tion of Ohio, and served on the committee on the judiciary, and the committee on revision, to which the phraseology and arrangement of that great instrument was committed. It can safely be said that no member of that body was more instrumental in securing those provisions in the organic law which time has sanctioned as the surest safeguard against corporate power and the best means of securing wise and impartial legislation.

He believed in the law as right, and in its proper administration as the only method of enforcing right. This principle characterized his whole career, and, united with his comprehension of legal subjects, gave him largely the mastery of the common law as well as the legal and constitutional history of his country. His mind was analytical and his reason logical, so that, with the command of a diction singularly pure, his decisions are models of clearness, and distinguished by broad and comprehensive principles. He was twice a member of the Supreme Court of the State, and it is fortunate that one who was so instrumental in framing the fundamental law of the commonwealth was in a position to give interpretation to many of its provisions. He venerated the common law of England and yet did not hesitate to reject any of its principles, without an abiding conviction of their justice and adaptation to the genius and spirit of our own institutions. Judge Ranney might be described as Lord Campbell pictures one of the Chief Justices of England, as cultivating law as a science-having distinct objects to which it might or might not be adapted, admitting and requiring alterations and amendments, according to the varying circumstances of society. He believed in the maintenance of a just and equitable system of jurisprudence, and had an abiding conviction that the energetic efforts of a learned bar, as he pleaded for a liberal legal education, aided by a large body of educated men instructed in and devoted to its principles, and necessarily carrying the sympathy of the whole community, would make it approach nearer to that absolute and eternal justice, with no one so high as to be above its power, and no one so humble as to be beneath its protecting care. There are many here who will remember how he performed the duty now undertaken by myself, at the first meeting of the State Bar Association, with characteristic duty and fidelity, and will not forget the sound of that voice as it appealed to the profession to keep the sacred trust for making human justice, in its manifold applications to human wants and interests, more closely conform to its original and divine pattern.

THE SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF THE ADDRESS.

It is made the duty of the president of the Association, by express provision of the constitution, to deliver an address at the opening of the meeting next after his election. The framers of the constitution, with perhaps prophetic realization of this occasion, have made the president ineligible for re-election. Those who have gathered here to-day will doubtless be impressed with the wisdom of the provision. The marked professional distinction, however, awarded by my brethren of the Ohio Bar is greatly appreciated, because it bears on it the specific stamp and value of their confidence and good will. The duty still is involved in some

embarrassment, since no guidance is furnished as to the selection of topics, except what might be inferred from the scope and character of the occasion itself.

To promote reform in the law, to facilitate the administration of justice, and to uphold integrity, honor and courtesy in the legal profession, are among the declared objects of the Association.

It was thought not inappropriate, therefore, instead of a formal address on some special topic, kindred to the law, to speak informally of such matters as may affect the profession and which have transpired since the last annual meeting. This presentation, with the purposes of the organization always in view, will consist, principally of a reference to the new Federal Court of Appeals and a review of the legislation of the State as the same may relate to our Supreme Court and other inferior courts, the creation of new statutory offenses, the jury system, the amendments of the law of corporations, elections, and protection of labor, and the more important modifications or changes touching judicial procedure.

This review has been confined, within reasonable limits by a system of classification, and it is not intended that there should be more than a reference to the enactments with now and then a suggestion called forth by the principle involved in the legislation.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS.

