The interpretation of the Constitution, like the prerogative of a sovereign, may be abused; but from hence the disuse of either cannot be inferred. In the exercise of prerogative the minister is responsible for his advice to his sovereign, and the members of either House are responsible to their constituents for their conduct in construing the Constitution. We act at our peril; if our conduct is directed to the attainment of the great objects of Government it will be approved, and not otherwise; but this cannot operate as a reason to prevent our discharging the trusts reposed in us.

Let us now compare the different modes of reasoning on this subject, and determine which is right, for both cannot be.

[FEB. 7, 1791.

President and Senate. His rule of interpretation then was therefore more liberal than it is now. In the other case, Congress determined by law, with the sanction of the President, when and where they should hold their next session, although the Constitution provides that this power should rest solely in the two Houses. The gentleman also advocated this measure, and yet appears to be apprehensive of the consequences that may result from a construction of the Constitution which admits of a National Bank. But from which of these measures is danger to be apprehended? The only danger from our interpretation would be the exercise by Congress of a general power to form corporations; but the dangers resulting from the gentleman's interpretations, in the cases alluded to, are very different; for what may we not apprehend from the precedent of having assumed a power on which the Constitution was silent, and from having annexed it to the Supreme Executive? If we have this right in one instrance, we may extend it to others, and make him a despot. And here I think it necessary to declare, that such is my confidence in the wisdom, integrity, and justice of the Chief Magistrate, as that I should be at ease, if my life, liberty, and property were at his disposal; but this is a trust which I am not authorized to make for my constituents; and as his successors in office will possess equal powers, but may not possess equal virtues, caution, with respect to them is necessary. Again, what may be the result of the precedent relating to the session of Congress? If we had a right by law The gentleman has referred us to the last to determine where the next Congress should article of the amendments proposed to the Con-hold their session, one Congress may oblige anstitution by Congress, which provides that the powers not delegated to Congress, or prohibited to the States, shall rest in them or the people; and the question is, what powers are delegated? Does the gentleman conceive that such only are delegated as are expressed? If so, he must admit that our whole code of laws is unconstitutional. This he disavows, and yields to the necessity of interpretation, which, by a fair and candid application of established rules of construction to the Constitution, authorizes, as has been shown, the measure under consideration.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. MADISON) has urged the dangerous tendency of a liberal construction; but which is most dangerous, a liberal or a destructive interpretation? The liberty we have taken in interpreting the Constitution, we conceive to be necessary, and it cannot be denied to be useful in attaining the objects of it; but whilst he denies us this liberty, he grants to himself a right to annul part, and a very important part of the Constitution. The same principle that will authorize a destruction of part will authorize the destruction of the whole of the Constitution; and if gentlemen have a right to make such rules, they have an equal right to make others for enlarg. ing the powers of the Constitution, and indeed of forming a despotism. Thus, if we take the gentleman for our pilot, we shall be wrecked on the reef which he cautions us to avoid.

other to sit in Kentucky, or in the intended State Yazoo, under the protection of a Choctaw chief, or His Excellency Governor Tallan. It must therefore be evident that the usage of Congress in both instances is against the gentleman, and that the dangers from the precedent of establishing a bank are comparatively small to those resulting from the other measures referred to.

The gentleman from Virginia has endeavored to support his interpretation of the Constitution by the sense of the Federal Convention; but how is this to be obtained? By applying The usage of Congress has also been referred proper rules of interpretation? If so, the sense to; and if we look at their acts under the exist- of the Convention is in favor of the bill; or are ing Constitution, we shall find they are gene- we to depend on the memory of the gentleman rally the result of a liberal construction. I will for a history of their debates, and from thence mention but two. The first relates to the esta to collect their sense? This would be improblishment of the Executive Departments, and per, because the memories of different gentlegives to the President the power of removing men would probably vary, as they had already officers. As the Constitution is silent on this done, with respect to those facts; and if not, subject, the power mentioned, by the gentle- the opinions of the individual members who man's own reasoning, is vested in the States or debated are not to be considered as the opinthe people; he, however, contended for an as-ions of the Convention. Indeed, if they were, sumption of the power, and when assumed, urged that it should be vested in the President, although, like the power of appointment, it was by a respectable minority in both Houses conceived that it should have been vested in the

no motion was made in that Convention, and therefore none could be rejected for establishing a National Bank; and the measure which the gentleman has referred to was a proposition merely to enable Congress to erect commercial

corporations, which was, and always ought to be, negatived.

