THE DECISIONS OF THE Supreme Court of the United States AT OCTOBER TERM, 1921 ROBERT HAWES, Plff. in Err., V. STATE OF GEORGIA. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 1-5.) Constitutional law due process of law-presumption and burden of proof. ling and manufacturing prohibited liquors. Affirmed. See same case below, 150 Ga. 101, 103 S. E. 170. brief. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Marion Smith submitted the cause for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Carroll A state may, consistently with the D. Colley and F. H. Colley were on the due-process-of-law clause of U. S. Const., 14th Amend., create by statute a rebuttable presumption of guilty knowledge by the actual occupant of a farm from a finding upon the premises of apparatus for distil ling prohibited intoxicating liquors, although, under the local law, a defendant in a criminal case may not testify as a witness, and husband and wife are not competent or compellable to give evidence in any criminal proceeding for or against each other. Mr. George M. Napier, Attorney General of Georgia, and Mr. Seward M. Smith, filed a brief for defendant in error. [2] Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court: Indictment against Hawes under the law of Georgia for the offense of knowingly permitting certain persons to lo [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, 774-cate and have on his premises apparatus 778, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 95.] IN Note. As to what constitutes due process of law, generally-see notes to People v. O'Brien, 2 L.R.A. 255; Kuntz v. Sumption, 2 L.R.A. 655; Re Gannon, 5 L.R.A. 359; Ulman v. Baltimore, 11 L.R.A. 224; Gilman v. Tucker, 13 L.R.A. 304; Pearson v. Yewdall, 24 L. ed. U. S. 436; and Wilson v. North Carolina, 42 L. ed. U. S. 865. for distilling and manufacturing prohibited liquors and beverages. A A verdict of guilty was rendered. motion for new trial was made and de nied, which action and the judgment of the trial court were affirmed on appeal by the supreme court of the state. The act of the state upon which the indictment was based made it unlawful, among other things, "to distill, manufacture, or make any alcoholic spirits, vinous or malted liquors, or intoxicating beverages" in the state. Section 22 of the act provides that when any apparatus used for such purposes "is found or discovered upon said premises the same shall be prima facie evidence that the person in actual possession had knowledge of the existence of the same, and on conviction thereof, shall be punished as prescribed in § 16 of this act, the burden of proof in all cases being upon the person in actual possession to show the want of knowledge of the existence of such apparatus on his premises." The trial court instructed the jury that Hawes was charged with knowing who had the apparatus upon the premises of which he was in possession, or who operated it, and that, under the act the burden was upon him to show the want of knowledge. And further, that all that the state had to show was that the apparatus was on the premises; and "when the state shows that, stopping there, that makes out a prima facie case against defendant, and you should find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment," unless he shows that it, the apparatus, was there without his consent and knowledge. [3] The charge was made the basis of a motion for new trial on the ground that it was offensive to the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States and also of the Constitution of Georgia. The same grounds were assigned in the supreme court of the state on appeal from the order and judgment denying the motion for new trial. phasis of the effect of the statute against him, Hawes points out that a defendant in a criminal case is not allowed to testify as a witness, that he has only the right to make a statement not under oath; and that husband and wife are not competent or compellable to give evidence in any criminal proceeding for or against each other.1 [4] It has been decided, as counsel concede, that the legislature may make one fact prima facie evidence of another, and it is certainly within the established power of a state to prescribe the evidence which is to be received in the courts of its own government. Adams v. New York, 192 Ü. S. 585, 588, 48 L. ed. 575, 578, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 372. In Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 214, 61 L. ed. 678, 683, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 637, 13 N. C. C. Ă. 959, it is said: "The establishment of presumptions, and of rules respecting the burden of proof, is clearly within the domain of the state governments, and that a provision of this character, not unreasonable in itself and not conclusive of the rights of the party, does not constitute a denial of due process of law. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 42, 55 L. ed. 78, 80, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 226, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463, 2 N. C. C. A. 243." must be connection between them,—a requirement that reasoning insists on, and, necessarily, the law. In the supreme court the specific error against the charge of the court was that it cast upon Hawes the burden of "showing the want of knowledge of the exist- Undoubtedly there must be a relation ence of the apparatus on his premises, between the two facts. Bailey v. Alaand, in fine, his innocence of the crime bama, 219 U. S. 219, 55 L. ed. 191, 31 with which he is charged," he "claiming Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; McFarland v. Amerthat this was an unreasonable and ar-ican Sugar Ref. Co. 241 U. S. 79, 60 bitrary exercise of its power by the L. ed. 899, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498. That legislature of the state of Georgia." is, if one may evidence the other, there And this is the assignment here; in other words, that § 22 creates a presumption of guilty knowledge from the finding of the apparatus upon premises We think the condition is satisfied by occupied by him, and that both the the Georgia statute. Distilling spirits trial court and the supreme court of is not an ordinary incident of a farm, Georgia enforced this statutory pre- and, in a prohibition state, has illicit sumption, and the same, therefore, en- character and purpose, and certainly is tered into his conviction, and that the not so silent and obscure in use that one 14th Amendment to the Constitution of who rented a farm upon which it was or the United States was thereby violated. had been conducted would probably be In aid of his contention, and in em-ignorant of it. On the contrary, [5] it 1 Section 1036 of the Penal Code is as Section 1037 of the Penal Code is as folfollows: "In all criminal trials the prisoner shall have the right to make to the court and jury such statement in the case as he may deem proper in his defense. It shall not be under oath, and shall have such force only as the jury may think right to give it. They may believe it in preference to the sworn testimony in the case. The prisoner shall not be compelled to answer any questions on cross-examination, should he think proper to decline to answer." lows: "Husband and wife shall not be competent or compellable to give evidence in any criminal proceeding for or against each other, except that the wife shall be competent, but not compellable, to testify criminal offense committed, or attempted to against her husband upon his trial for any have been committed, upon her person. She is also a competent witness to testify for or against her husband in cases of abandonment of his child, as provided for in § 116 of this Code." |