the hull and skeleton of an old vessel in, preference shall be given by any regulation its intact condition, without being broken of commerce or revenue to the ports of one up, is built upon, the law holds that in state over those of another," does not insuch a case it is the old vessel rebuilt, and clude an incorporated and organized terrinot a new vessel. But where no piece of [For other cases, see Commerce, VII. b, in Di. tory such as Alaska. the timber of an old vessel is used without gest Sup. Ct. 1908.] being first dislocated and then replaced, where no set of timbers are left together intact in their original positions, but all Argued December 14 and 15, 1921. Dethe timbers are severally taken out, refitted, and then reset, there we have a very different case. That is a case of a vessel rebuilt." 1. A direct regulation of commerce, such as the prohibition in the Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, § 27, against the transportation of merchandise by water over any part of the route between points in the United States in any other vessel than one built in and documented under the laws of the United States, and owned by persons who are citizens of the United States, or in vessels to which the privilege of engaging in the coastwise trade is extended by that act, is not controlled by the provisions of U. S. Const. art. 1, § 8, that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. [For other cases, see Commerce, VII. b, in Di gest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Commerce-preference of ports -ter ritory. 2. The word "state," as used in U. S. Const. art. 1, § 9, which provides that "no Note. On the power of Congress to regulate commerce-see notes to State ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana & O. Oil, Gas, & Min. Co. 6 L.R.A. 579; Bullard v. Northern P. R. Co. 11 L.R.A. 246; Re Wilson, 12 L.R.A. 624; Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 L. ed. U. S. 23; Brown v. Maryland, 6 L. ed. U. S. 678; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 29 L. ed. U. S. 158; Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 32 L. ed. U. S. 229; Harmon v. Chicago, 37 L. ed. U. S. 216; and Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 38 L. ed. U. S. 1041. [No. 392.] cided February 27, 1922. APPEAL from the District Court of the United States for the District of Alaska, Division No. 1, to review a decree which dismissed, on demurrer, the bill in a suit attacking the validity of the Merchant Marine Act, regulating coastwise trade. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. John Rustgard, Attorney General of Alaska, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants: If the language of the treaty means anything, it means that the people of Alaska shall be entitled to the same rights, the same advantages, and the same immunities as the people in the several states, including equal rights to trade and commerce. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 127, 21 L. ed. 394, 425; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L. ed. 745; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 52, 49 L. ed. 939, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; Railroad Tax Cases, 8 Sawy. 238, 13 Fed. 722. The term "United States," as used in the Constitution, applies to the American Empire, and includes not only the various states, but also the incorporated territories; hence it is that the uniformity clause of § 8, art. 1, which provides that all duties, imposts, or excises shall be uniform throughout the United States, deprives Congress of power to discriminate for or against any incorporated territory. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L. ed. 98; Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 518, 49 L. ed. 862, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 514; Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486, 48 L. ed. 1087, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 107, 44 L. ed. 995, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 292, 360, 45 L. ed. 1088, 1108, 1134, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 492, 12 L. ed. 780; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 15 L. ed. 691; United States v. Morris, 1 Curt. C. C. 23, Fed. Cas. No. 15,815; Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15, 29 L. ed. 47, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747: Dooley v. United States, 183 U. S. 151, 168, 46 L. ed. 128, 135, 22 Sup. Ct., 34 L. ed. 478, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 792; If the Congress has power to discriminate against the ports of the territory, it has power to close its ports; and if it has power to close the ports of the territory, it has power to otherwise dispose of the territory; for the right to discriminate involves the right to destroy. Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 337, Fed. Cas. No. 13,245; Cincinnati v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 223 U. S. 390, 56 L. ed. 481, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267; Choisser v. Hargrave, 2 Ill. 317; Palmer v. Cuyahoga County, 3 McLean, 226, Fed. Cas. No. 10,688; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 331, 4 L. ed. 97, 104; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579. The political rights-the right to vote and to be voted for-are not rights pertaining to citizenship of the United States. Such rights pertain only to citizenship of a state, and by Congress may be prescribed for a territory. Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 632, 48 L. ed. 822, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 573; United States v. Anthony, 11 Blatchf. 200, Fed. Cas. No. 14,459; Stone v. Smith, 159 Mass. 414, 34 N. E. 521; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 32 L. ed. 637, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 256; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492, 12 L. ed. 702, 789. [109] Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court: In the court below appellant's bill was dismissed upon demurrer. It attacks the validity of § 27, Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, chap. 250, 41 Stat. at L. 988,1 upon the ground that the regulation of commerce prescribed therein gives a preference to ports of the Pacific coast states over those of Alaska, contrary to § 9, art. 1, Federal Constitution,-"No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one state over those of another." The act purports, among other things, "to provide for the promotion and maintenance of the American merchant marine," and § 27 forbids transportation of merchandise [110] over any portion of the route between points in the United States, including Alaska, "in any other vessel than a vessel built in and docu 1 Act of June 5, 1920. To Provide for the Promotion and Maintenance of the American Merchant Marine, to Repeal Cerfor the Disposition, Regulation, and Use of tain Emergency Legislation, and Provide Property Acquired Thereunder, and for Other Purposes. The third clause of U. S. Const. § 8 Sec. 27. That no merchandise shall be (the commerce clause), which reads: transported by water, or by land and water, "Congress shall have power to regulate on penalty of forfeiture thereof, between commerce with foreign nations and points in the United States, including disamong the several states and with In-tricts, territories, and possessions thereof dian tribes," vests Congress with power directly or via a foreign port, or for any embraced within the coastwise laws, either to regulate commerce between territories and the states. the The Louisa Simpson, 2 Sawy. 57, Fed. Cas. No. 8,533; Handley v. Kansas City Southern R. Co. 187 U. S. 617, 47 L. ed. 333, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; Beitzell v. District of Columbia, 21 App. D. C. 49. Solicitor General Beck argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee: The terms "the state," "the several states," and "territory," as used in the Constitution, have a precise and definite meaning. Pro part of the transportation, in any other vessel than a vessel built in and documented under the laws of the United States and owned by persons who are citizens of the United States, or vessels to which the privilege of engaging in the coastwise trade is extended by $$ 18 or 22 of this act: vided, That this section shall not apply to merchandise transported between points within the continental United States, excluding Alaska, over through routes herestate Commerce Commission tofore or hereafter recognized by the Interfor which routes rate tariffs have been or shall here after be filed with said Commission when such routes are in part over Canadian rail lines and their own or other connecting water facilities: Provided further, That this section shall not become effective upon the Yukon river until the Alaska Railroad Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 45 L. ed. 1088, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 45 L. ed. 1041, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 743; Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486, 48 L. ed. 1087, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 42 L. ed. 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620; Church of Jesus Christ v. United States, 136 U. S. 1,dling the traffic. shall be completed and the shipping board shall find that proper facilities will be furnished for transportation by persons citizens of the United States for properly han mented under the laws of the United | porated and organized territory. This States and owned by persons who are word appears very often in the Constitucitizens of the United States, or vessels to which the privilege of engaging in the coastwise trade is extended by §§ 18 or 22 of this act," provided that, under certain conditions, this limitation shall not apply to merchandise transported between points within the United States, excluding Alaska, over through routes by Canadian rail lines and connecting water facilities. The bill assumes that the preference is obvious upon a consideration of the statute, without more. And although, by fostering lines of boats which afford frequent, regular, and speedy service, and otherwise, the practical effect may be highly beneficial to Alaskan ports, nevertheless, in view of the record, we will assume that the act does give preference to ports of the states over those of the territory. Alaska has been incorporated into and is part of the United States, and the Constitution, so far as applicable, is controlling upon Congress when legislating in respect thereto. Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516, 525, 528, 49 L. ed. 862, 865, 866, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 514. It has been organized and is governed under appropriate congressional action. For present purposes, therefore, we need not inquire into the object and scope of the treaty of cession. The questioned regulation relates directly to commerce, and clearly is not within the usual meaning of the words of § 8, art. 1, of the Constitution,-"All duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." That such regulations are not controlled by the uniformity clause was pointed out in Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, 314, 13 L. ed. 996, 1002: "But, having previously stated that, in this instance, the law complained of does not pass the appropriate line [111] which limits laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage, the suggestion that this law levies a duty on tonnage or on imports or exports is not admissible; and, if so, it also follows that this law is not repugnant to the first clause of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, which declares that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; for, if it is not to be deemed a law levying a duty, impost, or excise, the want of uniformity throughout the United States is not objectionable." The appellants insist that "state" in the preference clause includes an incor tion, and, as generally used therein, it clearly excludes a "territory." To justify the broad meaning now suggested would require considerations more cogent than any which have been suggested. Obviously, the best interests of a detached territory may often demand that its ports be treated very differently from those within the states. And we can find nothing in the Constitution itself or its history which compels the conclusion that it was intended to deprive Congress of power so to act. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 18 How. 421, 15 L. ed. 435; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 107, 44 L. ed. 995, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747. Great weight is attributed to certain statements concerning the preference clause found in the several opinions announced in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 249, 288, 352, 354, 355, 45 L. ed. 1088, 1091, 1106, 1131-1133, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770. But none of these opinions was accepted by a majority of the court, and statements therein are not binding upon us. That controversy grew out of a revenue measure, and the point now presented was not directly involved. The writers used the language relied upon in arguments intended to support their particular views concerning the fundamental points. Without attempting to ascertain the exact purport of these expressions, it suffices to say that they afford no adequate support for appellants' position. [112] A quotation from the opinion of the court in Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516, 520, 49 L. ed. 862, 863, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 514, is apposite: "In Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 49 L. ed. 128, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 1 Ann. Cas. 697, the question was whether the 6th Amendment was controlling upon Congress in legislating for the Philippine Islands. Applying the principles which caused a majority of the judges who concurred in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 45 L. ed. 1088, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770, to think that the uniformity clause of the Constitution was inapplicable to Porto Rico, and following the ruling announced in Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, 47 L. ed. 1016, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 787, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 465, it was decided that, whilst, by the treaty with Spain, the Philippine Islands had come under the sovereignty of the United States, and were subject to its control as a dependency or possession, those islands had not been incorporated into the United States as a part thereof, and therefore Congress, in legislating concerning them, was subject only to the provisions of the Constitution applicable to territory occupying that relation." The judgment below is affirmed. BANK OF JASPER, Petitioner, V. credit of the makers of the notes on the bank's books, and issuing certificates of deposit therefor without setting aside any specific fund, the certificates being merely the promissory notes of the bank, payable like unsecured notes of individuals, out of general assets, did not constitute a res within the state of which the certificates of deposit were merely evidence, so as to give the state courts jurisdiction to determine the liability of the maker of the certificates of deposit to the holder, where FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ROME, neither such certificates nor the holder FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ROME, ant in suits upon certificates of deposit. GEORGIA, (No. 74.) BANK OF JASPER, Petitioner, V. Affirmed. See same case below in No. 74, 264 Fed. 83; in Nos. 76, 73, 77, 264 Fed. 88. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. F. P. Fleming argued the cause STATE BANK OF ROME, GEORGIA. and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 3. The proceeds of bank discounts of notes given by buyers of stock, and applied to the payment of the purchase price by transferring to the credit of the trustee for the seller the amounts which stand to the 76: In Florida, the prosecutions of appeals constitute general appearances. Tunno v. Robert, 16 Fla. 738; Standley v. Arnow, 13 Fla. 361; Henry v. Spitler, 67 Fla. 146, 64 So. 745, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1267; Busard v. Houston, 65 Fla. 479, 62 So. 483; Barwick v. Rouse, 53 Fla. 643, 43 So. 753; Hayman v. Weil, 53 Fla. 127, 44 So. 176; Rumeli v. Tampa, 48 Fla. 112, 37 So. 563; Wylly v. Sanford Loan & T. Co. 44 Fla. 818, 33 So. 453; Shrader v. Shrader, 36 Fla. 502, 18 So. 672; Rome Ins. Co. v. Corbett, 66 Fla. 438, 63 So 833; Gilbreath v. Kuykendall, 1 Ark. 50; Murphy v. Williams, 1 Ark. 376; Graves v. Hughes 4 Bibb, 84. The proceedings in the state court were proceedings in rem, to the validity of which personal service was unneces sary. Bristol v. Brent, 36 Utah, 108, 140 Am. St. Rep. 804, 103 Pac. 1076, 21 Ann. Cas. 1125; 12 R C. L. 777; 5 R. C. L. 930; Wyman v. Halstead Wyman v. United States) 109 U. S. 654, 27 L. ed. 1068, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 417; Swedish-American Nat. Bank v. Bleecker, 72 Minn. 383, 42 L.R.A. 283, 71 Am. St. Rep. 492, 75 N. W. 740; Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415, 26 L. ed. 187; Pease v. Rathbun-Jones Engineering Co. 243 U. S. 273, 61 L. ed. 715, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 1147; Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Chatman, 244 U. S. 276, 61 L. ed. 1131, L.R.A.1917F, 1128, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Stockbridge v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. 193 Fed. 558; Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151, 28 L. ed. 101, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586; Langdell, Eq. Pl. 2d ed. §§ 42, 43, 184; Boswell v. Otis, 9 How. 336, 350, 13 L. ed. 164, 170; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 234, 17 L. ed. 531, 534; Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 466, 7 L. ed. 922; Texas Co. v. Central Fuel Oil Co. 114 C. C. A. 21, 194 Fed. 1; Snell v. Hill, 263 Ill. 211, 105 N. E. 16; Horner v. Ellis, 75 Kan. 675, 121 Am. St. Rep. 446, 90 Pac. 275; Spurr v. Scoville, 3 Cush. 578; Silver Camp Min. Co. v. Dickert, Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556, 26, Brooklyn City & N. R. Co. v. National L. ed. 229; Gamble v. Dawson, 67 Wash. Bank, 102 U. S. 14, 26 L. ed. 61; 72, 120 Pac. 1060, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 501; Jellenik v. Huron Copper Min. Co. 177 U. S. 1, 44 L. ed. 647, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559; Quarl v. Abbett, 102 Ind. 233, 52 Am. Rep. 662, 1 N. E. 476; Loaiza v. Superior Ct. 85 Cal. 11, 9 L.R.A. 376, 20 Am. St. Rep. 197, 24 Pac. 707; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 43 L. ed. 1144, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797; Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 49 L. ed. 1023, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625, 3 Ann. Cas. 1084; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518, 519, 60 L. ed. 1140, 1142, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 613; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Deer, 200 U. S. 176, 50 L. ed. 426, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Hostetter, 240 U. S. 620, 60 L. ed. 829, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475; Amparo Min. Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co. 74 N. J. Eq. 197, 71 Atl. 605, affirmed in 75 N. J. Eq. 555, 73 Atl. 249; Gassert v. Strong, 38 Mont. 18, 98 Pac. 497; Pennington 31 Mont. 488, 67 L.R.A. 940, 3 Ann. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U. S. 269, 272, 61 L. ed. 713, 715, L.R.A.1917F, 1159, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. 3d ed. §§ 134, 135; Bispham, Eq. 75; Rome Ins. Co. v. Corbett, 66 Fla. 438, 63 So. 833; Morris v. Graham, 51 Fed. 53; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 58 L. ed. 1363, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 779; Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U. S. 341, 46 L. ed. 580, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391; King v. Cross, 175 U. S. 399, 44 L. ed. 213, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131. The decrees entered in the state court constituted a complete defense to this action, brought in the Federal court. Heathcote v. Fairbanks, M. & Co. 60 Fla. 97, 53 So. 950; Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 288, 26 L. ed. 735, 739, 1 Mor. Min. Rep. 510; Robinson v. Belt, 187 U. S. 41, 47 L. ed. 65, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16; Wood v. Weimar, 104 U. S. 786, 795, 26 L. ed. 779, 782; Bort v. E. H. McCutchen & Co. 109 C. C. A. 558, 187 Fed. 798. Mr. F. P. Fleming argued the cause, and, with Mr. C. Seton Fleming, filed a brief for petitioner in No. 77. Messrs. W. E. Kay and Henry C. Clark argued the cause, and, with Messrs. J. L. Doggett and L. A. Dean, filed a brief for respondents in Nos. 76 and 77: Cas. 1000, 78 Pac. 967; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. ed. 260, L.R.A.1918C, 497, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461; Scharmann v. Union P. R. Co. 144 Minn. 290, 175 N. W. 554; Ward v. Bankers Life Co. 99 Neb. 812, 157 N. W. 1017; Cross v. Armstrong, 44 Ohio St. 613, 10 N. E. 160; Washington L. Ins. Co. v. Gooding, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 490, 49 S. W. 123; Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 89, 48 L. ed. 623, 628, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518, 519, 60 L. ed. 1140, 1142, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 613; Etna L. Ins. Co. v. Lyon County, 95 Fed. 325; Brooklyn v. Etna L. Ins. Co. 99 U. S. 362, 25 L. ed. 416; Empire Twp. v. Darlington, 101 U. S. 87, 25 L. ed. 878; Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 529, 27 L. ed. 424, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 704. There can be no question of respondents' right to have entered the special appearance in the state court, and such special appearance did not constitute a general appearance. Standley v. Arnow, 13 Fla. 361; Tidwell v. Witherspoon, 18 Fla. 282; Seacoast Lumber Co. v. R. J. & B. F. Camp Lumber Co. 63 Fla. 604, 59 So. 13; Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476, 25 L. ed. 237; Davis v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 217 U. S. 157, 54 L. ed. The state court suits were not in rem. 708, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 823, 30 Sup. Ct. Chase v. Wetzlar, 225 U. S. 79, 89, Rep. 463, 18 Ann. Cas. 907; Columbia 56 L. ed. 990, 995, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 659; Screw Co. v. Warner Lock Co. 138 Cal. Gill v. More, 200 Ala. 511, 76 So. 453;445, 71 Pac. 498; Freer v. White, 91 Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 680, 39 Mich. 74, 51 N. W. 807; Craighead v. L. ed. 578, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555; Martin, 25 Minn. 41; Hurlburt V. |