1819. HOLROYD against BREARE. mitted. There was another similar justification, setting out a judgment recovered in the same court, at the suit of J. C. against Sarah Holroyd. At the trial at the last Summer assizes for the county of York, before Bayley J., the principal question was, whether the goods which had been seized were wholly or in part the property of the plaintiff, or of Sarah Holroyd. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. It appeared also, that the defendant, Breare, was not in any respect personally concerned in the seizure of the goods, but only as having, in his character of steward of the court baron, signed the precept for taking Sarah Holroyd's goods in execution. Upon this Scarlett contended, that he was, in this case, acting in a judicial and not a ministerial capacity; and that, therefore, he was not liable for the acts of his bailiff. On the other hand, it was argued, that he was only in the nature of a minister of the court baron, of which the suitors are the judges, and that, therefore, he was, like any other ministerial officer, responsible civiliter for the acts of his bailiff. The learned Judge reserved the point, giving leave to the defendant, Breare, to move to have a verdict entered for him, in case the Court should be of opinion that he was not liable. A rule nisi to this effect having been obtained in last Michaelmas term, Cross Serjt., and Tindal, shewed cause in last Hilary term. The steward of a court baron is merely a ministerial officer; for the pleadings in this case state, that the court is holden before the suitors, who are the judges of the court; and it is the duty of the steward, as their minister, to see that their judgments are executed properly. There are many authorities which shew. shew this. Lord Coke, speaking of the court baron, says, "This is a court incident to every manor, and is not of record, and the suitors be thereof judges, although the plea be holden by force of a writ of right." (a) So again, "And it is to be understood, that this court is of two natures: the first is by the common law, and is called a court baron, as some have said; for that it is the freeholders or freeman's court, (for barons, in one sense, signify freemen,) and of that court the freeholders being suitors be judges, and this may be kept from three weeks to three weeks. The second is a customary court, and that doth concern copyholders, and therein the lord or his steward is the judge. And as there may be a court baron of freeholders only, without copyholders, and then is the steward the register; so there may be a customary court of copyholders only without freeholders; and then is the lord or his steward the judge." (b) And in Bro. Abr., tit. Court Baron, pl. 11., there is this passage: "Nota, per Choke Justice, that in court baron, county, or hundred, the suitors are judges, and the bailiff and sheriff are only ministers." And the steward falls within the same reason, as appears from another passage in the same book, tit. Judgment, pl. 118., "Nota, that the suitors are the judges in county court, court baron, and hundred, as well in writ of right patent, as in justicies, and other suits there; and the sheriff, steward, and bailiff are not judges there, quod nota bene." Then it is clear, from the evidence, that the steward, in this case, is only a ministerial officer; and if once that is established, the question is at an end. For though no action will lie against a judge, for (b) 1 Inst. 58. (a) 4 Inst. 268. c. 57. 1819. HOLROTD against BREARE. 1819. HOLROYD against BREARE. what he does judicially, though it should be laid falso Scarlett and Parke, contrà. The circumstance that no instance can be produced in which such an action as the present has ever yet been maintained, goes strongly to shew that the steward is not liable. For the thing must often have happened before. The distinction between this case and that of the sheriff is obvious; for the sheriff is no part of the court out of which the process issues; but the steward of a court baron is so, and his situation is rather to be compared to that of the signer of the writs in this court, who is surely not liable in case of a mis-execution of any of them by the sheriff. The passages cited only shew, that the steward of a court baron is a minister of that court for some purposes, as, for instance, to register their proceedings, and the like. But they do not shew, that he is their minister, for the purpose of executing their process and if so, he is not liable, when the process is improperly executed. : (a) 7 St. Tr. 442. C Howell, 1094. Cur. adv. vult. ABBOTT ABBOTT C. J. now delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action of trespass, in which the plaintiff' obtained a verdict upon the general issue, against both these defendants; and upon a motion having been made to set aside the verdict, (and to enter a verdict for the defendant, Breare, the Court took time to consider of their judgment. It was contended, in argument, that the defendant, Breare, being the steward of a court baron, was merely the minister of that court, to execute its process, and was not clothed with any judicial character; and it was said, that his warrant to the other defendant was analogous to that of the sheriff to his bailiff, and rendered him, like the sheriff, civilly responsible for the mis-execution of it. This was contended, on the ground, that in the court baron the free suitors are the judges; and certainly they are so, for the purposes stated in the authorities which have been cited. We are, however, of opinion, that the steward is not merely a minister of that court, but a constituent and essential part of it. The Court cannot be holden without him. No mandate is directed to him as an officer; but he makes his mandate to the bailiff. And there is this material distinction between the mandate of the sheriff and that of a steward of a court baron: in the former, the sheriff commands the bailiff to make the levy, and it concludes thus," So that I may have the same before the court, &c." But in the warrant of the steward, the bailiff is directed to levy, so that he the bailiff may may have the same before the Court on the day appointed. This, therefore, is more like the writ of the superior court to the sheriff than the warrant of the sheriff to his bailiff. That seems to be decisive, to 1819. HOLROYD against BREARE. shew 1819. HOLROYD against BREARE. shew that the bailiff and not the steward is the minister of the court baron, for the execution of its process, and that he is not the servant of the steward in this respect. We are, therefore, of opinion, that the steward is not for this purpose a minister, but part of the Court itself. And if so, this action is not maintainable against him, and the rule for entering a verdict for him must therefore be absolute. Rule absolute. Monday, Where an agree ment on un stamped paper has been destroyed, no parol evidence can be given of its contents, even if it has been destroyed act of the party who takes the objection. RIPPINER against WRIGHT, Clerk. SSUMPSIT for a crop of peas, bargained and sold by plaintiff to defendant. Plea, non assumpsit as to part, and a tender of 6l. 3s. 9d. as to the residue. At the trial before Burrough J., at the Spring assizes for the county of Northampton, the defendant proposed to by the wrongful give parol evidence of an agreement between him and the plaintiff, that the latter should not be paid for the value of the crop, but only for the expense of ploughing and seed sown. It appeared that this agreement had been reduced into writing, on unstamped paper; and that afterwards the plaintiff took an opportunity to snatch it from the hands of the defendant's attorney, and to destroy it. Holbech, for the plaintiff, objected that no parol evidence of the contents of this paper could be received, inasmuch as the paper itself could not, if in existence, have been read, not being stamped. On the other hand, it was contended that the plaintiff, by his act in destroying the paper, had prevented the defendant from getting it stamped, as he might have done on |