section is confined to the assignees of the reversion of the whole, but the second section applies to assignees of the reversion of a part of the estate. In Kitchen v. Buckly, this question was not raised. If the construction contended for by the other side should be put upon this statute, the lessor may subject his lessee to a multiplicity of actions against his consent, for the lessee will be subjected to as many actions as the lessor may choose to divide the reversion into parts. BAYLEY J. Although it has never been expressly decided, that the assignee of the reversion of part of the demised premises can maintain this action against the lessee, yet, when the question comes fairly to be considered, I cannot entertain any doubt that covenant will lie both by and against the assignee of the reversion of part of the premises. The 32 H. 8. c. 34. s. 1., enacts, "that the grantees or assignees of any reversion or reversions, shall have the like advantages against the lessees by entry for non-payment of the rent, or for doing of waste or other forfeiture, and also shall have all such like and the same advantage, benefit, and remedies, by action only, for not performing of other conditions, covenants, or agreements contained and expressed in their leases, demises, or grants against the lessees, as the lessors or grantors themselves might have had at any time." The words therefore apply to conditions as well as to covenants, and are sufficiently large to include persons who are grantees of the reversion, either of the whole or part of the property, which is the subject of the lease. That part, however, which applies to conditions which in their very nature are entire, is necessarily confined to the assignees of the reversion 1818. TWYNAM against PICKARD. 1818. TWYNAM against PICKARD. reversion of the whole of the premises. The authorities cited in the course of the argument, to shew that the assignees of the reversion of part are not within the act, were cases of conditions, and do not apply to covenants. I do not agree to the distinction taken in the argument, between the first and second sections of the act, for the words used in both sections are substantially the same, and must receive the same construction. The only difference is, that the words in the first section apply to the assignee of the reversion; those in the second section, to the assignee of the term. Then, except in cases where the construction of the statute is confined by the use of the word condition, and the nature of the thing, there is no good reason why the word assignee in the statute should not be held to extend to the assignee of the reversion in part, as well as of the whole of the premises. In Palmer v. Edwards (a), it was held, that the assignee of part of the premises from the lessee might maintain covenant against the lessor ; and there Buller J. considered the remedies as mutual. In Congham v. King, it was held, that the lessor might maintain covenant against the assignee of part of the premises demised. These authorities seem to shew, that the severance of the estate demised does not take away the mutual remedies. I have always understood it to be clear law, that covenant was maintainable by the assignee of the reversion in part. In Kitchen v. Buckly, this objection, if valid, would have succeeded; and it can hardly be supposed, that if it had been considered valid, it would have been overlooked. In Pyot v. Lady St. John (b), a person seised in fee of one (a) 1 Dougl. 187. (b) Cro. Jac. 329. mes messuage, and possessed of a term of years in other premises, demised both for ten years to Lady St. John, by one lease, and then, by separate deeds, conveyed the reversion in fee, and the reversion for years to Pyot. On an action of covenant being brought, it was objected, that Pyot ought to have brought several actions, but no objection was taken, that he was possessed, by each separate deed, only of the reversion of part of the premises. The Court held, that though he might have brought several actions, still the bringing only one action was well enough. But if this objection had been valid, that decision could not have taken place; because it would have been an obvious answer to say, that several actions would not lie, inasmuch as in each it must have appeared that Pyot was only assignee of the reversion in part. Upon authority, therefore, as well as principle, I am of opinion, that this action is maintainable; and, therefore, that there must be judgment for the plaintiff. ABBOTT J. I am of the same opinion. The statute makes no material distinction between the assignee of the reversion and the assignee of the term. It has been decided, that the assignee of part of the premises for the term may maintain this action, and it therefore appears to me to follow that the assignee of the reversion of part may do the same. HOLROYD J. I am also of opinion that this action is maintainable. The cases cited in argument apply only to conditions, with respect to which the statute expressly enacts," that assignees shall have the like ad vantages 1818. TWYNAM against PICKARD. 1818. TWYNAM against PICKARD. vantages against the lessees by entry for non-payment of rent, or for doing of waste or other forfeiture, as the leesors would have had." Now if the lessor assigned the reversion of part of the premises to another, his right of entry would be gone, for in Knight's case (a), it was expressly held, that the severance of any part of the reversion destroyed the whole condition (which was entire, and the breach of which gave one entire right of entry into the whole premises on non-payment of rent ;) that being so, the lessor at common law would have no right, in such a case, to vacate the lease by entry, and consequently his assignee would not have that right under the statute. But that does not apply to the case of covenants, for three, although the lessor has granted away part of the demised premises, still at common law he might maintain covenant against the lessee, and therefore it seems to me, that his assignee of part of the demised premises is entitled under the statute to maintain that action. (a) 5 Coke, 55. b. Judgment for Plaintiff. (6) (b) In Shepherd's Touchstone, 176., the following is stated, among the covenants of which grantees shall take advantage by the stat. H.8.: "As where a lessee for life or years doth covenant with his heirs to keep the houses demised in good reparation, or the like, and after the lessor doth grant away the reversion of all, or part of the houses to J. S., in this case J. S. shall take advantage for any breach of the covenant in his time, but not for any breach before the time the reversion was granted." And Pime's case, Mich. 8 Jac. is cited. 1818. REES against WARWICK. ASSUMPSIT, by the indorsee of a bill of exchange The bill was drawn by against the acceptor. Dennison, Benson, and Co. upon the defendant, payable two months after date to the order of Johnson and Co., and by the latter indorsed over to the plain tiff. Plea, general issue. At the trial at the last Lancaster assizes before Bayley J., it appeared, that on the 4th of May, the day after the bill was drawn, the drawers wrote the following letter to the defendant. Yesterday we valued upon you, favour W. Johnson and Co. two months for 1007. which please to honour." In reply to which the defendant wrote word " your bill 100l. to W. Johnson and Co. shall have attention." Before the last letter had arrived the bill had been in the possession of Johnson and Co.; but the letter was afterwards communicated to them, and by them to the plaintiff previously to the bill being indorsed over to him. The learned Judge, at the trial held, first, that in order to make this an acceptance the letter ought to have been written to the payee, and not to the drawer of the bill; and, secondly, that the phrase "shall have attention," did not amount to an acceptance, but left it still open to the defendant to refuse to accept the bill. On its being suggested that in the dealings between these parties, these particular words had meant the acceptance of the bill to which they were applied, he permitted other letters written by the defendant to the drawee, concerning other bills which had been paid by him, to be given in evidence, in order to VOL. II. prove I |