of the then registered electors of the same constituency, divided by the quota for the time being declared according to section III., and one member for every fractional part of such dividend; and in all cases where the number of registered electors is less than such quota, such constituency shall be summoned to return one member, and no more,except in cases falling within the power of section XXXII. aforesaid.

The operation of this law will be explained by supposing the constituency of North Cheshire, from an extended franchise, to be increased to 11,000, and the quota, under clause III.,* to be 2037.† The number of electors, divided by the quota, gives a quotient of five, and a fractional number, which will make it the duty of the sheriff or returning officer to return five, and one for the fractional number, making together six members for North Cheshire. The arrangement of the number of members to be returned for every constituency, under a system regulated by its magnitude, thus becomes no more than a question of nomenclature.

The whole contest in which the nation appears to be so fiercely engaged, with reference to the relative importance and right of counties, cities, and towns, and other constituencies, to return severally so many members, and to the propriety of disfranchising boroughs, the only fault of whose inhabitants is, that nature has not placed them on a seaboard, or on some great stream of communication, or enriched them with mineral treasures, is worthy of the times when laws were made to enable one city or one class to exercise privileges hostile

to another, and when the statute of Kilkenny was in force. How incomparably greater would the object be of obtaining for every British subject one universal test of capacity; whether it be high or low,—a franchise of the same political value, wherever be the place of its exercise, and electoral laws, under which he might carry with him, wherever he might happen to dwell, his electoral privileges, opinions, and attachments, and the means of thereby manifesting his regard or devotion to the same political principles or chiefs. The electors of the kingdom, whether in town or country, would be left to vie with one another in choosing the greatest men. It is probable they would often elect, as their titular representatives, the same men, and thus give a practical denial to those, who, for their own purposes, desire to draw distinctions of class, and set one against another, by endeavouring to persuade them that they are naturally foes, instead of being, as they are by nature, friends and countrymen, having one common interest in the national welfare.

CHAPTER XI

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND THE IMPERIAL
GOVERNMENT.

Relation of constitution to government-Calhoun-Pascal-Guizot -Burke-Inevitable abuse of a sole depository of powerDespotism of a multitude-Struggle for majority and dominionUnity of right and power-Concurrent consent-British constitution-Compromise and concession-Appeal to conscience and necessity-Constitutional principle in relation to physical power —Concurrent interests and opinions in representative constitution-Party government-Means-Result-Public opinionIts imperfect, false, or delusive declaration-Illustration in April, 1848-The House of Commons its only proper exponent -Ancient democratic laws to ascertain it-Individual independence of electors a self-acting register of public opinion-The press-Stability of the position of individual statesmen, and of the general government-Operation of an enlarged range of causes-Elections made frequently with convenience and safety.

THE American statesman, whose "Disquisition on Government" has been referred to, observes that all history and experience testify that the same predominance of the individual over the social feelings which makes government indispensable to preserve society, produces also on those who administer the government a strong tendency to abuse its powers. "Liberty," he "is little more than a name under all governsays, ments of the absolute form, including that of the numerical majority, and can have only a secure and durable existence under those of the concurrent or

constitutional form." It is only a constitution, by whatever name it may be called, which can prevent an abuse of power. "Having its origin in the same principle of our nature, constitution stands to government as government stands to society, and as the end for which society is ordained would be defeated without government, so that for which government is ordained would, in a great measure, be defeated without constitution. But they differ in this striking particular. There is no difficulty in forming government. It is not even a matter of choice whether there shall be one or not. Like breathing, it is not permitted to depend on our volition. Necessity will force it on all communities in some one form or another. Very different is the case as to constitution. Instead of a matter of necessity, it is one of the most difficult tasks imposed on man to form a constitution worthy of the name; while, to form a perfect one,-one that would completely counteract the tendency of government to oppression and abuse, and hold it strictly to the great ends for which it is ordained, has thus far exceeded human wisdom, and possibly ever will." "The question involves difficulties, which, from the earliest ages, wise and good men have attempted to overcome. For this purpose many devices have been resorted to, suited to the various stages of intelligence and civilisation, through which our race has passed. The only materials which the early ages

* Calhoun, Disquisition, &c., p. 60. See Niebuhr, Hist. Rome, (Hare and Thirlwall's Trans.), vol. ii. p. 298, Camb. 1832, where there are several illustrations from ancient and modern history; Buckle, Hist. Civilization, vol. i. p. 71.

† Disquisition, &c., p. 8.

afforded for the construction of constitutions, "were applied with consummate wisdom and skill. To their successful application may be fairly traced the subsequent advance of our race in civilisation and intelligence, of which we now enjoy the benefits. For, without a constitution,—something to counteract the strong tendency of government to disorder and abuse, and to give stability to political institutions, there can be little progress or permanent improvement."

The writer who, in our own times more perfectly than any other, has combined the characters of the laborious historian, the practical statesman, and the calm philosopher, divides power into that which exists de facto, and that which is de jure: not the jus of the lawyers, founded on the accidents of history, but that which rests on immutable principles of truth and justice. He cites the words of Pascal, "La multitude qui ne se réduit pas à l'unité est confusion. L'unité qui n'est pas multitude est tyrannie." This, says M. Guizot, "est l'expression la plus belle et la définition la plus précise du gouvernement représentatif. La multitude, c'est la société : l'unité, c'est la vérité-c'est l'ensemble des lois de justice et de raison qui doivent gouverner la société. Si la société reste à l'état de multitude, si les volontés isolées ne se réunissent pas sous l'empire de règles communes, si elles ne reconnaissent pas également la justice et la raison, si elles ne se réduisent pas elles-mêmes à l'unité, il n'y a pas société, il y a confusion. L'unité qui n'est pas sortie du sein de la multitude, qui lui a été violemment imposée par un ou plusieurs, n'importe le nombre, en vertu d'un droit à eux personnel, est

* Id. p. 11.

S