respect of the leasehold interest, nor did Keeton, or the company, demand that that, or any other part of Keeton's interest in the land, should be separately valued. The jury gave a verdict for 15,2027. 9s. 6d., and the sheriff made an indorsement on the warrant as follows:

The execution of this precept appears in the panel annexed.

"George Thomas Nicholson, Esq., Sheriff." The company conceived this verdict to be a nullity, inasmuch as it did not ascertain the compensation for damages separately from the value of the lands; and they issued a second warrant to the sheriff, calling on him to sum

mon a jury to inquire of the same matters as were specified in the [*683 former warrant. The sheriff refused obedience, on the ground that the verdict already given was conclusive. Mr. Keeton's agent, on being informed of the difficulty respecting the verdict, alleged that the jury had awarded the whole sum as compensation, and nothing for the lease. In moving for the present rule, the verdict was objected to as contrary to the act, and it was urged, that as the verdict did not state what sum was assessed in respect of the leasehold interest to be purchased, it would be impossible, in an assignment of that interest, to give a true statement of the consideration money for the purpose of fixing the ad valorem duty; and consequently that such assignment to the company would be invalid.

Thesiger, and Channell, now shewed cause. The proviso for a separate finding as to value and damages is introduced for the benefit of the company, not of the vendor. All the proceedings are instituted by the company. They should have taken care, upon the inquiry, to have the damages properly assessed; but it appears that they did not raise the question at that time. The clause is only directory. Acts of this kind are to be construed strictly as to the companies who obtain them, but favourably to parties whose property they affect. No real difficulty can arise as to the duty.

Sir W. W. Follett, Solicitor-General, and Wightman, contrà. The words of sect. 51, are imperative, "shall be settled and ascertained separately;" whereas the next section only directs the jury to apportion the purchase-money "if thereunto required:" Davison v. Gill, 1 East, 64, shews that the [*684 form of words used in sect. 51, is compulsory. The company are not in fact voluntary agents in this transaction: they are in want of a small piece of ground, and are compelled to purchase many acres. They ought to be enabled to make a good title to such part of the lands as they may wish to sell again; but for that purpose the ad valorem duty on the assignment must be properly ascer tained. If the amount of purchase-money for the lands were not distinctly assessed, the company could not, in case of necessity, avail themselves of sects. 58 and 73. It is alleged that the whole amount of damages has been given by way of compensation; but, from all that passed, it is clear that the value of the land forms part of that amount. The demand made upon the company under sect. 46 was, that they should buy the whole of the land. The present objec tion could not be waived by any supposed acquiescence of the company at the time of the inquiry. It is essential that the verdict should be given according to the statute. The enactment is intended as a check upon juries. [Lord DENMAN, C. J. It was the company's business to call upon the sheriff to have distinct assessments made. To the claimant it was nothing whether he received his compensation in a gross sum or not.] The company did, in their precept to the sheriff, distinguish the matters to be assessed as far as lay in their power. [LITTLEDALE, J. If all that you require is, to have the value of the property ascertained, in order that you may make a valid conveyance, what prevents your fixing a value? The conveyance may state that the claimant has assigned all

*685]

his interest to the company for 15,000l. Government, *which is to receive the ad valorem duty, will sustain no damage.]

Lord DENMAN, C. J. I cannot see that the claimant was called upon to have the compensation assessed in the manner now expired. His only business was to obtain all that the jury would give. I think that we cannot treat this verdict as a nullity, and that it would be hard to visit the claimant with the consequences of any omission that has taken place.

LITTLEDALE and COLERIDGE, Js., (a) concurred.

THE COURT recommended that, to avoid difficulty as to the stamp, the conveyance should recite the finding of the jury specially, and value the interest conveyed at 15,000. Rule discharged.

*686] *In the Matter of PALMER, Gent., One, &c. Friday, January 30. A motion was made against P., an attorney, for suffering E., an unqualified person, to practice in his name, contrary to stat. 22 G. 2, c. 46, s. 11. The affidavits stated facts tending to shew such practising in some inferior courts; and it was further alleged, that E. had delivered writs (not stating that they issued from this Court) to a sheriff's officer to be executed; that the writs bore P.'s name, but that P. had refused to pay for their execution, alleging that the business was E.'s. The Court having referred the matters of the rule to the Master:

Held, that the Master might, on such reference, receive affidavits tending to establish a case of practice contrary to the statute in a cause commenced in this Court, although no such charge had been specifically made in the affidavits on which the rule was granted.

