Cunningham v. Stanford, 68 N. J. 7; Bullard v. Lopez, 7 N. Mex. 561, 624 (semble); Soulden v. Van Rensselaer, 3 Wend. 472; Atkinson v. Winters, 47 W. Va. 226.

Burden of Proof. The Statute of Limitations being an affirmative answer, it would seem too clear for argument that, as in the case of other affirmative answers (Shailby v. Fales, Neb. 1906, 106 N. W. R. 1035; Gregory v. Trainor, 4 E. D. Sm. 58; Brice v. Brice, 2 S. Aust. L. R. 108), upon a denial of the answer by the plaintiff, the defendant would have the burden of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the period of limitation had elapsed. It was so decided in Borland v. Haven, 37 Fed. 394; Wright r. Ward, 65 Cal. 525; Chemung Co. v. Hanley, 9 Ida. 786; Harlin v. Stevenson, 30 Iowa, 371; Tredway v. McDonald, 51 Iowa, 663; Jenks v. Lansing Co., 97 Iowa, 342; White v. Campbell, 25 Mich. 463; Van Burg v. Van Enger, (Neb. 1906) 107 N. W. R. 1006; Duggan v. Cole, 2 Tex. 381; Thomas v. Glendinning, 13 Utah, 47; Green v. Dodge, (Vt. 1906) 64 Atl. R. 499; Wilkinson v. Holloway, 7 Leigh, 288 (semble); Lewis v. Mason, 84 Va. 731, 741; Goodell v. Gibbons, 91 Va. 60. See also a learned note by Professor Graves in 1 Va. L. Reg. 343. But by a strange abandonment of a fundamental principle, several courts have reached the opposite result. Hurst v. Parker, 1 B. & Al. 92, 2 Chit. 249 s. c.; Wilby v. Henman, 2 Cr. & M. 658, 4 Tyrw. 957 s. c.; Bodenham v. Hill, 7 M. & W. 274, 279 (semble); Taylor v. Spears, 6 Ark. 412 (semble); Carnall v. Clark, 27 Ark. 500; McNeil v. Garland, 27 Árk. 343; Leigh v. Evans, 64 Ark. 26; Watkins v. Martin, 69 Ark. 311; Huston v. McPherson, 8 Black, 562 (semble); Pɔnd v. Gibson, 5 All. 19 (discrediting Emmons v. Hayward, 11 Cush. 48); Moore v. Garner, 101 N. Ca. 374; Hobbs v. Barefoot, 104 N. Ca. 224; Koonce v. Pelletier, 115 N. Ca. 233; Graham v. O'Bryan, 120 N. Ca. 463; Parker v. Hardon, 121 N. Ca. 57; House v. Arnold, 122 N. Ca. 220 (but see Davenport v. Wynne, 6 Ired. 128); Prigmore v. E. T. Co., 1 Lea, 204.

