stance of the person who builds residing in the house himself makes him not liable, there will, in such cases, be no one who is bound to contribute. That is a consequence directly contrary to the object of the act. Here, if the defendant had underlet the house at the rent of 2201., he would clearly be liable, Sangster v. Birkhead. (a) ABBOTT C. J. This case seems exactly within that of Beardmore v. Fox (b), the authority of which is by no means shaken by what fell from L. C. J. Gibbs, in Stuart v. Smith. In that case, the premises were let for 1007. originally; and in consequence of subsequent improvements by the tenant, became of the improved value of 180l. per annum. Yet the Court held, that the party who occupied was not there to be considered as the owner of the improved rent. The only difference between the cases is in the amount of the improvements, which can make no difference; for no solid distinction can exist between an improved value of 50%. and one of 500l., in point of law. It is to be observed, that the words of the act are, "owner of the improved rent,” and not "owner of the improved value;" and we must construe it according to those words, and not according to others which we might think would have been more applicable to the justice of the case. There may be a distinction between the ground rent and the improved rent; but here the premises were originally let by Cloake, at an improved rent. The nonsuit, therefore, was right. (a) 1 Bos. & Pull. 303. VOL. II. Rule refused. (b) 8 Term Rep. 214. Ii 1819. LAMBE against HEMANS. BULWER, Clerk, against BULWER, D. D. 'RESPASS for breaking and entering several closes TRESP of the plaintiff, and reaping and carrying away his corn, hay, &c. Plea, general issue. At the trial at the last Lent assizes for the county of Norfolk, before Graham B., it appeared that the defendant had been the rector of the parish of Sall, and that he had resigned that living on the 21st May, 1818. The plaintiff was presented on the 4th June, and was instituted to it on the 7th July, and afterwards inducted. The defendant retained possession of the glebe lands till Old Michaelmas-day following, and severed and took the crops of hay, corn, &c. which had been previously The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, sown. damages 1887. And now Frere Serjt. moved to enter a nonsuit, or for a reduction of the damages. On the first point, he contended that the plaintiff had not sufficient possession of the glebe lands to entitle him to maintain trespass, and for this he cited 2 Roll. Abr., 553. pl. 45.:" Plaintiff cannot maintain trespass quare clausum fregit, if he has not actual possession, though he has the freehold in law, as an heir shall not have trespass against an abator." [Abbott C. J. By the act of induction, the parson is put into the actual possession of a part for the whole, and he can therefore maintain trespass. It is not necessary that he should actually go upon the glebe itself.] Then, with respect to the second point, he contended that the verdict should be reduced to the sum of of 30%., being the value of the tithes of the crops in question. In Moyle v. Ewer (a), it was laid down by Coke C. J., that if a parson sows the ground and is afterwards deprived or doth resign, if the corn was not severed at the time of the successor's coming in, he shall have the tithe. And in Degge, ch. 2. p. 2., if the parson, vicar, &c. sow the land, and be deprived, resign, or accept another living, the successor shall have the tithes. And in Gibson's Codex (b), title "Rules of canon and common Law concerning Glebe," it is said, "if the parson dies after severance from the ground and before the corn is carried off, the successor shall have no tithe, because, though it was not set out, yet a right to it was vested in the deceased parson by the severance from the ground. The same is true in case of deprivation or resignation after glebe sown, the successor shall have the tithe if the corn was not severed at the time of his coming in, otherwise if severed.” So that from all these authorities, it appears, that even in the case of resignation before severance, the successor is only entitled to the tithes of the crop arising from the glebe, and not to the crop itself. ABBOTT C. J. The general rule of law applicable to cases of this description is, that where a tenant of land has an uncertain interest which is determined either by the act of God or the act of another, there he shall have emblements: but that is not so where the tenancy is determined by his own act. That is laid down in a variety of instances, which will be found in L. C. Baron Comyn's Digest. (c) As where the lessee 1819. BULWEB against BULWER. 1819. BULWER against BULWER, surrenders, or a woman who is tenant durante viduitate marries, or the estate determines by forfeiture, condition broken, &c. In all these cases they are not entitled to emblements. It seems to me, that this case is precisely the same in principle, and ought to follow the same rule. And the authorities cited are much too loose for the Court to act upon in opposition to so old and so established a rule of law. The lessee of the glebe of a parson who resigns is in a different situation, for his tenancy being determined by the act of another, he will be entitled to emblements. Rule refused. Saturday, The Court refused to set aside the verdict in ejectment, on the ground that there was a va riance between the description of the premises in the nisi prius record (upon which the plaintiff recovered) and the issue; it not being stated how the premises were described in the declaration delivered. DOE, on the Demise of COTTERILL, against WYLDE. EJECTMENT for two messuages, &c. The issue delivered stated premises to be situate in the parish of Wimbledon, in the county of Worcester. The nisi prius record stated the premises to be situate in the parish of Himbleton, in the county of Worcester. At the trial at the last assizes for Worcester, before Richard son J., the lessor of the plaintiff proved a title to premises in the parish of Himbleton, in the county of Worcester, and had a verdict. Campbell now moved to set aside this verdict, on an affidavit that the name of the parish in the issue delivered was Wimbledon; that no judge's order had been obtained, nor any consent given on the part of the defendant, to amend the issue, or to alter the nisi prius record record from the amended issue; and that the defendant went down to trial relying upon this objection. But the Court refused the rule, on the ground that the affidavit did not state how the premises were described in the declaration; and they said that they suspected that the premises were properly described there; and if so, it was the duty of the defendant to have returned the issue, as not corresponding with the declaration. Rule refused. 1819. DOE against WYLDE. HOLROYD against BREARE and HOLMES. Saturday, The steward of a court baron is a judicial trespass will officer; and not lie against him where his bailiff by mis take took the goods of B. under a precept commanding him to take in execution the TRESPASS for breaking and entering plaintiff's house, and seizing and taking his cattle, goods, and chattels. The defendants pleaded first the general issue, and, secondly, justified the one as steward of the court baron of the manor of Wakefield, and the other as his bailiff, stating, that on the 12th of September, 1817, at a court of the said manor, holden before certain then suitors of the said Court, according to the custom of the said court, one J. A. levied his plaint goods of 4. against Sarah Holroyd, and afterwards recovered on the plea aforesaid against her 97. 14s. for his damages and costs; and the defendant, Breare, on the 5th of December, 1817, as such steward of the nianor, caused his precept to be issued, to take the goods of the said Sarah Holroyd in execution, which precept was delivered to the defendant, Holmes, as bailiff, to be executed, and that by virtue of that precept, the goods in question were by him seized, and the trespasses comIi8 mitted. |