On the other hand, many other courts hold that where an infant has received a substantial and beneficial consideration growing out of his executed contract he cannot repudiate the contract and recover his consideration to the other party without returning, or at least offering to return, the consideration he has received. To hold otherwise, they say, would be to use the plea of infancy as a sword, instead of as a shield-in other words, as an instrument of fraud and injustice to others instead of as an instrument of protection to the infant.1 This view, however, is not in accord with the weight of authority.

61. Who may disaffirm an infant's contracts.-Ordinarily, a plea of infancy is personal to the infant. In case of his death or insanity, however, his personal representative may avail himself of it. Thus, where an infant dies before reaching his majority his executor or administrator may disaffirm his contracts, and where he becomes insane his guardian or conservator may do so. Moreover, in an action on an insurance policy on an infant's life the beneficiary may plead the assured's infancy in answer to the insurance company's defense of false warranties in the application. Were the rule otherwise, an infant's contract of insurance would be binding upon him during his minority.

62. Ratification by an infant.—Since to ratify a contract requires the same capacity that is required to make one, an infant cannot ratify his voidable contracts until he reaches his majority.

Gillis v. Goodwin, 180 Mass. 140, 61 N. E. Rep. 813, 91 Am. St. Rep. 265; O'Rourke v. Ins. Co., 23 R. I. 457, 50 Atl. Rep. 834, 57 L. R. A. 496, 91 Am. St. Rep. 643.

1 Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. Rep. 664, 1 Am. St. Rep. 379; Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N. H. 354, 47 Am. Rep. 209; Riley v. Mallory, 33 Conn. 201; Johnson v. Ins. Co., 56 Minn. 365, 57 N. W. Rep. 934, 26 L. R. A. 187, 45 Am. St. Rep. 473.

Ratification may be either express or implied. In other words, it may be either by word or by acts.

As a rule, an express oral promise by an infant, made by him after reaching his majority, that he will abide by the terms of his contract, constitutes a sufficient ratification. In a few states, however, the new promise must be in writing.

The ratification must be total or it will be ineffectual. An infant may not ratify what he believes will prove beneficial to him and disaffirm the rest. Thus, where an infant purchases real estate and makes and delivers to the vendor a purchase-money mortgage he will not be allowed to ratify the deed and disaffirm the mortgage.

But where an infant purchases property on credit and it becomes lost, or even wasted or squandered, he may disaffirm the contract and refuse to pay for it. Thus, where an infant buys a horse on credit and it dies before the infant reaches his majority he may avoid the contract. Moreover, it has been held that where an infant pays cash for property which subsequently becomes lost or destroyed, he may sue and get judgment for the amount. If he still has the property purchased by him he must tender its return.

EXAMPLES

24. A, an infant, makes a contract with B to work for him a year at $30 per month. After working for three months A quits without fault on B's part. A may recover for the services rendered. Moreover, he is not liable to B for breach of contract.

25. A, an infant, purchases articles of food and clothing on credit. A's circumstances are such as to render the articles purchased "necessaries." A is liable for the reasonable value of the articles, not exceeding the agreed price.

26. A, an infant, purchases an automobile on credit. A year later, and during his minority, he returns the machine to the vendor. Since A has the right to disaffirm his contract at any time during his minority, he is not liable to the vendor.

27. A, an infant, buys a horse for cash. Within a reasonable time after reaching his majority he returns the horse to the vendor and requests him to return the purchase-money. A's request is enforcible at law.

28. A, an infant, buys a piano of B and gives him in payment his negotiable promissory note. B indorses the note to C before maturity for a valuable consideration and without notice that A is a minor. Before reaching his majority A returns the piano and disaffirms the contract. A is sued on the note by C and pleads infancy. His plea is good and should be sustained.

29. A, an infant, purchases a diamond ring on credit. After attaining his majority he promises the vendor that he will pay for it. A week later he offers to return the ring and seeks to disaffirm his contract. A's promise to pay, after reaching his majority, constitutes a ratification of his contract and he is liable.

