his elevation to the Bench, the reports abound in cases in which he appeared.

At this time Trenton contained many men of prominence and experience at the Bar, and Mr. Beasley was put upon his mettle in coping with them as adversaries, as well as in collaborating with them as associate counsel. He acquired particular distinction as an expert in the intricate and exacting science of special pleading. Despite his general antipathy for technicalities, his fondness for this branch of the practice, which was then of great importance, was of such intensity that, in the words of Justice Van Syckle, he became so proficient that "none of the old masters in that branch of the law excelled him; he would have been a worthy contestant for supremacy with the most adroit of them.”

Before the Bar he displayed a complete mastery of the principles of his profession—the natural and inevitable result of the years of diligent preparation. His rather tall, erect form and impressive, if not handsome, countenance gave him a dignified and commanding presence which was heightened by his courtly demeanor and respectful attitude toward counsel, witnesses and court. He was skilful and resourceful in argument, and always possessed a remarkable faculty for discerning and pointing out the determining points of a proposition or case and a facility for applying with unerring precision the principles of law pertinent to any combination of facts or circumstances. He was an effective speaker before juries as well as in the appellate courts. His clear enunciation and well modulated voice compelled attention, he clothed his logical arguments in the choicest rhetoric, and spoke with a confidence and earnestness that were unusually convincing.

His practice continued to expand and increase, but, although he concentrated his faculties almost entirely upon the law, he became mildly interested in politics and occasionally delivered campaign addresses on behalf of the Whig party. Upon the advent of the Republican party, he affiliated himself with the Democrats, with whom he was identified for the remainder of his life.

He was the defeated candidate for Mayor of Trenton in 1850 and had previously aspired, without success, for election to the Assembly. These defeats, which were solely the result of general party reverses prompted him to determine never to seek elective office again, and to this resolve he steadfastly adhered.

He was, however, City Solicitor of Trenton and also served as President of its Common Council. His reputation as a lawyer of

extraordinary attainments made him so prominent that, when Chief Justice Whelpley died, in 1864, public and legal opinion seemed unanimously centered upon Mercer Beasley as the man best qualified to be his successor. Chancellor Green, who had himself been Chief Justice, immediately recommended his appointment to Governor Joel Parker. Before three weeks had elapsed he was nominated and confirmed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, at the age of forty-nine. He first occupied his new position on March 8, 1864, and commenced a service that was to continue for thirty-two years and eleven months, the longest period of any Chief Justiceship in New Jersey and almost equal to the term of thirty-five years served by Chief Justice Marshall in the United States Supreme Court. At the expiration of his first term in 1871, he was reappointed by Governor Randolph; in 1878, by Governor McClellan; by Governor Abbett in 1885; and again, for his fifth term, by Governor Abbett in 1892. It will be observed that his nomination each time was made by a governor of the same political faith as himself; but he became so highly esteemed that long before the conclusion of his first term his continuance in office was assured, regardless of the politics of the administrations during which his terms might end.

As in the case of John Marshall, who was appointed Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court without having previously held any judicial office, so Mercer Beasley was not promoted from a humbler seat upon the Bench. It was a sudden ascension from the varied activities of a successful practitioner to the presidency of a high court, composed of distinguished justices of long experience upon the Bench. But so eminent was his ability as a lawyer, and so complete seemed his equipment for his new duties that the State had entire confidence in his capacity to perform them satisfactorily. With modest dignity and a deep realization of the solemn responsibility that his office entailed, he took his position, presiding over the Supreme Court and sitting in the Court of Errors in a manner that was considered marvelous by his colleagues, who knew his judicial inexperience. Although considerate and uniformly courteous to his associates, he maintained the supremacy of his rank and was always treated and recognized as Chief Justice in fact as well as name.

He first rendered a decision in the Court of Errors and Appeals in the March Term, 1864, delivering the opinion in Eames v. Stiles, involving the nature and history of Writs of Error. The

'31 New Jersey Law, 490.

Chief Justice delivered a brief but masterful opinion which disclosed a most careful investigation of this form of remedy. The new Chief Justice prepared every reported opinion of this term, a manifestation of the diligence that he continued to display throughout his judicial career.

His written opinions from the beginning were models of clear legal analysis, couched in pure and vigorous diction, and he seemed to have an innate faculty for throwing the light of his knowledge directly upon the controlling point in the controversy, brushing aside all the unessential matter injected by counsel which tended to obscure the real issue. He possessed an accurate off-hand knowledge of the most abstruse legal principles, and his opinions, sometimes containing decisive points that entirely escaped the attention of both counsel, were always illuminating. His use of unfamiliar words, frequently of his own construction, and unusual sentence structure often renders the full meaning of his statements rather obscure, but close perusal unfolds his subtle reasoning and there is a revelation of perspicuity in his thought. In his trials at Circuit, however, his charges to juries were direct, simple and adapted to the understanding of his auditors.

