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tion of his estate. In this respect his liability differs from that of an infant.

69. Nature of the insanity.-To render an insane person's contracts voidable it is not essential that he be permanently insane, nor that his reason be entirely dethroned for the time being. It is sufficient if his infirmity makes him incapable of comprehending the nature of the contract and its consequences. Mere weakness of intellect, however, is not sufficient.

The incapacity may result from idiocy, lunacy, senile dementia or any other defect or disease of the mind.

An idiot is a person who has never had a mind, whereas a crazy person is one whose reason has become dethroned.

Formerly a deaf and dumb person was considered incapable of making a contract, as his infirmity was looked upon as a species of insanity. According to the modern view, however, such an infirmity does not render a person incapable.1

70. Disaffirmance by the insane.-An insane person, like an infant, possesses the right to disaffirm his voidable contracts. This right may be exercised by him during a lucid interval, or within a reasonable time after he has become sane. If under guardianship, it may be exercised by his guardian during the existence of his infirmity. And in case of his death the privilege belongs to his personal representative, and in some cases to his heirs. The privilege, however, is a personal one, and does not extend to the other parties to the insane person's contracts, nor to third persons. Moreover, the fact that third persons have acquired in good faith in

1 Brown v. Brown, 3 Conn. 299, 8 Am. Dec. 187; Barnett v. Barnett, 54 N. C. 221.

terests growing out of his contracts does not prevent him from exercising his right to disaffirm.

71. Return of consideration by the insane.—When an insane person elects to disaffirm his voidable contract he must return the consideration received by him provided he can do so. If, however, he is unable to do so, this fact, as a rule, does not prevent him from exercising the right.

If the law required restoration of the price as a condition precedent to the recovery of the estate, that would be done indirectly which the law does not permit to be done directly, and the great purpose of the law in avoiding such contracts-the protection of those who cannot protect themselves-defeated.1

72. Ratification by the insane.-An insane person may ratify his voidable contracts during a lucid interval, or after he becomes sane, as well as disaffirm them. This privilege also extends to his guardian, or his personal representative and heirs, as in the case of disaffirmance.

73. Burden of proof.-The question of burden of proof as to whether the contract was made during a lucid interval or not is one upon which the decisions are conflicting. According to the Massachusetts rule the burden is upon the party setting up the defense of insanity. In other states, however, as well as in England, the contrary has been held.3

EXAMPLES

34. A, an insane person, purchases necessaries on credit. A is liable for the reasonable value of them, whether he is un

1 Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray (Mass.) 283, 66 Am. Dec. 414. See, also, Hovey v. Hobson, 53 Me. 453, 89 Am. Dec. 705.

2 Wright v. Wright, 139 Mass. 177, 29 N. E. Rep. 380.

3 Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. 605; Sheets v. Bray, 125 Ind. 33, 24 N. E. Rep. 357; Fishburne v. Ferguson's Heirs, 84 Va. 87, 4 S. E. Rep. 575.

der guardianship or not and whether the other party to the contract had knowledge of A's insanity or not.

35. A, an insane person, purchases a bicycle on credit. The seller has no knowledge of A's insanity, nor reasonable grounds to believe that he is insane. A subsequently destroys the bicycle. By the weight of modern authority A is liable for the reasonable value.

36. A, an insane person, purchases a horse for cash. During a lucid interval he returns it to the seller and asks him to pay back the purchase price. The seller must accept the horse and return A's money.

37. A, an insane person, purchases for cash a buggy of B who has knowledge of A's insanity. A subsequently destroys the buggy. During a lucid interval he disaffirms the contract and seeks to recover the purchase money. B must return to A the purchase money.

38. A, who labors under the insane delusion that he is Julius Cæsar, but who otherwise is sane, purchases a watch of B on credit. Subsequently he seeks to disaffirm the contract and offers to return the watch, but B refuses to accept it. A is bound by the contract.

39. A, who is insane, owns a house which is rented to B. B, who is injured owing to the negligence of A's agent in failing to keep the house in a safe condition, obtains a judgment against A. A's insanity is no defense.

40. A, who has a weak intellect, but who knows the nature and effect of a contract, purchases a house and lot. He subsequently seeks to have the contract set aside on the ground of mental incapacity. In the absence of fraud and undue influence on the part of the vendor A's weakness of intellect is of no avail.

41. A, who is insane, purchases a cow. After A's death, B, his personal representative, seeks to disaffirm the contract by returning the cow. The seller must take back the cow.

74. Drunken persons.-The capacity of a drunken person to make a contract is similar to that of an insane

person. As a rule, his contracts are voidable at his option. In some cases, however, they are valid and in others absolutely void.

To render a drunken person's contract voidable at his option he must be so drunk at the time it is entered into that he is incapable of understanding its nature and effect. Slight intoxication is of no effect, except in so far as it may concern the question of fraud. The fact that he became drunk voluntarily is immaterial.

75. A drunken person's liability for necessaries.—A drunken person is liable for necessaries the same as an infant. The extent of his liability is the reasonable value of the goods. Whether they can be regarded as necessaries in any case or not is a question for the court, and whether they are necessaries in the particular case is a fact for the jury to determine.

76. Quasi-contracts by a drunken person. — A drunken person is also liable on his quasi-contracts, or those created by law. And he is also liable for his torts.

77. Drunken person under guardianship.-When a person has been judicially declared incapable of managing his own affairs owing to his habitual drunkenness, and has been put under guardianship, most courts hold that his contracts are not voidable but absolutely void. 78. Good faith of third party. Whether a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable promissory note made by a person totally drunk can enforce it against him or not is a question upon which the decisions are conflicting. Some courts hold that even total drunkenness is no defense, while others hold the contrary.1

79. Disaffirmance and ratification by drunkards.The voidable contracts of a drunken person may be

1 State Bank v. McCoy, 69 Pa. 204, 8 Am. Rep. 246. See, also, Norton on Bills and Notes (3d Ed.) 232.

either disaffirmed or ratified by him when he becomes sober. And the disaffirmance or ratification may be shown either by words or by conduct. If, upon becoming sober, he decides to disaffirm, he must, as a rule, return or offer to return the consideration received, but if he has wasted the consideration while drunk he is excused from doing so. Failure on his part to disaffirm within a reasonable time, or disposing of the consideration received, after he has become sober, constitutes a ratification. Once having ratified the contract his power to disaffirm it is gone.

80. Aliens.-Aliens are divided into two classesalien friends and alien enemies.

In respect to the former class the laws of the various states are not entirely harmonious. In some states the organic law entitles resident foreigners to all the rights enjoyed by native-born citizens; while in others, statutes prohibit aliens from acquiring and holding real property. Some of the latter states discriminate in this respect between resident and non-resident aliens, but others do not. However, in most of the states, if not in all, alien friends, whether resident or non-resident, may make enforcible contracts relating to personal property. Many questions involving the rights of certain aliens are regulated by treaty with the sovereigns to which they owe allegiance.

Alien enemies are persons who are subjects or citizens of a hostile nation. When war is declared between nations, commercial intercourse between them ceases, except in so far as sanctioned by sovereign authority. Existing contracts with alien enemies are, as a rule, suspended during hostilities. When they When they are inherently antagonistic to the existing military conditions 1 United States v. Grossmayer, 9 Wall. 72.

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