1819. The KING against WHEELER. this degree of heat; he does not say, during what length of time the process is to be continued, but contents himself with saying, that "the proper degree of heat, and time of exposure, will be easily learned by experience, the colour of the internal part of the prepared grain affording the best criterion;" not even mentioning what the colour is, which is to be the criterion. A specification which casts upon the public the expense and labour of experiment and trial is undoubtedly bad. If it be said, that all these matters will be well or easily known to a person of competent skill, (and to such only the patentee may be allowed to address himself,) then the inventor will not in reality have given any useful or valuable information to the public; so that in either way of viewing the case, there is either no certain and clear process described, or the process described is such as might be practised without the assistance of the patentee. For these reasons, we think the direction at Nisi Prius was right, and consequently that no rule should be granted. Rule refused. Thursday, Feb. 4th. Court will not set aside an The KING against The Sheriffs of LONDON, in a Cause of TODD and Others against JACOB. Practice. The ARULE had been obtained by Comyn, calling on the plaintiffs to shew cause why the attachment obtained against the sheriffs, for not bringing in the body, should not be set aside upon payment of costs. It appeared upon the affidavits, that the defendant's attorney had applied to the filazer for a copy of the writ, and attachment against the sheriff for not bringing in the body on payment of costs, on the applica tion of the defendant, who swore to merits, that in the copy so given, one of the plaintiffs, by mis where it appeared that no bail-bond had been taken by the sheriff. take, take, was described by the name of John instead of James, and bail was put in in due time in the name of John. The plaintiffs took no notice of it, and proceeded by attachment against the sheriffs, for not bringing in the body, after which the defendant had become bankrupt. Bail was then put in the proper name, and the defendant's attorney swore to merits. It appeared upon the affidavits that no bail-bond had been taken. Bolland shewed cause. This must be considered as an application on the part of the sheriffs or their officer, and not on behalf of the defendant. It is sworn that the sheriffs neglected to take a bail-bond; and if no bailbond was taken, there is no ground for this application, for the defendant could not be damnified by the attachment. This, therefore, must be considered as, in fact, an application in behalf of the sheriffs, and then the affidavit of merits is immaterial. The Court were of that opinion, and refused to set aside the attachment, as they considered it was in reality an application by the sheriffs' officer, he being the only person interested in setting aside the attachnient; and therefore discharged the rule with costs. 1819. The KING against The Sheriffs of LONDON. MORRIS against HUNT. Thursday, Judgment signed after a summons for THE rule to plead expired on Saturday, the 16th Practice. further time to plead is return able, is irre gular. 1819. MORRIS against HUNT. signed judgment. A rule nisi having been obtained for. setting aside this judgment, for irregularity, the Court, after hearing Scarlett and Smedley against the rule, held, that the judgment was irregular, not having been actually signed till after the summons was returnable; and they said that this was distinguishable from Calze v. Lord Lyttleton (a), where the judgment was signed before the summons was returnable, and the rule was therefore made absolute. (a) 2 Black. 954. Thursday, Feb. 4th. A carrier is liable for gross negligence, although the goods are above the value mentioned in his public notice, and although they are not specially entered and insured. Ас BIRKETT against WILLAN and Others. CTION by the plaintiffs against the defendants, as proprietors of the London and Exeter coach, to recover the value of a box of cochineal, sent by their reached reached Exeter on a Saturday, and on that evening a man enquired at the office, if a box had arrived for Mr. Worthy, and upon being answered that such a box had arrived, he asked what the price of the carriage was, and whether he might have it on the next day, the answer given was, that the price was 16s. 6d., and that parcels were never sent out on a Sunday, but that by sending for it, he might have it. A labouring man standing near the inn on Sunday night was accosted by a stranger, and promised 6d. if he would fetch from the office a box directed for Mr. Worthy. Upon his assenting, 16s. 6d. was given him to pay for the carriage, and he went to the office and asked for Mr. Worthy's box. Upon the book-keeper's asking, who had sent him, he replied, he did not know the person, but it was a man in the street; the book-keeper said he had two packages for Mr. Worthy, the one a box, the other a small parcel; the man said that he had only money to pay for the box, but that he would ask the person who had sent him, for money to pay for the parcel also, and on his going out of the office and so doing, the other told him he would only have the box then, and would leave the parcel till the following day. The book-keeper then delivered the box to the man who had applied for it, and the latter delivered it to the stranger who had employed him. It was proved, that the letter of order was not written by Worthy, the correspondent of the plaintiffs. It was further proved, that at the coach-office of the defendants in London, where the box was delivered, there was affixed a public notice," that the proprietors would not be answerable for any package of more than 57. value, if lost or damaged, unless the same be specified, and insurance paid over and above the common carriage;" but the porter A a 3 who 1819. BIRKETT against WILLAN. 1819. BIRKETT against WILLAN. who carried the parcel to the office, swore, that he did not see the notice, and it was not proved that the plaintiff himself had any knowledge of the contents of such notice. Upon these facts, the learned Judge directed the jury first, that if they believed the plaintiff knew the contents of the notice, that they should find a verdict for the defendants; but, secondly, if they did not believe that the plaintiff was acquainted with the terms of the notice, that then they should consider in this case whether there had been any want of care in the defendants having delivered the parcel to the person who came for it; he added that if a parcel was directed to a person generally, in such a place as Exeter, without specifying his place of abode, the carrier was not bound to carry that parcel to any place, but he would fully discharge his duty by delivering it at his office, to any person coming from the person to whom it was so directed, or whom he might reasonably suppose to come from that person; and he left it to the jury to say, whether, under the circumstances proved, the defendant had reasonable ground for thinking, that the man to whom he did deliver the parcel came from the person to whom it was directed. The jury found a verdict for the defendants. A rule nisi for a new trial had been obtained by Marryat, on the ground that the jury had been directed to find a verdict for the defendants, if they thought the plaintiff was acquainted with the terms of the notice, and if, 2dly, the defendants had not taken due care; whereas, assuming that the defendants were guilty of gross negligence, the defendants were still liable, notwithstanding their notice; and therefore the |