Exceptions to the Statute, Affirmative Replication. If the plaintiff relies upon some exception which prevents the bar of the statute from attaching, he has the burden of establishing the exception, and except in jurisdictions in which no pleading after the answer is required, of pleading the exception as an affirmative replication. Kempe v. Gibson, 9 Q. B. 609; Gibbs v. Guild, 9 Q. B. Div. 59; Somerville v. Hamilton, 4 Wheat. 230; Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135; Barlow v. Arnold, 6 Fed. 35; Crossey v. Morrill, 125 Fed. 878; Knight v. Clements, 45 Ala. 89; Bercy v. Larretta, 63 Ala. 374; Morrison v. Stevenson, 69 Ala. 448; Condon v. Enger, 113 Ala. 233; Yell v. Lane, 41 Ark. 53; Simpson v. Brown Co., 70 Ark. 598; Levy v. Gillis, 1 Pennew. 119; Chandler v. Duncan, 1 Pennew. 170; Vinson v. Palmer, 45 Fla. 630; Beatty v. Nickerson, 73 Ill. 605; Bartelott v. Internat. Bank, 119 III. 260; Gunton v. Hughes, 181 Ill. 132; Kettenring v. N. W. Assn. 99 Fed. 532 (Illinois law); Vail v. Halton, 14 Ind. 344; Young v. Whittenhall, 15 Kan. 579; Lemon v. Dryden, 43 Kan. 477; Meeh v. Mo. Co., 61 Kan. 630; Cottom v. Nat. Co., 65 Kan. 511; Good v. Ehrlich, 67 Kan. 94; Newdigate v. Early, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1452; Dessaunier v. Murphy, 33 Mo. 184; Campbell v. Laclede Co., 84 Mo. 352; Spuryer v. Hardy, 4 Mo. Ap. 573; Erickson v. Quinn, 3 Lans. 299; Hulbert v. Nichol, 20 Hun, 454; Baldwin v. Martin, 14 Abb. Pr. N. s. 9, 35 N. Y. Super. Ct. 98 s. c.; Reilly v. Sabater, 26 N. Y. Civ. Pro. 34; Burdicke v. Hicks, 29 N. Y. Ap. Div. 205; Metz v. Metz, 45 N. Y. Misc. R. 338; Edwards v. University, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 325; Hussey v. Kirkman, 95 N. Ca. 63; Gupton v. Hawkins, 126 N. Ca. 81; Hooper v. Worthington, 134 N. Ca. 283; Burr v. Burr, 26 Pa. 284; Barclay's Ap., 64 Pa. 69; Barnes v. Pickett Co., 203 Pa. 570; Godbolt v. Lambert, 8 Rich. Eq. 155; Apperson v. Pattison, 11 Lea, 484; Gross v. Denney, (Tenn. 1895) 32 S. W. R. 632; Phillips v. Holman, 26 Tex. 276; Harvey v. Cummings, 68 Tex. 599; Byers v. Carll, 7 Tex. Civ. Ap. 423; Phillips v. Sherman, (Tex. Civ. Ap. 1897) 39 S. W. R. 187; Dodge v. Signor, (Tex. Civ. Ap. 1898) 44 S. W. R. 926; Capen v. Woodrow, 51 Vt. 106.

--

Affirmative Rejoinder. — Occasionally the defendant may defeat the affirmative replication only by an affirmative rejoinder. Newborg v. Freehling, 43 Ill. Ap. 463; McGregor v. McGregor, 15 Vt. 727; Rixford v. Miller, 49 Vt. 319; Burnham v. Courser, 69 Vt. 183. Anomalous Plea. - Sands v. St. John, 36 Barb. 632; Scott v. Christenson, (Oreg. 1905) 80 Pac. R. 731.- Ed.

CHAPTER V.

DILATORY PLEAS.

THE SOUTH FORK, ETC., CANAL CO. v. SNOW.

SUPREME COURT, CALIFORNIA, OCTOBER, 1874.

[49 California Reports, 155.]

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, El Dorado County.

The action was brought to restrain the defendants from diverting the waters of Webber Creek at a point above the head of a certain ditch owned by the plaintiffs and used by them to obtain water for mining purposes. The South Fork and Placerville Canal Company was joined with Newton Booth and four others as plaintiffs. The defendant, in his answer, set up a misjoinder of the corporation with each of the other parties plaintiff, alleging that it had no interest in the property described in the complaint. At the trial the plaintiffs failed to prove that the Canal Company had any interest in the property, and after the plaintiffs had closed their evidence, the defendant, upon motion, obtained a judgment of nonsuit against all the plaintiffs, upon the ground that there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff as set out in the answer. The plaintiffs appealed.

George G. Blanchard, for appellants.

The substantial rights of the defendant cannot be affected by permitting those plaintiffs who have a cause of action, to recover, and it was therefore the duty of the court to deny the motion for a nonsuit and render judgment according to the rights of the parties. (Code Civil Pro. Sec. 475.)1

The Court (Mr. Justice CROCKETT presiding, in the absence of Mr. Chief Justice WALLACE) affirmed the judgment.2

