486

J. for life, and after her death, OR,
if she should survive his sister H. so
that, &c. then" &c. and conse-
quently G. took a vested remainder
in the estate at B. to which he be-
came entitled in possession after the
death of the testator's sisters and L.
J. his executrix, although his sister
J. did not survive his sister H.
Doe d. George Leach v. Micklem, E.
45 G. 3.
6, A. being possessed of lands at L.
which had been settled on his mar-
riage on himself for life; remainder
to his wife for life, for her jointure,
remainder to the heirs of their bo-
dies; with reversion in fee to him-
self; and having other lands at P..
and Q. settled to the same uses (ex-
cept a coppice, part of Q. of which
coppice, as well as of some other
lands, he was seised in fee) after
the death of his wife, and having
only two daughters living, devised
to his daughter J. in tail his unset-
tled estates by name, and all other
his freehold, copyhold, and leasehold
lands, which he was possessed of or
entitled to, and which were not set-
tled in jointure on his late wife (ex-
cept the coppice, which he directed
hould always be held with his es-
tate at P.) she, his said daughter,
and the heirs of her body, paying
out of all the aforesaid lands a cer-
tain annuity unto his other daugh-
ter A. M. for life; and in case his
said daughter J. should die and leave
no issue, then to his other daughter
A. M. for life, remainder to her
children, charged, &c. remainder to
his nephew in fee; held, That
the reversion of the settled lands
did not pass by the will, but were
excepted out of the general clause
by force of the restrictive words,
66 and which are not settled in join-
ture," &c.; not only by the na-
tural import of those words, but be-
cause of the incongruity of imput-
ing to the devisor an intention of
devising estates tail and for life to
his daughters in lands, which were
before settled on them in tail gene-
ral; though it did not appear that

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8.

Under a devise of all the devisor's
lands to his niece S. E. for life, and
after that estate determined the same
to trustees to preserve contingent
remainders; and after her decease,
then to remain to her first and other
sons successively in tail, remainder
to her daughters as tenants in com-
mon in tail; and for default of such
issue, then to the issue of the devi-
sor's four sisters in such manner as
he had limited the same to his
niece's issue; and for default of such
issue or his sisters, to his own right
heirs: held, That, as by the limita-
tion of all the devisor's lands, which
description runs thro' the subsequent
remainders, it was his apparent intent
that his estate should go over alto.
gether, in default of issue of his
niece, to the issue of his four sis-
ters; and again, That no part
should go over to his right heirs
while there remained any issue of
his sisters; therefore, the devise is
in effect to his niece S. E. for life;
remainder to her first and other
sons successively in tail; remainder
to her daughters as tenants in com-
mon in tail, with cross remainders
(by implication) between those
daughters; remainder to the issue
of the four sisters of the devisor in
tail; and one of the four sisters
having issue a son and two daugh-

ters,

ters, living at the death of the tes-
tator; at all events, they took vested
estates in remainder; and whether
that son took conjointly with his
two sisters in tail, or whether (as
the issue of the devisor's four sisters
were to take in such manner as was
limited to the issue of the niece) the
son would have taken first in tail,
with remainder to his two sisters in
tail, made no difference in the event,
as the son died without issue; and
the three other sisters of the devi-
sor and his niece S. E. having all
died without issue after the death
of the devisor: held, That the two
surviving daughters of the 4th sister
were entitled to all the estate
against the devisee of the niece, who
was the devisor's heir at law. Roe,
on the joint and several demises of
Cecilia Wren, and of John Bacon,
Clerk, and Isabella his Wife, v.
Clayton, T. 45 G. 3.
628

DISTRESS.