The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was established by an act of Congress of March 3, 1891; but the selection of the judges and the organization proper of the court occurred after midsummer. The act provided for an additional judge in each circuit, and then made the new court to consist of three members, the justice of the Supreme Court assigned to the circuit, and the two circuit judges. The court is made a court of appellate jurisdiction, to hear writs of error and appeals from judgments and decrees of existing circuit and district courts of the circuit. A judge who decided the question or case which is the subject of review is disqualified to sit in the Court of Appeals. His place is supplied by the court designating a district judge of the circuit to sit and make a part of the court. All cases heard in the circuit and district courts may now be carried up for review by a higher court. In cases involving a constitutional question, a question of jurisdiction, or conviction of infamous crime, writs of error or appeals, lie directly to the Supreme Court. A decision by the Court of Appeals is final in patent cases, admiralty cases, cases in which jurisdiction is obtained solely by reason of the diverse citizenship of the parties, in revenue cases, and cases arising under criminal law, unless the judge of the Court of Appeals shall certify a question arising therein to the Supreme Court, or unless the Supreme Court shall, on motion, issue its writ of certiorari to bring up the case. This last power, the Supreme Court has said, it will only exercise to compel uniformity of decision between the Court of Appeals in the different circuits and in cases of national importance. In all other cases than those mentioned, cases decided by the Court of Appeals, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court, if the amount involved exceeds one thousand dollars.

The result of this act is that nine-tenths of all the judgments of the Court of Appeals will be final. The change effected by the law is twofold: it makes a new court of last resort for the great majority of the cases tried in the Federal Court, and it makes every case triable in those courts appealable. The decision of the judge in a court of first instance is now final. Thus is removed one objection often made to the unrestrained power of Federal judges in cases involving less than five thousand dollars.

When the Bar has become familiar with the features of the new law, it is certain that the business of the court will rapidly increase. The aggregate business of the new Circuit Court of Appeals will largely exceed the business of the Supreme Court before the passage of the new act. The act of March 3, 1891, was by joint resolution made applicable to writs of error and appeals taken after July 1, 1891. The relief intended for the Supreme Court will not therefore be fully felt until all cases filed in that court before July 1, 1891, shall have been disposed of, and this will probably not be until July, 1893, or 1894.

A bill is now pending which will probably become a law, giving to both parties, if they agree, the right to transfer any case now pending in the Supreme Court of a class cognizable under the new act by the Court of Appeals, to the latter court. It is doubtful, however, whether this will materially reduce the docket of the Supreme Court.

The new Court of Appeals is now on trial. It is too soon to express an intelligent opinion of the advantages or disadvantages of the system. One change has been suggested which might add to the national character of the new court. If the circuit judges could be assigned by the chief justice, when required to sit in the Court of Appeals of other circuits than their own, the benefit from the added judicial force of nine new judges could be equalized throughout the country. In some circuits the appellate business is comparatively small, while in others it promises soon to crowd the docket and delay the disposition of the business. In this way, the necessity for calling a district judge to sit in the Court of Appeals would be obviated. The circuit judges could give their entire time to appellate work, and the circuit and district work would be wholly attended to by district judges. The suggestion has met the approval of Senator Hoar, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and in another Congress may ripen into legislation. The circuit in which our profession is most interested is composed of the States of Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee and Michigan. The President, in selecting judges for this court, did not limit his choice to members of his own political party. This practice has not been unusual for appointments on the Bench in many of the States, but it is an innovation in the history of the national judiciary, and certainly a precedent which it would be well to follow.

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

There has been much discussion in the Association in respect to the legislation necessary for the relief of the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform has given intelligent consideration and thought to the subject. The act of the General Assembly, which

passed April 13, is perhaps not as broad and comprehensive as the legislation proposed by the Adams bill, which was approved at the last annual meeting, yet an additional judge, with the system proposed, may assist in reducing the docket. The act is amendatory to section 411 and 439 of the Revised Statutes, and supplements section 410 with an additional section. The court will hereafter consist of six judges organized in two divisions. The two judges of the Supreme Court having the shortest time to run, not holding their office by appointment or election to fill a vacancy, shall be the chief justices of their respective divisions, and as such shall preside at all terms of such division; and in case of the absence of the chief justice of a division, the judge of such division having in like manner the next shortest term shall preside in his stead, and the elder in service of the two chief justices of such division shall be the chief justice of the whole court, and as such shall preside at all terms of the court. In case of his absence, the other chief justice of a division shall preside.

