Nor is the appellants' contention upheld by the decision of this court in Merchants Exch. v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365, 63 L. ed. 300, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114. In that case this court sustained the constitutionality of a statute of Missouri providing that, in cities having more than seventy-five thousand inhabitants, buildings used for the storage of grain shall be deemed public warehouses; and prohibiting the issue of weight certificates by other than authorized bonded state weighers. We held that the state statute did not violate the due process clause or the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, it was held that the act, under the facts of that case, did not violate the United States Grain Standards Act, as the latter did not regulate weighing; and, for reasons stated, did not violate the United States Warehouse Act. The act there in question did not undertake to regulate the buying of grain in interstate commerce, nor to levy a license tax upon the privilege, nor to fix the profit which could be realized on grain bought, shipped, and sold in interstate commerce. It is alleged that such legislation is in the interest of the grain growers, and essential to protect them from [61] fraudulent purchases, and to secure payment to them of fair prices for the grain actually sold. This may be true, but Congress is amply authorized to pass measures to protect interstate commerce if legislation of that character is needed. The supposed inconveniences and wrongs are not to be redressed by sustaining the constitutionality of laws which clearly encroach upon the field of interstate commerce, placed by the Constitution under Federal control.

We agree with the circuit court of appeals that this legislation is beyond the power of the state, as it is a regulation of interstate commerce when applied to complainant's business. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider whether the provisions of the state act are in contravention of the regulations provided in the Federal Grain Standards Act, as was held by the circuit court of appeals. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.

condition for different kinds of grain, and provides that when such standards shall have been established, shipment of any such grain for sale by grade in interstate commerce is prohibited, unless the grain has either been inspected before shipment or is to be inspected en route or at destination, by an inspector licensed under the Federal act. Shipment without such inspection is permitted whenever the sale is by sample, or by some description other than the official grade. The act does not purport to deal in any way with sales in intrastate commerce.

[62] In 1919 the legislature of North Dakota concluded that its farmers were being systematically defrauded in purchases of their grain, made within the state. The buyers were largely local mills, of which there are 160, and local elevators, of which there are 2,200. The fraud was perpetrated, in part, by underweighing and undergrading in the unofficial inspection of the grain, made locally by or on behalf of the purchasers. In part, the fraud was perpetrated by means of unconscionable bargains made locally, through which valuable dockage was obtained from the farmer without any payment therefor, or by which the grain itself was bought at less than its fair value. Against such frauds the Federal act did not purport to afford any protection. So far as the transactions were wholly intrastate, Congress was without power to do so. So far as the sales were part of transactions in interstate commerce the power was ample; but Congress did not see fit to exert it. And, the Secretary of Agriculture did not even exercise his authority to provide for Federal inspection and grading within North Dakota of such grain as was shipped from there in interstate commerce. That was left by him to be done after the grain reached Minnesota or other states.

Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, with whom Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Clarke concur:

requiring payment to the farmer of the, fair value of grain,-the value to be [63] ascertained by fixing the so-called margin; (e) by insuring compliance with the above provisions through the further provision that only persons or concerns licensed to inspect, grade, and weigh may buy grain before it has been officially inspected. The standards of quality and condition established by the Secretary of Agriculture were adopted under regulations issued by the state inspector of grades, weights, and measures; and all state inspectors (including licensed buyers) were required to observe those grades.

Ordinarily, when a state's police power is exerted in connection with sales, it is the buyer whom the law seeks to protect; and the seller is licensed as part of the machinery to enforce the regulations prescribed. I cannot doubt that the state has power as broad to protect the seller, and, to that end, to license the buyer. Compare House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270, 55 L. ed. 213, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234. Ordinarily the function of inspection, grading, and measurement is committed to a public official or other impartial person. But I am not aware of any constitutional objection to imposing the duty upon the buyer, where conditions demand it. The requirement that the amount of the dockage shall be ascertained, and that it shall be paid for separately or be returned, does not differ in principle from the requirement upheld in McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 53 L. ed. 315, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206, that coal shall be measured before screening, or the requirement upheld in Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 46 L. ed. 55, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, that store orders shall be redeemed in cash, or that upheld in House v. Mayes, supra, which prohibited, in the purchase of grain, making arbitrary deductions from the actual weight. The requirement that the buyer shall take only a proper margin for graded grain is, in effect, requiring that he pay a fair price. Laws designed to prevent unfair prices are ordinarily enacted to protect consumers. But there is no constitutional objection to protecting producers against unconscionable bargains, if conditions [64] are such that it is they who require protection. Nor can there be any constitutional objection to using, as a factor in determining what is fair, the price prevailing in terminal markets, even if they happen to be located in another state.

