Boulay-paty, Droit Commercial Maritime, p. 104; Emerigon, Ins. chap. 6, § 7. Meredith's ed. p. 144; Parsons, Shipping & Admiralty, pp. 80, 82; Desty, Shipping & Admiralty, p. 8; Benedict, Admiralty, 4th ed. p. 126, § 158. 2, Fed. Cas. No. 6,172; McMaster v. One Dredge, 95 Fed. 832; The Iris, 40 C. C. A. 301, 100 Fed. 104; The Roanoke, 41 C. C. A. 377, 101 Fed. 298; The Emma B. 162 Fed. 966; The O. H. Vessels, 106 C. C. A. 107, 183 Fed. 561; The Dredge The restrictive rule of People's Ferry A. 217 Fed. 617; Malynes, Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, 1686 ed. p. 123; Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393, 15 L. ed. Justice, Sea Laws, 1705 ed. p. 442; 1961, standing opposed to the maritime vessel was lengthened, the work was held | a repairing, and not a constructing of a vessel, so that a lien against the vessel existed in admiralty. Hardy v. The Ruggles, 2 Hughes, 78, Fed. Cas. No. 6,062. It What was done and supplied in this case And the work necessary to alter a lake steamer so as to fit it for ocean navigation, the principal part of which was the lengthening of the vessel, is more in the nature of reconstruction than repairs, and no maritime lien exists under the Act of 1910. The Susquehanna, 267 Fed. 811. And where one purchased an old hull which had been built of timbers of a dry dock, a contract for work and materials for converting it into a suction dredge is one for construction, and not for repairs, within the jurisdiction of admiralty, so that the provisions of the Act of 1910 do not apply. The dredge A. 217 Fed. 617. And in The Schuylkill, 249 Fed. 781, where a lien was claimed under the Act of 1910, it appears to have been admitted that work done on a vessel which had already been in service, for the purpose of making her seaworthy, and enabling her to obtain a new registry, was not a construction, but the making of repairs. But it has been held that a contract to convert a scow into a dredge is a contract for construction, and not for repairs, and is not a maritime contract. McMaster v. One Dredge, 95 Fed. 832. The court, quoting from The Paradox, 61 Fed. 860, in which a contract for the machinery of a vessel was held not enforceable in admiralty where the machinery was supplied for the completion of the construction of the vessel, said: "When the vessel is completed for the purpose intended, then the vessel is "built," and not till then, whether it be a steamer, a sailing vessel, a barge, a scow, or a mere float, designed to support And where a barge was dismantled and transport a bathhouse; and whatever is supplied to such a vessel for the and a new hull built, though the old purpose of making it what it was in-cabin and machinery were used, it was tended to be, and to enable it to enter upon the kind of business or navigation intended, is a part of the "building" of the vessel.' Tried by this criterion, the work and labor and materials furnished in this case were for the building of the vessel. It can make no difference whether the scow was already built, and had theretofore been used for another purpose, or whether it was newly constructed for the purposes of a dredge. The purpose of this contract was to build this scow into a dredge. As a mere wood barge, the things done were not required. It was only for the purposes of a dredge, which, in its relation with the scow, was a new thing, that the work and labor in this case were performed and the materials furnished, and this is a building of the dredge, within the rule adopted in the cases cited. held that there were no repairs, but the completed vessel was held to be a new boat, so that admiralty was without jurisdiction to declare a lien on the hull for the work on her. Hartuppe v. The Coal Bluff No. 2, Fed. Cas. No. 6,172. And a contract with a shipwright to assist in the building of a new vessel on which some of the parts of an old boat are used, including the boilers, pilot house, and roof, is not a maritime contract, over which admiralty has jurisdiction. Smith v. The Royal George, 1 Woods, 290, Fed. Cas. No. 13,102. And the work performed and materials furnished in converting a war vessel into a fishing boat, including the removal of cabins, cutting hatches, building a railing, and lining, have been held to be in the nature of construction, and not furInished for a maritime service, so that 258 U. 6. law of practically all the world (Hughes, | Mr. George L. Dillaway argued the cause and filed a brief for claimant: The contract in this case was one for construction, and therefore not maritime. McMaster v. One Dredge, 95 Fed. 832; Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242, 65 L. ed. 245, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65; The Dredge A, 217 Fed. 617. If not a contract for construction, it was for reconstruction, and not repairs. The Susquehanna, 267 Fed. 811; The Harvard, 270 Fed. 668. This being a domestic vessel, it follows that any lien here depends on the United States Statute of June 23, 1910, which covers repairs, but not reconstruction. Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129, 16 L. ed. 294; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, 22 L. ed. 487; The Winnebago (Iroquois Transp. Co. v. DeLaney Forge & Iron Co.) 205 U. S. 354, 51 L. ed. 836, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 509; Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242, 65 L. ed. 245, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65. The basis for the original-construction Piedmont & G. C. Coal Co. v. Seaboard rule is that the structure does not be- Fisheries Co. 254 U. S. 1, 11, 65 L. ed. come a ship, in the legal sense, until it 97, 101, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; The Oceana, is completed and launched. 