It is provided that all decisions by either division of the court in causes or matters not reserved to the full court, shall be entered as the judgment of the court. When the judges composing either division divide as to a decision or a cause before it, the cause shall be reserved for decision by the full court, and when different causes involving the same question are before the respective divisions at the same time, such causes shall also be reserved for decision by the full court. If the whole court divided evenly as to the decision in any cause, the judgment of the lower court shall be entered as affirmed, and such decision shall be held to be the law as to all such questions in other causes until overruled by a majority of all the judges.

When the judges in any matter of original jurisdiction divide evenly on any question or questions involved, the determination of the members with whom the chief justice votes shall be held to be the judgment of the court.

The term of the judges of the Supreme Court to be elected in the future has been extended to six years; of the two judges to be elected in November one will be for the extended term of six years and one for the present term of five years.

The number of cases pending in the Supreme Court at the last annual meeting of the Association was 984, while the number of cases brought from that time to July 2 was 421.

Two hundred cases have been disposed of in that period. The number of motions filed was 242, while the number of motions disposed of was 248. The number of cases on the docket at the adjournment on September 26 last, was 984.

Among the most important cases decided were those involving the Standard Oil Trust, the Compulsory Education Law, the provisions of the Cincinnati Charter Act, the constitutionality of the Massie Law fixing the fees for charters on a per cent. of the capital stock of corporations, the construction of the Australian Ballot Law, the right of individuals to prefer creditors in cases of assignment, and the two cases providing for the Experimental Farm at Wooster. The Circuit Court for the Second Judicial Circuit has affirmed the judgment of the lower court that a matricide has the

right to inherit, under the statute of descents, the real estate of which his mother was seised in fee simple, and whom he willfully killed. This case has provoked some discussion in the law journals, and the decision of the court of final resort will be awaited with interest.

The patient industry of the court is an example, and must commend itself to the Bar of Ohio.

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

The General Assembly passed an act authorizing the judges of the Court of Common Pleas residing in Cuyahoga county to be paid, each out of the treasury of Cuyahoga county, twenty-five hundred dollars annually in addition to the salary now paid judges of the Court of Common Pleas out of the State treasury. This increased the salary from $4,000 to $5,000.

An additional judge of the Court of Common Pleas was authorized for the first subdivision of the Fifth Judicial District composed of the counties of Adams, Brown and Clermont, to be elected at the regular annual election for State and county officers in November.

An additional judge was authorized in the second subdivision of the Ninth Judicial district, composed of the counties of Trumbull, Mahoning and Portage, to be elected at the regular election for State and county officers in November, but with the term of office to commence on the fourth Monday of April, 1893.

There was, also, an act passed authorizing the election of an additional judge of the Court of Common Pleas for the first subdivisions of the Eighth Judicial District, composed of the counties of Muskingum, Morgan, Guernsey and Noble, to be elected the first Monday in April, 1893, but in the future to be elected at the regular election for State and county officers in November.

CLASSIFICATION OF CITIES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF OTHER INFERIOR

TRIBUNALS.

In the general classification of municipal corporations by the act of February 10, 1892, they are now divided into cities and villages; cities are divided into two classes, first and second; cities of the first class are divided into three grades, first, second and third; cities of the second class are divided into five grades, first, second, third, third a and fourth; cities of the second class which hereafter become cities of the first class, will constitute the fourth grade of the latter class, and villages which will hereafter become cities, the fourth grade of the second class.

Cities of the third grade a are defined as those which, on the first day of July, 1890, had more than 28,000 and less than 33,000 inhabitants, and those which should, on and after the passage of the act defining the classification, constitute and be, and those which on the first day of July in any year have, when ascertained in the same way, more than 28,000 and less than 33,000 inhabitants.

The official publication of the session laws specifies upon the margin of the page that the classification thus defined and minimized and described as a city of the second class, third grade a, relates to the officers of the city