seers of the poor for 1000 years, reserving a pepper-corn rent, and continued to reside there. Being sick, his daughter and her husband came, by permission of the parish-officers, to reside with and take care of him: after his death, the daughter being his heir, they contiuued to reside there above 40 days, claiming a right to the possession: Held that they thereby gained a settlement, being entitled to the reversion, and the residence not being fraudulent. The King v. The Inhabitants of Staplegrove, E. 59 G.3. Page 527 SETTLEMENT-By Hiring and Service. 3. hire himself into any fresh service till the year had expired: Held that this amounted only to a dispensation with his service for the remainder of the year, and that he thereby gained a settlement. The King v. The Inhabitants of Polesworth, E. 59 G. 3. Page 483 A pauper was hired for a year from Old Michaelmas, to go away a month at harvest, and to make up the time after Michaelmas: Held that this was not a hiring for a year, and no settlement was thereby gained. The King v. The Inhabitants of Turvey, E. 59 G. 3. SHERIFF. 520 The sheriff is not entitled to more than a fee of 4d. upon every warrant issued by him. Dew v. Parsons, E. 59 G. 3. 562 1. To make a valid contract of hiring and service, it is not absolutely necessary that the contract, when by deed, should be executed by the master; it is sufficient that he accepted the services on the terms 1. of the deed; and, therefore, where a pauper executed a deed, by which he became bound to serve the master for a year, and afterwards entered into and continued in his service for that period, it was held that such deed, although not executed by the master, ought to have been received in evidence to shew the terms of the hiring. The King v. Houghton le Spring, H. 59 G. 3. 375 2. Where a pauper, being hired for a year, and having served till within a few days of the end of the year, went, without his master's leave, to the statutes to hire him. self for the next year; and on the master dismissing him for that, went before a magistrate with his master, and there offered to serve his year out; but, upon receiving his full year's wages, was satisfied, and did not return to his service; but neither hired nor offered to SHIP. In an action against several defendants, as ship-owners, for damage sustained by the loss of goods laden on board their ship, it was held that by the 53 G. 3. c. 159. s. 1., they were not liable in that character beyond the value of the ship and freight, due or to grow due, although the loss was occasioned by the misconduct of one of the defendants, who was both master and partowner; and, Secondly, That the value of the ship was to be calculated at the time of the loss, and not at the time of the commencement of the voyage; and, Thirdly, that in calculating the value of freight due or to grow due money actually paid in advance was to be included. Wilson v. Dickson, M. 59 G. 3. 2 2. A. and B., owners of a ship, exe cuted an absolute bill of sale to C. and D. for a nominal considera tion. There was a parol agree ment between them that C. and D. should accept bills for the accommodation of A. and B.; that the ship should be a security to C. and D. for any advances they should make on such acceptances, and that until default made by A. and B. in providing for the acceptances, the ship should remain in their possession and management. The ship was registered in the names of C. and D.; but A. and B. remained in the possession and management of her, appeared to the world as owners, and obtained credit from appearing so. Before default made by A. and B., in providing for the acceptances, C. and D. became bankrupts, and their assignees immediately seized and sold the ship. A. and B. afterwards became bankrupts. Held that trover for the ship could not be maintained by their assignees against the assignees of C. and D., for the parol agreement could not be set up against the bill of sale, and the case did not come within the statute of James, the ship having been seized by the defendants before the bankruptcy of A. and B.; and though the bill of sale unaccompanied by possession might be void as against creditors, it was binding upon A. and B. and their assignees. Robinson, v. M'Donnell, M. 59 G. 3. 4. 5. passed to A.'s assignees under the statute of James. Hay v. Fairbairn, M. 59 G. 3. Page 193 Where A., having contracted for a ship to be built for him in the East Indies, agreed, during the time of the building, to sell a share to B., and B. paid part of the price in pursuance of the agreement, and afterwards, on the ship's arrival in England, A. caused her to be registered, and accounted with B. as part-owner; but B.'s name was never on the register as part-owner: Held that B. had no legal interest in the ship. Stringer v. Murray, H. 59 G. 3. 248 Where a ship registered at the port of N. was transferred by a deed of assignment to owners resident in L., the ship being then in the port of L.. Held that this transfer was not within 34 G. 3. c. 68. s. 15., but within s. 16. of that act; and that the transfer was valid, although no indorsement was made on the certificate of registry. Held, also, that the non-compliance with 7 and 8 W.3. c. 22. s. 21., does not avoid the transfer. Hodgson v. Brown, E. 59 G. 3. SLANDER, See VARIANCE. STAMP, 427 Page 134 See EVIDENCE, 6. INSURANCE, 3. 3. The 21 Jac. 1. c. 19. s. 11. is not repealed as to shipping by the ship-register acts; and, therefore, when A., the owner of a ship, duly assigned his interest in it to B., and B. became the registered owner, but, by his permission, A. continued to have the same in his possession, order, and disposition, until he became bankrupt: Held that the property in the ship ed on credit. Doe v. Wood, T. 59 G. 3. Page 724 2. Where an agreement on unstamped paper has been destroyed, no parol evidence can be given of its contents: even if it has been destroyed by the wrong- 2. ful act of the party who takes the objection. Rippiner v. Wright, E. 59 G. 3. 478 TAX-COLLECTOR, TERM, SURRENDER OF, A and, therefore, a felon attainted is TRESPASS. By his induction the parson is put in possession of a part for the whole, and may maintain an action for a trespass on the glebe land, although he has not taken actual possession of it. parson who resigns his living, is not entitled to emblements. Bul470 wer v. Bulwer, T. 59 G.3. 2. The steward of a court baron is a judicial officer; and trespass will not lie against him where his bailiff by mistake took the goods of B. under a precept commanding him to take in execution the goods of A. Holroyd v. Breare, E. 59 G. 3. 473 3. In the execution of criminal process against any man in the case of a misdemeanor, it is necessary to demand admittance, before the breaking of the outer door of the house can be legally justified. Quære, if so in the case of felony. Launock v. Brown, E. 59 G. 3. 592 TROVER, See BANKRUPTCY, 2. GIFT, 1. 1. Certain parts of a machine had been put up by the tenant during his term, and were capable of 2. being removed without either injuring the other parts of the machine or the building, and had been usually valued between the out-going and in-coming tenant : Held that these were the goods and chattels of the out-going tenant, for which he might maintain trover. Davis v. Jones, M. 59 G. 3. Page 165 2. A person having three bills of exchange, applied to a country banker, with whom he had had no previous dealings, to give for them a 3. bill on London of the same amount, and the bill given by the banker was afterwards dishonoured: Held that this was a complete exchange of securities, and that trover would not lie for the three bills of exchange. Hornblower v. Proud and Others, H. 59 G. 3. 327 3. Trover will lie for the mis-delivery of goods by a warehouseman, although such mis-delivery has occurred by mistake only. Devereux v. Barclay, T. 59 G. 3. VARIANCE, See BILL OF Exchange, 3. 702 1. The declaration stated that a bill of exchange was drawn and accepted at Dublin, viz. at Westminster, for a certain sum therein mentioned, without alleging it to be at Dublin in Ireland: Held that the bill upon this declaration must be taken to have been drawn in England for English money; and therefore proof of a bill drawn at Dublin in Ireland for the same sum in Irish money, which differs in value from English money, did not support the declaration, and that this was a fatal variance. Held, also, the bill having been drawn for a certain sum sterling, that the omission of the word sterling in the declaration was immaterial. Kearney v. King, H. 59 G. 3. Page 301 The contract laid in the declaration was to deliver stock on the 27th of February. The contract proved was to deliver stock on the settling-day, which, at the time, was fixed for, and understood by the parties to mean, the 27th of February. Held that the proof supported the declaration. Wickes v. Gordon, H. 59 G. 3. 335 In an action for distubance of plaintiff's right of common, the declaration stated that he was possessed of a messuage and land, with the appurtenants, and by reason thereof ought to have common of pasture, &c.: Held that this allegation was divisible, and that proof that plaintiff was possessed of land only, and entitled to the right of common in respect of it, was sufficient to entitle him to damages pro tanto, Ricketts v. Salwey, 360 4. Declaration stated that defendant went before one R. C. Baron Waterpark of Waterfork, in the county, &c., and the proof was that he went before R. C. Baron Waterpark of Waterpark, in the county, &c.: Held that the allegation in the declaration was a description of a name of dignity, and therefore that this was a fatal variance. In a count for slander, the words were, "This is my umbrella: he stole it from my back door." The words proved were," It is my umbrella, &c." And it appeared that these words were not spoken in the house where the umbrella was: Held that the evidence did not support the declaration, inasmuch as the words laid imported to be spoken concerning a thing then present, and the words given in evidence were actually spoken con 1. concerning a thing not present at the time. Walters v. Mace, T. 59 G.3. Page 756 5. Declaration alleged that before the publishing of the libel, a carriage, in which one E. S. was 6. riding, was passing on a certain highway, and that plaintiff was there driving another carriage, and that it happened, without any negligence, fault, or furious driving on the part of the plaintiff, that the two carriages came in contact together, whereby the carriage in which E. S. was riding was overturned, and the said E. S. was injured. The declaration then proceeded to allege that the defendant published a libel of and concerning the plaintiff, and of and concerning the said accident, and that allegation was made in every count of the declaration. The defendant pleaded, 1st, Not guilty; 2dly, Justification to the whole of the libel in the first count of the declaration, and stated that the accident mentioned in the supposed libel was the same accident mentioned in the introductory part of the declaration, and that it was occasioned by the careless and furious driving of the plaintiff. The defendant then pleaded a justification only as to part of the libel contained in the second count, that the said E. S. had been thrown from a chaise, owing to the hard driving of the plaintiff'; but there was no justification as to the other part. The jury found a verdict for the defendant on the justification; and they found a verdict for the plaintiff as to that part of the libel to which no justification was pleaded: Held that the word "accident" in this declaration meant the collison of the carriages only, and that the allegation that that collison was o casioned by the furious driv VENDOR AND VENDEE. ing of the plaintiff, was a separate and distinct allegation, and that the verdict therefore was right. Lord Churchillv. Hunt, T.59 G.3. Page 685 In an action of covenant, the declaration stated, that by a certain indenture it was witnessed that, as well in consideration of certain furnaces to be erected by the plaintiff, T. R. B. did demise, &c. The defendant pleaded non est factum. On producing the deed in evidence, it appeared to be, that as well in consideration of the erection of the furnaces, as also for building certain houses and payment of rent, T. R. B. did demise, &c. Held that this was a fatal variance. Swallow v. Beaumont, T. 59 G. 3. 765 VENDOR AND VENDEE. By the usage of Liverpool, the vendor of goods was to pay warehouse rent for two months after the sale, if the goods remained there so long: Held, however, that where the vendor of such goods had, within the two months, given the usual order for delivery to the purchaser, the property in the goods from that time vested in the latter, and that he became responsible for all accidents which might happen to them, and that the circumstance of the goods having within that time been distrained for warehouse-rent, was an accident which must fall on the vendee, and such rent having been paid by the vendor's agent, in order to redeem the goods. Held that the latter could not recover the same from the vendor as money paid to his use. Greaves v. Hepke, M. 59 G. 3. 131 2. A tenant was bound either to consume the hay on the demised premises, or for every load of hay removed, to bring two loads of manure. |