that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean were shocked by Liddy's plan; Mr. Magruder's staff man, Gordon Liddy, was apparently quite humiliated, and nothing was approved. In other words, if those meetings were routinely reported to Mr. Haldeman, as evidence of Mr. Magruder's administrative ability and judgment, the January and February meetings would not very likely inspire the confidence of Mr. Haldeman or the President.

Yet, Mr. Magruder testified that "as he recalled" he returned to his office after both these embarrassing meetings and routinely called Mr. Haldeman's staff assistant, me, and told me about his blunder, presumably so that I could inform Mr. Haldeman. That testimony is difficult to reconcile with good sense. Presumably, Mr. Magruder knew that Mr. Dean would report on the meetings to Mr. Haldeman-as Mr. Dean has testified he did-why would Mr. Magruder want two people reporting the same disaster to Mr. Haldeman?

It is true, however, that Mr. Magruder called me after he returned. from the March 30, 1972, meeting at Key Biscayne with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. LaRue and reported on about 30 major campaign decisions. Each of these decisions was briefly described in that rather short phone conversation. During this call, he told me, and I am repeating his words rather precisely: "A sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system has been approved with a budget of 300." Unfortunately he neither gave me, nor did I ask for any further details about the subject.

Soon thereafter I wrote one of my regular "political matters" memos for Mr. Haldeman. This particular memo for early April was 8 to 10 pages long with more than a dozen tabs or attachments, but it contained only one three-line paragraph on political intelligence. That paragraph read almost verbatim as Mr. Magruder had indicated to me over the phone. I wrote in the memo to Mr. Haldeman-Again this is almost a quote:

Magruder reports that 1701 now has a sophisticated political intelligencegathering system with a budget of 300. A sample of the type of information they are developing is attached at tab "H."

At tab "H", I enclosed a political intelligence report which had been sent to me from the committee. It was entitled Sedan Chair II. This report and two others somewhat like it that I had received began with a statement such as, "A confidential source reveals" or "a reliable source confidentially reports." This was followed by a summary of some political information.

In April 1972, I was mainly interested in reporting to Mr. Haldeman on those 30 campaign decisions and other relevant political items. I did not give much thought to what Mr. Magruder meant by "sophisticated political intelligence-gathering system." Nor did I give much thought to the real identity of Sedan Chair II, but I remember that the information dealt with Senator Humphrey's Pennsylvania organization.

However, on June 17, 1972, and afterward, as the news began unfolding about the break-in at the Democratic National Committee, I certainly began to wonder who else but people from 1701 could have been involved. I suspected that maybe the Watergate break-in was part of the sophisticated political intelligence operation Mr. Magruder had

mentioned to me on the phone in early April. And worse, I feared that Sedan Chair II's so-called confidential source might really have been a wiretap, or might in some way have been connected with the Watergate break-in. I immediately tried to call Mr. Magruder so I could have a report for Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Magruder did not return my calls on Saturday and I was not able to reach him until around noon on Sunday, when I again called him in California.

When I finally reached him and began to ask him what he knew about the Watergate break-in, he cut me off and said that he had been on the phone with Mr. Haldeman that morning and the matter was being taken care of.

I doubted that Mr. Magruder had actually spoken with Mr. Haldeman so I called Mr. Higby who clears most calls to Mr. Haldeman. Mr. Higby told me that Mr. Magruder had talked to Mr. Haldeman and that Mr. Ehrlichman was handling the entire matter.

I met with Mr. Haldeman on June 19 or 20 and showed him the April political matters memo that mentioned the intelligence gathering system. After speaking to him, I destroyed that memo and Sedan Chair II, as well as several other documents I have told this committee and the prosecutors about. I also told Mr. Dean that I had destroyed a political matters memo to Mr. Haldeman showing a $300,000 intelligence budget at the committee and three confidential source memos which I said could possibly have been wiretap reports with the sources carefully camouflaged. I did not tell Mr. Dean that I had, in fact, destroyed wiretap logs, because I was not then sure what they were, I only had suspicions.

