for the purpose of willfully or maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade, business, or profession by any means whatever." An information under this statute charged certain persons. with unlawfully combining together with the intent of willfully and maliciously injuring the Journal Company, a corporation, and certain persons named, stockholders and officers of the company, in their trade and business. The agreement of the combination related to rates of advertising in the Milwaukee Journal and rival newspapers, and a feature of competition was based upon circulation. The effect of the agreement was to injure the Journal. The state court adjudged the combination unlawful. The Supreme Court of the United States sustained the judgment; holding that the liberty to combine to inflict injury upon another, even upon such intangibles as business or reputation, was not among the rights which the fourteenth amendment was intended to preserve, and that the defense that motives are not actionable is true in determining what a man is bound to foresee, but not necessarily true in determining the extent to which he can justify harm which he has foreseen. In other words, if the acts were intended and the injury foreseen, it is no defense to say that motives are not actionable. "An act," says the court, "which in itself is merely a voluntary muscular contraction, derives all its character from the consequences which will follow it under the circumstances in which it was done. When the acts consist of making a combination calculated to cause temporal damage, the power to punish such acts, when done maliciously, cannot be denied because they are to be followed and worked out by conduct which might have been lawful if not preceded by the acts. No conduct has such an absolute privilege as to justify all possible schemes of which it be a part. The most innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions. may be made a step in a criminal plot, and, if it is a step in a plot, neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the punishment of the plot by law." This opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, while it was directed to the construction of a statute, appears to go to the heart of the whole question, and disposes of the argument that there can be no liability of a combination for acts unless the acts themselves are criminal.

It follows that the complainants are entitled to a temporary injunction against all the defendants except the Building Trades Council of San Francisco, which, it appears, is not concerned in any combination, scheme, or conspiracy with the other defendants to injure the complainants in their business.

Writ of Injunction.

United States of America, Northern District of California-ss.:

The President of the United States of America, to California State Federation of Labor, San Francisco Labor Council, Harry Knox, T. F. Gallagher, Nicholas Blum, Daniel D. Sullivan, J. R. Hillis, C. W. Holmquist, J. C. Templeton, John Guinne, Frank J. Bonnington, G. K. Smith, Will J. French, A. C. Rose, Russel I. Wisler, P. H. Coyle, J. A. Johnson, Richard Cornelius, Sarah Hogan, Charles T. Shuppert, J. L. Franklin, Theodore Johnson, G. M. Lipman, Wm. P. McCabe, George Metzger, A. Burton, J. E. Hooper, A. S. Howe, Joseph

Moran, Annie Mullen, O. E. Pierce, T. E. Zant, J. R. Roland, their, and each of their, attorneys, agents, employés, and all persons acting in aid of, or in conjunction with them, or any of them, greeting:

Whereas, Dietrich E. Loewe and Martin Fuchs, complainants in the aboveentitled cause, and citizens of the state of Connecticut, have filed on the chancery side of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California a bill against the above-named defendants and others, and have obtained an allowance for an injunction as prayed for in said bill:

Now, therefore, we, having regard to the matters in said bill contained, do hereby command and strictly enjoin you, the said California State Federation of Labor, San Francisco Labor Council, Harry Knox, T. F. Gallagher, Nicholas Blum, Daniel D. Sullivan, J. R. Hillis, C. W. Holmquist, J. C. Templeton, John Guinne, Frank J. Bonnington, G. K. Smith, Will J. French, A. C. Rose, Russel I. Wisler, P. H. Coyle, J. A. Johnson, Richard Cornelius, Sarah Hogan, Charles T. Shuppert, J. L. Franklin, Theodore Johnson, G. M. Lipman, Wm. P. McCabe, George Metzger, A. Burton, J. E. Hooper, A. S. Howe, Joseph Moran, Annie Mullen, O. E. Pierce, T. E. Zant, J. R. Roland, your, and each of your, attorneys, agents, employés, and all persons acting in aid of or in conjunction with you, or any of you, from in any manner agreeing or combining or conspiring together to injure or destroy the trade or business of complainants herein, or to interfere with the manufacture, transportation, or sale by complainants, or by any other person, firm, or corporation, of hats manufactured by complainants; from boycotting or agreeing or attempting to boycott and from declaring or continuing a boycott against complainants or complainants' trade or business or the product of complainants' said factory, or against any person, firm, or corporation, for the purpose of preventing or injuring, and from thereby preventing or injuring, the regular operation and conduct of complainants' trade or business or the transportation or sale of or trade in hats manufactured or sold by said complainants, and from abetting, aiding, or assisting in such boycott; from publishing or circulating, in combination, or in pursuance of any conspiracy or agreement to injure or destroy the trade or business of complainants, in writing or orally, any statements or representations advertising or calling the attention of complainants' customers or merchants or tradesmen or the public to any boycott or strike against complainants, or against the product of complainants' said factory, or that, or to the effect that, complainants, complainants' factory. or complainants' goods, or the hats or products made or sold by complainants, or sold by complainants' customers, are or were "unfair," or should not be purchased or dealt in or handled by the public or merchants or tradesmen; from publishing or circulating, in combination, or in pursuance of any conspiracy or agreement to injure or destroy the trade or business of complainants, or for the purpose of injuring or destroying the trade or business of complainants, in writing or orally, statements or representations to customers of complainants, or to dealers in hats, or tradesmen or the public, that complainants' factory, complainants' business, or complainants' hats, or the product of complainants' factory, or either or any of them, are unfair or have been boycotted or are boycotted, or should not be dealt in or with or sold, and from coercing or inducing or attempting to coerce or induce any such dealer, person, firm, or corporation, or the public, not to wear, buy, trade in, deal in, or have in possession, hats or any hat made by complainants, or the product of complainants' factory, for the purposes last aforesaid, and, for like purposes, from threatening any person, firm, or corporation with injury or loss to the business or trade of such person, firm, or corporation in case such person, firm, or corporation should purchase or deal in hats manufactured by complainants, or the product of complainants' said factory; from giving any orders or directions to committees, associations, or others for the performance of any acts or threats hereinbefore enjoined-which commands and injunctions you are respectively required to observe and obey until our said Circuit Court shall make further order in the premises.