The Master, in his report, made a special statement of facts as proved before him, and forbore to draw any conclusion: Held, that the Court might draw its own inference from the report and the affidavits filed in support of the rule; and, if satisfied, upon the whole, that P. had allowed E. to use his name for his (E.'s) profit, although the Master had not expressly stated either that fact, or the actual receipt of such profit by E., was bound to enforce the statute against P.

IN Michaelmas term, 1833, a rule was obtained, calling upon John Palmer, an attorney of this Court, to shew cause "why he should not be struck off the

roll of attorneys of this Court." The application was grounded upon stat. *687] 22 G. 2, c. 46, s. 11.(6) The affidavits upon which the rule was granted charged Palmer with permitting one Edmonds to practise in his name in various instances, contrary to the statute. They alleged expressly that he had suffered Edmonds to use his name in actions in the hundred court, and on an appeal at the quarter sessions. The examination of Palmer before commissioners of bankrupt was also put in, in which he admitted having allowed Edmonds to practise for him, but for Edmonds's own profit, at the court of requests, and before the magistrates at the public office, in Birmingham. It appeared also that Ed(a) Williams, J., had gone to hear motions in the bail court.

(b) Stat. 22 G. 2, c. 46, s. 11, recites, that "divers persons who are not examined, sworn, or admitted to act as attorneys," &c., "do, in conjunction with, or by the assistance or connivance of certain sworn attorneys and solicitors, and by various subtle contrivances, intrude themselves into, and act and practice in the office and business of attorneys and solicitors, to the great prejudice," &c.: and it enacts, that from and after, &c., "if any sworn attorney or solicitor shall act as agent for any person or persons, not duly qualified to act as an attorney or solicitor as aforesaid, or permit or suffer his name to be anyways made use of upon the account, or for the profit of any unqualified person or persons, or send any process to such unqualified person or persons, thereby to enable him or them to appear, act, or practise in any respect as an attorney or solicitor, knowing him not to be duly qualified as aforesaid, and complaint shall be made thereof in a summary way to the Court from whence any such process did issue, and proof made thereof, upon oath, to the satisfaction of the Court, that such sworn attorney or solicitor hath offended therein as aforesaid, then, and in such case, every such attorney or solicitor so offending, shall be struck off the roll, and for ever after disabled from practising as an attorney or solicitor; and in that case, and upon such complaint and proof made as aforesaid, it shall and may be lawful to and for the said Court to commit such unqualified person, so acting or practising as aforesaid, to the prison of the said Court, for any time not exceeding one year.'

monds had practised in like manner at the petty sessions at Warwick. And there was an affidavit by a sheriff's officer, stating that he had received writs from Edmonds to be executed, bearing the name of Palmer; that he had delivered bills to Palmer for the execution of writs bearing his name, and that Palmer had refused payment on the ground that that business belonged to Edmonds; saying that the business sent from Coleshill was on his own account, but the Birmingham business was Edmonds's. Many affidavits were filed in answer; and, upon cause being shewn against the rule, in Hilary term, 1834, it was ordered "that the matters of the said rule be referred to the Master, to report thereon to this Court." The Master, in Michaelmas term (November 22d,) 1834, reported as follows:

"That, in 1829, Palmer was residing with his family at Coleshill, and also occupying occasionally part of a house in Birmingham, in which [*688 Edmonds and his family lived, Edmonds paying the rent and taxes; Edmonds being at the time articled to Palmer, and the name of Edmonds being on the door, as also that of Palmer. That Edmonds was in the habit of attending the court of requests in Birmingham, and before the magistrates at the public office in Birmingham, and at the petty sessions in Warwick, transacting business as the clerk of Palmer nominally, and with Palmer's knowledge and concurrence, but deriving a profit to himself therefrom. It appeared also that an appeal had been tried in the court of quarter sessions for the county, in the name of Palmer, in which the client had consulted Edmonds, supposing him to be an attorney, and where Palmer had permitted Edmonds to conduct the proceedings, and had permitted part of the law bill to be paid by the client, who was a tailor, making a suit of clothes for Edmonds."

