of the cotton gins, which we have seen precede but are not a part of interstate commerce, renders it quite impossible to consider them an instrumentality of such commerce, which is burdened by the Anti-gin Act, and the first contention of the plaintiff in error must be denied.

There remains the second contention, that the Anti-gin Act denies to plaintiff in error the equal protection of the laws, because it applies to corporations, and not to individuals.

[137] Where, as we have found in this case, a foreign corporation has no Federal right to continue to do business in a state, and where, as here, no contract right is involved, and there is no employment by the Federal government, it is the settled law that a state may impose conditions, in its discretion, upon the right of such a corporation to do business within the state, even to the extent of excluding it altogether. Horn Silver Min. Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, 36 L. ed. 164, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 57, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493; Baltic Min. Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 83, 58 L. ed. 127, 133, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15, and cases cited. And in such case the inherent difference between corporations and natural persons is sufficient to sustain a classification making restrictions applicable to corporations only. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 343, 344, 53 L. ed. 530, 541, 542, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370; Baltic Min. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra. And see Ft. Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U. S. 532, 533, 64 L. ed. 396, 398, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 45 L. ed. 102, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 276, 45 L. ed. 186, 189, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128; W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452, 45 L. ed. 619, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423.

This would be sufficient to dispose of this second contention, but we may add that the law assailed was enacted by the state in the exercise of its police power, to prevent a practice conceived to be promotive of monopoly, with its attendant evils. It is clearly settled that any classification adopted by a state in the exercise of this power which has a reasonable basis, and is therefore not arbitrary, will be sustained against an attack based upon the equal protection of the laws clause of the 14th Amendment, and also that every state of facts sufficient to sustain such classification which can be reasonably conceived of as having existed when the law was enacted will be assumed. Lindsley v.

Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160, and cases cited; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679, L.R.A.1917A, 421, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455.

[138] The record before us shows that before the law assailed was enacted, cotton gins had been operated in Mississippi by individuals as well as by corporations, but there is no showing that oil mills and cotton gins were both operated by an individual or by groups of individuals, and we think it may well be assumed, under the rule stated, that because of the larger capital required, and perhaps for other reasons, oil mills and cotton gins may have been operated in that state only by corporations, and that for this reason the restraint of the evil aimed at by the act of the legislature could be accomplished by controlling corporations only. Assuming this to be the fact when the law was enacted, obviously the classification objected to cannot be pronounced so without reasonable basis as to be arbitrary.

A number of minor contentions are discussed in the briefs. These have all been considered, but are found to be not of sufficient substance to deserve special discussion.

It results that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi will be affirmed.

against United States risdiction - contract or tort.

ju

suit in the court of claims to recover from 1. An allegation, in the petition in a the United States the value of property

Note. As to what constitutes a taking of private property for public use-see notes to Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Birmingham, S. & T. R. R. Co. 18 L.R.A. 166; D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Missouri P. R. Co. 37 L. ed. U. S. 156; Sweet v. Rechel, 40 L. ed. U. S. 188; and A. Backus Jr. & Sons v. Fort Street Union Depot Co. 42 L. ed. U. S. 853.

(N.S.) 596, 81 Pac. 785; King v. Miles City Irrig. Ditch Co. 16 Mont. 463, 50 Am. St. Rep. 506, 41 Pac. 431; Burt v. Farmers' Co-op. Irrig. Co. 30 Idaho, 752, 168 Pac. 1078; Wolf v. St. Louis Inde pendent Water Co. 10 Cal. 541, 10 Mor. Min. Rep. 541; Everett v. Hydraulic Water Flume Tunnel Co. 23 Cal. 225, 4 Mor. Min. Rep. 589; Campbell v. Bear River Co. 35 Cal. 679, 10 Mor. Min. Rep. 656; North Sterling Irrig. Dist. v. Dickman, 59 Colo. 169, 149 Pac. 97, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 973; Bridgeford v. Colorado Fuel & I. Co. 63 Colo. 372, 167 Pac. 963; North Sterling Irrig. Dist. v. Gehrig, 27 Colo. App. 551, 149 Pac. 1193; Middelkamp v. Bessemer Irrigating Co. 46 Colo. 115, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 795, 103 Pac. 280; Brennan Constr. Co. v. Cumberland, 29 App. D. C. 554, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 541, 10 Ann. Cas. 865; Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 217, 223, 48 L. ed. 416, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 238.

Plaintiff having consented to the construction of the canals, and granted the defendants a right of way through his lands for the construction of the canal, is estopped from any right of a recovery in the absence of negligence. This was a voluntary act on his part, and he cannot recover for the loss of other prop erty which may have been damaged by the construction of the work to which he agreed.

Daniels v. St. Francis Levee Dist. 84 Ark. 333, 105 S. W. 578; Lewis, Em. Dom. 3d ed. § 474; Wallace v. Columbia & G. R. Co. 34 S. C. 62, 12 S. E. 815; Nunnamaker v. Columbia Water Power Co. 47 S. C. 485, 34 L.R.A. 222, 58 Am. St. Rep. 905, 25 S. E. 75.

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

Actions in the court of claims to recover respectively the sums of $35,000 and $170,000, alleged values of certain properties charged to have been taken and appropriated by the United States. Both appellants are corporations, and are respectively owners of lands in Churchill county, state of Nevada, surrounding and including lakes known as Little Soda lake and Big Soda lake. The Horstmann Company is owner of the former and the Natron Soda Company is

owner of the latter.

In 1906 each appellant was manufacturing soda from the waters of the respective lakes, and the controversy of the cases turns upon the condition of the lakes at that time, and their condition

after an irrigation project was instituted by the government, called the Truckee Carson project.

The lakes are situated in an area known as the Carson sink valley, and in 1906 were the source of soda supply to the respective appellants.

From prior to 1867 to 1906 the levels of the lakes had not varied more than 2 feet. In 1906 the United States Reclamation Service, acting under the authority of acts of Congress, constructed the Truckee Carson project, consisting [143] of dams, canals, and other struc tures, whereby, through the usual means, large quantities of surface waters there tofore confined to the watershed of the Truckee river, were in 1906, and during each year since then, transported to the watershed of the Carson river, and distributed to various and sundry tracts of land in the Carson river valley for irrigation purposes.

Details of the project need not be given, but with its advent the body of the ground water in the entire section covered by the project rose, and the volume of water in the lakes has continually increased, and the level of the lakes has risen about 19 vertical feet during the period of 1906 to 1916, in consequence of which the value of the properties of appellants has been destroyed, that of the Horstmann Company being $9,000 and that of the Natron Company being $45,000, according to the findings of the court of claims.

There have been additions to the canal project, and its ultimate development contemplates the reclamation of 206,000 acres of land. At present the canals of the project ramify an area of 100,000 acres.

No negligence on the part of the United States is alleged or proven.

The conclusion of the court was that

appellants were not entitled to recover; hence it dismissed the actions and rendered judgments against appellants for costs of printing the records. Motions for new trials were made and denied.

The question of the jurisdiction of the court of claims of the actions is intimated, if not urged, based on the allegation in the petition of the Horstmann' Company that, owing to the porous condition of the soil in the canals and ditches, and "the lack of proper lining in said canals and ditches, and owing to the way said canals and ditches were built, and also to the natural condition existing," the [144] water flowed into

The government is cautious in its characterization of this allegation, and says that it "apparently based the claim of the Horstmann Company upon a tort," and adds, if the claim be so based, the court of claims had no jurisdiction, "as the government has never waived its immunity from suit in such cases." We do not think, however, that the allegation was intended as an tion of negligence, but rather to forestall a defense, based on the character of the works, that from them there could be no causal connection between the project of the government and the rise of waters in the lakes. The court of claims, besides, explicitly found that there was no negligence.

accusa

Upon the merits, the contention of the government is the absence of such causal connection between its works and the injury to the properties of appellants. It concedes, however, that the contention is a deduction from obscure findings, the court not finding affirmatively that a causal connection did not exist. "Its decision was the Scotch verdict of 'not proved,'" to quote counsel. Appellants oppose the government's contention and deductions, oppose to them the difference in conditions before and after the execution of the canal project, and their reasoning seems to have the support of the methods that the world employs in the investigation of its phenomena and instances.

Post hoc, therefore, propter hoc may not be confidently asserted, but there is a suggestion of effect and cause in it, of sequence, something more than unrelated occurrence. And of this there seems to be pertinent application in the 'present case. The transfer of water from one [145] watershed to another, -from the Truckee river watershed to the Carson river watershed,-accompanied by an increase of the water in the lakes from a level not varied in twentynine years more than 2 feet to 19 vertica feet, would seem to demonstrate this as an effect of the canal project. And there can be no doubt of the adequacy of the cause, even though, to quote from the findings, "percolating waters are hidden and invisible," and "it does not appear from the evidence how they are governed or how they move under 1 The petition of the Natron Seda Com pany directly alleges that the acts of the government were legally done, in the exercise of a constitutional and legal power.

rise of water in the lakes from 2 feet to 19 feet of water, are certainly visible and unmistakable. Indeed, the court explicitly found that, with the advent of the irrigation project, the body of ground water in the entire section covered by the project rose.

However, we need not arbitrate the contentions, but will assume with appellants that there was causal connection between the work of the government and the rise of waters in the lakes, and the consequent destruction of the properties of appellants, but it does not follow that the government is under obligation to pay therefor, as for the taking of the properties.

The court of claims, as we have seen, decided against such obligation, and to its reasoning it would be difficult to add anything. The reasoning of the court is attacked, however, by appellants, and United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 47 L. ed. 539, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349, is adduced against it.

The instance of the cited case and a certain generality in its reasoning and basic principle gives plausible support to the contention.

It is declared that

56.

This generality has had exception in It is to be rememsubsequent cases. bered that, to bind the government, there must be implication of a contract to pay, but the circumstances may rebut that done may be in the exercise of a right, implication. In other words, what is and the consequences only incidental, incurring no liability. Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 217, 48 L. ed. 414, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 238; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 51 L. ed. 956, 27 Sup. Ct.