1 The argument of appellants is abridged and that of respondent omitted. - ED.

2 MISJOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS.

A. APPARENT IN DECLARATION DEMURRER. At common law if the declaration disclosed a misjoinder of plaintiffs, the defendant might demur, move in arrest of judgment after verdict, or proceed by writ of error after judgment, on the ground that the declaration was not sufficient in law, since it did not state a joint cause of action in favor of all the plaintiffs. Arundel v. Short, Cro. El. 133 (arrest of judgment); Abbot v. Blofield, Cro. Jac. 644, 2 Rolle, 250 s. c.; Helliar's Case, Sty. 9 (arrest of judgment); Coleman v. Harcourt, 1 Lev. 140 (arrest of judgment); Staunton v. Hobart, 1 Sid. 224 (arrest of judgment); Anon. 1 Sid. 346 (arrest of judgment); Buckley v. Collier, 1 Salk. 114 (demurrer);

King v. Basingham, 8 Mod. 199, 341 (arrest of judgment); Holmes v. Wood, 1 Barnard, 75, 249 (arrest of judgment); Bidgood v. Way, 2 W. Bl. 1236 (writ of error); Serres v. Dodd, 2 B. & P. N. R. 405 (demurrer); Gossett v. Kent, 19 Ark. 602 (semble); Christian v. Crocker, 25 Ark. 327 (semble); Lewis v. Moore, 25 Ark. 63; Leavet v. Sherman, 1 Root, 159; Gerry v. Gerry, 11 Gray, 381 (semble); Cofran v. Shepard, 148 Mass. 582 (semble); Bond v. Hilton, 6 Jones, (N. Ca.) 180 (arrest of judgment); Lockhart v. Power, 2 Watts, 371 (writ of error). By statute in England and in several of the states in this country misjoinder of plaintiffs is no longer a ground for demurrer, but for a motion to strike out the superfluous party or parties. Bellingham v. Clark, 1 B. & S. 332; Rhoads v. Booth, 14 Iowa, 575; Mornan v. Carroll, 35 Iowa, 22; Dubuque Co. v. Reynolds, 41 Iowa, 454; Horwick v. Ringen Co., 116 Iowa, 1; Winifield Co. v. Maris, 11 Kaf. 128; McKee v. Eaton, 26 Kan. 226; Hurd v. Simpson, 47 Kan. 372; Dean v. English, 18 B. Mon. 132; Hoard v. Clum, 31 Min. 186; Wiesener v. Young, 50 Minn. 21; Boldt v. Budwig, 19 Neb. 739; Lancaster Co. v. Rush, 35 Neb. 119; Green v. Green, 69 N. Ca 294; Burns v. Ashworth, 72 N. Ca. 496 (semble); McMillan v. Baxley, 112 N. Ca. 578; Stiles v. Guthrie, 3 Okla. 26; Weber v. Dillon, 7 Okla. 568; Martin v. Clay, 8 Okla. 46; Mader v. Plano Co., 17 S. Dak. 553; Willard v. Reas, 26 Wis. 540; Marsh v. Board, 38 Wis. 250; Schiffer v. Eau Claire, 51 Wis. 385; Boyd v. Beaudin, 54 Wis. 193; Nevil v. Clifford, 55 Wis. 161; Kucera v. Kucera, 86 Wis. 416; Wunderlich v. Chicago Co., 93 Wis. 132. (But see Read v. Sang, 21 Wis. 678.)

In many of the states, however, the statute provides that the objection to a misjoinder of plaintiffs may be taken by a special demurrer, pointing out the particular misjoinder. Rowe v. Bacigaluppi, 21 Cal. 633 (semble); Tennant v. Pfister, 45 Cal. 270 (semble); White v. Portland, 67 Conn. 272; Daniels v. Miller, (Ind. Terr. 1902) 69 S. W. R. 925; Gerry v. Gerry, 11 Gray, 381; Cofran v. Shepard, 148 Mass. 582; Michael v. St. Louis Co., 17 Mo. Ap. 23; Finney v. Randolph, 68 Mo. Ap. 557 (waiver); Dunderdale v. Grimes, 16 How. Pr. 195; Enos v. Leach, 18 Hun, 139; Tew v. Wolfsohn, 77 N. Y. Ap. Div. 454, 456 (Palmer v. Davis, 28 N. Y. 242, 245; Case v. Carroll, 35 N. Y. 385; Allen v. Buffalo, 38 N. Y. 280; People v. Crooks, 53 N. Y. 648, and Peabody v. Washington Co., 20 Barb. 339, are superseded); Birmingham v. Griffin, 42 Tex. 147.

