66: 862 13. A verdict finding that a defendant was guilty of fraud in obtaining title for himself and his associates to lands thrown open to homestead entry by the Act of August 14, 1894, § 15, is justified by evidence that all the parties proceeded upon the theory that if the entrymen put in a periodical appearance on the land they would get it, and that no one troubled himself about intent, provided the affidavits were in due form. Jones v. United States, 258 U. S. 40, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 218, ard has been overreached by a competent provides that "bank notes, bills or eviKendall v. Ewert, dences of debt, circulating as money, or and aggressive person. any shares or interest in any incorporated 259 U. S. 139, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444, company, belonging to the defendant in execution, may be taken and sold by virtue of an execution, in the same manner as goods and chattels, or applied to the payment of the execution; and the clerk, cashier, or other officer having the custody of the books of the company, shall, upon exhibiting to him the writ of execution, be bound to give to the officer having such writ a certificate of the number of shares or amount of the interest held by the defendant in such company, and if he shall neglect or refuse to do so, or if he shall wilfully give a false certificate thereof, he shall be liable to the plaintiff for double the amount of all damages occasioned by such neglect or false certificate, to be recovered in an action on the case against him. The purchaser of such share or interest at such sale shall become the owner thereof in the same manner as if such share or interest had been regularly assigned to him by the defendant," the procedure therein provided being intended to furnish to the levying officer a certificate of the shares which the officer could manually take and offer for sale as the shares, and which, when indorsed by the officer with a record of his proceedings and sale, would work an assignment of the shares to the purchaser as if regularly assigned to him by the usual transfer of a certificate. Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Clarksdale, 257 U. S. 10, 42 66: 104 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27, 66: 453 14. A conviction not only for cheating, but for obtaining property under false pretenses, is justified by evidence tending to prove that the accused obtained a pearl button from a jeweler as a result of his representations, all false to his knowledge, that he was a wealthy man, was a partner in a business house, was an army officer on leave, had a right to draw on a London house the draft which he gave the jeweler in payment, and that this house was a firm of bankers. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U. S. 309, 66: 956 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469, 15. Any presumption against infringement that may attach to the issuing of a later patent may be overcome by the evidence. Hildreth v. Mastoras, 257 U. S. 27, 66: 112 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 20, EXCEPTIONS. Bill of, see Appeal and Error, 42. Sales on, as interestate commerce, see commerce, Taxation of membership in, as affecting EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES. See Constitutional Law, III. a. EXECUTION. Conformity of execution sale to state practice, see Courts, 23. 2. Only judicial sales made under order or decree of the court, and requiring confirmation by the court for their validity, are within the purview of the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1893, that all real estate, or any interest in land sold under any order or decree of any Federal court, shall be sold at public sale at the courthouse of the county, parish, or city in which the property or the greater part thereof is located, or upon the premises, as the court rendering such order or decree of sale may direct, and that all personal property sold under any order or decree of any Federal court shall be sold in the same manner unless, in the opinion of the court rendering such order or decree, it would be best to sell it in some other way. act has no application to sales under common-law executions which issue by mere præcipe of the judgment debtor on the judg ment, without order of the court, and in which the levy and sale of the marshal are ministerial, do not need confirmation to give them effect, and only come under judicial supervision on complaint of either party, the sale in such case depending for its validity upon the marshal's compliance with the requirements of the law. Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Clarksdale, 257 U. S. 66: 104 10, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27, The 3. Recitals as to a venditioni exponas return of a United States marshal in a which shows a sale under a fieri facias may he treated as surplusage, not affecting the 1133 validity of the proceedings, if in other re- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS. Deportation of alien by executive or Power of Treasury Department over Power of Attorney General to sue, see 1. Power to make war savings certificates of the United States and the stamps attached thereto nontransferable was conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury by the Acts of September 24, 1917. and September 24, 1918, which authorized the issuance of such obligations, limiting the number of certificates to be sold to or held by any one person, and intrusted the details of execution to the Secretary of the Treasury. United States v. Janowitz, 257 U. S. 42, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66: 120 40, one of his subordinates in a state court, un criminal in both jurisdictions. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U. S. 309, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469, 66: 956 Evidence. 