his wife, conveyed all that his pro-
perty to trustees (who had married
his two daughters) for the benefit of
his wife and daughters, and subject
to his wife's future appointment:
in consideration whereof, the wife
discharged him of above 30007. he.
fore raised on the estate, principally
for his use, and enabled the trustees
to raise out of her estate 12,000 l.
more for the benefit of her husband's
creditors, but subject to the appoint-
ment of him, his executors, &c. ; and
also covenanted to levy a fine, which
was levied a year afterwards; and
the husband covenanted to deliver
an inventory of the goods to the
trustees within 6 months; which was
not done and after the conveyance,
the husband continued to use the
furniture, &c. in the house as before;
and was soon afterwards sued by se-
veral of the creditors, whose execu
tions against such goods were satis-
fied by him, without setting up the
trust deed, or resorting to the trust
fund; but money was raised on it
afterwards for other creditors; and
above two years after the deed, the
husband being sued by the plain-
tiff, a creditor before that time, the
trust deed was set up in bar of
the levy upon the goods in the house,
and the sheriff returned nulla bona:
and upon an action brought for a
false return, held, That in consider-
ation of the question, Whether this
were a bona fide transaction or a
contrivance to defeat creditors, and
therefore void at common law, or
by the stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5-it is ma-
terial to submit to the jury "the re-
lative value of the property with-
drawn from the reach of the cre-
ditors, in proportion to the amount
of their demands at the time, and
the value and tangibility of that sub-
stituted in its place," in aid of the
conclusion that the deed was cove-
nous against them; and therefore
a verdict for the plaintiff, founded
principally on these concomitant
circumstances: 1. The previous em-
barrassment of the husband; 2d, -
The want of notoriety of the con-

veyance at the time; 3d, The want
of an inventory; 4th, The continu-
ance of the husband's possession,
though consistent with the deed,
yet without notice of the change of
property; and, 5th, The appropri-
ation, by the husband, of a part of
the money raised by the trustees to
his own use, without objection;
was set aside; and a new trial grant-
ed, to bring the question more fully
before the Court and jury as to the
good faith of the transaction, and
the value of the consideration, and
its availability to the creditors.
Dewey v. Bayntun, Burt. Hil. 45

G. 3.

FREEHOLD.

-

257

Things annexed to by Licence,
See Bridge, No. 1; Trespass, No. 1.

FREIGHT,

See Lien, No. 4.

GREENLAND FISHERY,
See Impressing.

HEARSAY,

See Evidence, No. 2.

HUSBAND AND WIFE,

See Evidence, No. 2;
Fraudulent Conveyance, &c.
1,Where husband and wife entered into
a deed with trustees, whereby the
husband covenanted with the trus
tees (to whom certain annuities were
transferred, one payable to his wife
absolutely, and another for so long
a time as she should live with her
husband) That they should apply
the first, and an equal annuity in
lieu of the second, to be paid by the
L14
hus

husband, to the separate use of the
wife, in case she should live apart
from her husband with the appro-
bation of the trustees; and the hus-
band also covenanted, in case of fu-
ture differences, to permit the wife
to live separate from him, if she
should on that account, find it ne-
cessary; and the deed contained a
clause, that in case of separation
with the approbation of the trustees,
certain of the children should live
with and be educated by the wife
for a certain period; and that she
might visit the others at his house,
especially when ill, so as to require
the attention of a mother; and it
also contained other clauses, provid.
ing certain things in case of such se-
paration as aforesaid: held, That
such a deed did not preclude the
husband from maintaining an action
against the defendant for an act of
adultery, proved to be committed
while the wife was in fact living
apart from her husband; for if there
were no approbation of the trustees
to the separation, which must be
taken to be the case, as none was
proved, then this was not such a se-
paration as the husband consented
by the deed, according to the true
construction of it: and if the sepa-
ration were with the approbation of
the trustees, then the husband, not
having given up all claim to the
comfort, society, and assistance of
his wife (for the interests of the
children were provided for as well
as the separation of the parents dur-
ing such approbation) the case is
rot brought within the principle of
the decision in Weedon, v. Timbrell;
allowing that to be law to the ex-
tent of the case there decided.
Chambers v. Caulfield, Hil. 45 G. 3.

241
2. The Court are not restrained from
granting a new trial in case of crim.
con. for excessive damages, if they
be satisfied that the jury acted un-
der the influence of undue motives,
or of gross error, or misconception
of the subject.

ib.

The stat. 6 Geo. 2. c. 31, only autho
rizes parish-officers to take security
from the putative father of a bastard
child to indemnify the parish; and
therefore where they had taken a
promissory note absolute for a sum
certain, to which there was a plea of
tender of a lesser sum, as the amount
of the charge actually sustained by
the parish; which tender was found
for the defendant: held, That the
plaintiffs could not recover further
upon the note. Cole and others v.
Gower and Piggott, fiil. 45 G. 3.