Whether the purchases involved in this case were intrastate or interstate

commerce we need not decide. For the fact that a sale or purchase is part of a transaction in interstate commerce does not preclude application of state inspection laws, unless Congress has occupied the field, or the state regulation directly burdens interstate commerce. That neither of these exceptions applies here appears from the description of the operation of the Federal and the state laws, given below, in the opinion of Judge Amidon. Compare Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 56 L. ed. 1182, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715; Merchants Exch. v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365, 63 L. ed. 300, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114; Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U. S. 427, 63 L. ed. 689, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325; Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, ante, 166, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 42, and New York C. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 156, note 1, 61 L. ed. 1045, 1050, L.R.A. 1918C, 439, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1139, 14 N. C. C. A. 680. The requirement of a license and the payment of a $10 license fee, if applied to nonresidents not regularly engaged in buying grain within the state, might, perhaps, be obnoxious to the commerce clause. But the objection, if sound, would not afford this plaintiff ground for attacking the validity of the statute. Lee v. New Jersey, 207 U. S. 67, 52 L. ed. 106, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 22. It is a North Dakota corporation, owner of an elevator within the state, and is carrying on business there under the laws of the state as a public warehouseman. Compare Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391, 394, 396, 38 L. ed. 757-759, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 670, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857. It is possible, also, that some provision in the license, or some regulation issued by the state inspector, is obnoxious to the commerce clause. If so, a licensee may disregard it. W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452, 45 L. ed. 619, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423. Even if the margin clause should be held a burden upon interstate commerce, still that would not invalidate the whole statute. The margin clause is separable from the other provisions [65] of the act; and it could be eliminated without affecting the operation of any other feature of the state system. Compare Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 29 L. ed. 615, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580; Bowman v. Continental Oil Co. 256 U. S. 642, 65 L. ed. 1139, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 606. And it is clear that the legislature would have wished to secure the protection afforded by the other provisions, if this one should be held to be beyond the power of the state. That it was not the pur

pose of Congress to supersede state in

fest by § 29 of the United States Grain Standards Act (p. 490). Merchants Exch. v. Missouri, 248 U. S. p. 368, 63 L. ed. 306, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114.

To strike down this inspection law, instead of limiting the sphere of its operation, seems to me a serious curtailment of the functions of the state, and leaves

the farmers of North Dakota defenseless against what are asserted to be persistent, palpable frauds.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. William Lemke, Attorney General Messrs. Seth W. Richardson and Karl of North Dakota in propria persona, and Knox Gartner submitted the cause for appellants.

Messrs. William A. Lancaster, David F. Simpson, and Harold G. Simpson submitted the cause Messrs. W. A. McIntyre, O. B. Burtness, for appellees. Sveinbjorn Johnson, John Junell, and James E. Dorsey were on the brief.

Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit was brought by companies representing 692 elevators, in the state of North Dakota, to enjoin the enforcement of the North Dakota Grain Grading and Inspection Act, chapter 138 of the Laws of North Dakota of 1919. This

February 27, 1922.

Note. On state regulation of interstate or foreign commerce-see notes to Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Com. 13 L.R.A. 107; Brown v. Maryland, 6 L. ed. U. S. 678; and Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 29 L. ed. U. S. 158.

For a discussion of police power, generally-see notes to State v. Marshall, 1 L.R.A. 51; Re Gannon, 5 L.R.A. 359; State v. Schlemmer, 10 L.R.A. 135; Ulman v. Baltimore, 11 L.R.A. 224; Electric Improv. Co. v. San Francisco, 13 L.R.A. 131; and Barbier v. Connolly, 28 L. ed. U. S. 923.

On inspection laws as regulations of commerce-see notes to New Mexico ex

rel. McLean v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 51 L. ed. U. S. 78, and Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 63 L. ed. U. S. 180.

On state statute in relation to inspection and grading of grain as unlawful burden on interstate commerce-see note to Farmers' Grain Co. v. Langer, 19 A.L.R. 164.

