Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Monaghan, what are you reading? Mr. MONAGHAN. I am reading from the One hundred and twentieth Federal Reports, Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Ruef, page 116. Mr. WEBB. You think that is a pretty clear statement as to what the preponderance of evidence would have to be in order to prove coercion? Mr. MONAGHAN. In my own judgment peaceful picketing is not permissible under the law if that picketing is accompanied by coercion, whether coercion is actually used or assumed, and distinction is made in the courts upon that subject, to which attention. might be invited. Now, while I have spoken of this particular case, I wish to enter upon a recitation of the authorities which govern the issuance of injunctions. They constitute in this statement of fact as well as of law, an irrefutable argument against the legislation contemplated. In view of the limit of time imposed it will not be practicable to quote the decisions at length and comment extensively upon them, but for the sake of brevity I will relate to the committee by quotations from the authorities themselves, the principles which are held, and rely upon the arguments contained in the decisions and the inferences. which may be drawn from their recitations of conditions, to convince the committee of the propriety, as well as the necessity and the legality of allowing the writ of injunction to remain with force unhampered. The authorities cover questions suggested by the committee as to the power of an injunction to bind those not served, but who have knowledge of the conditions as well as the fundamental principles of law relative to them. I might say in addition that the inherent power of courts of chancery to issue injunctions is materially infringed upon by the measure itself, and I emphatically question the right of Congress to withdraw from a citizen the protection afforded him, and to seek, by definition, to annihilate the right of property and lift his liberty of contract above the right of law to protect. The case of the Bucks Stove & Range Co. v. Hatters' Union is extremely instructive in setting forth in definite and precise form the evil of the boycott and the right of the courts to prevent its invocation. To this case the attention of the committee is especially and particularly invited. The case of Loewe v. Lawler, reported in 208 United States, is alike instructive in illustrating the inhuman ingenuity displayed in a system of boycott and the power of labor organizations unhampered by injunction to wrong without right the established business of another. Without further comment we submit the following authorities declarative of the law relative to injunction and the limit of the authority of courts in the issuance of them: WHO ARE BOUND BY INJUNCTION. Lord Wellesly v. Earl of Mornington (11 Beavan, 181) (England). An injunction was granted against the earl only (but not expressing his servants and agents) from cutting timber. A. Bately, who was the earl's agent, with knowledge of the injunction, cut the timber. Held, that Bately might be committed for contempt though not for breach of the injunction. 'Bately was in a position to know and knowing the duty of the earl, ought to have taken care not to do any acts in violation of the order of the court." The court said: United States v. Agler (62 Fed. Rep., 824) (Indiana). "Now this party defendant is not named, and to say now that process of injunction may not be issued to be binding upon men who are not named, or shall not be binding until they are actually served with subpoena, as they are on the civil side, on the equity side of the court, it would defeat the purpose of the law. It is not within the language of the statute itself. I think the injunction as against unknown defendants is valid and binding when the injunction order is served upon them, although they are not at the time parties to the suit. Indeed I think an injunction that is issued against one man enjoining or restraining him, and all that give aid and comfort to him, or all that aid or abet him is valid against everybody that aids or gives countenance to the man to whom it is addressed. I do not entertain any doubt about that.” Ex parte Lennon (166 U. S., 548). The Supreme Court of the United States said: "To render a person amenable to an injunction, it is neither necessary that he should be a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have been actually served with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have actual notice." Injunction in this case, was directed to "to agents, servants, etc." Conkley v. Russell (111 Fed., 417). "When a Federal court has issued an injunction directed against the defendants in a suit and which has been served upon them, such court has jurisdiction to punish for contempt any person whom with actual knowledge of the injunction and of its scope and effect, combines and confederates with the defendants who were enjoined for the purpose of violating and resisting it, and who in pursuance of such conspiracy, aids and assists in the commission of acts which were enjoined. This jurisdiction exists by reason of the conspiracy to defeat the process of the court, and although such person is a stranger to the suit and by reason of his citizenship could not have been made a defendant therein." Christansen et al. v. People (114 Ill. App., 59). "It is not necessary that one shall be a party to the bill or officially served with the writ in order for him to be bound by the injunction, but only that he shall have actual notice of it." Ex parte Richards (117 Fed., 658). "It is not necessary that a person be served with an injunction in order to render himself amenable to its provisions if it appears that he had reasonable notice of it.” Cases in all States cited. Cent. Digest 447 (vol. 27). HIGH ON INJUNCTIONS. (Vol. 2, ed. 4, sec. 1415, L.) "And it may be stated as a general rule that where the injunction runs against certain named defendants and against all others who are their confederates, or associates, or who are aiding or abetting or acting in concert with them are persons who fall within the designated class, and who have knowledge of the existence of the injunction, will be held amenable to the order of the court and will be bound thereby, even though they are not parties to the injunction suit and are not named either in the bill or in the writ." (U. S. v. Agler, 62 Fed. 824; U. S. v. Elliott, 64 Fed. 27; Conkley v. Russell, 111 Fed. 417; Ex parte Richards, 117 Fed. 658; Union Railway . Ruef, 120 Fed. 102; In re Reese, 107 Fed. 942; U. S. r. Weber, 114 Fed. 950; U. S. . Haggerty, 116 Fed. 510.) PERSUASION PICKETS-BOYCOTT. Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union (150 Fed., 181). "A simple request to do or not to do a thing made by one or more of a body of strikers under circumstances calculated to convey a threatening intimidation, with a design to hinder or obstruct workmen is unlawful intimidation and not less obnoxious than the use of physical force for the same purpose." (In re Doolittle, 23 Fed., 515; Atchinson R. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed 582.) Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union (150 Fed., 173). "Where peaceful picketing develops, as it generally does, in a strike, into "strong' persistent and organized persuasion and social pressure of every description, making the condition of workmen disagreeable and intolerable, followed by hints of injury, veiled threats, offensive or abusive language and occasioned instances of assault and personal violence -all of which conditions are shown in the evidence in this casethen we have a condition condemned by the injunction, a compelling and inducing by threats, intimidation, force and violence, the quitting of workmen, a preventing by threats, etc., workmen from entering the service, and the maintaining of picket lines in a threatening and intimidating manner." Cases where peaceful persuasion" allowed: Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, L. R., 23, Q. B., 598; Macauley Bros. v. Tierney, 37 L. R. A., 455; Wabash Ry. Co. v. Hannohan, 121 Fed., 563; Bohn Manufacturing Co. v. Hollis, 21 L. R. A., 337; National Protective Ass'n v. Cummings, 58 L. R. A., 135; Boyer v. W. U. Tel. Co., 124 Fed., 292; Jacobs v. Cohen, 2 L. R. A., 292; People v. Marcus, 77 N. E., 1073 (N. Y.). In those cases where the motive was only economic benefit of defendants, where there was no malicious intent nor violence, where the resulting injury was only incidental, held not unlawful, but in these cases the unions, strike committees, and picket, captains instructed the men to use only peaceful means, not to follow workmen, to leave them unless they were willing to talk, etc., and instructions were obeyed. Interference is defined in the Century Dictionary "Interposition, especially intermeddling, a clashing or collision; to act in such a way as to check or hamper the action of other persons or things.' Hillenbrand v. The Building Trades Council. "The practice of soliciting workmen to join a labor union, when done, as in the present case, with intent to injure an employer in his business or compel him to accede to the demands of the union, is unlawful and may be restrained. Visiting jobs' where workmen are employed to persuade workmen to quit service or to join the union has been repeatedly condemned as unlawful. Visiting employees at their homes or at their places of work in groups in pursuance of the unlawful purpose against the employer is of itself intimidation." The court said: Kunsden v. Benn (123 Fed., 636). "Fellow-workmen may agree together to leave at once the service of their employer, but having done so, and being no longer interested in the matter, then, notwithstanding certain dicta in cases on the subject, it does not seem clear that they are acting lawfully where they are persuading the servants of their former employer to break their contracts and leave the service. It is a matter that does not concern them any longer; it is a matter that is apparently injurious to their former employer. It seems to me that such an interference in a matter with which they have no rightful concern and which is injurious to another is unlawful. ** They have no right to interfere with that business in any way." The court said: ** Barr v. Essex Trades Council (53 N. Y., Eq. 101). "Nor does it matter whether the wrongdoer effects his object by persuasion or by false representation. The court looks through the instrumentality or means used to the wrong perpetrated with the malicious intent and bases the right of action upon that." Jersey Printing Co. v. Cassidy (53 Atl., 229). "The interest of any employer or an employee in a contract for services is properly conceded. Where defendants in combination or individually, undertake to interfere with and disrupt existing contract relations between the employer and employee, it is plain that a property right is directly invaded. The effect is the same whether the means employed to cause the workman to break his contract and thus injure the employer are violence or threats of violence against the employee, or mere molestation, annoyance, or persuasions." This rule is also laid down in Luvka v. Clothing Cutters (77 Md., 396). "Merely to persuade a person to break his contract may or may not be wrongful in law or fact, but if the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff or benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act which is in law and fact a wrong act." These principles are reaffirmed and emphasized in the following cases: London Guaranty & Accident Co. v. Horn, 101 Ill. App., 355; Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass., 492; Ex parte Richards, 117 Fed., 658; Flaccus v. Smith, 199 Pa., 128; Southern Ry. v. Machinists Local Union, 111 Fed., 49. Plant v. Woods (51 L. R. A., 344). "The purpose of these defendants was to force the plaintiff to join the defendant association and to that end they injured the plaintiff in their business and molested and disturbed them in their efforts to work at their trade. It is true they committed no acts of personal violence, or of physical injury to property, although they threatened to do something which might reasonably be expected to lead to such results, The necessity that the plaintiff should join this association is not so great nor is its relation to the rights of the defendants as compared with the right of the plaintiff to be free from molestation, such as to bring the acts of the defendant under the shelter of the principle of trade competition. Such acts are without justification, and therefore * "The law protects a man from interference even though he is hired merely from day to day. Intentional and willful interference with a man's pursuing his trade or occupation in life, by direct acts