The Master also stated that the parties supporting the rule had proposed, on the hearing before him, to put in affidavits shewing specific instances of practice by Edmonds, using the name of Palmer, in business depending in the King's Bench; but that he had declined receiving such affidavits without the sanction of the Court, being doubtful whether, on the reference to him, he ought to enter upon new cases, although he did not hesitate to admit affidavits explanatory of any matter which had been expressly submitted to the Court already. Upon this report, Hill, on behalf of Palmer, contended that the charges which it was now proposed to go into had not been stated in applying for the rule; that the accusation at that time was general; that neither the affidavits nor the report at present specified any thing which could give juris diction under the statute to this Court as the Court out of which the "process," stated to have been abused, "did issue;" and that the complainants ought not now to have the liberty of going into particular charges not specified before.

[*689

Sir James Scarlett, Follett, and Whateley, contrà, insisted that the affidavits laid sufficient ground for the proposed inquiry, the new matter being only the particulars of the more general charge preferred before: and, at all events, that the inquiry was one which, on an application of this kind, the Court would call upon the Master to make."

Lord DENMAN, C. J. It seems to me that the charge, as originally made, was large enough in its terms to let in this inquiry, and that the advisable course will be, for the Master to receive these affidavits, and report upon them to the Court.

TAUNTON, J. concurred.

PATTESON, J. It would have been far better if the original affidavits had been more specific, but I think the statement is large enough. We cannot act upon the new affidavits here, the accused party having relied upon their not being receivable; but they may be laid before the Master.

WILLIAMS, J., concurred.

[*690

*The Master now made his further report. After stating that this was an application against Palmer, calling upon him to shew cause why he should not be struck off the roll for permitting his name to be used by Edmonds

contrary to stat. 22 G. 2, c. 46, s. 11, he repeated the statement delivered by him in Michaelmas term, and proceeded as follows:- "The above instances have arisen in the inferior courts, and court of quarter sessions; and I have now, after receiving further affidavits, to add, and submit for the decision of the Court, two instances arising in the Court of King's Bench. These are :-First, that in or about 1832, several writs were placed (a) in the hands of an officer to be executed, having Palmer's name upon them, for part of which Palmer afterwards paid him, but referred him to Edmonds for the remainder, saying the rest was Edmonds's business and not his. And, secondly, that in 18291830 an action (Davies v. Ashford) was carried on in the name of Palmer, and with the knowledge and concurrence of Palmer, in the course of which Edmonds appeared and acted as the attorney, and, after verdict obtained, claimed to have the costs paid to himself, and objected to have them paid to Palmer."(b)

Hill, shewed cause against the rule. The cases first reported by the Master are not within the jurisdiction of this Court under 22 G. 2, c. 46, s. 11., no process in those cases having issued from hence. The act 2 G. 2, c. 23, s. 17, *691] cannot be resorted to. That requires that *the party shall have been "lawfully convicted," which terms can scarcely apply to a mere rule of Court. And the Master has made his report entirely with reference to stat. 22 G. 2, c. 46. The case is not brought within that statute by the ultimate report. The statement there does not necessarily imply a practice contrary to the statute, and the Master draws no conclusion from the facts. He does not find that Palmer permitted Edmonds to practice in his name; and the Court will not extend the finding by any inference. As to the alleged mal-practice at quarter sessions, that is the subject of a distinct provision, in stat. 22 G. 2, c. 46, s. 12. It may be said that, independently of the statute, the Court may, by its general authority, strike an attorney off the roll; but if such a power existed originally, the statutes must now be considered as guiding the discretion with which it is to be exercised.

Sir W. W. Follett, Solicitor-General, and Whateley, contrà. The affidavits, and the Master's report, establish a sufficient case for granting the rule. (In support of this proposition they commented on the facts above stated.) The Master's report must not be taken as a statement of the whole matter, but is to be read in conjunction with the affidavits. If the parties have been brought within the provisions either of stat. 2 G. 2, c. 23, or of 22 G. 2, c. 46, it is sufficient. In the case In the master of Clark, 3 Dowl. & R. 260, where the application was to the same effect as this, Lord Tenterden, after referring to the words of stat. 22 G. 2, c. 46, which inflict the penalty of striking off the roll, if any attorney "shall permit or suffer his name to be anyways made use *692] of upon the account or for the profit of any unqualified person," and proof thereof be made on oath "to the satisfaction of the Court," goes on to say, "Independently of the statute, it is equally the duty of the Court to strike an attorney off the roll for misconduct of this description, for, if we were to suffer a person to remain on the roll, who has so conducted himself, we should thereby give him a sanction and credence with the world, and enable him to defraud and impose upon the public. The words of the statute are to the satisfaction of the Court.' I disclaim for myself any wish to proceed in a case like this, upon mere suspicion; but we are to ask ourselves this question, (which is not unfrequently asked in summing up a case for the jury,) adverting to the evidence before us, are our own judgments satisfied, are our minds convinced that the crime charged has been proved to our satisfaction and conviction? That conviction may arise as well from collateral circumstances as from direct