30. A, an infant, contracts with B, his employer, that the price of certain articles, not necessaries, which he purchases of B, shall be deducted from his wages. Upon attaining his majority, A repudiates his contract concerning the articles purchased of B, and seeks to recover his wages without deducting their price. A may recover the full amount of his wages, even although he has disposed of the articles to his benefit.1

31. A, an infant, insures his life. The insurance company 1 Morse v. Ely, 154 Mass. 458, 28 N. E. Rep. 577, 26 Am. St. Rep. 263. Many courts, however, hold the contrary. See Johnson v. Ins. Co., supra; Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. Rep. 275, 47 L. R. A. 303, 73 Am. St. Rep. 703; Gillis v. Goodwin, 180 Mass. 140, 61 N. E. Rep. 813, 91 Am. St. Rep. 265. The principle recognized by these courts is that where an infant's contract is free from fraud and undue influence, and is fair and reasonable, and it has been wholly or partly executed on both sides, the infant cannot recover what he has paid without returning what he has received.

cannot revoke the policy so long as A continues to pay the premiums. A, however, may revoke it at any time during his minority or within a reasonable time after attaining his majority.

32. A, an infant, leases his farm to B for ten years, and continues to receive rent from year to year after reaching his majority. A's ratification of the lease after becoming of age estops him from avoiding it during the remainder of the term.

33. A, an infant, sells to B a farm and delivers to him a deed of it. A cannot avoid his deed until he becomes of age. Neither can he ratify it until then.

63. Insane persons.—As a rule, an insane person's contracts are voidable at his option. This rule, however, is subject to exceptions. Some contracts made by an insane person are binding upon him, while others are absolutely void. In some classes of cases the decisions are conflicting.

64. Insane delusions.-A person can be sane upon some subjects and at the same time be insane upon other subjects. A person who labors under an insane delusion is called a monomaniac. Such a person, while incapable of making valid contracts upon the subject of his delusion, may be perfectly capable of making valid contracts upon other subjects. Thus, a monomaniac on religion may not be bound by a contract on this subject, but may be thoroughly capable of binding himself in the purchase of a horse.

65. Good faith of the other party.-Most courts hold that when a sane person enters into a contract with an insane person and the former has no knowledge of the latter's insanity, nor reasonable ground to suspect it, and the contract is fair and reasonable, and its subjectmatter has been subsequently dealt with in such a way as to render it impossible to place the parties in statu

quo, it is binding upon the insane person as well as upon the other party. This was stated in an English case:1

The modern cases show that when that state of mind was unknown to the other contracting party, and no advantage was taken of the lunatic, the defense cannot prevail, especially where the contract is not merely executory, but executed in whole or in part, and the parties cannot be restored to their original position.

A few courts, however, hold that a contract made, even under such circumstances, is voidable at the insane party's option.

66. Insane person under guardianship.-The contracts of a person who has been judicially declared insane and placed under guardianship are, according to most courts, void. Such a person, however, is usually held liable for the reasonable value of necessaries purchased by him during a lucid interval.

67. Quasi-contracts by the insane.—An insane person's quasi-contracts, or those created by law, are binding upon him the same as in the case of a sane person. This is owing to the fact that the obligation imposed does not depend upon the consent of the party bound.

68. Contracts for necessaries by the insane.-An insane person is also liable for the reasonable value of necessaries, not exceeding the agreed price, furnished to him or to his wife, the same as is an infant; whether he is under guardianship or not is immaterial. In some jurisdictions he is responsible for necessaries furnished to his children. He is also liable for the reasonable value of necessary labor and materials for the preserva

1 Molton v. Camroux, 2 Exch. 489, 4 Exch. 17. See, also, to same effect, Burnham v. Kidwell, 113 Ill. 425; Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N. J. L. 108, 18 Am. Rep. 716; Gribben v. Maxwell, 34 Kan. 8.