that make a direct and proximate, and in its nature, effective interference with such pursuit of trade or occupation, has uniformly been held unlawful. Such acts and threats as were found against the defendants in this case amounts to force and intimidation within the meaning of the common law and of our statutes; and there need not be fear of personal physical injury from violence, but a moral and material intimidation that works upon the mind and would move even against his will, an ordinary man, is sufficient." The court said: O'Neil v. Behanna (38 L. R. A., 385–386). "When the new men were followed and importuned not to work from their point of embarkation to their destination, and there met by the strikers in considerable numbers and followed to their lodging places, all the time being pressed and entreated to return and called "scabs" and "blacklegs" and sometimes surrounded and the effort made to pull them away, and unfriendly (at least) atmosphere about everywhere, it must be admitted that there was something more than mere argument and persuasion and the orderly and legitimate conduct of a strike. This was certainly serious annoyance and well calculated to intimidate and coerce, and that effect was apparently produced on more than one occasion. * * * The strikers and their counsel seem to think that the former could do anything to attain their ends short of actual physical violence. This is a most serious misconception. The 'arguments' and 'persuasion' and 'appeal' of a hostile and demonstrative mob have a potency over men of ordinary nerve which far exceeds the limits of lawfulness. * **It is further urged that the strikers only exercised their right to talk to the new men to persuade them not to go to work. There was no such right. These men were there presumably under contract with the plaintiff, and cetainly in search of work, if not actually under pay. They were not at leisure and their time, whether their own or their employer's, could not be lawfully taken up and their progress interfered with by those or any other outsiders on any pretense or under any claim of rights to argue or persuade them to break their contract.” Casey v. Typographical Union (45 Fed., 135). In this case no violence or even threats of violence were used by strikers, but strikers were enjoined and their actions held unlawful, because, as the court said: "It was an organized conspiracy to force complainant to yield his right to select his own workmen, and submit himself to the control of the union, and allow it to regulate prices for him, and to determine whom he should employ and whom discharge. In other words it was, and is, an organized body to force printers to come into the union, or to be driven from their calling for want of employment, and to make the destruction of the complainant's business the penalty for his refusing to surrender to the union." Chicago Typothetae v. Franklin Press Feeders' Union. Judge Smith in the decision says: "It is idle to talk of picketing for lawful persuasive purposes. There can be no such thing as peaceful, polite, and gentlemanly picketing any more than there can be 'chaste, polite, and gentlemanly vulgarity, peaceful mobbing, or unlawful lynching. In imagination and in theory, a peaceful picket line may be possible, but in fact a picket line is never peaceful. It is always a formation of actual warfare and quite inconsistent with anything not related to force and violence." Vegelahn v. Guntner (167 Mass., 92; 35 L. R. A., 722). A patrol by strikers in front of a factory used in combination with social pressure, threats of personal injury, or unlawful harm, and persuasion to interfere with the rights of both employer and employee, since it is a means of intimidating, indirectly to the employer and directly to persons actually employed or seeking to be employed by him. The motive or purpose of strikers to secure better wages for themselves by compelling the acceptance of their schedule of wages does not justify maintaining a patrol in front of a factory as a means of carrying out their conspiracy. "A conspiracy of strikers to prevent persons from entering employment or continu ing therein, even if they are not under any binding contract, by maintaining a patrol in front of the employer's premises and by means of threats and intimidation is unlawful." Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef (120 Fed., 102). "Where a labor organization whose members are engaged in a strike institute a system of picketing around the works of the former employer, which results in acts of violence and the use of threats and abusive language toward those working for such an employer, some of such acts being committed by the pickets and other by their sympathizers, the effect of which, as intended, is to intimidate some of those against whom they are directed, and to prevent from continuing in the employment, all members who participate in the establishment and maintenance of such picket, as well as those personally participating in the unlawful acts, must be held chargeable with the results which experience has shown almost universally follow the maintenance of such system. Nor can such responsibility be escaped by merely instructing the pickets that they shall not commit any such unlawful acts, where the officers and the members know that they are in fact committed, and take no steps to punish the guilty persons or to discontinue the picketing. Beck v. Teamsters' Pro. Union (118 M., 520). "To picket complainants' premises in order to intercept their teamsters or persons going there to trade is unlawful. It itself is an act of intimidation and an unwarrantable interference with the right of free trade. The law protects the buyer, seller, merchant, manufacturer, and the laborer in the right to walk the streets unmolested it makes no difference in effect, whether the picketing is done 10 or 1,000 feet away. It will not do to say that these pickets are thrown out for the purpose of peaceful argument and persuasion. They are intended to intimidate and coerce. * * * Eureka Foundry Co. v. Lepker (48 O. L. B., 400). "Language is none the less a threat, which used alone appears harmless, but in connection with tone of voice, gestures, or surrounding circumstances implies a threat. Any course of conduct upon the part of others which deprives or substantially affects the freedom of mind of workmen in reaching a decision to remain in the employment |