156 C. C. A. 508, 244 Fed. 82; The Hatteras, 166 C. C. A. 586, 255 Fed. 518; The Muskegon, 275 Fed. 348; The Schuylkill, 267 Fed. 811; The J. Doherty, 207 Fed. 997; The Sinaloa, 209 Fed. 287; The United Shores, 193 Fed. 552; The Convoy, 257 Fed. 843; North Pacific As long as a vessel preserves her S. S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine R. & identity, any work done in the way of Shipbuilding Co. 249 U. S. 119, 63 L. ed. alterations, enlargement, or improve-510, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221; Donnell v. ment, no matter how extensive, falls The Starlight, 103 Mass. 227. under the head of repairs. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 438, 46 L. ed. 264, 270, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 195; North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine R. & Shipbuilding Co. 249 U. S. 119, 63 L. ed. 510, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221. 28 Cyc. 764; Hughes, Admiralty, 2d ed. 109; The Susquehanna, 267 Fed. 811; The Iris, 40 C. C. A. 301, 100 Fed. 104; The Harvard, 270 Fed. 668; Ely v. Murray & T. Co. 118 C. C. A. 520, 200 Fed. 368; The Convoy, 257 Fed. 843; Homer v. The Lady of the Ocean, 70 Me. 350; Donnell v. The Starlight, 103 Mass. 227; Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v. Jackson, 55 L.R.A. 692, 50 C. C. A. 159, 112 Fed. 146; Covington v. Bullock, 126 Ky. 236, 103 S. W. 276; American Bonding Co. v. Ottumwa, 70 C. C. A. 270, 137 Fed. 572. If the contract in this case was a construction contract, the libellant would have no lien. Under the decisions of our courts it would not even be a maritime contract. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How 392, 15 L. ed. 961; Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242, 65 L. ed. 245, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65. [98] Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court: Claiming a lien under Act of Congress approved June 23, 1910 (chap. 373, 36 Stat. at L. 604, Comp. Stat. § 7783, 9 labor and materials were supplied and furnished was the vessel qualified to enter into the service of navigation and trade. claims based thereon were not within the In Ely v. Murray & T. Co. 118 C. C. A. 520, 200 Fed. 368, where a libel was filed in rem for the price of a gasolene engine installed in a launch, the court stated that the record did not show the facts definitely enough for them to determine whether the engine was furnished in the line of construction or in the line 2, Fed. Cas. No. 6,172; McMaster v. Boulay-paty, Droit Commercial MariOne Dredge, 95 Fed. 832; The Iris, 40 time, p. 104; Emerigon, Ins. chap. 6, C. C. A. 301, 100 Fed. 104; The Roanoke, § 7. Meredith's ed. p. 144; Parsons, 41 C. C. A. 377, 101 Fed. 298; The Emma Shipping & Admiralty, pp. 80, 82; Desty, B. 162 Fed. 966; The O. H. Vessels, 106 Shipping & Admiralty, p. 8; Benedict, C. C. A. 107, 183 Fed. 561; The Dredge Admiralty, 4th ed. p. 126, § 158. A. 217 Fed. 617; Malynes, Consuetudo, The restrictive rule of People's Ferry vel Lex Mercatoria, 1686 ed. p. 123; Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393, 15 L. ed. Justice, Sea Laws, 1705 ed. p. 442; 1961, standing opposed to the maritime vessel was lengthened, the work was held | What was done and supplied in this case a repairing, and not a constructing of was for the purpose of making the vessel a vessel, so that a lien against the vessel what it was intended to be, and what it existed in admiralty. Hardy v. The had theretofore not been,-a dredge, a Ruggles, 2 Hughes, 78, Fed. Cas. No. thing with which the wood scow, as such, 6,062. had no relation. This contract, therefore, is not a maritime contract. was a contract to convert the wood scow into a dredge, which is precisely the same as one to build a dredge. The remedy of the libellants to enforce the lien given by the state statute is in the state courts." It And the work necessary to alter a lake steamer so as to fit it for ocean navigation, the principal part of which was the lengthening of the vessel, is more in the nature of reconstruction than repairs, and no maritime lien exists under the Act of 1910. The Susquehanna, 267 Fed. 811. And where one purchased an old hull which had been built of timbers of a dry dock, a contract for work and materials for converting it into a suction dredge is one for construction, and not for repairs, within the jurisdiction of admiralty, so that the provisions of the Act of 1910 do not apply. The dredge A. 217 Fed. 617. And in The Schuylkill, 249 Fed. 781, where a lien was claimed under the Act of 1910, it appears to have been admitted that work done on a vessel which had already been in service, for the purpose of making her seaworthy, and enabling her to obtain a new registry, was not a construction, but the making of repairs. But it has been held that a contract to convert a scow into a dredge is a contract for construction, and not for repairs, and is not a maritime contract. McMaster v. One Dredge, 95 Fed. 832. The court, quoting from The Paradox, 61 Fed. 860, in which a contract for the machinery of a vessel was held not enforceable in admiralty where the machinery was supplied for the completion of the construction