Hereof fail not, under penalty of the law thence ensuing.

Witness the Honorable Melville W. Fuller, Chief Justice of the United States, this 1st day of July, 1905, and in the 129th year of the Independence of the United States of America.

BANKRUPTCY-DISCHARGE-APPLICATION-TIME.

Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427], provides that any person, after the expiration of 1-month and within the next 12 months subsequent to being adjudged a bankrupt, may file an application for a discharge, and, if it shall be made to appear to the judge that the bankrupt was unavoidably prevented from filing it within such time, it may be filed within, but not after, the expiration of the next 6 months. Held, that a court of bankruptcy had no jurisdiction to act on a petition for a discharge not filed until after 18 months from the date of the adjudication.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 6, Cent. Dig. Bankruptcy, § 694.]

Petition for Discharge.

Alfred Chartz, for petitioner.

Summerfield & Roberts, for opposing creditors.

HAWLEY, District Judge (orally). It appears from the record herein that the petition of creditors was filed September 22, 1902, and petitioner Wagner was adjudicated a bankrupt on October 21, 1902, and on the same day the case was referred to a referee. The creditors on April 21, 1904, objected to the allowance of certain claims in favor of P. A. Wagner and the estate of William Sadler, and petitioned for a re-examination of said claims. The referee filed an opinion allowing said claims, and certified his rulings thereon to the district judge, who sustained the rulings of the referee. On such hearing it was shown that petitioner Wagner had, after he was adjudged a bankrupt, collected certain moneys due him, and had not accounted for the same to the estate. The court informed him that he would not be entitled to a discharge unless said moneys were turned over by him to the estate for the benefit of the creditors. It appears that after said date he paid said moneys. On April 24, 1905, he regularly petitioned this court for his discharge, and gave notice to creditors, in pursuance of the provisions of the bankruptcy act. At the time set for the hearing thereof, certain creditors of the bankrupt, being persons interested in the estate of petitioner, appeared and opposed his discharge, and filed the following specification, viz.:

"That said E. A. Wagner, bankrupt, filed his application for a discharge from his debts more than eighteen months subsequent to the adjudication of bankruptcy, and not within the time provided by section 14 of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427])."

This presents the single question, was the petition for discharge filed in time to give the court jurisdiction to consider it? It will be observed that petitioner was adjudged a bankrupt on October 21, 1902. His petition for discharge was not filed until April 24, 1905-a period of more than two years and six months. No application

was ever made for the court to extend the time for petitioner to make an application for his discharge.

Section 14 of the bankruptcy act provides:

"(a) Any person may, after the expiration of one month and within the next twelve months subsequent to being adjudged a bankrupt, file an applicatíon for a discharge in the court of bankruptcy in which the proceedings are pending; if it shall be made to appear to the judge that the bankrupt was unavoidably prevented from filing it within such time, it may be filed within but not after the expiration of the next six months."

This language is clear, positive, and direct.

