commissioners would not be justified in taking a bond with one, and that such a bond would be void? The fourteenth section then provides that the inhabitants of the parish may require security to be taken, and may name persons willing to give such security; and perhaps such security, if taken by the commissioners, should be taken in the form prescribed in the thirteenth section. If, therefore, the persons originally returned by the assessors are required in the first instance to give security, or if in default thereof the commissioners or inhabitants of the parish appoint or name others, it may be contended that a bond must be taken with two sureties. But there is nothing on these pleadings to shew that the appointment in question came within any of these classes; and if not, the act does not absolutely avoid a bond taken with one surety. Upon the second point, I am quite clear upon this act of parliament that the office of collector is an annual office, and that the bond being taken under the act, the liability can only be co-extensive with the duty required to be performed, I do not mean to say that a bond for a longer period would be absolutely void; but merely that there ought to be very strong words to shew that clearly to be the intention. By the act, the commissioners are to meet yearly to appoint assessors for a year, and the assessors are to nominate persons to be collectors. Now, as the assessors themselves are annual officers, and are annually to return the names of persons to be collectors, the legislature must have intended the duty of collector to continue only for one year. I therefore think that the fifth plea is a good plea, and that being so, it is unnecessary to pronounce any judgment on the seventh 1819. PEPPIN against COOPER. 1819. PEPPIN against COOPER. plea; but I entirely agree with my Lord Chief Justice that that plea cannot be supported. HOLROYD J. I am also of opinion, that this bond is not void for want of two sureties. The thirteenth section of the act gives to the commissioners an authority to take one with two sureties, but it is not compulsory on them so to do, except in the case contemplated by the fourteenth section. I also agree with my Lord and my Brother Bayley, that this is an annual office, and that the fact of the collector having faithfully performed his duty for one year, is a sufficient compliance with the condition of the bond. Upon the third point, I also think that this bond may be put in suit against the surety, although it may happen that another person has been jointly appointed a collector, without first selling the lands and goods of that person; for the collector, contemplated by the act, whose goods are to be sold previously to the bond being put in suit, is the collector who has made default. BEST J. I agree with the rest of the Court, that this is a good and valid bond. The act does not, in express terms, make void a bond taken with one surety only. In the case of a bail-bond, it is the duty of the sheriff to take sufficient sureties, yet the bond is not void if he take only one; and in Austen v. Haward (a), the Court of Common Pleas held a replevin-bond taken with one surety, not to be void, although it was the duty of the sheriff to take two. The principle that appears to have governed the decision in that case applies to the present. With respect (a) 2 Mar. 352. to to the second question, I entirely agree with the rest Judgment for the Defendant on the fifth 1819. PEPPIN against COOPER. DOE, on the Demise of JOHN BALDWIN and ELIZABETH his Wife, against THOMAS RAWDING and ELIZABETH his Wife. (a) EJECTMENT tried at the last Midsummer assizes for the county of Lincoln, when a verdict was entered for the lessors of the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court, on the following case: William Wells, of Spalding, died in January, 1808, leaving his wife, Elizabeth, since married to Thomas Rawding, the defendant, and an only daughter Mary Wells, and by will devised his property as follows: "I give and devise unto my affectionate wife, Elizabeth Wells, one undivided moiety or equal half part of all and every my messuages, cottages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments whatsoever and wheresoever, with their and every of their appurtenances, to hold the same unto my said wife and her asssigns, for during the term of her natural life, charged and chargeable, nevertheless, to and with a certain weekly payment unto my mother Sarah Wells, of Helpston, widow, for and during the term of her natural life; and from and immediately after the decease of my said wife, I give and devise the same, subject as aforesaid, unto (a). This case was argued at Serjeants' Inn. and 1819. Doğ against RAWDING. my daughter, Mary Wells, and all and every other the child and children which I shall have at the time of my decease, or which shall be born in due time afterwards, and to her or their heirs and assigns for ever; also I give and devise unto my said daughter, Mary Weils, and such other child or children which I shall leave, or which shall be born as aforesaid, the other undivided moiety or equal half-part of all and every my said messuages, cottages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments whatsoever and wheresoever, with their and every of their rights, members, and appurtenances : to hold the same unto my said daughter Mary Wells, and such other child or children which I shall leave, or which shall be born as aforesaid, and to her or their heirs and assigns for ever, subject and chargeable, nevertheless, to and with the same weekly payment unto my said mother, Sarah Wells, during the term of her natural life; but in case my said daughter, Mary Wells, and such other children as aforesaid, shall die under the age of twenty-one years, unmarried, and without lawful issue, then and in such case I give and devise the entirety of all and every my said messuages, cottages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, from and after the decease of my said daughter Mary, and such other children as aforesaid, unto my said wife, Elizabeth Wells, her heirs and assigns for ever; also I give and bequeath unto my said wife and daughter, Mary Wells, all and singular my household goods and furniture, during their joint natural lives; and after the decease of my said wife, I give the same unto my said daughter, for her own use: and all the rest, residue, and remainder of my goods, chattels, personal estate, and effects whatsoever and wheresoever, I give to cer tain trustees, in trust, to sell, and reasonably to apply the net monies arising therefrom in paying my simple contract debts; and then to pay off the mortgage affecting my real estate: but in case there shall be more than sufficient to pay off and discharge the same, then, in trust, to pay such residue unto my said wife, to and for her own use; and I do hereby appoint my said wife, Elizabeth Wells, sole executrix of this my will." On the death of the testator, Mary Wells became seised of the moiety bequeathed to her, and in February, 1817, married W. Goodwin, and died under the age of twenty-one years, and without issue, in the following September: Elizabeth Baldwin is heir at law of Mary Goodwin. Marriott, for the plaintiff. The question here turns upon the construction of the devise over; the words of which are, "that in case his daughter die under. twenty-one, unmarried, and without issue." The daughter has died under twenty-one, and without issue, but she was a married woman, and has left a husband surviving her. By the terms of the will, the devise over is to take effect upon the happening of three things; the death of the daughter under twenty-one, her death under twenty-one without being married, and her death under that age without issue. Two only of these events have happened, and therefore the estate does not pass by the devise over. This very point was decided by this Court, in the case of Doe v. Cooke (a), where all the former authorities were considered. There the words of the devise over were, "in case Thomas Cooke shall die an infant, unmarried, 1819. DOE against RAWDING. |