INDICTMENT AND
INFORMATION,

110

See Conviction, Nuisance.
1. Threatening by letter or otherwise
to put in motion a prosecution by a
public officer to recover penalties
for selling Fryar's Balsam' without
a stamp (which, by stat. 42 Geo. 3,
c. 36, is prohibited to be vended
without a stamped label) for the pur-
pose of obtaining money to stay the
prosecution, is not such a threat as a
firm and prudent man may not be
expected to resist, and therefore is
not in itself an indictable offence ut
common, although it be alleged
that the money was obtained, no
reference being made to any statute
which prohibits such attempt. Res
v. Southerton, Hil. 45 G. 3.
126
2. But it seems that such an offence

is indictable upon the stat. 18 Eliz.
c. 5, s. 4, for regulating common
informers; which prohibits the tak-
ing of money, without consent of
Court, under colour of process, or
without process, from any person,
upon pretence of any offence against
a penal law. Rex v. Southerton,
Hil. 45 G. 3.
3. But no indictment, for any attempt
to commit such a statutable misde-
meanor can be sustained as a misde-
meanor at common law, without at
least bringing the offence intended
within, and laying it to be against

126

the statute.
ib.
4. Though if the party so threatened
had been alleged to be guilty of the
offence imputed within the statute
imposing the duty, and creating the
penalty, such an attempt to com-
pound and stifle a public prosecu-
tion, for the sake of private lucre,
in fraud of the revenue, and against
the policy of the statute which gives
the penalty as auxiliary to the reve-
nue, and in furtherance of public
justice; for example's sake, might
also, upon general principks, have
been deemed a sufficient ground to
sustain the indictment at cominon
law.

ib.

5. Public officers, indicted for ena-
bling accountants with the pay-of-
fice to pass false accounts in fraud
of the revenue. Rex v. Bembridge
and Powell, Westminster sittings af-
ter Trin. Term 1803, cited in Rex
v. Southerton, Hil. 45 G. 3. 136
6. The Court refused to grant a rule
nisi for a new trial, after a verdict
for the defendant upon an incict-
ment for non-repair of a church-
yard fence; which was moved on
the ground of the verdict being
against evidence. Rex v. Reynell,
Clerk, E. 45 G. 3.

315

7. The stat. 37 G. 3, c. 123, makes it
felony for any person, in any man-
ner or form whatsoever, to admi-
nister, &c. any oath purporting or
intended to bind the party to en-
gage in any seditious purpose, or to
disturb the public peace, or to be
of any society, &c. formed for any
such purpose, &c. or not to inform

8.

or give evidence against any asso-
ciate, &c.; and by s. 4, it shall not
be necessary, in an indictment for
any such offence, to set forth the
words of the oath; but it shall be
sufficient to set forth the purport of
it, or some material part thereof:
held, That an indictment, charging
that the defendants administered to
J. H. an oath, "intended to bind
him not to inform or give evidence
against any member of a certain so-
ciety, formed to disturb the public
peace, for any act or expression of
his or theirs," &c. is good, without
alleging the tenor or purport of the
oath to be set forth, and without
stewing in what monner the public
peace was meant to be disturbed by
such society. Rex v. Moors and
others, E. 45 G. 3.
419

Where the witness, swearing to the
words spoken by way of oath by
the prisoner, when he administered
the same, said, That he held a paper
in his hand at the same time when
he administered the oath, from
which it was supposed that he read
the words; yet held, That parol
evidence of what he in fact said was
suficient, without giving him notice
to produce such paper.
ib. 419
9. Where the oath on the face of it
did not purport to be for a seditious
purpose, yet held that evidence
might be given to shew that the
brotherhood therein referred to was
a seditious society.

ib.
10. An endeavour to provoke another
to commit the misdemeanor of send-
ing a challenge to fight, is itself a
misdemeanor indictable; particularly
where such provocation was given
by a writing, containing libellous
matter, and alleged in the prefatory
part of the indictment to have been
done with intent to do the party
bodily harm, and to break the King's
peace; the sending such writing be-
ing an act done towards procuring
the commission of the misdemeanor
meant to be accomplished.
Philips, E. 45 G. 3.
11. Where an evil intent accompany-
ing an act is necessary to constitute
such act a crime, the intent must be

Rex v.

464

alleged

See Fire Insurance.

