whereas, if Lord W. advances into Andalusia, and compels Soult to retreat upon Madrid, the French generals will then be at liberty to send whatever troops to Cataloma they inay think proper, taking up, with the remainder, the same position that was held by them in 1808, after the defeat of Dupont, viz. in the strong country extending from Bilboa |