provisions, if not unconscionable, and void under the statute of frauds, and that the acts done and relied upon to warrant a decree on the ground of part performance are not of such a nature that damages would not be an adequate relief, but, on the contrary, that he has within his immediate control money and property more than sufficient to compensate him for any loss sustained, a case for equitable intervention is not shown, and upon such state of facts, a court of equity is justified in refusing specific performance." In short, the court held that the trial court was fully warranted in refusing to require the alleged contract to be specifically performed as being so unreasonable in its provisions as to justify such refusal, and also for want of mutuality and not practically enforceable as to both parties, and as to the part performance relied on to take the contract out of the statute of frauds, that the contention was without merit. The doctrine is that in order that specific performance may be decreed on the ground of part performance, the acts done by the one seeking relief and relied on to warrant a decree, must be of such a nature that damages would not be an adequate relief. Williams v. Morris, 95 U. S. 444. But here, as the lower court pointed out, the plaintiff showed on the face of his petition that he had in his possession money belonging to the defendant adequate to cover any possible damages many times over. He had paid the merely nominal sum of $50.20 on the purchase price, entered into the possession of the property, done the repairing common to all farmers, expended $60 in improvements, and prepared 110 acres for crop. But he had in his own control the $920 derived from the sale of the wheat and oats, and in addition thereto the sum of $458.76, the first year's returns from the farm above the cost of obtaining it. In other words, he had lived on the farm free for over a year; had almost $1,400 of the other's money in his hands, and now complained in equity that fraud would be perpetrated upon him if the court does not enforce a contract which will allow him to remain nine years longer in possession of the land, free from any obligations with which defendant can force him to comply until the expiration of that time. Such a condition of affairs did not appeal to equitable consideration. The action of the trial court was sustained as entirely justified. We concur in that conclusion, and nothing else calls for comment. Judgment affirmed. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS. No. 233. Argued October 15, 1909.-Decided January 10, 1910. In determining whether an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be suspended or set aside, power to make-and not the wisdom of the order is the test and this court must consider all relevant questions of constitutional power or right, all pertinent questions as to whether the administrative order is within the scope of the delegated authority under which it purports to be made, and also whether even if in form it is within such delegated authority it is not so in substance because so arbitrary and unreasonable as to render it invalid. In determining whether the action of the court below was or was not correct, this court does so irrespective of the reasoning by which such action was induced. The equipment of an interstate railroad, including cars for transportation of its own fuel are instruments of interstate commerce and subject to control of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The act to regulate commerce has delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to consider, where complaint is made on that subject, the question of distribution of coal cars, including the carrier's own fuel cars, in times of car shortage, as a means of prohibiting unjust preference or undue discrimination. Under § 15 of the act to regulate commerce as amended June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 585, the Interstate Commerce Commission has power 215 U.S. Argument for Appellant. to deal with preferential and discriminatory regulations of carriers as well as with rates. It is not beyond the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to require a railroad in distributing its coal cars to take into account its own fuel cars in order not to create a preference of the mine to which such cars are assigned over other mines. Where an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission is sustained by the court below in part and only the Commission appeals, the conclusions of the court below as to those portions of the order sustained are not open to inquiry in this court. Even if commerce in regard to the purchase of coal at a mine on a railroad line by the railroad company which supplies its own cars may end there, the power to use the equipment of the railroad to move the coal is subject to the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission in order to prevent discrimination against, or undue preference of, other miners and shippers of coal. THE facts, which involve the question of whether a duty rested upon the railroad company to obey an order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission in regard to the distribution of coal cars, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Wade H. Ellis, Assistant to the Attorney General, and Mr. Luther M. Walter, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom Mr. L. A. Shaver and Mr. H. B. Arnold were on the brief, for appellant: Under §§ 12, 13, 14 of the Hepburn Act, June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, the Interstate Commerce Commission has authority to examine into and decide whether or not a railroad company is violating any of the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act with respect to furnishing cars, and to direct it to cease and desist from such violation and to prescribe just, fair and reasonable regulations with respect to such transportation. The Commission clearly had power to deal with unjust, preferential and discriminatory regulations and practices of carriers under § 15 of the act as it stood prior to the Hepburn Act. Whether or not it still exists under $15 of the amended act must be ascertained by examining the whole act as it now Argument for Appellant. 215 U.S. stands, with a view to gathering the general intent and purpose of Congress, and then by examining the various provisions by which the general intent and purpose are sought to be made effective. The general intent and spirit of the act, taken with the words themselves, show that the commission has the power. This court has held that the act should be interpreted reasonably to accomplish its great purpose, to wit, to secure just and reasonable charges, to prohibit unjust discriminations and to prevent undue and unreasonable preferences. New Haven R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 261. The phrase in § 15 should not be construed to mean only those practices which in some way increase or diminish the amount of freight charges, or directly affect rates. An order of the commission issued in pursuance of the authority conferred upon the commission by the courts is a legislative act; it becomes the law, and cannot be set aside. by the courts unless it clearly violates constitutional rights. Knoxville v. Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 8, 18; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226, 227; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 41; Noyes on American Railroad Rates, 203; Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 69 Minnesota, 353. The order of the commission must stand unless it appears, either first that the commission failed to follow the procedure required by law, or second, that upon the face of the proceedings, enforcement of the order would amount to a confiscation of property. The so-called court review provided in the Hepburn Act was not designed to, and does not, give the Federal courts any larger or different powers to protect the railroads from an invasion of constitutional rights than such courts would have possessed without any declaration on the subject. The court review amendment merely confirms the jurisdiction of the court, specifically defines the venue and authorizes suits against the commission as an agency of the Government. The history of this legislation supports no other conclusion. A suit to set aside an order of the commission is not a mere 215 U.S. Argument for Appellant. appeal from an inferior to a superior tribunal. There is no authority for the substitution of the court's judgment for the commission's judgment. The only thing before the court, if the commission proceeded regularly under the statute, is the result reached. The courts cannot inquire into the steps by which the result was reached, nor consider the methods. They have the same and no greater power to review the reasons which control the commission as they would those of Congress. When there is a shortage of cars, not enough for all, then the right of the shipper to the exclusive use of his private cars, and in addition to a full share of the system cars of the railroad company, must yield to the requirements of the law that all shippers shall have an equal right to have their goods transported. The shipper furnishing private cars is not penalized for using them by a denial to him of a full share in addition of the system cars in times of car shortage, because at such times he is not entitled to a full share of system cars if to give him such full share prevents that equality in the transportation facilities of the railroad which the act to regulate commerce requires. The cars claimed by the railroad to be private or devoted to a special use are in fact merely rented by the railroad company, and ought to be a part of its available equipment. There is no difference in principle between a railroad company's own fuel cars and foreign railway fuel cars or private cars in so far as the duty exists to count all such cars against the distributive share of the mines receiving them. Logan Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 154 Fed. Rep. 497; United States v. B. & O. Railroad Co., 165 Fed. Rep. 126; Majestic Coal Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 162 Fed. Rep. 810. The Ohio Railroad Commission and other state railroad commissions have held that it is the duty of the railroads to count their private fuel cars in apportioning the distributive shares of the available equipment to the mines. Railroad |