[H. OF R.

that whilst the Conventions were silent on this subject, and had no objections to such a measure, several of them had proposed amendments to the Constitution for restraining Congress from establishing commercial corporations; which evinced their disapprobation of such institutions, and admitted at the same time, in some degree, the power of Congress, under the existing Constitution, to form them.

Mr. G. then showed that as a monopoly had been urged as an objection to the bill, no such consequence could result from it; for the bill does not restrain State or private banks, or even individuals, from negotiations of a similar nature with those permitted to the stockholders; nor does it restrain the States from forming similar corporations. This plan has not a feature of monopoly, and the gentlemen who oppose it contend for a bank, which, according to its original institution, was founded in monopoly.

The gentleman's arguments respecting the sense of the State Conventions have as little force as those relating to the Federal Convention. The debates of the State Conventions, as published by the short-hand writers, were generally partial and mutilated; in this, if the publications are to be relied on, the arguments were all on one side of the question, for there is not in the record which is said to contain the Pennsylvania debates a word against the ratification of the Constitution; although we all know that arguments were warmly urged on both sides. The gentleman has quoted the opinions, as recorded in the debates of this State and North Carolina, of two of our learned judges; but the speech of one member is not to be considered as expressing the sense of a Convention; and if it was, we have no record which can be depended on of such speeches. Indeed, had even this been the case, the Union was at He then answered the argument urged against that time divided into two great parties, one of the authority of Congress to enable corporawhich feared the loss of the Union if the Con- tions to hold lands, when they had no power stitution was not ratified unconditionally, and themselves of purchasing and holding land; the other the loss of our liberties, if it was. and showed that although Congress are restrainThe object on either side was so important as ed from purchasing lands, (except in certain perhaps to induce the parties to depart from cases,) and from exercising over the same excandor, and to call in the aid of art, flattery, clusive legislation, yet that they may hold professions of friendship, promises of office, lands obtained by execution, conquest, and by and even good cheer; and when these failed, other means as well as by those clauses of the the federal Bull was published, denouncing Constitution which relate to lands now belongpolitical death and destruction to antifederaling to the Union; and that Congress had often infidels. Under such circumstances, the opin-invested others with powers which they themions of great men ought not to be considered as selves could not exercise. authorities, and in many instances could not be recognised by themselves.

Mr. G. then observing that the sense of the States respecting a bank would be best ascertained by their legislative acts, showed, from the journals of Congress, that when restrained by the Confederation from exercising any powers but what were expressly delegated, Congress had, without any authority, established a bank whose capital might extend to ten millions of dollars; and had not only pledged the faith of the Union not to erect any other, but had recommended it to the States to prohibit any State establishment of the kind, and had also determined that the bank bills should be re

He then noticed the argument, that, by a law of Virginia, notes payable to the bearer, or order, could not circulate in that State; and observed that this law could not be supposed to extend to bank notes; and if it did, it would be null and void, because the Constitution of the Union and laws, made in pursuance thereof, were paramount to the laws and Constitutions of the several States. Having considered the arguments against the constitutionality of the bill, he entered into the policy and utility of the

measure.

TUESDAY, February 8.

Mr. TUCKER, from the committee appointed for the purpose, presented a bill to alter the time of the next meeting of Congress, which was twice read, and ordered to be engrossed.

ceivable in the taxes and duties of every State. That the States did not remonstrate against, or tacitly acquiesce in, but actually supported the measures of Congress relative to the bank, whilst the war continued, and after the peace. House that they have passed the bill making A message from the Senate informed the That this was the strongest evidence the States could give that they thought the measure salu-appropriations for the support of the Government for the year 1791. tary, and had no objection to it on the ground of its being constitutional. He then urged that if the States and the people at large had no objection to a bank in that case, they certainly could not in this; and inquired whether there was any evidence of their disapprobation of such an institution in the debates of their Con- | ventions or propositions for amendments? this he answered in the negative, and urged

BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.
The House resumed the consideration of the
bill for incorporating the Bank of the United
States.

The question still being on the passage of the
bill,
Το Mr. VINING apologized for rising to offer his
sentiments on this subject, which had been al-

Bank of the United States.

[H. OF R.