The stat. 42 G. 3, c. 90, s. 61, enables
a magistrate to make an order for
payment of servants' wages in cer-
tain cases; and directs, that in case
of refusal or non-payment or any
sum so ordered for 21 days after
such determination, he may issue
his warrant of distress; but it gives
an appeal to the sessions: held, That
21 days having elapsed between the
making of such order before the
appeal, and also 21 days after such
appeal dismissed before the war-
rant of distress issued, the magis-
trate was warranted in issuing such
order of distress, without proof of
any demand subsequent to the ap-
peal. Wootton v. Harvey, Clerk,
II. 45 G. 3.

DYERS,

See Lien, No. 2.

75

1.

2.

EJECTMENT,

See Entry; Notice to quit.
Where the ancestor died seised,
leaving a son and daughter, infants;
and on the death of the ancestor, a
stranger entered, and the son soon
after went to sea, and was supposed
to have died abroad, within age:
held, That the daughter was not en-
titled to 20 years to make her entry
after the death of her brother; but
only to 10 years, more than 20
years having in the whole elapsed
since the death of the person last
seised. Doe d. George and Frances
his Wife v. Jesson, H. 45 G. 3. 80
The lessor of the plaintiff in eject-
ment, suing in forma pauperis, will
be dispaupered in case of vexatious
delay. Doe, on the demise of Lep
pingwell, suing in Forma Pauperis,
v. Trussell, E. 45 G. 3.

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ENTRY.

505

1. Where the ancestor died seised,
leaving a son and daughter, infants;
and on the death of the ancestor, a
stranger entered, and the son soon
after went to sea, and was supposed
to have died abroad, within age:,
held, That the daughter was not en-
titled to 20 years to make her entry
after the death of her brother; but
only to 10 years, more than 20
years having in the whole elapsed
since the death of the person last
seised.. Doe d. George and Frances
his Wife v. Jesson, H. 45 G. 3. 80
2. A condition against alienation, ex.
cept to sisters or their children, an-
nexed to a devise to two and their
heirs, is good; and for a breach of
it by one of them, in levying a fine
of her moiety to the use of her hus-
band in fee, the heir of the devisor
(the remainder, on non-perform-
ance of the condition, not passing
by a general residuary clause) may
enter on such moiety. Doe d. Gill
and Wife v. Pearson, H. 45 G. 3.

See Jurisdiction, No. 1; Market Toll.
1. The presumption of death arises,
in the absence of all other evidence,
at the end of seven years from the
time when a person was last known
to be living. Doe v. Jesson, Hil.
45 G. 3.
85
2. In an action by the husband, upon
a policy of insurance on the life of
his wife, declarations by the wife,
made by her when lying in bed, ap-
parently ill, stating that the bad state
of her health at the period of her go-
ing to M. (whither she went a few
days before, in order to be examined
by a surgeon, and to get a certificate
from him of good health, prepara-
tory to making the insurance) down
to that time; and her apprehensions
that she could not live ten days lon-
ger, by which time the policy was
to be returned, are admissible in
evidence to shew her own opinion,
who best knew the fact of the ill
state of her health at the time of ef-
fecting the policy, which was on a
day intervening between the time of
her going to M. and the day on
which such declarations were made;
and particularly after the plaintiff
had called the surgeon as a witness,

to prove that she was in a good state
of health when examined by him at
M.; his judgment being formed in
part from the satisfactory answers
given by her to his enquiries, and
this being but a sort of cross-exami-
nation as it were of her. Areson v.
188
Lord Kinnaird, H. 45 G. 3.
3. Declarations of a party accompany-
ing an act done, and tending to ex-
plain such act, are evidence for the
latter purpose, as part of the res
geste.