(a) The Master stated, in the course of the ensuing argument, that he did not mean to decide whether or not the writs were placed in the officer's hands by Edmonds.

(b) The Master stated that there was no proof before him of Edmonds having actually received the profits of this business.

and positive proof." This shews that in the present case a more precise report from the Master was not necessary; and, further, that if the abuse of process from this Court were not satisfactorily made out, the Court by its general authority, might strike the party off the roll for the other misconduct which has been proved. In the case In the matter of Jackson and Wood, 1 B. & C. 270, 3 D. & R. 263, note, (a) Abbott, C. J. said that the enacting part of stat. 22 G. 2, c. 46, s. 11, "must be construed with reference to the mischief recited in the preamble." The present case is, at all events, within that mischief. [COLERIDGE, J. referred to the case In the matter of Garbutt, 2 Bing. 74, (See In the Matter of King and Tredwell, 1 A. & E. 560.) Here the affidavits and the Master's *report shew such a participation of profits (on [*693 Palmer's own admission) as the Court of Common Pleas in that case thought necessary to be proved. In Ex parte Whatton, 5 B. & Ald. 824, where the Court forbore to act upon the clause now in question, the unprofessional person had never represented himself, or been considered, as an attorney; nor had he received any profit on the law proceedings. It is said that, to bring this case within the stat. 2 G. 2, c. 23, s. 17, the party must be "convicted;" but, whatever meaning may be given to that word, the Court has authority to strike an attorney off the roll who, in that character, transgresses an act of parliament.

Lord DENMAN, C. J. By the affidavits upon which this rule was obtained, it appeared that an intimacy, and something very like a partnership, had existed between these parties; and the question ultimately was, whether any business had been done by them in the manner imputed, upon process issuing out of this court, within the eleventh section of the statute 22 G. 2, c. 46. The case was then referred to the Master, and he has reported to us upon it. The object of. that reference was to ascertain whether or not the statute of 22 G. 2, could be enforced; and, having confined the inquiry to that statute, the Court ought not now to act in virtue of its general power. Then, as to the report which has been made to us: the former part contains strong facts, and the two transactions stated in the latter, leave, I fear, no doubt as to the conduct of the party before us, if we examine the circumstances upon the principles *laid down by Lord Tenterden in one of the cases which have been cited, and [*694 which must be acted upon in the consideration of such facts. In the first of these two instances, it appears that writs, having Palmer's name upon them, were placed in the hands of an officer to be executed, and that Palmer stated, as to some of those writs, that they related to business of which he was to have the profit, and, as to others, that he was not bound to pay the officer for executing them, because the business was Edmonds's. In the other instance an action was carried on in Palmer's name, but Edmonds appeared and acted as the attorney, and claimed the costs. The report does not state who actually received those costs, but the suit was carried on with Palmer's knowledge and concur rence, Edmonds appearing and acting as attorney in the cause, in which Palmer's name was employed, and in which he did not act. Considering that the object of the examination before the Master was, not to obtain a particular statement of all the facts, but to point the inquiry with reference to the statute 22 G. 2, c. 46, I think it is sufficiently shewn that Edmonds was employed, with the concurrence of Palmer, in a manner contrary to the eleventh section of the statute and therefore, with respect to Palmer, we have no option as to the exercise of our authority, but must order him to be struck off the roll. LITTLEDALE, J. The two instances of practice in matters arising in this court are not very explicitly brought before us. But in the first case we have the admission of Palmer, that some of the writs bearing Palmer's name belonged to Edmonds and some to Palmer, and it seems that Edmonds had the benefit of *some. And this instance is helped out by the circumstance of their residing together, and Edmonds being the articled clerk of [*695 Palmer. It must, upon this case, be taken that Edmonds had the benefit of