On validity of state inspection laws as applied to commodities in interstate commerce-see note to State v. Bartles Oil Co. L.R.A.1916D, 196.

Generally, on statutes part valid and part invalid-see notes to Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co. 1 L.R.A. 363, and Fayette County v. People's & D. Bank, 10 L.R.A. 196.

No. 456, just decided [258 U. S. 50, ante, 458, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 244].

The matter was heard before three judges, and a temporary injunction was of the circuit court of appeals, which we granted upon the authority of the decree have just reviewed and affirmed. Appeal

from that order was taken to this court. The facts are not materially different from those presented in the former case, and the reasons therein stated for the conclusion reached are controlling here, and need not be repeated.

The order of the District Court is affirmed.

to in the provision of the Judicial Code, § 57, authorizing service of process in suits to remove clouds upon title, liens, and encumbrances upon real or personal property within the district by bringing in adverse claimants who cannot be reached by the ordinary methods of personal service. [For other cases, see Courts, V. c, 7, a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Federal

courts- territorial jurisdiction - nonresident defendant in lo

cal suit.

2. The mere physical presence within the southern district of New York of certain promissory notes secured by deeds of trust on lands in Mississippi does not make them personal property of that localized character lawfully within the district which, under the Judicial Code, § 57, would justify foreign service of process upon a nonresident and bring him to the local jurisdiction to contest title to the notes, where complainant derives her title. as she sets forth in her bill, from bequests made to her by her parents, both residents of Mississippi, she having obtained letters in each of their estates under probate de crees declaring all the personal property bequeathed to be within the jurisdiction of the Mississippi probate court, and having taken the notes to New York in violation of a state statute forbidding an executor or administrator to remove any of the property of an estate out of the state, the estates at the time the bill was filed remaining open and unsettled.

[For other cases, see Courts, V. c, 7, a, in

Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

The appeal has been properly prosecuted directly to this court.

Jellenik v. Huron Copper Min. Co. 177 U. S. 1, 44 L. el. 647, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559; Chase v. Wetzlar, 225 U. S. 79, 56 L. ed. 990, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 659.

The securities have become vested with the attributes of personalty.

Re Bronson, 150 N. Y. 1, 15, 34 L.R.A. 238, 55 Am. St. Rep. 632, 44 N. E. 707; People ex rel. Westbrook v. Ogdens burgh, 48 N. Y. 390, 397; People ex rel. Jefferson v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576; Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Adams, 181 U. S. 580, 45 L. ed. 1011, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729; Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U. S. 447, 49 L. ed. 546, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 48 L. ed. 195, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 88; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Jahier v. Rascoe, 62 Miss. 699; R. F. Walden & Co. v. Yates, 111 Miss. 631, 71 So. 897; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 206, 47 L. ed. 439, 445, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 322, 323, 44 L. ed. 174, 181, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110; Cooley, Taxn. 3d ed. p. 87; Fishburn v. Londershausen, 50 Or. 363, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1234, 92 Pac. 1060, 15 Ann. Cas. 975; Manning v. Berdan, 132 Fed. 382; Pensacola State Bank v. Thornberry, 141 C. C. A. 367, 266 Fed. 611; Thompson v. Emmett Irrig. Dist. 142 C. C. A. 192, 227 Fed. 560; Hodgman v. Atlantic Ref. Co. 274 Fed. 104; Jones v. Rutherford, 26 App. D. C. 114; Sweets v. Chandler 98 Me. 145, 56 Atl. 584; Schoonmaker Mitchell, 144 Ky. 794, 139 S. W. 968.

V.

This action is not personal, but in rem. Amparo Min. Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co. 75 N. J. Eq. 555, 73 Atl. 249; New York & N. H. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592; Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185, 30 L. ed. 372, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165;

Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 33 L. ed. 918, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 557; Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 40 L. ed. 691, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585; Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 58, 39 L. ed. 69, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24; Dick v. Foraker, 155 U. S. 404, 39 L. ed. 201, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124; Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556, 26 L. ed. 229; Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works, 131 U. S. 352, 33 L. ed. 178, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781; 6 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 740, 743; Magnuson v. Clithero, 101 Wis. 551, 77 N. W. 882; McBurney v. Carson, 99 U. S. 567, 25 L. ed. 378.

Messrs. Louis Marshall and James Marshall submitted the cause for appellee: