transfer. This cannot be considered a purchase, nor was there any consideration paid before the sealing of the lease, nor does it appear, upon the facts stated, that there ever was a full consideration, for it cannot be assumed that the rent reserved was a full consideration for these premises. Comyn, for the defendant. If the lease had been granted on the express condition that the premises should always be used as a meeting-house or chapel, the case of the Attorney-General v. Graves would be an authority to shew, that it was granted for a charitable use, within the meaning of the statute. Here, however, the lease contains a simple unconditional demise of the premises described as a chapel or meeetinghouse, with the usual covenants and provisoes. The lessees have the entire controul over the property, and are at liberty to convert them to any other uses they please during the term. They may, without incurring a forfeiture, convert them even into a public theatre; and if the lessees may apply the premises to any use they think fit, Doe v. Copestake (a), is an authority to shew that such a case does not fall within the statute. The lease itself, independent of the declaration of trust, does not appear to be granted for any charitable use, and the latter cannot affect the lessor; for if the lessees wish to avoid the lease, they could not do so by shewing this declaration of trust, which was their own act; besides, it is executed only by four out of the several lessees, and cannot therefore affect the others. Assuming, however, that this lease would be void, within the enacting 1818. DOE against HAWTHORN, 1818. DOE against HAWTHORN. clause, it falls within the proviso, for it may be assumed that the 400l. was laid out upon the premises, and that that, together with the 107. rent, reserved after the death of the lessor, was a full and valuable consideration. BAYLEY J. The question in this case depends upon the construction of the 9 G. 2. c. 36. s. 1., which enacts, "that no man's lands, &c. shall be given, granted, aliened, limited, released, transferred, assigned or appointed, or anyways conveyed or settled to or upon any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, for any estate or interest whatsoever, in trust or for the benefit of any charitable uses whatsoever, unless such conveyance be made by deed, sealed and delivered, in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, twelve months before the death of the donor or grantor, and be enrolled in the Court of Chancery, within six calendar months after the exe'cution thereof." It is admitted, that if this lease come within the former part of the clause, it is void, inasmuch as the provisions of the act have not been complied with, and the question therefore is, whether it was conveyed for the benefit of a charitable use. Now, to ascertain the purpose for which the lease was made, we must see, first, the situation of the parties at the time; then, what was the thing granted; and lastly, the declaration of the lessees to whom the grant was made. It appears, from the case, that in 1796, Wellard had, at his own expence, erected a chapel, and that 400%. had been subscribed for the making of improvements by the congregation, and that the lease was executed as a security to the congregation, for laying out so large a sum of money upon the premises. The motives, therefore, which induced Wellard to grant the lease were, that the chapel might be enlarged and improved as a place of public worship; and he agreed, that the congregation should have the lease, as a security for the money they were about to lay out on the premises, which were to continue to be used as a place for public worship. The lease itself then describes the subject matter of the conveyance as a chapel or meeting-house, which then was and had been used as a place of public worship, and there is then a reservation of a peppercorn rent during the life of the lessor, and upon his death, 107. per annum during the remainder of the term. It has been argued, that this must be taken to be a full consideration for the granting of the lease, and that this case, therefore, comes within the exception of the act of parliament. When the plaintiff has, however, once established that this is a charitable use, it lies upon the defendant to bring himself within the exception; but it is quite impossible to say, that this was a full and valuable consideration. Wellard had, at his own expence, built this chapel upon his own land, and 4007. having been subscribed for the improvement of that chapel, he parts with the premises for twenty-three years, without receiving any remuneration whatever, in the event of his living to the end of the term, and if he die, then his executors are to receive 107. per annum during the residue of the term. The purposes, therefore, for which the lease was to be made, is stated on the case, and if that only had been stated, without adding the declaration of trust, I should have thought that this case came within the act of parliament. I take it to be quite clear, that it is not necessary that the purH 3 pose 1818. DOR against HAWTHORN 1818. DOE against HAWTHORN pose should appear upon the face of the instrument itself, for if it were so, the statute might always be evaded. Then, if we look to the declaration of trust, it puts the matter beyond all doubt, for the purposes for which the lease was granted are there specifically described, and clearly amount to a charitable use; and although the premises may cease to be used for public worship, yet the lease having been originally granted for a charitable use, is void. It has been argued, too, that the declaration of trust having been executed by four only out of the several lessees, is only evidence against those; but I take it to be clear, that the declaration of one of the lessees is evidence against all as to the purpose for which the lease was taken. Under these circumstances, I have no doubt, that this lease is void, within the 9 G. 2. c. 36. s. 1.; and that being so, there must be judgment for the plaintiff. ABBOTT J. If the Court were to hold this leasc good they would establish a precedent by which the provisions of the 23 H. S. c. 10. and the 9 G. 2. c. 36. would be rendered nugatory. The lease does not in itself contain any declaration of the use or purpose for which it is granted. I take it to be quite clear, however, that in order to learn that purpose the Court may look not only at the instrument itself, but at the accompanying facts both before, at, and after the execution of the lease. The intention of the grantor is to be inferred from his acts. Looking at the facts before the execution of the lease, we find that the chapel was erected by the lessor for the use of a congregation of a particular description, that that congregation had sub scribed scribed a sum of money with a view of improving the chapel, and that it was agreed that they should hold the same for the purpose of carying on a certain species of religious worship for the period mentioned. This took place before the declaration of trust was indorsed on the back of the lease. In furtherance of the object of that instrument, the indorsement was prepared, which was intended to be executed by all the lessees, and which states that the lease was granted in order that the premises might be used by the whole of the congregation as a place for the celebration of divine worship. We have therefore one piece of evidence which cannot deceive us as to the use which was the object of this lease, and it is clearly either a superstitious use within the stat. 23 H. 8. c. 10., or a charitable use within the 9 G. 2. c. 36.; and if it falls within the provisions of either of these statutes, the lease is void. And it does. not come within the exception in 9 G. 2. c. 36., for no money was actually paid to the lessor as a consideration for granting the lease. Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that this lease is void, and that the lessor of the plaintiff is entitled to recover. HOLROYD J. I am also of opinion that this lease is void. It is a general principle of law, with respect to deeds, that where a statute makes them void as for charitable or superstitious uses, or where they are void by the common law as contra bonos mores, that the proof of their invalidity may be collected, not only from the instrument itself, but from circumstances which, though they do not appear upon the face of the deed, may be taken into consideration. Then what are the facts of this case? It is stated that 400l. had been subscribed 1818. Dor against HAWTHORN. |