1. A policy of insurance on a ship on
a certain commercial voyage, with or
without letters of marque, giving
leave to the assured to chace, capture,
and man prizes, however it
may war-
rant him in weighing anchor, while
waiting at a place in the course of
the commercial voyage insured, for
the purpose of chasing an enemy
who had before anchored at the same
place in sight of him, and was then.
endeavouring to escape, will not
warrant him, after the capture, and
in the course of the further prose-
cution of the voyage, in shortening

sail and laying to, in order to let the
prize keep up with him, for the pur-
pose of protecting her as a convoy
into port in order to have her con-
demned, though such port were
within the voyage insured. Law-
rence v. Sydebotham, Hil. 45 G. 3.

45

2. Whether an insurance of a ship,
with or without letter of marque,
upon a certain voyage and commer.
cial adventure from A. to B. ena-
bles her to chace, for the purpose of
hostile attack, and capture any ves-
sel she may happen to descry in the
course of the voyage insured, in
whatever direction, or to any limit,
and whether known at the com-
mencement of such chacing to be an
enemy or not; or whether those
words are to be confined to a leave
to employ force only for the purpose
of defence (including a liberty of at-
tack and chace only, as far as they
may be fairly supposed to promote
ultimate security) must, in the ab-
sence of any legal decision as to
their construction, depend upon the
received practice and known sense
of commercial men, if any such re-
ceived practice there be in the use
of them; and therefore the cause
was referred to another trial to as-
certain the commercial usage and
practice in that respect: but at any
rate, such words do not appear to
authorize direct cruising out of the
course of the voyage in search of
prize. Parr v. Anderson, Ilil. 45
G. 3.

202

3. Upon an insurance on profits valued
at 400, where the plaintiff de-
clared as for a total loss, and it ap-
peared that after a shipwreck, by
which many of the slaves, on the
profits on whom the insurance was
made, were lost, but the remainder
reached the market, and were sold;
and it did not appear what profit
was made of them; though it was
found that the produce of those
who were sold did not give a profit
upon the whole adventure: held,
that the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover. Note. The whole

-

adventure was a voyage from Liver-
pool to Africa, and from thence to
the West Indies, but the profits were
only insured from St. Vincent's
(after the ship's arrival there) to
her last port of discharge in the
West Indies. Hodgson v. Glover,
E. 45 G.

316

4. Where a policy described the in-
surance to be on goods on board
the ship called The American Ship
President;" this was taken to be all
name of the ship, and not a wur-
runty of her being an American ship
called The President. And where
the policy after such name had the
words, 46

or by whatever other name
the same ship should be called," it
was holden to be no variance that
the real name of the ship was The
President, the identity of the ship
meant to be insured with that
name being proved. Le Mesurier
v. Vaughan, E. 45 G. 3.
Hall v. Molineaux, at Guildhall, 1774.
cor. Lee, C. J. S. P. cited ib, 385

382

JOINDER IN ACTION..
1. A count stating that the plaintiff
had delivered a note to the defend-
ant, to get it discounted or account
with the plaintiff for the money
raised on it; and that the defendant
received the note for that purpose,
but intending to defraud the plain-
tiff, had not, though requested, ac-
counted with him, &c. is laid in tort
(whether formally or not in its
frame) and not in assumpsit: and no
objection can be taken upon a gene-
ral demurrer to the whole declara-
tion, because such count was joined
with a count in trover. Samuel v.
Judin, in Error, E. 45 G. 3. 333
2. A count upon a promise to the
plaintiff, as administratrix, for goods
sold and delivered by her after the
death of the intestate, may be joined
with a count upon an account stated
with her as administratrix; for the
damages and costs when recovered
would be assess. Cowell and Wife,
Administratrix v. Watts, E, 45 G. 3.

405

IRELAND,

See Jurisdiction.

JURISDICTION,

1. Every plea to the jurisdiction of the
court ought to give some other
court by which the matter may be
tried, Therefore it is not sufficient
for a native of Ireland, charged with
the publication of a libel in Middle-
sex, to plead to the jurisdiction of
B. R. that Ireland before the union
was governed by its own laws, and
not by the laws of Great Britain;
and that since the union it is yet go-
verned by its own laws, &c.; and
that there always have been and
now are courts and jurisdictions in
Ireland, distinct from those in G. B.
and competent to the trial of all
offences committed by the natives
resident there; and that the defend-
ant is a native of ard was resident in
Ireland at the time of the offence al-
leged; and that the subject-matter
of the supposed libel related to
things in Ireland; for the objection,
if any, going to the total want of
jurisdiction in any of the courts of
this part of the kingdom to try the
defendant for such an offence, it
should either be taken advantage of
by a plea in bar, or by evidence un
der the general issue. Rex v. the
Hon. R. Johnson, T. 45 G. 3. 583
2. A Government store-keeper, resi-
dent in Antigua, transmitting false
vouchers to his agent in London,
who unknowing of the fraud deliver
ed them at the custom-house in Lon
don, iş indictable in London, as if
for his own act there. Réz v. Mun-
ton, Sittings after Mich. term, 1793.