In these jurisdictions a demurrer upon the ground that the declaration does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, i. e. a cause of action in favor of all the plaintiffs, is not allowed. Tennant v. Pfister, 51 Cal. 511; O'Callaghan v. Bode, 84 Cal. 489; Berney v. Drexel, supra, 48.

In some jurisdictions the legislation is the converse of that just described, a demurrer not being allowed, if based expressly upon the misjoinder of plaintiffs, but only upon the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, i. e. a joint cause of action by all the plaintiffs. Berkshire v. Shultz, 25 Ind. 523; Goodright v. Goar, 30 Ind. 418; Devolt v. Carter, 31 Ind. 355; Lippert v. Edwards, 39 Ind. 165; Parker v. Smith, 58 Ind. 349; Harris v. Harris, 61 Ind. 117; Hyatt v. Cochran, 85 Ind. 231; Brown v. Critchell, 110 Ind. 31; Brunson v. Henry, 140 Ind. 455; McIntosh v. Zaring, 150 Ind. 301; Swales v. Grubbs, 6 Ind. Ap. 477; Bartgas v. O'Neil, 13 Oh. St. 72; Masters v. Freeman, 17 Oh. St. 323 (no evasion by not demurring).

A special demurrer for misjoinder of parties must point out the particular misjoinder. O'Callaghan v. Bode, 84 Cal. 489. And the objection is waived if there is no demurrer. Gillam v. Sigman, 29 Cal. 637; Mueller v. Kaessman, 84 Mo. 318; Finney v. Randolph, 68 Mo. Ap. 557; Enos v. Leach, 18 Hun, 139 (semble); Kelly v. Jay, 79 Hun, 535; Miller v. Baxley, 112 N. Ca. 578; Hocutt v. Wilmington, 124 N. Ca. 214.

B. NOT APPARENT IN THE DECLARATION. (1) Objection by a negative Plea. - If there is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff, not apparent in the declaration, the defendant can usually raise the objection by a negative plea. For the plaintiffs at the trial will rarely be able to prove their allegation of a joint right in contract or tort of all the plaintiffs against the defendant. The plaintiffs, accordingly, were non-suited for a variance in the following

cases.

Contract. -Bell v. Allen, 53 Ala. 125; Phillips v. Pennywhit, 1 Ark. 59; Medlock v. Merritt, 102 Ga. 212; Snell v. DeLand, 43 Ill. 323; Fairbanks v. Badger, 46 Ill. Ap. 644; Brent v. Tivebaugh, 12 B. Mon. 87; Ulmer v. Cunningham, 2 Me. 117; Grozier v. Atwood, 4 Pick. 234; Tuttle v. Cooper, 10 Pick. 281, 283; Oakley v. Emmons, (N. J. 1906) 62 Atl. R. 996 (semble statutory notice of misjoinder essential); Doremus v. Selden, 19 Johns. 213; Waldsmith v. Waldsmith, Oh. 156; Heron v. Hoffner, 3 Rawle, 393; Gay v. Rogers, 18 Vt. 342; Dennison v. Boylston, 48 Vt. 439; Goodale v. Frost, 59 Vt. 491; Estabrook v. Messersmith, 18 Wis. 545.

Tort. Walker v. Fenner, 28 Ala. 367 (demurrer to evidence); Towns v. Mathews, 91 Ga.

546; McGlamory v. McCormick, 99 Ga. 148; Medlock v. Merritt, 102 Ga. 212; Rhoads v. Booth, 14 Iowa, 575; Glover v. Hunnewell, 6 Pick. 222; Gerry v. Gerry, 11 Gray, 381 (see Bullock v. Hayward, 10 Atl. 460, 462); Rogers v. Raynor, 102 Mich. 473.

