Opinion of the Court. 360 U.S. the respondent's Local Chairman apparently was still not available at that time. When respondent failed to appear for the 2:30 hearing, the Assistant Superintendent proceeded with the investigation in his absence. The testimony of railroad witnesses was taken stenographically and transcribed; no evidence was received in respondent's behalf. On July 24 the railroad notified the respondent that he was discharged. The Brotherhood processed respondent's grievance through the required management levels, and when settlement could not be reached, nor agreement arrived at for a joint submission to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the Brotherhood, in January 1951, filed an ex parte submission with the Board's First Division.' Hearing was waived by the parties and the submission was considered on the papers filed by them. The Adjustment Board, on June 25, 1952, rendered its award "Claim denied," with supporting findings.3 2 It is conceded that respondent authorized the Brotherhood to bring his claim before the Adjustment Board. Compare Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, aff'd on rehearing, 327 U. S. 661. 3 The pertinent excerpts from the findings are the following: "If the carrier is to have efficient operations on its railroad, employees must be relied on to obey operating instructions and orders. Claimant was found to have wilfully disobeyed his orders. This was insubordination and merited discipline. "The employee . . . seeks complete vindication on the grounds that he was denied the investigation provided by the rules of agreement. Thus, the only question for review is whether there was substantial compliance with the investigation rule. "Basically, the complaint is that the hearing was held when the claimant was not present. The right of the employee to be heard before being disciplined is a personal right which he can waive by action, inaction, or failure to act in good faith. . . . "... his position here would have been strengthened had he personally appeared at all stages of the proceeding to labor as best 601 Opinion of the Court. Some three years after the filing of the award, the respondent, on June 6, 1955, brought the instant suit. His complaint alleges a cause of action predicated on the same grounds of allegedly wrongful dismissal in violation of the collective bargaining agreement which had been urged on the Adjustment Board, namely, (1) that he "was dismissed without cause" and (2) that he was dismissed without a "thorough investigation" because not "afforded an opportunity to have a trainman of his choice present at the investigation held" nor "afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense," "to present his defense," "to have witnesses present" or "to participate in his own defense." After filing an answer, the railroad moved for summary judgment on affidavits and other papers on file upon the ground that "any judicially enforceable cause of action arising from the termination of the employment relationship . . . is now barred by the adjudication and determination of the validity of such termination by the National Railroad Adjustment Board under the terms and conditions of said collective bargaining agreement, and pursuant to and in conformance with the Railway Labor Act . . . The District Court, without opinion, granted the motion and entered summary judgment in favor of the petitioner. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, assigning as the single point on the appeal that the District Court "erred in holding that the award of the National Railroad Adjustment Board entitled . . . [the railroad] to Summary Judgment." The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed, 255 F. 2d 663. Although the Court of Appeals held that the District Court would he could to preserve his record and to get his story to us first hand. All that the transcript reflects does claimant no credit, but leaves us with the feeling that the things of which he now complains were planned by him that way." Opinion of the Court. 360 U.S. be "without jurisdiction to entertain the action if the Board award represents a determination on the merits,” id., at 666, the court concluded that while the question whether the railroad was entitled to discharge the respondent "was one of the two questions which Price submitted for Board determination," "the Board made no determination on the merits" but determined only that in "the manner in which the investigation was conducted by the carrier. . . none of Price's rights in that regard was abridged," and held that the District Court therefore had jurisdiction to entertain the action. Id., at 666-667. We granted certiorari to decide the important question raised by the case of the interpretation of the Railway Labor Act. 358 U. S. 892. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' holding that the Board's award was based solely on its decision that Article 33 (a) was not violated by the railroad because respondent's dismissal followed a "thorough investigation." Rather we think the award also reflects the Board's determination that respondent was discharged for good cause. Thus we agree with Judge Healy, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, that on the face of the customarily brief findings of the Board it appears "plain that 4 * Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L. J. 567, 584, describes the awards of the First Division of the National Adjustment Board as follows: "It will be noted that, except for the purely jurisdictional recitals, the findings consist of a single sentence ("The evidence indicates that the movements made did not constitute switching under Article I-R') which constitutes the nub of the whole decision. Rarely does this central finding consist of more than a sentence or two. To a lay reader the sentence quoted above is meaningless. In order that it may be more intelligible the findings in their printed form are preceded by the employees' statement of facts taken from their submission, and a statement of their position (likewise extracted from the submission), followed by the management's statement of facts 601 Opinion of the Court. the Board was of opinion, and in substance held, that the asserted violation by the Company of Article 32, even if true, would not serve to justify an employee's violation of direct operating instructions and his abandonment of his post." 255 F. 2d, at 667-668. Since the discharge could be set aside by the Board if either ground of the submission was sustained, the unqualified denial of the claim necessarily implied, we think, that the Board decided both grounds submitted adversely to the respondent. Even if the procedure followed by the railroad constituted a proper investigation, the Board's outright denial of the claim is explicable only on the ground that the Board also held that Article 32 (b) did not justify the respondent in disobeying the dispatcher's instruction to remain at Nipton. We conclude that both issues were decided by the Board against the respondent,5 and therefore reach the question whether the respondent, despite the adverse determination of the Adjustment Board, could pursue the common-law remedy for damages in the District Court." and a statement of its position derived similarly from its submission. From these rival statements it is easy to determine what the controversy is about, but it is not easy to determine from the laconic findings the real basis upon which the decision was reached." 5 In an interpretation announced on November 26, 1958, sought by the railroad under § 3 First (m) of the Railway Labor Act, the Board declared that its award reflected its conclusion that the railroad was justified in discharging respondent. This interpretation was not before the Court of Appeals in this case, and we refer to it only as further substantiation of our conclusion based on the record in the case. 6 Since respondent, instead of bringing his claim in court as was his right under Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, chose to pursue that claim before the Adjustment Board, he does not even argue that a holding that the Railway Labor Act precludes a relitigation of that claim in the courts would deprive him of any constitutional right to a jury trial. Opinion of the Court. 360 U.S. Congress has said in § 3 First (m) of the Railway Labor Act that the Adjustment Board's "awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award." Respondent does not argue that a "money award" is anything other than an award directing the payment of money. Indeed, it would distort the English language to interpret that term as including a refusal to award a money payment. Thus, the plain language of § 3 First (m), on its face, imports that Congress intended that the Board's disposition of a grievance should preclude a subsequent court action by the losing party. Furthermore, we have said of the Railway Labor Act that "the specification of one remedy normally excludes another." Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297, 301. Thus, our duty to give effect to the congressional purpose compels us to hold that the instant common-law action is precluded unless the overall scheme established by the Railway Labor Act and the legislative history clearly indicate a congressional intention contrary to that which the plain meaning of the words imports. Our understanding of the statutory scheme and the legislative history, however, reinforces what the statutory language already makes clear, namely, that Congress barred the employee's subsequent resort to the common 748 Stat. 1191-1192, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (m). That section provides: "The awards of the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall be stated in writing. A copy of the awards shall be furnished to the respective parties to the controversy, and the awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award. In case a dispute arises involving an interpretation of the award the division of the Board upon request of either party shall interpret the award in the light of the dispute." |