2. The admissibility of documentary evidence in foreign extradition proceedings is governed by the provisions of the Act of August 3, 1882, § 5, that depositions, warrants, and other papers, or the copies thereof, properly and legally authenticated, shall be received and admitted as evidence for all purposes on hearings of an extradition case if they bear the certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in the foreign country, and not by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5271, which provides only that copies of foreign depositions shall be admitted when attested upon the oath of the party producing them to be true copies, and which does not provide for the admission of warrants or other papers. since § 6 of the Act of 1882 expressly provides for the repeal of so much of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5271, as is inconsistent with the earlier provisions of that act. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U. S. 309, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469, 66: 956 3. It is not the function of the committing magistrate in foreign extradition proceedings to determine whether or not the accused is guilty, but merely to decide whether or not there is competent evidence which, according to the law of the surrendering state, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime had been committed in that state. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U. S. 309, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469, 66: 956 4. The exclusion, in a foreign extradition proceeding, of evidence relating strictly to the defense, does not render the “evidence of criminality" insufficient, according have justified apprehension and committo the laws of the surrendering state, to ment for trial if the crime had been committed there, within the meaning of the der U. S. Rev. Stat. § 367, is that which 1842, art. 10, although, by the law of the Treaty with Great Britain of August 9, relates to the safety and custody of United surrendering state, a person charged with States prisoners in confinement under sen- crime is entitled to make a voluntary deetence of Federal courts. In such matters laration before the committing magistrate he represents the United States, and may, and to present evidence in his own behalf. on its part, practise the comity which the The phrase "such evidence of criminality," harmonious and effective operation of both as used in the treaty, refers to the scope systems of courts requires, provided it does of the evidence or its sufficiency to block not prevent enforcement of the sentence of the Federal courts, or endanger the pris-out those elements essential to a conviction. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254. It does not refer to the character of specific oners. 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 309, EXPERT TESTIMONY. EXTRADITION. 66: 607 1. The law of foreign extradition does not require that the name by which the crime is described in the two countries shall be the same, nor that the scope of the liability shall be coextensive or in other respects the same in both countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is instruments of evidence, or to the rules gov- FALSE PRETENSES. Sufficiency of evidence to sustain conviction for obtaining property under false pretenses, see Evidence, 14. FOOD AND DRUGS. Sufficiency of indictment charging un lawful sale of narcotics, see Indictment and Information, 3. The exception from the prohibitions of the Harrison Antinarcotic Act of Deeember 17, 1914, § 2, against sales of narcotic drugs to persons not having a written order in official form, which that section makes in favor of registered physicians dispensing or distributing such drugs to patients in the course of their professional practice only, does not protect a physician who has issued to one known by him to be a drug addict three so-called prescriptions calling respectively for 150 grains of heroin, 360 grains of morphine, and 210 grains of cocaine. United States v. Behrman, 258 U. S. 289, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. See Corporations. FORFEITURE. 66: 619 Enforcing in equity, see Equity, 2. FRANCHISE. Of water company, see Waters, 26. FRAUD. Partial invalidity, see Statutes, 6. See also Commerce, 20; Pleading, 5. Preserving status quo after appeal from order enjoining gas rate as confiscatory, see Appeal and Error, 49. Review of discretion in imposing condition in enjoining gas rate as con fiscatory, see Appeal and Error, Sufficiency of evidence of, see Evidence, district court may hear and determine on a writ of habeas corpus sued out to in 13. quire into a detention under the sentence of an Army court-martial are whether the court-martial which tried and condemned the prisoner had jurisdiction of his person and of the offense charged, and whether the sentence imposed was within the scope of its lawful powers. Collins v. McDonald, 258 U. S. 416, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326, 66: 692 State taxation of income from Indian leases, see Taxes, 9. Riparian rights in Indian tribal lands, see Waters, 15-19. Interdiction on trade. Laches as bar to suit to set aside purchase of land by person employed in Indian affairs, see Limitation of Actions, 2. 1. The trade with the Indians which persons employed in Indian affairs, includes Kendall v. Ewert, 259 U. S. 139, 42 Sup. 2. The contention that there was no evidence of guilt before a court-martial is forbidden by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2078, to other than the confession of the accused, which, it is averred, was made under oath, to and at the instance of his superior officer, under duress, whereby it is alleged that he was compelled to become a witness against himself, in violation of the Federal Constitution, being in substance a conclusion of the pleader, unsupported by any reference to the record, shows at most an error in the admission of testimony, which cannot be reviewed in a habeas corpus proceeding. Collins v. McDonald, 258 U. S. 416, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326, 66: 692 2. A person appointed a special assistant to the Attorney General to assist in the institution and prosecution of suits to set aside deeds to certain allotments in the Quapaw Indian agency is, while so engaged, "employed in Indian affairs," within the meaning of the provision of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2078, that no person employed in Indian affairs shall have any interest or concern in any trade with the Indians except for and on account of the United States. Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U. S. 129, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 442, 66: 858 Kendall v. Ewert, 259 U. S. 139, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444, 66: 862 3. One who purchases Indian lands in tice, see Appendix, IX. ante, p. violation of the provision of U. S. Rev. Stat. HARRISON ANTI-NARCOTIC ACT. Sufficiency of indictment for violation of, see Indictment .and Information, 3. See also Food and Drugs. HAWKINS, WALLACE. Cancelation of order admitting to prac 1094. HEARING. Necessity of, to constitute due process of law, see Constitutional Law, III. b, 4, c. HOUSING LAWS. § 2078, that no person employed in Indian affairs shall have any interest or concern in any trade with the Indians except for and on account of the United States, and who encumbers the land with a mortgage, must, upon the setting aside of the deed, indemnify the Indian owners against the mortgage if the lien still subsists. Ewert v. Validity of, see Constitutional Law, Bluejacket, 259 U. S. 129, 42 Sup. Ct. 22, 59-64, 69. HUSBAND AND WIFE. Statute regulating dower as denying equal protection of the laws or abridging privileges and immunities, see Constitutional Law, 5, 8. Statute barring dower as denying due process of law, see Constitutional Law, 21. IMMIGRATION. IMPUTED NOTICE. See Notice. INCOME TAX. See Internal Revenue. IV. a. INCOMPETENT PERSONS. Matters as to Indians, see Indians. INDIANS. Rep. 442, 66: 862 1. An offense the punishment for which may be by imprisonment at hard labor in Boundary of Indian lands, see Bound the workhouse of the District of Columbia is an infamous crime within the meaning aries, 11. of U. S. Const., 5th Amend., which provides Alleging knowledge or intent. 3. An indictment for violating the prohibition of the Harrison Antinarcotic Act of December 17, 1914, § 2, against selling narcotic drugs to persons not having a written order in official form, need not charge that the defendants sold the inhibited drugs knowing them to be such, the statute not making such knowledge an element of the offense. United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 66: 604 In a Waiver of objection to teste of injunc tion, see Appeal and Error, 55. Effect of new statute after decision below, see Appeal and Error, 65. Dismissal of appeal from pro forma order, see Appeal and Error, 70. Remanding injunction suit for dismissal, see Appeal and Error, 74. Restitution on reversal of, see Appeal and Error, 78. Violation of, see Contempt. Enjoining proceedings in state court, see Courts, 25. Interlocutory or final character of de- Effect of decree, see Judgment, 2. Sufficiency of bill in stockholders' suit, industrial disputes. Federal question respecting Kansas Industrial Relations Court Act, see Appeal and Error, 30. Prohibiting injunction as denying Validity of statute prohibiting, see 1. The right to injunctive relief against 4. It is enough to sustain an indict employer by organized picketing must be conspiracy to injure the business of an ment that the offense be described with suf- determined by an appellate court as of the ficient clearness to show a violation of law, time of the hearing, although the controland to enable the accused to know the na-ling statute, the Clayton Act of October 15, ture and cause of the accusation, and to plead the judgment, if one be rendered, in bar of a further prosecution for the same offense. If the offense be a statutory one, and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the indictment need not charge such knowledge or intent. United States v. Behrman, 258 U. S. 280, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303, 66: 619 Negation of exception. 5. An indictment for a statutory of fense need only charge facts sufficient to show that the accused is not within any exception in such statute. United States v. Behrman, 258 U. S. 280, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303, INFAMOUS CRIME. 66: 619 See Indictment and Information, 1, 2. Validity of child labor tax law, see Internal Revenue, 7. INFANTS. Injuries to children, see Negligence. INFORMATION. 1914, § 20, was passed after the decree appealed from was entered. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72, 66: 189 2. The irreparable injury to property Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, § 20, afor to a property right which, under the fords grounds for injunctive relief in cases "between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between ployment, involving, or growing out of, a persons employed and persons seeking emdispute concerning terms or conditions of employment," includes injury to the business of an employer. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72, 66: 189 3. No new principle was introduced into the equity jurisprudence of the Federal courts by the provisions of the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, § 20, which forbid an injunction against recommending, advising or persuading others by peaceful means to For criminal offense, see Indictment cease employment and labor, or against at tending at any place where such person or persons may lawfully be for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working, or against peaceably assembling in a lawful manner and for lawful purposes. These provisions are merely declaratory of what was the best practice always. Congress thought it wise to stabilize this rule of ac |