If the objection is not taken at the trial it is waived. Dodge v. Wilkinson, 3 Met. 292. In some states, by statute, the practice of non-suiting all the plaintiffs, because one or more of them are misjoined, is abolished. In Indiana, verdict and judgment will be given for those properly plaintiffs and against those improperly plaintiffs. Nicodemus v. Simons, 121 Ind. 564. So also in Iowa and California. (See however Weinreich v. Johnston, 78 Cal. 254). But, in Iowa, the defendant may move to strike out the superfluous plaintiff. Miller v. Keokuk Co., 63 Iowa, 680; Lull v. Anamosa Bank, 110 Iowa, 537; and in California, as appears from the principal case, the effect of a negative plea at common law in non-suiting all the plaintiffs may be accomplished by an answer setting up the misjoinder. See also Rowe v. Bacigaluppi, 21 Cal. 633; Gillam v. Sigman, 29 Cal. 637. In New York and Missouri, also, an answer specially setting up a misjoinder of parties plaintiff, not apparent on the face of the declaration, operates as a bar to all the plaintiffs, and a failure to make such answer is a waiver of the objection, with the consequence that all the plaintiffs may obtain judgment against the defendant. Mills v. Carthage, 31 Mo. Ap. 141; Walrod v. Bennett, 6 Barb. 141; Clark v. Aldrich, 4 N. Y. Ap. Div. 52 (answer insufficient because not specifying the particular misjoinder).

MISJOINDER OF DEFENDANTS.

A. APPARENT IN DECLARATION Demurrer. At common law, if the declaration disclosed a misjoinder of defendants, the defendants might demur, move in arrest of judgment after verdict, or proceed by a writ of error after judgment, on the ground that the declaration was not sufficient in law, since it did not state a joint cause of action against all the defendants. May v. House, 2 Chit. 697 (joint demurrer); Morris v. Norfolk, 2 Taunt. 212 (writ of error); Lester v. Harlow, 18 N. H. 518 (demurrer); Carleton v. Haywood, 49 N. H. 314 (joint demurrer), Robinson v. Scull, 3 N. J. 597 (writ of error); Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281 (writ of error — joint); Grasser v. Eckhart, 1 Binn. 575 (arrest of judgment); State Treasurer v. Priott, 24 Vt. 134 (demurrer); Cunningham v. Orange, 74 Vt. 115 (demurrer); Wooster v. Northrup, 5 Wis. 245 (demurrer.)

