instrumentality of inter- 6. Any classification adopted by a state in the exercise of its police power to preof monopoly, with its attendant evils, and vent a practice conceived to be promotive which has a reasonable basis, and is therefore not arbitrary, will be sustained against an attack based upon the equal protection of the laws clause of U. S. Const., 14th Amend., and every state of facts uificient to sustain such classification which can be reasonably conceived of as having existed when the law was enacted will be as- of the laws classification state commerce or restriction. 3. The fact that a nonresident corporation operating a cotton-seed oil mill in its home state, and cotton gins in Mississippi, ships out of the latter state, for use in its oil mill, all of the cotton seed which may be purchased in connection with its ginning operations, does not make such 7. Prohibiting corporations from ownoperations an instrumentality of inter- ing or operating any cotton gin, where such state commerce so as to invalidate the pro- corporations are interested in the manufacvisions of Mississippi Laws 1914, chap. 162, ture of cotton-seed oil or cotton-seed meal, prohibiting any corporation from owning as is done by Mississippi Laws 1914, enap. or operating any cotton gin where such 162, enacted in the exercise of the police corporation is interested in the manufac- power of the state, to prevent a practice conture of cotton-seed oil or cotton-seed meal.ceived to be promotive of monopoly, with its [For other cases, see Commerce, IV. b, 1, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1903.] Foreign corporations power of state to restrict or exclude. 4. A state may impose conditions, in its discretion, upon the right of a foreign corporation to do business in the state, Note. On state regulation of interstate or foreign commerce-see notes to Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Com. 13 L.R.A. 107; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Commercial Mill. Co. 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 220; Brown v. Maryland, 6 L. ed. U. S. 678; and Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 29 L. ed. U. S. 158. On recognition or exclusion of foreign corporations-see note to Cone Export & Commission Co. v. Poole, 24 L.R.A. 289. As to validity of class legislation, generally-see notes to State v. Goodwill, 6] attendant evils, does not deny the equal protection of the laws to corporations merely because the act applies to corporations alone, and not to natural persons, where, before the law was enacted, cotton gins had been operated in Mississippi by individuals as well as corporations, but L.R.A. 621; State v. Loomis, 21 L.R.A. 789. As to constitutional equality of privi leges immunities, and protection, generally-see note to Louisville Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 14 L.R.A. 579. For a discussion of police power, generally-see notes to State v. Marshall, 1 State v. Schlemmer, 10 L.R.A. 135; ElecL.R.A. 51; Re Gannon, 5 L.R.A. 359; trie Improv. Co. v. San Francisco, 13 L.R.A. 131; Ulman v. Baltimore, 11 L.R.A. 224; and Barbier v. Connolly, 28 L. ed. U. S. 923. there is no showing that oil mills and cotton gins were both operated by an individ ual, or groups of individuals, since it may well be assumed that, because of the larger capital required, and perhaps for other reasons, oil mills and cotton gins may have been operated in the state only by corporations, and that for this reason the restraint of the evil aimed at could be accomplished by controlling corporations only. [For other cases, ՏՐԸ Constitutional Law, IV. a, 3, a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 41.] supra; Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co. 60 L.R.A. 619 and note, 131 N. C. 536, 42 S. E. 983, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 197; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 285, 56 L. ed. 438, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1050; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 112, 54 L. ed. 687, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 493, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481, 18 Ann. Cas. 1103; Looney v. Crane Co. 245 U. S. 178, 62 L. ed. 230, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85. The Supreme Court of the United States will construe the state laws for itself with reference to their operation, Argued October 17, 1921. Decided Novem- regardless of the state decision. IN ber 14, 1921. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi to review a decree which, on a second appeal, affirmed a decree of the Chancery Court of Sunflower County, in that state, enforcing as against a foreign corporation, a state statute prohibiting corporations from owning or operating cotton gins, where such corporations are interested in the manufacture of cotton-seed oil or cotton-seed meal. Affirmed. See same case below, on first appeal, 116 Miss. 398, 77 So. 185; on second appeal, 121 Miss. 615, 83 So. 680. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. J. B. Harris argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Thomas A. Evans and A. W. Shands, filed a brief for plaintiff in error: The application of the act of the Mississippi legislature, chap. 162, Laws of 1914, to the plaintiff in error, was to burden and destroy its interstate com merce. Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 68, 54 L. ed. 386, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, 34 L. ed. 391, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 181, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 34, 54 L. ed. 369, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190; Ludwig v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 216 U. S. 146, 54 L. ed. 423, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 380: Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 232 U. S. 318, 58 L. ed. 621, L.R.A.1915F, 1187, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 333. The plaintiff in error has the right to carry on local business in connection with and in aid of its interstate com merce. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 34, 54 L. ed. 369, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, supra; Ludwig v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 216 U. S. 146, 54 L. ed. 423, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 380; Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 363, 59 L. ed. 271, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99; American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, 63 L. ed. 1084, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522; Looney v. Crane Co. 245 U. S. 189, 62 L. ed. 236, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85. The regulation of commerce and a burden thereon cannot be justified upon the ground that it is in exercise of police power. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 34, 54 L. ed. 369, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190; Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S. 313, 56 L. ed. 215, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1349; Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489, 52 L. ed. 295, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174; Cincinnati, I. & W. R. Co. v. Connersville, 218 U. S. 336, 54 L. ed. 1060, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93, 20 Ann. Cas. 1206; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 56 L. ed. 175, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 529; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 56 L. ed. 1182, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715; Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540, 56 L. ed. 1197, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 784; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 52 L. ed. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121; Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218, 53 L. ed. 973, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633. A burden placed on interstate commerce by a state cannot be sustained because it applies to all persons alike. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 319, 34 L. ed. 455, 457, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; Robins v. Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 497, 30 L. ed. 694, 697, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592; Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292, 62 L. ed. 295, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 126. The act is unconstitutional because it unjustly discriminates against corporations and in favor of individuals. Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 415, 54 L. ed. 541, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. York, 119 U. S. 110, 30 L. ed. 342, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108; Southern Bldg. & L Asso. v. Norman, 98 Ky. 294, 31 L.R.A. 43, 56 Am. St. Rep. 373, 32 S. W. 954; National Council v. State Council, 203 U. S. 151, 51 L. ed. 132, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 46; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. State, 107 Miss. 597, 65 So. 881; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Gulf, C. & S., S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Com. 212 F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. j Mass. 35, 98 N. E. 1056, Ann. Cas. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Santa Clara 1913C, 803; Fire Asso. of Phila. v. New County v. Southern P. R. Co. 118 U. S. 394, 30 L. ed. 118, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132; Pembina Consol. Silver Min. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 189, 31 L. ed. 650, 654, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 24, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, 32 L. ed. 109, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1176; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 35 L. ed. 1051, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198. Mr. Frank Roberson, Attorney General of Mississippi, argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in error: Public ginning is subject to regulation under the police power of the state. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 61 L. ed. 755, L.R.A.1917E, 938, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024; United States v. Delaware & H. Co. 213 U. S. 366, 53 L. ed. 836, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 527; Tallassee Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Holloway, 200 Ala. 492, L.R.A.1918A, 280, 76 So. 434; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77. Plaintiff in error has no charter power to operate a gin in Tennessee, or elsewhere, and therefore cannot question the constitutionality of the statute un der review. Huntington v. National Sav. Bank, 96 U. S. 388, 24 L. ed. 777; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. ed. 629; 1 Bouvier's Law Dict. 775; 1 Words & Phrases, 2d ed. 1223; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 601, 59 L. ed. 379, P.U.R. 1915A, 121, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 146. A state has the right to expel a foreign corporation after it has entered and commenced doing business therein, provided no right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution is denied. Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 27 L. ed. 442, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 60 L. ed. 348, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 143, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 927; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 53 L. ed. 530, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, 15 Ann. Cas. 645; Baltic Min. Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 83, 58 L. ed. 133, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15;1 The acquisition of property prior to passage of the act does not deprive the state of its power to regulate and exclude under the police power. United States v. Delaware & H. Co. 213 U. S. 366, 53 L. ed. 836, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 527; United States v. Reading Co. 226 U. S. 324, 57 L. ed. 243, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 363, 58 L. ed. 269, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65. The application of Miss. Laws 1914, chap. 162, to plaintiff in error, prohibiting it from owning and operating a cotton gin in this state for the purpose of more easily procuring cotton seed for its oil mill in Memphis, Tennessee, is not to burden or destroy its interstate com merce. Friday v. Hall & K. Co. 216 U. S. 449, 54 L. ed. 562, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 475, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; State v. American Sugar Ref. Co. 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851; Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, 28 L. ed. 1137, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 739; Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 19 L. ed. 274; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410, 19 L. ed. 972; Tredway v. Riley, 32 Neb. 495, 29 Am. St. Rep. 447, 49 N. W. 268; Judson, Interstate Commerce, §7; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 46 L. ed. 171, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 120; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Com. 212 Mass. 35, 98 N. E. 1063, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 805; Covington Stock-Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128, 35 L. ed. 73, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469; United States v. Union Stock-Yard & Transit Co. 226 U. S. 286, 57 L. ed. 226, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; McCluskey v. Marysville & N. R. Co. 243 U. S. 36, 61 L. ed. 578, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 374; Keystone Watch Case Co. v. Com. 212 Mass. 50, 98 N. E. 1063. The doctrine that a state may not, in Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 325, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. ed. 715, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. 1101, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724. any form, or under any guise, directly] stituted a suit in equity against the comburden prosecution of interstate company in a county court of chancery, merce, is not infringed in the act under which, after various vicissitudes, rereview. sulted in a decree that the act was constitutional, and that the plaintiff in error was guilty of violating it. A penalty was imposed upon the company, its right to do intrastate or local business in Mississippi was declared forfeited, it was perpetually enjoined from operating cotton gins in the state, and it was ordered that, within ninety days, the company should dispose of the two cotton gins which it owned and operated in Mississippi. The company was also found guilty of violating the Anti-trust Law of the state, and a penalty therefor was imposed. Plaintiff in error is not denied the equal protection of the law. Huggins v. Home Mut. F. Ins. Co. 107 Miss. 650, 65 So. 646; Adams v. Standard Oil Co. 97 Miss. 879, 53 So. 692; St. John v. New York, 201 U. S. 633, 50 L. ed. 896, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 554, 5 Ann. Cas. 909; Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U. S. 593, 50 L. ed. 322, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159, 19 Am. Neg. Rep. 625; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 53 L. ed. 530, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, 15 Ann. Cas. 645; Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U. S. 413, 54 L. ed. 817, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 543. Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court: An act of the legislature of Mississippi, approved March 28, 1914 (designated in the record the "Anti-gin Act"), prohibits corporations, whether organized under the laws of that state or authorized under the laws thereof to do any local business therein, among other things, from owning or operating any cotton gin, when such corporation is interested in the manufacture of cottonseed oil or cotton-seed meal. A penalty is provided for violation of the act, but corporations are permitted to operate their gins for a reasonable time until they may be sold. A proviso [133] permits cotton-seed oil companies to operate gins of a prescribed capacity, but only in the city or town where their oil plants are located. Mississippi Laws 1914, chap. 162; Hemingway's Code, 1917, SS 4752 et seq. The plaintiff in error, a corporation organized under Tennessee Laws, prior to 1914 owned and operated a cotton seed oil mill at Memphis, in that state, and two cotton gins in Mississippi. Disregarding the Anti-gin Act, it continued to operate its two gins in Mississippi until October, 1915, when, for the purpose of enforcing the law, the state, on the relation of its attorney general, in This is a proceeding in error to review the decree of the supreme court of Mississippi affirming that decree of the county court as to the Anti-gin Act. The holding that the Anti-trust Laws were violated was reversed by the supreme court. Without proof of it in the record, the case is argued upon the assumption that the statute assailed was enacted in aid of the Anti-trust Laws of the State, under the conviction on the part of the legislature that it was the practice of corporations operating oil mills and cotton gins to depress the price of ginning, regardless of cost, until local competition was suppressed, or brought to terms, and then to charge excessive prices for ginning, and to pay [134] unfairly low prices for seed. There is evidence in the record tending to show resort to such methods by the plaintiff in error. It clearly appears that, in practice, it is an advantage to the purchaser of cotton seed to operate gins, not