PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. NO. III. On the true Standard of Morals. SINCE, then, happiness is the chief end of existence, utility must be the standard of morals; i. e., every action which does not increase the sum of happiness in some way or other, must be immoral; and vice versa. I feel persuaded that there is not a single action which men commit, and which the common sense of mankind approves as moral, but which will, upon examination, be found to be conducive in some measure to the general welfare. Even the sufferings which a martyr may voluntarily endure, may effect this object. The flames of a disgraceful persecution may be quenched by his death, and his example may be the means of stimulating others to rational inquiry and to the performance of noble deeds. In short, there is no action which can with strict propriety be denominated moral, unless it is adapted to promote, either immediately or remotely, the increase of happiness. A great deal has been said and written upon morality and virtue to little purpose. Perhaps the readers of this essay may feel disposed to affirm the same of its author. Be that as it may, I can scarcely forbear from making some quotations from approved works on the subject, and the first that strikes my attention is the dissertation concerning the fundamental principle of morality, or virtue, written by Edmund Law, Bishop of Carlisle, and prefixed to his translation of Archbishop King's Origin of Evil. "Though all writers of morality," observes he, " have in the main agreed what particular actions are virtuous, and what otherwise, yet they have, or at least seem to have, differed very much, both concerning the criterion of virtue-viz., what it is which denominates any action virtuous; or, to speak more properly, what it is by which we must H try any action, to know whether it be virtuous or noand also the principle or motive by which men are induced to pursue virtue. "As to the former, some have placed it in acting agreeably to nature, or reason; others, in the fitness of things; others, in a conformity with truth; others, in promoting the common good; others, in the will of God, &c. This disagreement of moralists concerning the rule or criterion of virtue in general, and, at the same time, their almost perfect agreement concerning the particular branches of it, would be apt to make one suspect, either that they had a different criterion (though they did not know or attend to it,) from what they professed, or (which, perhaps, is the true as well as the more favourable opinion) that they only talk a different language, and that all of them have the same criterion in reality, only they have expressed it in different words. "And there will appear the more room for this conjecture, if we consider the ideas themselves about which morality is chiefly conversant; viz., that they are all mixed modes, or compound ideas, arbitrarily put together, having at first no archetype or original existing, and afterwards no other than that which exists in other men's minds. Now, since men, unless they have these their compound ideas, which are signified by the same name, made up precisely of the same simple ones, must necessarily talk a different language; and since this difference is so difficult, and in some cases impossible, to be avoided; it follows that greater allowance and indulgence ought to be given to these writers than any other; and that if we have a mind to understand them, we should not always take their words in the common acceptation, but in the sense in which we find that particular author which we are reading used them. And if a man interpret the writers on morality with this due candour, I believe their seeming inconsistencies and disagreements about the criterion of virtue would in a great measure vanish; and he would find that acting agreeably to nature or reason (when rightly understood,) would perfectly coincide with the fitness of things, the fitness of things -as far as these words have any meaning-with truth, truth with the common good, and the common good with the will of God." If, therefore, the advancement of the common good be consistent with the will of heaven, he who does not endeavour to promote the happiness of man, acts both irreligiously and immorally. And if it can be proved that socialism tends to advance the common good, he who opposes it, according to the standard of morality assumed, must be an immoral character. In settling this question, it is necessary that we should define terms. The following definitions, therefore, of virtue and vice, I quote from Belsham's Mental Philosophy. 66 Virtue, in propriety of language, is applied only to voluntary qualities; namely, action, affection, habit, and character; and expresses what is excellent and worthy of choice." "Vice, in propriety of language, is applicable to the same qualities, and expresses something which renders them ineligible, and worthy of being avoided. "Actions are volitions carried into effect. "Affections and habits are tendencies to action either natural or acquired. "Character is the sum total of affections and ha bits. "Virtue is the tendency of an action, affection, habit, or character, to the ultimate happiness of the agent. "For happiness being the only consideration which renders existence valuable, the tendency to it is the only quality which renders any disposition or action eligible. Vice is the reverse of virtue; it is the tendency of action, affection, habit, or character, to produce ultimate misery, or to diminish ultimate happiness. "An action or affection, accompanied with the most exquisite gratification, may nevertheless be vicious, as it may tend ultimately to diminish happiness, or to produce misery. "Conversely, actions or affections, the performance or exercise of which may be accompanied with great present pain, may nevertheless be highly virtuous, as they may ultimately be productive of the greatest happiness. "Natural qualities, such as beauty, health, deformity, sickness, and the like, though productive of pleasure and pain, are neither virtuous nor vicious, because they are involuntary."* These are Mr. Belsham's definitions; and, so far as they go, appear to me to be tolerably correct. The only objection to his theory which is worth noticing, is that urged by Dr. Price, in his Review of Morals, p. 183, where he says, "Any the most pernicious and horrible effects will become just and fit to be produced by any being, if but the minutest degree of clear advantage or pleasure may result to him from them:" which is saying that, according to this definition of virtue, injustice, treachery, malice, and the like, would be virtues, if their tendency, in any given instance, was to produce the happiness of the agent; and justice, faithfulness, sincerity, and benevolence, would be vices, if they could be proved, in any given instance, to diminish the happiness of the agent. So that the moral value of an action depends not upon its nature, but its tendency. To this specious but unphilosophical objection Belsham answers, 66 Agreed. If absurd_principles be true, absurd conclusions will follow. Injustice, malignity, and the like, never can, in the present state of things, tend to happiness. It might with equal propriety be alleged, that if even pain should become pleasure, it would cease to be an evil." Having now stated what we conceive to be an approximation to a true theory of morals, we shall briefly notice what some celebrated writers have said upon the subject. Dr. Clarke maintains "that the eternal necessary differences in things obvious to all whose understandings are not depraved, lay a firm foundation for different relations, and for the fitness of certain actions to these relations."+ The congruity of the * Ment. Phil., p. 372. + Clarke at Bayle's Lect., fol., vol. ii:, pp. 79-88. action to the circumstances or relations in which the agent is placed, is virtue-its incongruity, vice. "These eternal necessary differences lay an obligation on men to act virtuously, separate from any consideration of the will of God, or any expectation of advantage or disadvantage annexed by natural consequence or positive appointment."* Against this theory of virtue and moral obligation, it may be and has been objected First. "That if the fitness or unfitness of actions means anything different from their tendency to happiness or misery, the expression is unintelligible." Secondly. That it is a mere petitio principii to assert, that the perception of fitness constitutes an obligation paramount to all other considerations, or even any obligation at all, to the practice of those actions which are denominated fit.” Thirdly. "It makes virtue and vice perfectly arbitrary, as depending on the imagined perception of an imaginary congruity or incongruity. It is in vain to say that these fitnesses are self-evident; for in that case they would be undisputed, which is contrary to fact." Fourthly. "It is a very gloomy system of morals. For virtue consisting in fitness, and the obligation to virtue being paramount to that of interest, and sometimes even inconsistent with it, a moral agent may, by the practice of virtue, diminish his own happiness and that of others, and the supreme being himself may have an end in view distinct from and inconsistent with the happiness of his creatures."+ Dr. Hutcheson, in his Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue, defines moral goodness to be "a property apprehended in some actions, which produces approbation and love towards the actor, from those who receive no benefit from the action; and supposes a moral sense implanted in our natures, which, independent of any argument, leads us to perform virtuous actions ourselves, or to approve them when performed by others." Now this theory assumes the moral sense to be in Clarke, at Bayle's Lect., fol., vol. ii., pp. 79-88. |