It is impossible to distinguish this case in its legal aspects from In re Fahy (D. C.) 116 Fed. 239; and, as my views coincide with those expressed by Judge Shiras, I content myself with a quotation from his opinion as to the true meaning of section 14 of the bankruptcy act:

"Section 14 of the act provides that within 12 months subsequent to the adjudication the petition for discharge may be filed, and, if unavoidably prevented from filing the same within that period, the judge may permit it to be filed within, but not after the expiration of, the next six months. In express terms the discretion of the judge is limited to the six months following the expiration of the year beginning with the date of the adjudication, and, as I construe the statute, this is a limitation on the jurisdiction of the judge over the matter of discharge. The power and right to grant a discharge effectual to bar the enforcement of debts is conferred by the statute, and is governed by the limitations found in the statute; and therefore, unless it is petitioned for within the time limit fixed by section 14 of the act, the court of bankruptcy is without the power and jurisdiction to grant a discharge."

See, also, In re Wolff (D. C.) 100 Fed. 430; Kuntz v. Young, 131 Fed. 719, 65 C. C. A. 477; In re Knauer (D. C.) 133 Fed. 805; In re Anderson (D. C.) 134 Fed. 319; In re Lewin (D. C.) 135 Fed, 252.

Petitioner has offered no excuse for the delay in making his application for discharge. He was not compelled to wait until the bankruptcy proceedings were completed before making his application. Petitioner has failed to show that he was unavoidably prevented from filing his application within the time mentioned in section 14. If he had surrendered all of his property, he could have petitioned for his discharge within the time provided by the act, and his creditors could not have prevented his discharge, unless they could prove that he had been guilty of some of the acts which deprived him of the right to his discharge, and the burden of proof in that regard would have been upon the opposing creditors to show that he was not entitled to his discharge. In re Fitchard (D. C.) 103 Fed. 742, 744; In re Chamberlain (D. C.) 125 Fed. 629; Loveland on Bankruptcy (2d Ed.) 753; Collier on Bankruptcy (5th Ed.) 174. But the present objection is made to the jurisdiction of this court, and is well taken. This court is powerless to extend any clemency. through the inadvertence or neglect of petitioner in not applying for his discharge within the proper time and in the proper way.

The petition for discharge is denied on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction to consider it, and it is ordered that such. action be without prejudice to the commencement of new proceedings in bankruptcy upon the part of the petitioner if he so desires.

UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN EXP. CO.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. May 19, 1905.)

No. 3,971.

CUSTOMS DUTIES-CLASSIFICATION-STATUARY-CARVED "CISTERN."

Held, that a "cistern" in several pieces, with figures sculptured thereon in almost full relief, is "statuary," within the meaning of that term as used in Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule N, par. 454, 30 Stat. 194 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1678].

On Application for Review of a Decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers.

The decision under review reversed the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York. The case involves the construction of Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule N, par. 454, 30 Stat. 194 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1678], the pertinent part of which reads as follows:

The term "statuary” as used in this act shall be understood to include only such statuary as is cut, carved, or otherwise wrought by hand from a solid block or mass of marble, stone, or alabaster, or from metal.

The opinion rendered by the Board of General Appraisers reads as follows:

Waite, General Appraiser. The item in controversy in this case is described in the invoice as "round cistern with hauts relief, dancing cupids in Carrara marble." It consists of a circular object in several pieces, the prominent sculptural work being children's figures, which are almost in full relief. There seems no doubt that the article is of a sufficiently high grade of work to be classified under paragraph 454 of the tariff act of 1897, under which the importers claim, if it is "statuary" within the meaning of that provision. In our judgment, it should be so classified. The protest claiming a rate of 15 per cent. ad valorem under Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule N, par. 454, 30 Stat. 194 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1678], and the Italian reciprocity agreement (31 Stat. 1979; T. D. 22,373), is accordingly sustained, and the collector's decision assessing the article for duty at 50 per cent. ad valorem, as a manufacture of marble, under section 1, Schedule B, par. 115, of the act (30 Stat. 159 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1636]), is reversed.

Edward Hartley, for importers.

Henry A. Wise, Asst. U. S. Atty.

TOWNSEND, Circuit Judge. Decision of the Board of General Appraisers affirmed on the authority of U. S. v. Perry (C. C.) 131 Fed. 841.

THE ELIHU THOMPSON.

'District Court, W. D. Washington, W. D. June 27, 1905.)

No. 452.

1. SEAMEN-WAGES-PAYMENT-TIME-LIBEL-STATUTES.

Under Rev. St. § 4529 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3077], providing that a seaman engaged in the coasting trade shall be entitled to immediate payment of his wages on discharge, where seamen were discharged, and payment of wages refused, they were entitled to libel the vessel at once therefor, without instituting proceedings under sections 4546, 4547 [U. S.