4. The hand-writing of one dead, who
was an attesting witness to the sup-
posed execution of a bond, being
proved in an action on the bond,
Heath, J. permitted the defendant
to give in evidence, That the de-
ceased had, in his dying moments,
acknowledged that he had been
concerned in forging the bond. -
Cited by Lord Ellenborough. ib.195
5. Upon an indictment for perjury, in
falsely taking the freeholder's oath
at an election of a knight of the
shire, in the name of J. W. it ap-
pearing, by competent evidence,
that the freeholder's oath was ad-
ministered to a person who polled
on the second day of the election,
by the name of J. W. who swore to
his freehold and place of abode;
and that there was no such person;
and that the defendant voted on the
second day, and was no freeholder ;
and some time afterwards boasted
that he had done the trick, and was
not paid enough for the job, and was
afraid he should be pulled for his
bad vote; and it not appearing that
more than one false vote was given
on the second day's poll, or that the
defendant voted in his own name,
or in any other than the name of
J. W. : held, That there was suf
ficient evidence for the jury to pre-
sume that the defendant voted in
the name of J.W.; and consequent-
ly to find him guilty of the charge,
as alleged in the indictment. Rez
v.Thomas Price, alias John Wright,
E. 45 G. 3.

323

6. Though by the stat. 5 G. 2, c. 30,
the general plea of bankruptcy and

cer.

insurance was to continue " so long
as the insured should pay the said
premium at the said times, and the
office should agree to accept it:"
and, by the printed proposals, it was
stipulated that the insured should
make all future payments annually
at the office," within 15 days after
the day limited by the policy, upon
forfeiture of the benefit thereof; and
that no insurance was to take place
till the premium were paid:" and by
a subsequent advertisement (agreed
to be taken as part of the policy)
the office engaged, that all persons
insured there by policies for a year
or more, had been, and should be,
considered as insured for 15 days
beyond the time of the expiration
of their policies;" yet held, not-
withstanding this latter clause, the
assured having, before the expira-
tion of the year, had notice from the
office to pay an increased premium
for the year ensuing, otherwise they
would not continue the insurance;
which the assured had refused,
that the office was not liable for a
loss, which happened within 15 days
from the expiration of the year
for
which the insurance was made, tho'
the assured, after the loss, and before
the 15 days expired, tendered the
full premium which had been de.
manded. The effect of the whole
contract, &c. taken together, being
only to give the assured an option
to continue the assurance, or not
during 15 days after the expiration
of the year, by paying the premium
for the year ensuing, notwithstand-
ing any intervening loss, provided
the office had not, before the end of
the year, determined the option, by
giving notice that they would not
renew the contract. Salvin v.
James, T. 45 G. 3.

571

FORMA PAUPERIS.
The lessor of the plaintiff in eject-
ment suing in forma pauperis, will
be dispaupered in case of vexatious
delay. Doe d. Leppingwell, suing in

1.

2,

307

A memorandum, signed by the de-
fendants, whereby they agreed to.
give so much for goods, takes the
case out of the 17th sect. of the sta-
tute of frauds, though not signed by
the seller, nor expressing any con-
sideration for the defendants pro-
mise, otherwise than by inference
from their own obligation. Egerton
v. Matthews, H. 45 G. 3.
One who has contracted with the
owner of a close for the purchase
of a growing crop of grass there, for
the purpose of being mown and
made into hay by the vendee, has
such an exclusive possession of the
close, though for a limited purpose,
that he may maintain trespass qu. cl.
fregit against any person entering
the close and taking the grass, even
with the assent of the owner: but
this, being a contract of sale of an
interest in or concerning land is void-
able by the 4th section of the stat.
of frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, if not re-
duced to writing, and may be dis-
charged by parol notice from the
owner before any part execution of
it. Crosby v. Wadsworth, T. 45
G. 3.

602

3. The first section of the statute of

frauds as construed by the second,
is meant to vacate parol leases, &c.
conveying a greater interest in land
than for three years, and whereon a
rent is reserved.
ib.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
TO DEFEAT CREDITORS.
One, who had a life interest in a set-

tled estate of his wife (both of whom
were aged) of at least 3000 7. a year,
whereof the ultimate reversion on
failure of issue male (of which there
was none) was in her, and having
furniture and pictures, &c. in his
mansion of not less than 8000 l. va-
lue, being pressed by his creditors,
in pursuance of an agreement with

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