FEB. 8, 1791.] invalidate Mr. MADISON'S objections to the channels which would otherwise be occupied by power proposed to be given to the Bank, to the precious metals. This, experience shows make rules and regulations, not contrary to is the uniform effect of such a substitution. law. Mr. M. said, the question would in- The right of Congress to regulate trade is volve a very lengthy discussion; and other ob- adduced as an argument in favor of this of crejects more intimately connected with the sub-ating a corporation; but what has this bill to do ject remained to be considered. with trade? Would any plain man suppose

The power of granting charters, he observed, that this bill had any thing to do with trade? is a great and important power, and ought not He noticed the observation respecting the to be exercised unless we find ourselves ex-utility of banks to aid the Government with pressly authorized to grant them. Here he loans. He denied the necessity of the institudilated on the great and extensive influence tion to aid the Government in this respect. that incorporated societies had on public affairs Great Britain, he observed, did not depend on in Europe. They are powerful machines which such institutions; she borrows from various have always been found competent to effect ob- sources. jects on principles in a great measure independent of the people.

66

Banks, it is said, are necessary to pay the interest of the public debt." Then they ought to be established in the places where that interest is paid; but can any man say, that the bank notes will circulate at par in Georgia. From the example in Scotland, we know that they cannot be made equal to specie, remote from the place where they can be immediately con

He argued against the influence of the precedent to be established by the bill; for though it has been said, that the charter is to be granted only for a term of years, yet he contended, that granting the powers on any principle is granting them in perpetuum; and assuming this right on the part of the Government involves the as-verted into coin; they must depreciate in case sumption of every power whatever.

Noticing the arguments in favor of the bill, he said, it had been observed, that "Govern ment necessarily possesses every power." However true this idea may be in the theory, he denied that it applied to the Government of the United States.

Here he read the restrictive clause in the Constitution; and then observed, that he saw no pass over this limit.

of a demand for specie; and if there is no moral certainty that the interest can be paid by these bank bills, will the Government be justified in depriving itself of the power of establishing banks in different parts of the Union?

We reason, and often with advantage, from British models; but in the present instance there is a great dissimilarity of circumstances. The bank notes of Great Britain do not circulate universally. To make the circumstances parallel, it ought to have been assumed as a fact, that banks are established in various parts of Great Britain, at which the interest of the national debt is paid; but the fact is, it is only

The preamble to the Constitution, said he, has produced a new mine of power; but this is the first instance he had heard of, in which. the preamble has been adduced for such a purpose. In his opinion, the preamble only states the ob-paid in one place. jects of the Confederation, and the subsequent clauses designate the express powers by which those objects are to be obtained; and a mean is proposed through which to acquire those that may be found still requisite, more fully to effect the purposes of the Confederation.

It is said, "there is a field of legislation yet unexplored." He had often heard this language; but he confessed he did not understand it. Is there a single blade of grass-Is there any property in existence in the United States, which is not subject of legislation, either of the particular States, or of the United States? He contended that the exercise of this power, on the part of the United States, involves, to all intents and purposes, every power which an individual State may exercise. On this principle, he denied the right of Congress to make use of a bank to facilitate the collection of taxes. He did not, however, admit the idea, that the institution would conduce to that object. The bank notes are to be equal to gold and silver, and consequently will be as difficult to obtain as the specie. By means of the objects of trade on which gold and silver are employed, there will be an influx of those articles; but paper being substituted, will fill those

The clause of the Constitution which has been so often recurred to, and which empowers Congress to dispose of its property, he supposed referred only to the property left at the conclusion of the war, and has no reference to the moneyed property of the United States.

The clause which empowers Congress to pass all laws necessary, &c. has been brought forward repeatedly by the advocates of the bill; he noticed the several constructions of this clause which had been offered. The conclusion which he drew from the commentary of the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. GERRY,) was, that Congress may do what they please; and recurring to the opinion of that gentleman in 1787, he said the powers of the Constitution were then dark, inexplicable, and dangerous; but now, perhaps, as the result of experience, they are clear and luminous!

The constructions of the Constitution, he asserted, which have been maintained on this occasion, go to the subversion of every power whatever in the several States; but we are told, for our comfort, that the Judges will rectify our mistakes. How are the Judges to determine in the case; are they to be guided in their decisions by the rules of expediency?

Bank of the United States.

It has been asked, that if those minute powers of the Western Territory this had been thought of the Constitution were thought to be necessa- essential. The holders of six per cent. securiry, is it supposable that the great and important ties will derive undue advantages. Creditors power on the table was not intended to be at a distance, and the holders of three per cent. given? Mr. M. interpreted this circumstance securities, ought to be considered, as the pubin a quite different way, viz: if it was thought lic good is most essentially promoted by an equal necessary to specify in the Constitution those attention to the interest of all. minute powers, it would follow that more important powers would have been explicitly granted, had they been contemplated.