But by the code provisions of many of our states, changing the common law practice, a defendant may not demur because others are improperly made co-defendants with him upon the same cause of action. Garland v. Dunn, 11 Ark, 720; Christian v. Crocker, 25 Ark. 327; Oliphint v. Mansfield, 36 Ark. 191; Fry v. Street, 37 Ark. 39; Clark v. Gramling, 54 Ark. 525; Gardner v. Samuels, 116 Cal. 84; Hill v. Marsh, 46 Ind. 218; Redelsheimer v. Miller, 107 Ind. 485; Turner v. First Bank, 26 Iowa, 562; White Oak v. Oskaloosa, 44 Iowa, 512; Union Co. v. Smith, 59 Kan. 80; Livermore v. Norfolk Co., 186 Mass. 133; Sweet v. Converse, 88 Mich. 1; Bigelow v. Sanford, 98 Mich. 657; Lewis v. Williams, 3 Minn. 151; Nichols v. Randall, 5 Minn. 304; Mitchell v. Bank, 7 Minn. 252, 256; Ashby v. Winston, 26 Mo. 210; Lumber Co. v. Oliver, 65 Mo. Ap. 435; Territory v. Hildebrand, 2 Mont. 426; Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304; Pinckney v. Wallace, 1 Abb. Pr. 82; Richtmyer v. Richtmyer, 50 Barb. 55; New York Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592; Nichols v. Drew, 94 N. Y. 22, 26 (semble); McCrea v. Chahoon, 54 Hun, 577; Hall v. Gilman, 77 N. Y. Ap. Div. 458; Boston Ass'n v. Brooklyn Club, 37 N. Y. Misc. R. 521; Tew r. Wolfsohn, 77 N. Y. Ap. Div. 454, 174 N. Y. 272 (semble); Adams v. Slingerland, 87 N. Y. Ap. Div. 312 (semble); Wool v. Edenton, 113 N. Ca. 33; Sullivan v. Field, 118 N. Ca. 358; Powers v. Bumcratz, 12 Oh. St. 273; Gutridge v. Vanatta, 27 Oh. St. 366; Neil v. Board, 31 Oh. St. 15, 20 (semble); Ruffatti v. Lexington Co., 10 Utah, 386 (compare Whitehill v. Lowe, 10 Utah, 419). Nor can the defendant, properly made a defendant, unite with the defendant, improperly made a defendant, in a joint demurrer for the misjoinder. Empire Co. v. Rio Grande Co., 21 Colo. 244; People v. Stoddard (Colo. 1906), 86 Pac. R. 251; Burnett v. Preston, 17 Ind. 291; Clark v. Crawfordsville Co., 125 Ind. 277; Armstrong v. Dunn, 143 Ind. 433; Beckwith v. Dargett, 18 Iowa, 303; King v. King, 40 Iowa, 120; Cedar Bank v. Lanoy, 110 Iowa, 575; Alnutt v. Leper, 48 Mo. 319; Brownson v. Gifford, 8 How. Pr. 389; Davy v. Betts, 23 How. Pr. 396; Fish v. Hose, 59 How. Pr. 238; Burns v. Ashworth, 72 N. Ca. 496 (semble); Clark v. Boyer, 32 Oh. St. 299; Stiles v. Guthrie, 3 Okla. 26; Cohen v. Ottenheimer, 13 Oreg. 220; Lowry v. Jackson, 28 S. Ca. 318; Great Western Co. v. Ætna Co., 40 Wis. 373; Bronson v. Markey, 53 Wis. 98; Murray r. McGarigle, 69 Wis. 483; North Ass'n v. Childs, 86 Wis. 292.

But the party improperly made a defendant may demur, not, however, on the ground of a misjoinder of defendants, but because the declaration does not state facts sufficient to con

stitute a cause of action against him. Gardner v. Samuels, 116 Cal. 84; Bennett v. Preston, 17 Ind. 292, 293; Makepeace v. Davis, 27 Ind. 352; Livermore v. Norfolk Co., 186 Mass. 133, 135; Lewis v. Williams, 3 Minn. 151; Nichols v. Randall, 5 Minn. 304; Mitchell v. Bank, 7 Minn. 252, 256; Ancell v. Cape Girardeau, 48 Mo. 80; Brown v. Woods, 48 Mo. 330: Alnutt v. Leper, 48 Mo. 319; Territory v. Hildebrand, 2 Mont. 426, 429; Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304 (but see Boldt v. Budwig, 19 Neb. 739); Wood v. Olney, 7 Nev. 109; Brownson v. Gifford, 8 How. Pr. 389; Voorhies v. Baxter, 1 Abb. Pr. 43; Paxton v. Patterson, 26 Abb. N. C. 389 (but see Barnes v. Blake, 59 Hun, 371); Cohen v. Ottenheimer, 13 Oreg. 220, 224; Webster v. Tibbets, 19 Wis. 438, 448; Truesdell v. Rhodes, 26 Wis. 215, 219, 220; Gr. West. Co. v. Etna Co., 40 Wis. 373, 375; Bronson v. Markey, 53 Wis. 98; North Ass'n v. Childs, 86 Wis. 292, 298.

In a few states, misjoinder of parties defendant is one of the statutory grounds for a demurrer. Idaho, Civ. Code (1901) § 3206; Nev. Gen. St. (1885) § 3062; Rev. St. Utah, § 2962.

WAIVER. - If one improperly joined as a defendant fails to demur when he might properly demur, he waives the objection. Bensieck v. Coop, 110 Mo. 173; Burkarth v. Stephens (Kan. St. 1906), 94 S. W. 720.