of the vessel, said: "When the vessel is completed for the purpose intended, then the vessel is "built," and not till then, whether it be a steamer, a sailing vessel, a barge, a scow, or a mere float, designed to support and transport a bathhouse; and what- And where a barge was dismantled ever is supplied to such a vessel for the and a new hull built, though the old purpose of making it what it was in-cabin and machinery were used, it was tended to be, and to enable it to enter upon the kind of business or navigation intended, is a part of the "building" of the vessel.' Tried by this criterion, the work and labor and materials furnished in this case were for the building of the vessel. It can make no difference whether the scow was already built, and had theretofore been used for another purpose, or whether it was newly constructed for the purposes of a dredge. The purpose of this contract was to build this scow into a dredge. As a mere wood barge, the things done were not required. It was only for the purposes of a dredge, which, in its relation with the scow, was a new thing, that the work and labor in this case were performed and the materials furnished, and this is a building of the dredge, within the rule adopted in the cases cited. held that there were no repairs, but the completed vessel was held to be a new boat, so that admiralty was without jurisdiction to declare a lien on the hull for the work on her. Hartuppe v. The Coal Bluff No. 2, Fed. Cas. No. 6,172. And a contract with a shipwright to assist in the building of a new vessel on which some of the parts of an old boat are used, including the boilers, pilot house, and roof, is not a maritime contract, over which admiralty has jurisdiction. Smith v. The Royal George, 1 Woods, 290, Fed. Cas. No. 13,102. And the work performed and materials furnished in converting a war vessel into a fishing boat, including the removal of cabins, cutting hatches, building a railing, and lining, have been held to be in the nature of construction, and not furInished for a maritime service, so that law of practically all the world (Hughes, Admiralty, 116), subject to possible and once not inappropriate criticism (Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 244, 65 L. ed. 246, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65), should not be extended beyond its present scope. Cases decided subsequently have not extended the rule beyond cases of original construction. Mr. George L. Dillaway argued the cause and filed a brief for claimant: The contract in this case was one for construction, and therefore not maritime. McMaster v. One Dredge, 95 Fed. 832; Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242, 65 L. ed. 245, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65; The Dredge A, 217 Fed. 617. If not a contract for construction, it was for reconstruction, and not repairs. The Susquehanna, 267 Fed. 811; The Harvard, 270 Fed. 668. This being a domestic vessel, it follows that any lien here depends on the United States Statute of June 23, 1910, which covers repairs, but not reconstruc tion. Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129, 16 L. ed. 294; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, 22 L. ed. 487; The Winnebago (Iroquois Transp. Co. v. DeLaney Forge & Iron Co.) 205 U. S. 354, 51 L. ed. 836, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 509; Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242, 65 L. ed. 245, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65. The basis for the original-construction Piedmont & G. C. Coal Co. v. Seaboard rule is that the structure does not be- Fisheries Co. 254 U. S. 1, 11, 65 L. ed. come a ship, in the legal sense, until it 97, 101, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; The Oceana, is completed and launched. 156 C. C. A. 508, 244 Fed. 82; The Hatteras, 166 C. C. A. 586, 255 Fed. 518; The Muskegon, 275 Fed. 348; The Schuylkill, 267 Fed. 811; The J. Doherty, 207 Fed. 997; The Sinaloa, 209 Fed. 287; The United Shores, 193 Fed. 552; The Convoy, 257 Fed. 843; North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine R. & Shipbuilding Co. 249 U. S. 119, 63 L. ed. 510, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221; Donnell v. The Starlight, 103 Mass. 227. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 438, 46 L. ed. 264, 270, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 195; North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine R. & Shipbuilding Co. 249 U. S. 119, 63 L. ed. 510, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221. As long as a vessel preserves her identity, any work done in the way of alterations, enlargement, or improvement, no matter how extensive, falls under the head of repairs. 28 Cyc. 764; Hughes, Admiralty, 2d ed. 109; The Susquehanna, 267 Fed. 811; The Iris, 40 C. C. A. 301, 100 Fed. 104; The Harvard, 270 Fed. 668; Ely v. Murray & T. Co. 118 C. C. A. 520, 200 Fed. 368; The Convoy, 257 Fed. 843; Homer v. The Lady of the Ocean, 70 Me. 350; Donnell v. The Starlight, 103 Mass. 227; Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v. Jackson, 55 L.R.A. 692, 50 C. C. A. 159, 112 Fed. 146; Covington v. Bullock, 126 Ky. 236, 103 S. W. 276; American Bonding Co. v. Ottumwa, 70 C. C. A. 270, 137 Fed. 572. If the contract in this case was a construction contract, the libellant would have no lien. Under the decisions of our courts it would not even be a maritime contract. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How 392, 15 L. ed. 961; Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242, 65 L. ed. 245, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65. [98] Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court: Claiming a lien under Act of Congress approved June 23, 1910 (chap. 373, 36 Stat. at L. 604, Comp. Stat. § 7783, 9 labor and materials were supplied and furnished was the vessel qualified to enter into the service of navigation and trade. claims based thereon were not within the In Ely v. Murray & T. Co. 118 C. C. A. 520, 200 Fed. 368, where a libel was filed in rem for the price of a gasolene engine installed in a launch, the court stated that the record did not show the facts definitely enough for them to determine whether the engine was furnished in the line of construction or in the line Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 346), and seeking to recover for work done and supplies furnished in pursuance of a contract with the owner of the Jack-O-Lantern, appellant libeled the vessel. The libel was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. If the agreement between the parties is maritime, there was jurisdiction; otherwise there was none. The facts are not in dispute. They were stated as follows by the district court: "The Jack-O-Lantern was originally a car float of the usual type, something over 200 feet long, with neither motive power nor steering gear, and having two lines of track on her single deck. The claimant bought her and proceeded to convert her into a steamer to be used for The tracks were amusement purposes. removed, the deck relaid to make a daneing floor, a large house, or superstructure, was built, inclosing most of the deck, and containing a dance hall, rooms, balconies, etc. Steering apparatus and a steam plant of the propeller type for propulsion were also installed. "For the purpose of carrying out these changes the contract now before the court was made between the claimant and the libellant. It covers, generally speaking, all the woodwork involved in the changes above outlined. The [99] libellant did not install the power plant, but it did prepare the vessel for it. The scow was towed to the libellant's yard for the work to be done. The engine and boilers were there installed. As they were not yet in working condition when the vessel left the libellant's yard, she was towed away." [266 Fed. 562.] Upon these facts it held that the contract was not one for repairs or supplies, but for original construction, and therefore nonmaritime within the doctrine of Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis MeDonald, 254 U. S. 242, 65 L. ed. 245, "In rebuilding 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65. operations the test is whether the identity of the vessel has continued or has been extinguished." "The matter turns, as I view it, upon a question of fact; and upon the facts stated I think it clear that the identity of the car float which was delivered to the libellant was completely lost by the conversion into an amusement steamer under the contract in suit. It is 1 "Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any person furnishing repairs, supplies, or other necessaries, including the use of dry dock or marine railway, to a vessel, whether foreign or domestic, upon the or true that the hull is substantially un- The Jack-O-Lantern, with It is not always easy to determine what constitutes repairs as opposed to original construction. A contract for the former is maritime; if for the latter, it is not. We are not disposed to enlarge the compass of the rule approved in Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, under which contracts for the construction of entirely new ships are classed as nonmaritime, or to apply it to agreements of uncertain intendment,-reasonable doubts concerning the latter should be resolved in favor of the admiralty jurisdiction. Nor do we think that, in [100] cases like the instant one, any refined distinction should be made between reconstruction and repairs, the latter word, as used in the statute, has a broad meaning. As pointed out in Piedmont & G. C.. Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co. 254 U. S. 1, 11, 12, 65 L. ed. 97, 101, 102, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, the Act of June 23, 1910, makes "no change in the general principles of the present law of maritime liens, but merely substitutes a single statute for the conflicting state statutes." This court has not undertaken and will not now essay to announce rigid definitions of repairs and new construction; but we do not accept the suggestion that the two things can be accurately differentiated by consideration of the ultimate use to which the vessel is to be devoted. The view expressed by Judge Hughes in United States v. The Grace Meade, 2 Hughes, 83, Fed. Cas. No. 15,243, is both sound and helpful. "And generally, it may be held as a principle, that, where the keel, stem, and sternposts and ribs of an old vessel, without being broken up and forming an intact frame, are built upon as a skeleton, the case is one of an old vessel rebuilt, and not of a new vessel. Indeed, without regard to the particular parts reused, if any considerable part of der of the owner or owners of such vessel, or of a person by him or them authorized, shall have a maritime lien on the vessel which may be enforced by a proceeding in rem, and it shall not be necessary to allege or prove that credit was given to the ves sel." 258 U. S. |