A distinctive feature of his opinions is that they contain few citations, but convey the impression that he who wrote them felt either that the principles he enunciated were so obviously correct and well-known that reference to precedents would be superfluous, or that the rule he laid down was so clearly logical, that authorities either way should not be permitted to affect the result. I do not mean to intimate that he disregarded the doctrine of "stare decisis"; on the contrary he religiously upheld that rule, which is both the anchor and the compass of jurisprudence. But he realized its limitations and did not hesitate to repudiate and refuse to follow a decision that was palpably erroneous and unsound. True, his opinions contain references to prior cases and to commentaries, but these are included usually to explain and illustrate, rather than to justify or strengthen his decision. One feels as he reads his opinions that he spoke the law and that he himself was sufficient authority for his statements. All was reduced by him to such simple and distinct principles and applied with such logical exposition that he carries conviction by the force of his own reasoning. He had contempt for briefs containing an exhaustive and exhausting array of authorities, few of which, the Chief Justice once declared, the citers had even read, but had acquired this false show

of learning by practicing "petit larceny on the Digests." He favored careful references to a few controlling cases on each point, supplemented by careful argument based upon them.

Chief Justice Beasley always considered the law as ancillary to the promotion of justice. Mr. Justice Bergen, in Volume VI of "Great American Lawyers," relates that "on one occasion a newly appointed judicial officer applied to him for suggestions regarding the due performance of his professional duties and was told 'first ascertain which of the litigants has the right on his side, and when you are sure about that, find the law, as you always can, required to make justice prevail.'"

In reviewing his judicial career, it is impossible to select any particular division of the law to exemplify his importance in shaping and developing the present body of New Jersey jurisprudence. He did not specialize as a judge or confine his labors to any certain branch of the law. Nor was he destined for any peculiar mission such as the interpretation of the Federal Constitution by which John Marshall gained immortal honor. The seeds of Mercer Beasley's greatness were sown over the whole broad field of the law and blossomed forth with equal splendor in every part. His fame rests upon the wonderful product as a whole, of his third of a century of continuous service, his every duty performed with uniform brilliancy and thoroughness, and his life-work perpetually illuminating every nook and cranny in the great structure of the law.

It may be interesting to refer to the trend of his thought upon a few subjects as revealed in his opinions. He was inclined to be very strict in his construction of statutes, always refusing to speculate as to the probable purpose of the legislature, where the effect would be to vary the clearly expressed terms of the act; but he did not hesitate to vitiate enactments that were either unconstitutional or otherwise substantially defective. He maintained the sovereignty of the state, but recognized its constitutional obligations to the Union, holding that extradition as regulated by the Federal Constitution was an absolute legal duty imposed upon a state as distinguished from the generally accepted theory that it is an exercise of comity only.

His decision in Grove v. Van Duyne, is a careful exposition of his views upon the personal immunity of judges for their official

204.

*44 N. J. Law, 655, 43 Am. Rep. 412, Currier & Bate, Cases on Torts,

mistakes. He carefully guarded the right of property from the misuse of the authority of the State, declaring in Agens v. Newark,5 that assessments for street improvements must be limited in amount to the benefits conferred and not arbitarily fixed under the taxing power. But in Beseman v. P. R. R. Co., in a characteristic opinion he gives wide scope to the legislature to legalize that which would otherwise be a nuisance and thus indirectly even confiscate private property without compensation.

6

His deep-rooted fondness for the common law did not warp his judgment in the field of equity, as may be seen in his many Chancery appeal decisions contained in C. E. Green's and Stewart's Reports.

The Chief Justice had not occupied his position two years before there arose a political and legal situation which was well calculated to severely test his judicial capability and moral fibre. The Jersey City Police Department was under the control of the city Common Council, and an atmosphere of scandal pervaded all transactions concerning the demoralized force, which had degenerated into a mere political instrument of the local Democratic organization, then dominant in the city. The State Legislature at the time was Republican, and it determined to ameliorate conditions, and incidently deprive the Democrats of valuable patronage, by establishing a police commission, to be appointed by the Governor, and confirmed by the Senate, which was to supersede the Common Council in the administration of police departmental affairs. The bill passed both houses, but the signatures of the speaker of the House and President of the Senate and the approval of the Governor were applied to the original bill, without the amendments, and in this condition it was filed with the Secretary of State.

The commissioners were duly appointed and confirmed and then the discovery was made that the amendments were not included in the Act as filed. The new board proceeded to assume the reins of the department, but the city authorities resisted this attempt and refused to recognize the board. The commissioners made appointments and as a result Jersey City was protected by two distinct police forces. The crisis came upon pay day. The City Treasurer declined to honor the drafts of the Commissioners, and the Chief of Police likewise ignored the orders of the Board. Thereupon, two writs of mandamus were applied for; one to compel $37 N. J. Law, 415.

50 N. J. Law, 235, 13 Atl. 164, Currier & Bate, Cases on Torts, 413.