only for the profit that may be made from them directly, but because the grower of cotton often prefers to sell his seed to the company ginning it rather than carry it to another purchaser. It is also in evidence that individuals, as well as corporations, owned and operated gins, and that other oil companies than the plaintiff in error obtained their supplies of seed from growers, from gin owners, and from brokers. The plaintiff in error has heretofore relied, and here relies, for its defense, upon the unconstitutionality of the Antigin Act, which it asserts upon two grounds, viz: first, that, as applied to the plaintiff in error, it imposes a direct and substantial, and therefore an unconstitutional, burden upon an instrumentality of interstate commerce; and, second, mildly, that, the act being ap plicable to corporations, and not to individuals owning and operating cotton gins, it denies to the plaintiff in error the equal protection of the laws, and therefore offends against the Constitution of the United States. The basis of the first contention is the claim that it had become impracticable for the oil company to carry on its oil manufacturing business successfully when purchasing its cotton-seed supply from other ginners or from brokers; that for this reason the company acquired its two cotton gins in Mississippi, and nine in other states, to obtain the advantage of purchasing seed direct from the growers of cotton, and that all of the cotton seed which it had purchased in connection with its gins was shipped in interstate commerce to its oil mill at Memphis, the gins being, in effect, "feeders" to its oil mill. These facts, not disputed in the record, it is argued, constitute the gins an essential means and instrumentality of [135] interstate commerce, and that therefore the act imposes a direct and unconstitutional burden on commerce between the states, in violation of § 8 of article 1, of the Constitution of the United States. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 355, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 54 L. ed. 378, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; Ludwig v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 216 U. S. 146, 54 L. ed. 423, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 380; and Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 232 U. S. 318, 58 L. ed. 621, L.R.A.1915F, 1187, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 333, are relied upon to sustain this conten tion of the plaintiff in error. In the first two of the cases cited an attempt was made by the state of Kansas to tax interstate carriers on the basis of all of their property, wherever situated, as measured by the capital stock of the companies. In the third case a similar attempt was made by the state of Ar kansas. There was no question in any of these cases but that the principal business of the companies challenging the taxing law was interstate in character, and that their chief investment was in property used in and necessary to the conduct of their interstate commerce. The controversy in the cases was as to the incidence of the tax,-whether it was so imposed upon the property of the companies or the stock representing it, as to constitute a direct and substantial burden upon the interstate commerce in which they were engaged. It is clear that these decisions cannot be of aid in determining the question we are now considering, which is, whether a cotton gin operated by an oil company in Mississippi is rendered an instrumentality of interstate commerce by the fact that the owner of it ships out of the state, for its use in another state, all of the cotton seed which may be purchased in connection with its ginning operations. The fourth case relied upon, Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. supra, was an attempt on the part of a state to prevent removal of causes from state to United States courts, and is, if possible, yet more inapposite. [136] The separation of the seed from the fiber of the cotton, which is accomplished by the use of the cotton gin, is a short but important step in the manufacture of both the seed and the fiber into useful articles of commerce, but that manufacture is not commerce was held in Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 20, 21, 32 L. ed. 346, 350, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1, 12, 13, 39 L. ed. 325, 329, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 245, 46 L. ed. 171, 175, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 120; McCluskey v. Marysville & N. R. Co. 243 U. S. 36, 38, 61 L. ed. 578, 579, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 374; and in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 252, 62 L. ed. 1101, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724; Arkadelphia Mill. Co. V. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. 249 U. S. 134, 151, 152, 63 L. ed. 517, 527, P.U.R.1919C, 710, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237. And the fact, of itself, that an article when in the process of manufacture is intended for export to another state does not render it an article of interstate commerce. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. ed. 715, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475, and New York C. R. Co. v. Mohney, 252 U. S. 152, 155, 64 L. ed. 502, 505, 9 Á.L.R. 496, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287. When the ginning is completed, the operator of the gin is free to purchase the seed or not; and, if it is purchased, to store it in Mississippi indefinitely, or to sell or use it in that state, or to ship it out of the state for use in another; and, under the cases cited, it is only in this last case, and after the seed has been committed to a carrier for interstate transport, that it passes from the regulatory power of the state into interstate commerce and under the national power. The application of these conclusions of law to the manufacturing operations |