in many cases in conjunction with the assistant U.S. attorney, people were brought right to the grand jury. We tried with the ways available to us to do the very best job we could.

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, how do you test whether or not an investigation is good? Is it not in the results that are produced?

Mr. GRAY. It is in the results that are produced and we thought that we had produced some pretty decent results until all these

Mr. THOMPSON. I am not talking about the time even when you were testifying before the Judiciary Committee in February. I am talking about as of now.

Does it really matter as to how many manhours were expended or how many interviews were conducted or how many agents were assigned to the case if the results were not produced, if the job in effect was not done, as it appears to be in certain cases now? It has nothing to do with the motivations or any evil intent on behalf of anyone.

Mr. GRAY. I realize that, Mr. Thompson, but I still say to you that on the basis of everything that we had to work with and on the people we interviewed I think that those agents did a magnificent job.

Mr. THOMPSON. Let's discuss a few of those, and if your recollection of any of these matters differs from my notes, please tell me. This is based on limited information, but I believe, for example, Mr. Haldeman was not interviewed at all; is that right?

Mr. GRAY. Yes, sir; that is correct, and that was taken up during the meetings that we had prior to my confirmation hearings and I asked the question and was told by the senior executives that we had absolutely no leads that led to Mr. Haldeman and no lead was set out to interview Mr. Haldeman.

Mr. THOMPSON. That gets to another point.

You mentioned several times that you were not naturally curious, or that you were not curious. But does not a good investigator, just from the standpoint of an investigator, have to be very curious and does he not have to follow the leads out to their logical conclusions and their logical possibilities?

Here you had the Committee To Re-Elect. Here, if I recall, you had people caught inside of the DNC, some were employees of the Committee To Re-Elect. You knew, of course, the Committee To Re-Elect was the President's committee. You realized that Mr. Haldeman had contacts, to say the least, with the Committee To Re-Elect, and there certainly were contacts between the White House and the Committee To Re-Elect, and if anything beneficial was derived from the DNC by the Committee To Re-Elect or any of its agents that there was a very good possibility that someone in the White House would know about it or that it would be possibly useless or not as useful. These are, of course, matters of speculation, but aren't these things that investigators are supposed to do, speculate to the logical conclusion, and if you did would that not lead directly to Mr. Haldeman?

Mr. GRAY. No, sir; I would have to say, Mr. Thompson, in all fairness and with respect to you, that my agents did not come up with any leads going to Mr. Haldeman and, as a matter of fact, I think all of us were babes in the woods there with regard to the relationship that existed. We did not know of that relationship that existed.

Mr. THOMPSON. You did not ask?

Mr. GRAY. No, I didn't, I did not.

Mr. THOMPSON. I believe you did interview Mr. Ehrlichman. You interviewed him once, very early in the game, as I understand it.

Mr. GRAY. That is right, sir; and that documentation is in the record and as I recollect that was at the request of the Assistant U.S. Attorney Silbert working with the case agents.

Mr. THOMPSON. There seemed to be various people who might be described as principals now who were interviewed only once and very early. It seems as things developed, as new disclosures were being made, these people were not being reinterviewed. Who made the determination as to who was to be interviewed?

Mr. GRAY. Those leads were originated and generated right down at the working level, the case agent level working with the Assistant U.S. Attorney and subject to review, of course, by the field supervisor and even by the special agent in charge of the Washington field office and then even up into FBI headquarters with the Bureau supervisor working on the case and with the Assistant Director of the General Investigative Division.

Mr. THOMPSON. You mentioned you were hamstrung because of the information that was being furnished to you by the people who were interviewed. Who makes the determination as to what questions or what lines of inquiry are pursued with the individuals who are interviewed?

Mr. GRAY. I asked that question of my people and there is documentation before this committee with regard to that which sets forth the fact that no agent is specifically told the questions to ask and how to ask the questions, that these men are pretty well trained as investigators and reliance is placed upon them to ask the proper questions and I believe that they did.

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, Gordon Strachan, as an example, was interviewed and evidently interviewed rather extensively but he also evidently was interviewed only with regard to the Segretti situation. Of course, hindsight again is better than foresight, but with regard to whether or not he ever saw any materials which could be construed as results of electronic eavesdropping, I assume in the interview you found out he personally did have contact with the Committee To ReElect and in effect, was Haldeman's liaison between the White House and the committee. The questions about those possibilities is that even though there were no leads, or perhaps not even any accusations, those possibilities were not pursued with Mr. Strachan when he was interviewed on August 28.

Mr. Magruder was interviewed on July 20 and evidently was interviewed with regard to financial matters only. He testified at the trial, I think primarily with regard to financial matters and, of course, we know that he was receiving these results from his own testimony.

Dean, I believe, was in fact interviewed on June 26 or 27, but only with regard to the materials in Mr. Hunt's safe.

So it does seem that not only might you have been hamstrung by the particular answers you were getting, if you were being lied to, of course, but someone was hamstringing himself in not pursuing these other inquiries or not going back and following up on them.

Is this an unfair characterization or does this not seem to be true? Mr. GRAY. I think it may be a little unfair because I cannot really account for the state of mind of the agents with regard to the specific

questions that they are asking and I do know that the prosecution strategy was to endeavor to drive to conviction. Convictions were obtained on the basis of the FBI investigations and then after conviction to hope that some of those convicted would disclose some relevant facts, which is indeed what occurred.

Mr. THOMPSON. This is no excuse, of course, if these facts are true. The earlier that this information could be derived the better, I would assume, would it not, regardless of prosecution?

