with some qualifications; as for instance, if a factor, even with goods in his possession, acts beyond the scope of his authority, and pledges them, the principal is not bound: or if a broker, having goods delivered to him, is desired not to sell them, and sells them, but not in market overt, the principal may recover them back. The truth is, that in all cases, excepting where goods are sold in market overt, the rule of caveat emptor applies. I think therefore, that this case differs materially from the cases cited, which are those of principal and factor, and that therefore this claim of set-off cannot be allowed. Judgment for Plaintiffs.. 1818. BARING against CURRIE The KING against The Inhabitants of IDLE. UPON an appeal against an order of two justices, by which Mary Wade and her bastard child were removed from the township of Idle to the township of Rawden, in the west riding of the county of York, the Sessions confirmed the order as to the mother, but discharged it as to the child, subject to the opinion of this Court on the following case :— The pauper Mary Wade's settlement, was admitted to be in the township of Rawden, derivatively under her father John Wade. For several years prior to the 4th October 1817, the said John Wade was an efficient member of a friendly society, legally established in pur Saturday, The 35 G. 3 repeal 33 G. 3. c. 101. did not c. 54. And, therefore, where an unemancipated daughter was delivered of a bastard child in the township of I. during her father's resi dence there, under a certifi cate acknow ledging him to be a member of a Friendly Society, esta blished under 33 G. 3. c. 54. Held that such certificate extended not only to him, but to all the members of his family also; that the daughter, therefore, was at the time of her delivery residing in the township under the authority of 35 G. 3. c. 54., and that by sect. 25. of that act the settlement of the child followed that of the mother. 1818. The KING against The Inhabitants of IDLE of his present suance of the act passed in the 33d year Topping and Starkie, in support of the order of sessions. The 35 G. 3. c. 101. repealed the 33 G. 3. c. 54. the friendly society act. For the former act made all persons irremoveable till actually chargeable, and the only object of the 33 G. 3. was to exempt members of friendly societies from being removeable till actually chargeable. The latter act, therefore, was virtually repealed by becoming unnecessary. But, at any rate, this woman was not living under the authority of the 33 G. 3. when the child was born; for even supposing that act unrepealed, still its protection only continues till the person becomes actually chargeable : and here, being pregnant of a bastard child, she was by by 35 G. 3. c. 101. s. 6. actually chargeable. Then, if Scarlett and E. Alderson, contrà. The 33 G. 3. cannot have been repealed by 35 G. 3., for many of its provisions are still in force, and are wholly untouched by the latter act: as, for instance, the clause which states that the servants and apprentices of such certificated persons shall not gain settlements thereby. Then, if not repealed, this woman was residing under the authority of the act. It is found by the case that she was a member of her father's family at the time, and the certificate extends not merely to him, but to his family. This has been decided in the case of certificates under 8 and 9 W. 3.; and Rex v. Great Yarmouth, cited on the other side, is an authority on 1818. The KING against The Inhabitants of IDLE. 1818. The KING against The Inhabit ants of IDLE. that point. And the words of 8 and 9 W. 3. are precisely similar to those of 33 G. 3. The seventeenth clause says, that the party shall not be removed till he be actually chargeable, or be found to ask relief for himself and family; and that then, and not before, it shall be lawful to remove him, together with his family.. In truth, the rule laid down is, that the pater-familias includes his family, and that a certificate granted to him is virtually granted to his family also. Then, does 35 G. 3. c. 101. make any difference? That act was passed to prevent unnecessary removals. But inasmuch as unmarried women with child were sure to bring burthens on parishes, unless removed before delivery, that act made them actually chargeable. Where, however, this inconvenience did not exist, viz. in cases where the bastards, when born, would follow the mother's settlement, it was natural to expect that such power of removal (being unnecessary) should not be given. And accordingly there is a proviso introduced at the end of the sixth section for that purpose, which states that "all acts touching bastard children shall remain in full force, as well in cases where by this act the place of settlement of such child is directed to be the same as that of the mothers of such children, as where the place of settlement of such children remains the same as before this act." This proviso, therefore, limits the operation of the sixth section to cases where the removal is necessary, in order to prevent the child from being settled where born: and therefore this case is not within the clause. This is strongly supported by what fell from the Court in Rex v. Great Yarmouth. But even supposing that the mother in strict law was removeable, still it does not follow that the officers of Idle were bound to have removed her; and if they did not, she may still be considered as residing under the authority of 33 G. 3. And the other township has lost no advantage; for, if the mother had been removed, the child would have been born there, and so would have been clearly settled with them: and that is all that is sought to be done now. ABBOTT C. J. This case has been most fully and satisfactorily discussed, and the opinion I had originally formed has been changed in the course of the argument. I am of opinion that the original order of the two magistrates was good, and that the sessions were mistaken in their judgment. It has been argued that the friendly society act was repealed by the subsequent act of the 35 G. 3. c. 101, which provides that no person shall be removeable from any parish until actually chargeable, and thus, it is said, rendered wholly unnecessary the former protection by certificate under the friendly society act. But I think that is not so: for it may be very convenient, notwithstanding the effect of the 35 G. 3. to keep the provisions of the 33 G. 3. in force. In many cases, a labourer who might wish to come into a parish might not be able to obtain employment there, for fear that, by so doing, he might bring burdens upon the parish. But if he came with a certificate from a friendly society, that fear would be removed. It would therefore be depriving the members of such societies of a material benefit, if we were to hold the 35 G. 3. to be a virtual repeal of the provisions of the 33 G. 3. Then the question arises, who are the persons protected by the latter act? The object of the act being to facilitate the finding of employment, 1818. The KING against The Inhabitants of IDLE. |