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their interest in the ship and freight; and this appears
to be the true construction of this clause, from the
fourth section of the act, which expressly provides, in
the case of a master or mariner being part-owner, that
his responsibility as master or mariner shall, notwith-
standing that circumstance, continue.
This case,
therefore, falls as well within the principle as within
the express words of the act of parliament, and the
defendants are not liable beyond the value of the
ship and freight. Supposing that to be so, then that
value must be the value at the time of the loss, and
not at the time of the shipment; for the words “at
the time of the happening of such loss or damage,"
refer to the whole antecedent words: if they did not,
and the construction contended for on the other side be
correct, the value of the ship and freight must be cal-
culated from different periods; that of the ship at the
time of the shipment, and that of the freight at the time
of the loss. The argument that the freighters look to
the apparent value of the ship at the time of the ship-
ment, as the fund to indemnify them, wholly fails, upon
considering the entire clause; for the statute contem-
plates not only the case of damage to goods shipped on
board, but also damage done to any other ship; that
argument, therefore, clearly does not apply to the case
contemplated in the latter part of the clause, yet the
limitation of responsibility is exactly the same in both
cases. In the case, too, of a change of owners, during
the voyage, and a subsequent loss accruing, to what ex-
tent would the new owners be liable? if they purchased
at a price lower than the value of ship and freight,
what pretence would there be for saying that they were
liable for the original value, when she sailed? or if, on

the

1818.

WILSON against

DICKSON.

1818.

WILSON against DICKSON.

the other hand, they had purchased her during the voyage, at a price higher than the original value, would they be liable only for the original, and not the then actual value? The meaning of the statute clearly was to limit the responsibility to that amount, which constituted the existing value to the then owners, not to that which was the value at a former period to others. The effect, however, of the argument on the other side would be, to make them responsible to the amount, not of the present, but of the former value of the ship. The value therefore must be taken at the time of the loss, and not of the shipment. As far as the freight is concerned, the owners are liable only for the amount of freight due or to grow due, not for freight earned: here the freight paid by anticipation did not come within that description, and therefore it is not to be taken into the

account.

BAYLEY J. This was a special action on the case brought by the plaintiff against the defendants as jointowners of the ship Hope, on account of the loss of certain goods therein laden belonging to the plaintiff'; the nature of the loss was, the improper sale (by Patterson the captain and part owner) of those goods in the course of the voyage: the cause was referred, and the arbitrator has by his award submitted for the consideration of the Court three questions which arise upon the 53 G.3. c. 159. The first question is, whether, inasmuch as there was fault or negligence on the part of one of the three owners, that takes away the protection given by the statute to the other part-owners? and supposing his fault does not take away from the others (who are sued jointly with him) the protection

of this statute, the second question is, whether the value of the ship in this act of parliament is the value at the time of the loss, or at the time when the ship commenced her voyage? and the third question is, whether, under the words "freight due or to grow due," that part of the freight which was paid by anticipation is to be taken into the account? Upon the first point the arbitrator was of opinion that upon the true construction of this act, the defendants being sued jointly, and no fault being imputable to more than one of them, in the form in which this action was brought the defendants were entitled to the benefit of the act, and were not responsible beyond the value of the ship and freight. And in this respect it seems to me the arbitrator came to the proper conclusion. The object of this act of parliament is to limit the responsi bility of ship-owners, and the words of the first section are, "that no person or persons who is, are, or shall be owner or owners, or part-owner or owners of any ship or vessel, shall be subject or liable to answer for or make good any loss or damage arising or taking place by reason of any act, neglect, matter or thing done, omitted or occasioned, without the fault or privity of such owner or owners, which may happen to any goods, wares, merchandize, or other things, laden or put on board the same ship or vessel, or which may happen to any other ship or vessel, or to any goods, wares, merchandize, or other things being in or on board of any other ship or vessel further than the value of his or their ship or vessel, and the freight due or to grow due for and during the voyage which may be in prosecution, or contracted for at the time of the happening of such loss or damage." The act therefore

con

1818.

WILSON

against DICKSON

1818.

WILSON against DICKSON.

contemplated two descriptions of losses, the one a loss or damage to the cargo laden on board the ship, the other a loss or damage to an unconnected ship or her cargo. This is not the first act of parliament which limitted the responsibility of ship-owners: for the 7 G. 2. c. 15. was an act passed for the same purpose, but the words "part-owner or owners" were certainly not used in that statute, and I rather think they are for the first time introduced into this act. Without however considering whether those words were previously introduced into any intermediate statute or not, it is clear that the use of them in this act shews an anxiety on the part of the legislature to explain the words "owner or owners," used in the 7 G. 2. c. 15., and to give a protection to part-owners which might not have been given under the general words owner or owners. Indeed it seems as if those terms were introduced as a legislative exposition of the words "owner or owners" as used in the former statute. It is admitted that the words in the first section are sufficiently large to give the protection of the statute to these defendants, but it is said that the object of the statute was to protect the owners against the acts of their servants, and not against their own acts; that this is a loss occasioned by the act of one of several partners, and that therefore the whole are liable. But part-owners though jointly liable to the persons with whom they contract on account of the ship, yet in many respects stand in a very different situation from that of partners; and for this amongst other reasons, that in the case of a partnership every man knows who his partner is, but when one part-owner sells his share, the remaining partowners not being privy to the instrument by which the new part-owners are created, may be entirely ig6

norant

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norant of the fact who the person is who has become
a part-owner with them. And it is to be observed,
also, that the words of the statute are "that they shall
not be liable for any act, &c. without the fault or privity
of such owner or owners," without saying, "or any
of them." So that it seems that the true construction
of the clause is this, that if you sue a sole owner,
and the fault or privity were in him, he will be ex-
cluded from the protection of the statute: but if you
sue several owners, then the words applicable to that case
are" without the fault or privity of such owners," the
fair and true construction of which is, that there must
be the fault or privity of each. The fourth section
of the act seems to shew that that is the right construc-
tion; for that section provides that "nothing shall
lessen or take away any responsibility to which any
master or mariner of any ship may now by law be
liable, notwithstanding such master or mariner may be
an owner or part-owner, &c." It seems to me that the
meaning of that clause is, that if the master be a part-
owner, his responsibility, if you sue him in his character
of master and not as one of several part-owners, will not
be affected by the first section of the act, but that if
you sue him as one of the part-owners with the other
part-owners, the circumstance of the loss being oc-
casioned by his fault and with his privity will not take
away from the other part-owners the protection which
the first section of the statute intended to give to them.

The second question is, at what period of time you are to estimate the value of the ship: the words of the act as to that point are, "further than the value of his or their ship or vessel, or the freight due or to grow due during the voyage which may be in prosecution, or

con

1818.

WILSON against DICKSON.

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