Mr. GRAY. That is correct, Mr. Thompson, but what I am saying to you is that I do not know the state of mind of each one of those individual agents as he asked questions and developed his report and as those reports were viewed. I really do not.

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, again, going back to what we were discussing a minute ago, I do not think it is as important as to the state of mind of the agent because I do not know of anyone who is accusing any field agent of doing other than what he thought his job was. But with regard to whether or not it was in fact a good investigation, even in retrospect. Lest there be any intimation that there were political considerations with regard to these men, you might point out the political composition or lack of political composition of the Bureau itself, the agents. I do not know how many people realize how much turnover there is within the Bureau, for example, when a new administration comes in. Could you tell us briefly about that composition of the Bureau?

Mr. GRAY. Relatively none, sir. Right behind me and all down the line throughout the ranks of the FBI you have all career professionals. The only people during my tenure who were not career professional members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were the Acting Director and his personal staff.

Mr. THOMPSON. Of course, you were appointed by the President? Mr. GRAY. Yes, sir; I was appointed by the Attorney General, sir. Mr. THOMPSON. And you have related several matters here of contacts with the White House which evidently caused you some concern during the course of this investigation. Mr. Ehrlichman canceled a meeting which you were going to participate in, I believe, and Mr. Walters.

You were concerned about what was going on with regard to the CIA implications and you took it upon yourself to talk to the President about the matters which I believe you stated was something you did not do lightly.

You were receiving requests from John Dean for FBI material and, although you ultimately determined that it was the correct thing to do, you were, I suppose, sufficiently concerned that you asked for a legal memorandum or a legal opinion from your own people to make sure you were on firm ground?

Mr. GRAY. I knew I was on firm ground. What I wanted to do, I testified earlier, I took a step in the direction of standardizing within the Federal Bureau of Investigation the delivery of such materials through the Cabinet officer, and if you will look at that particular memorandum that was developed you will find comments are made right in there that Mr. Hoover disseminated when and wherever he wanted and this has been the practice in the Federal Bureau of Investigation and I was trying to reach a different objective.

96-296 0-73-pt. 9- -11

Mr. THOMPSON. But these were contacts that you were having or questions or matters that I assume caused some thought in your mind as to whether or not they were the correct things to do. I am especially referring to the cancellation of the meeting and the things that led up to the telephone call from the President, and what you told him on July 6. My question relates to the inquiry Senator Baker was pursuing awhile ago, what would lead us to believe that future Directors would not have these same contacts by White House personnel and what would lead us to believe anything other than that they would feel that they should acquiesce or do what the boss is ordering in effect. Does this point out some structural defect in the FBI or some situation with regard to the relationships between the FBI and the Justice Department or the FBI and the White House that should be rectified?

Mr. GRAY. I think every President has looked upon the FBI as his own province, not just this President. In fact, research that we did in the Federal Bureau of Investigation on this question revealed just that. And I think that the one suggestion that I did make to Senator Baker is that I do not fear the FBI as an independent agency with the idealistic, properly motivated individual there as head, reporting through an oversight committee or committees here in the Congress. I wanted to do that. I had that as one of the proposals that I made and I think it will work. I met with the House Judiciary Committee early in the game, I wanted that kind of relationship with the legislative branch because the FBI is in a difficult position in its present matrix. Mr. THOMPSON. Would that take it out of the Justice Department, according to your

Mr. GRAY. According to my view it would be an independent agency,

yes.

Mr. THOMPSON. Would this completely absolve the difficulties with regard to the relationship the Director might have with the White House?

Mr. GRAY. I don't know that it would. It is pretty broad that I could answer you and say that it would completely resolve it. I think that the matter is going to have to be studied a little more intensely, Mr. Thompson, than you and I could discuss it.

Mr. THOMPSON. Under your recommendation, then, I assume the Director would not be looking to the President as his direct employer, so to speak, as the situation exists now.

Mr. GRAY. That is correct.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Gray.

Senator ERVIN. Any further question from any member of the committee?

Captain Gray, you have cooperated fully with the committee and the staff in these hearings and I want to thank you on behalf of the committee for your cooperation.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the vice chairman and the members of the committee and the committee staff for the courtesies shown to me in a difficult situation. Thank you, sir. Senator ERVIN. The committee will stand in recess until 9:30 a.m. tomorrow.

[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned until Tuesday, Aug. 7, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.]

TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1973

U.S. SENATE,

SELECT COMMITTEE ON

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,

Washington, D.C. The Select Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:45 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, Gurney, and Weicker.

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred B. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief counsel; Arthur S. Miller, chief consultant; Jed Johnson, consultant; David M. Dorsen, James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsels; R. Phillip Haire, Marc Lackritz, William T. Mayton, Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Schochet, assistant majority counsels; Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel; Donald G. Sanders, deputy minority counsel; Howard S. Liebengood, H. William Shure, and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Pauline O. Dement, research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Senator Inouye; Robert Baca, office of Senator Montoya; Ron McMahan, assistant to Senator Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flanigan, assistant publications clerk.

Senator ERVIN. The commitee will come to order.

The committee met in executive session this morning and decided to postpone filing a suit until counsel for the committee have an opportunity to ascertain and study the reaction of the White House attorneys to the motion of the Special Prosecutor.

I would like to put in the record a statement of the American Nurses Association setting out the code of the nurses in respect to their attitude toward revealing confidential information they acquire while serving the patients.

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 144A*.] Senator ERVIN. The counsel will call the first witness.

Mr. DASH. Former Attorney General Richard Kleindienst.

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Kleindienst, will you stand and hold up your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. KLEINDIENST. I do.

Senator ERVIN. You might identify yourself for the purposes of the record, giving your name and address.

See p. 3855.