opinions for the court. The number of opinions is usually made the measure of a judge's work, but it is only a part of it. The study of cases with a view to their decision in conference is the greater task, and this varies with the individual judge and with his conscience and feeling of responsibility. No one could be more sensitive in this regard than Chief Justice White. He carried for eleven years the additional burden of the executive direction of the court. In his later years he did his work with the burden of growing physical defects entailing obstacle and suffering, which he refused to betray, and to which Ire would not yield. His whole being was absorbed by his anxious concern for the maintenance of the prestige of the court in the preservation of the Constitution and the upholding of its principles. He took infinite pains even in the lesser details of his duties. He regarded his office as a sacred trust,-as a Holy Grail,-which awakened an intense scrutiny of his own conduct and of that of every member of the court. Of the story of his life, which began as a soldier of the Confederacy at sixteen years, and the quick recognition of his power for usefulness from his early professional beginnings until, by noteworthy steps, he reached this Bench, there is not time to speak. His leadership of the long but successful fight against the lottery evil in Louisiana showed how formidable he was in organization and how courageous in action. His power as a speaker was only revealed in later years by the few addresses he was induced reluctantly to make to the American Bar Association. At Montreal and Washington his hearers were captivated by the grace and fluency of his diction, the exquisite charm, dignity, and force of his bearing, and the depth of his expressed conviction. His touching metaphor to illus trate his own change of heart toward "Old Glory," of the fading of the gray of the Confederacy into the blue of the Union, "the invisible blue" as he adapted it from the moving story of the Cricket on the Hearth, will never fade from the memory of those who were privileged to hear him. Edward Douglass White was the exemplary citizen, the considerate neighbor and friend, and the loving husband. He had a great heart, full of sympathy for mankind. He had an unfailing courtesy and a sweetness of manner which endeared him to all with whom he was associated. The strength and ruggedness and dignity of his character were stamped in his face, and these things but lent a peculiar charm to his gentleness and kindly manner. He was a gentleman of the old school. Of his personal relations to the members of the court in the intimacy of conference I cannot, of course, speak from personal experience. They are shown in the touching words in which, immediately after his death, the senior Associate Justice of this court, so long a loved and loving comrade in service with Chief Justice White, expressed the affectionate esteem in which the colleagues of this great Chief Justice held him. In closing this response for the court to these resolutions, I can best express their estimate of his judicial work by quoting Mr. Justice McKenna when he said: "Anticipating the future, I see no shadow on his fame or service. I venture to make comparisons. I make full concession of the recognized and distinguished merit of those who preceded him; I make full admission in assured prophecy of the ability of those who will succeed him; yet, considering his qualities, their variety and degree, and estimating them, I dare to say that he will forever keep a distinct eminence among the Chief Justices of the United States." The resolutions and the accompanying remarks will be entered upon the records of the court. January 16, 1922. 66 L. ed. 1093 Supreme Court of the United States. OCTOBER TERM, 1921. ORDER. It is ordered that the order admitting Wallace Hawkins to practice as an attorney and counselor of this court be, and the same is, canceled. April 11, 1922. APPENDIX X. Supreme Court of the United States. OCTOBER TERM, 1921. ORDER. On consideration of the petition of Marcellus Donald Ramsey (admitted to the bar of this court on the 29th day of January, A. D. 1920, under the name of Marcellus Donald Redlich), praying that the records of this court be made to show the change of his name from Redlich to Ramsey, together with a certified copy of an order of the circuit court of Marion county, Indiana, changing his name from Redlich to Ramsey, it is now here ordered by the court that said petition be, and the same is hereby, granted, and that this order be entered on the minutes of the court, and a certified copy thereof be furnished the petitioner. March 13, 1922. APPENDIX XI. Supreme Court of the United States. OCTOBER TERM, 1921. ORDER. It is now here ordered by the court that all the cases on the docket not decided, and all the other business of the term not disposed of, be, and the same are hereby, continued to the next term. June 5, 1922. GENERAL INDEX TO THE THREE VOLUMES CONTAINED IN THIS BOOK, 257, 258, 259 OCTOBER TERM, 1920. Editorial Notes are Indexed by the word "Annotated" appended to the paragraphs to which they apply. ABANDONMENT. Of claim against United States, see Ordering abandonment of intrastate ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL. 1. A suit to enjoin a public officer from enforcing a statute is personal, and, in the absence of statutory provision for continuing it against his successor, the suit abates upon his death or retirement from office. Irwin v. Wright, 258 U. S. 219, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293, (Annotated) 66: 573 2. A suit already begun against the officer in his lifetime is assumed by the provision of the Act of February 8, 1899, that a suit against an officer of the United States in his official capacity shall not abate by reason of his death or the expiration of his term of office, but that the court, upon motion, may allow the same to be maintained against his successor in office. Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co. 257 U. S. 1, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, 66: 99 3. The rule requiring the abatement of personal suits against public officers upon their retirement from office, and forbidding the substitution of their successors, does not apply when they constitute a board having continuing existence, such as an Arizona county board of' supervisors, which, under the local law, is vested with very wide and varied powers acting as a board, and consists of three members, who exercise official duties only as members of the board, a quorum of two being permitted to act, either one or two members being elected every two years, and the retiring members holding until their successors are elected and qualify. Irwin v. Wright, 258 U. S. 219, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293, (Annotated) 66: 573 ACTION OR SUIT. Various kinds of actions or proceed- Appearance in, see Appearance. Civil responsibility of labor organiza- Parties to action, see Parties. Effect of statutory repeal on pending Of parties, see Pleading, 1. of action A misjoinder of causes cannot successfully be asserted of the bill in a suit by the trustee in a trust deed given by a waterworks company, to enjoin a municipality from enforcing an ordinance requiring the removal of the waterworks company's system from the streets, to enjoin the disturbance of the system, and to protect the enjoyment by the company of its water rights, and to require the municipality to compensate the bondholders for the loss and injury to the trust and 66: 321 property through the impairment 5. In contract matters, admiralty jurisbreach of the contract through which, it is diction depends upon the nature of the alleged, the municipality gave exclusive transaction, and, in matters of tort, upon rights to the company to furnish water to the locality. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. the municipality, since these are but the v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. specifications of the elements of the right 157, of suit or equity that complainant has, being the enumeration of the elements of the asserted aggression upon the company, and in emphasis of it. Bankers Trust Co. v. Raton, 258 U. S. 328, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340, 66: 642 ADMIRALTY. hibition. 1. The New York Workmen's Compen to have contracted consciously with each 4. Vessels owned absolutely or pro hac 6. A contract to convert a car float having neither motive power nor steering gear into a steamer, to be used for amusement purposes, with a dance hall, rooms, balconies, etc., and equipped with steering gear and motive power, but with substantially unchanged hull, was not one for original construction, but was a contract for repairs, and hence was maritime in its nature, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. New Bedford Dry Dock Co. v. Purdy, 258 U. S. 96, 42 Sup. Čt. Rep. 243, (Annotated) 66: 482 7. The general admiralty jurisdiction extends to a proceeding to recover damages sel in process of construction when lying resulting from a tort committed on a veson navigable waters within a state. Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157, Grant 66: 321 of a state whose statutes give a right of ac8. A death upon the navigable waters tion on account of death by wrongful act will, when caused by a maritime tort committed on such waters, support a libel in personam in the admiralty courts for the damages sustained by those to whom such right is given. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89, 66: 210 Laws and rules of decision. Harmless error in instruction, see Ap peal and Error, 64. 9. The general rules of the maritime ADVERSE POSSESSION. Virginia side of the Potomac river under a Verification of petition in removal pro- ALIENS. Deportation by executive order. Due process of law in, see Constitu- 1. The mere fact that at the time aliens last entered the United States they could not have been deported except by judicial proceedings presents no constitutional obstacle to their expulsion now by executive order. Congress has power to order at any time the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful, and may do so by appropriate executive proceedings. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 492, 66: 938 2. Chinese laborers who entered the United States in violation of the Chinese Exclusion Acts prior to the effective date of the General Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, are subject to the provisions of that act authorizing deportation on executive orders, where, after such effective date, they unlawfully remain in the United States, notwithstanding the declaration of § 38 of that act, that as to all acts, things, or matters done or existing at the time of the taking effect of the act, the laws amended thereby are continued in force and effect, and the fact that deportation under the Chinese Exclusion Acts can be had only upon judicial proceedings. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 492, 66: 938 ALLOTMENT. IV. Proceedings to transfer cause, 39. V. The record, 40-42. VI. Hearing and determination, 43-67. Rules for appeals from court of claims, see As to bill of review, see Review. I. Appellate jurisdiction generally. Decisions reviewable; final judgment. 1. A judgment of dismissal which effectually terminates the particular cause, prevents the plaintiff from further prosecuting the same, and relieves the defendant from putting in a defense, is a final judg ment for the purpose of appellate review, although it leaves the merits undetermined, and may not be a bar to another action. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co. 257 U. S. 92, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35, 66: 144 2. Appeals lie to the Federal Supreme Court from orders of a district court, refusing to grant interlocutory injunctions in suits to restrain the enforcement of orders of the Secretary of Agriculture in aid of the Packers and Stockyards Act of August 15, 1921, since that act, in § 316, makes applicable to such suits the same procedure, original and appellate, provided in the Act of October 22, 1913, for suits for injunction against the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the latter act gives a right to a direct appeal to the Federal of Justices, see ante, p. 4; Appendix Supreme Court from the granting or refusVII., ante, p. 1084. AMENDMENT. Of Constitution, see Constitutional Law, AMOUNT IN DISPUTE. See Courts, 8, 16. ANCILLARY SUIT. See Courts, 20. ANIMALS. ing of an interlocutory injunction. Stafford 3. An order punishing one criminally II. Mode of review. Legislative regulation of stockyard. see Appeal or error. ANSWER. See Pleading, 7. ANTI-TRUST LAW. 4. The criminal feature of a judgment for contempt which is in part remedial and part punitive is dominant, and fixes its character for purposes of review, so that the part which was civil may be reviewed on a cross writ of error, where a writ of Combination in violation of, see Mo- error was sued out by the contemner. Union nopoly. APPEAL AND ERROR. I. Appellate jurisdiction, generally, 1-3. II. Mode of review, 4-10. III. Jurisdiction of particular courts, 11 38. a. Of circuit courts of appeals, 11. 1. Generally, 12, 13. 2. Over Federal Courts, 14-22. Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 42 Sup. Error or certiorari. See also infra, 32, 38. 5. Certiorari, not writ of error, is the proper mode of reviewing in the Federal Supreme Court a judgment of a state court adverse to the contention that a proposed Amendment to the Federal Constitution has not become a part of such Constitution. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216, 66:50 6. Certiorari. not writ of error, is |