B. NOT APPARENT ON FACE of DeclaratION-NEGATIVE PLEA. At common law, if the declaration in an action ex contractu did not disclose the actual misjoinder of defendants, the defendant under a denial of the alleged contract might move for a nonsuit on the ground of variance, or obtain a verdict for himself. Sherriff v. Wilks, 1 East, 48; Weall v. King, 12 East, 425 (tort based upon a contract); Cooper v. Whitehouse, 6 C. & P. 545; Eliot v. Morgan, 7 C. & P. 334; Robson v. Doyle, 3 E. & B. 396; Wickens v. Steel, 2 C. B. N. S. 488; Walcott v. Canfield, 3 Conn. 194; Supreme Lodge v. Zuhlke, 129 Ill. 298 (but objection cannot be raised if not taken at the trial. Nelson v. Smith, 54 Ill. Ap. 345); Ogle v. Miller, 128 Iowa, 474; Erwin v. Devine, 2 T. B. Mon. 124; Brown v. Warner, 2 J. J. Marsh, 37 (even tho' one defendant is an infant); Kimborough v. Ragsdale, 69 Miss. 674; Spann v. Grant, 83 Miss. 19; Robinsons v. Scull, 3 N. J. 597; Fleming v. Freese, 26 N. J. 263; Patterson v. Longridge, 42 N. J. 21 (but plea must be followed up by notice of the objection of misjoinder); Elmendorph v. Tappen, 5 Johns. 176; Livingston v. Tremper, 11 Johns. 101; Robertson v. Smith, 18 Johns. 459, 478; Rowan v. Rowan, 29 Pa. 181.

By statute, in England, and in some of our states, the objection of misjoinder of parties defendant, not apparent on the face of the declaration, can no longer be taken by a negative plea, denying the contract alleged. Such a plea, under the legislation of some of the states, justifies a verdict against those properly made defendants and in favor of the others. Rutenberg v. Main, 47 Cal. 213; Shain v. Forbes, 82 Cal. 577; Gruhn v. Stanley, 92 Cal. 86 (compare Curry v. Roundtree, 51 Cal. 184); Hubbell v. Woolf, 15 Ind. 204; Stafford v. Nutt, 51 Ind. 535; Louisville Co. v. Treadway, 142 Ind. 475, 487, 143 Ind. 702 s. c.; Crews v. Lackland, 67 Mo. 619; Conklin v. Fox, 3 Mont. 208; Knatz v. Wise, 16 Mont. 555; Ryan v. State Bank, 10 Neb. 524; Brumskill v. James, 11 N. Y. 294; Marquat v. Marquat, 12 N. Y. 336; McIntosh v. Ensign, 28 N. Y. 169; Lampkin v. Chisom, 10 Oh. St. 450; Ancker v. Adams, 23 Oh. St. 543; Grinnell v. Marine Co., 13 R. I. 135; Harrington v. Hingham, 15 Barb. 524.

SPECIAL ANSWER. — In some states the defendants may raise the objection of a misjoinder of defendants by a special answer pointing out the misjoinder. Rutenberg v. Main, 47 Cal. 213; Gruhn v. Stanley, 92 Cal. 86, 88; Conklin v. Fox, 3 Mont. 208.

In New Jersey, a negative plea must be accompanied by a notice of the objection of misjoinder of defendants. Patterson v. Longridge, 42 N. J. 21. MISJOINDER Of Defendants IN ACTION EX DELICTO. — - By the common law the joinder of superfluous persons as defendants in actions upon a joint tort is no ground of objection in any mode by those properly made defendants. A verdict and judgment was given against those properly made defendants and in favor of the others. Hardyman v. Whitaker, 2 East, 573; Govett v. Radnidge, 3 East, 62; Chaffee v. U. S., 18 Wall. 516; Hayden v. Nott, 9 Conn. 367; Swigert v. Graham, 7 B. Mon. 661 (semble); Tuttle v. Cooper, 10 Pick. 281 (semble); Keer v. Oliver, 61 N. J. 154; Lansing v. Montgomery, 2 Johns. 382; Lockwood v. Bull, 9 Cow. 322; Montfort v. Hughes, 3 E. D. Sm. 591; Pearson v. Stroman, 1 N. & McC. 354.

But see Harlem v. Emment, 41 Ill. 319. — ED.