I also told the prosecutors in April of this year what specific items I destroyed. And I told them I still suspected Sedan Chair II might have been a wiretap summary. It was not until Mr. Reisner and Mr. Porter testified before this committee in June that I learned Sedan Chair II was not an illegal wiretap, but was, instead, an informer planted in the Humphrey camp. In fact, you will recall that Mr. Magruder's testimony has established that I never received his wiretap data. Nor could I have passed it on to others or shredded a wiretap transcript. He says he made only one copy of the Watergate wiretap log, code-named "Gemstone." He testified that it was so sensitive that he would not let it out of his office.

Turning to matters after the election, I have told the committee that I returned approximately $350,000 in cash to Fred LaRue. I was not told by anyone, nor did I know what use was being made of this money. I had received the money from the campaign committee on Mr. Haldeman's instructions and, at that time, returning it to Mr. LaRue seemed appropriate since he was the top official left at the committee. I took it to him in December 1972, or January 1973, after I had left the White House staff. This money was the fund I had picked up in April 1972, for the purpose of conducting White House polling. It had not been used to pay polling expenses or originally planned and after the election I had been asking Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Higby what to do with the money.

The delivery to Mr. LaRue was made in two parts, on two occasions. In December or January, after talking to Mr. Dean, I took approximately $40,000 in two envelopes to Mr. LaRue at his apartment at the Watergate. I lived two blocks away and the delivery was made on my way home from work.

Later, I was asked to return the remainder of the money. I again called Mr. LaRue, who again asked if I could deliver it to his apartment. On this occasion, before picking up the money, Mr. LaRue donned a pair of gloves and then said, "I never saw you," I had been instructed by Mr. Dean to ask for a receipt, so I did, but Mr. LaRue refused saying "You will have to talk to John Dean about that." At that point I became more than a little suspicious. Frankly, after Mr. LaRue put on the gloves, I did not know what to say-so I said nothing. Nor did I know what to do so I left. The next day I told Mr. Dean that Mr. LaRue would not give me a receipt for the money. Mr. Dean said he would speak to Mr. LaRue about it. I don't know if he ever got the receipt, but I imagine he tried to follow up on it because I have since learned from Mr. Dean's testimony that it was Mr. Haldeman who asked that a receipt be given.

At no time did Mr. Dean or Mr. LaRue advise me what was being done with the money or that payments were being made to the defendants. Neither of them ever asked me to do or say anything that I can interpret as being part of a coverup.

In fact, there was only one occasion when I was expressly asked to do something that I knew was improper and which I could see was aimed at a coverup. That related to my upcoming grand jury testimony of April 11, 1973, and I refused to do it.

I have not attempted in my statement to describe in detail all of the subjects that I have mentioned. I have provided the committee in executive session with a good deal more of the details surrounding these subjects and I am ready to begin the questioning on these

matters.

Senator ERVIN. It is obvious that no member of the committee and no counsel can complete the questioning of Mr. Strachan today and for that reason the committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock Monday. [Whereupon at 4 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Monday, July 23, 1973.]

MONDAY, JULY 23, 1973

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,

Washington, D.C. The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, Gurney, and Weicker.

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief counsel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert Baca, office of Senator Montoya; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Ray St. Armand, assistant publications clerk.

Senator ERVIN. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will proceed to interrogate the witness.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Strachan, in your statement you indicated that you were staff assistant to Mr. Haldeman. Will you please tell us prior to that time what position you held? Did you have any other position at the White House?

TESTIMONY OF GORDON STRACHAN-Resumed

Mr. STRACHAN. Yes; I did. From August 3, 1970, until December 1970, I was also staff assistant under Mr. Klein, and I technically reported to Mr. Magruder.

Mr. DASH. What were your duties at that time?

Mr. STRACHAN. Well, I was originally recruited to be what was called a project manager. Particular issues would be assigned to one junior staff man and one senior staff man. For example, in the 1970 election the economy issue was assigned to Mr. Saffire as the senior man, and I was the junior staff assistant on that project.

Mr. DASH. Prior to this last position you stated at the White House, where were you employed?

Mr. STRACHAN. I practiced law in New York for 2 years with the law firm Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, and Alexander.

Mr. DASH. Is that the same law firm with which Mr. Mitchell was associated as a partner?