as part of the Constitution of the United, States, part of the supreme law of the land, binding upon the courts in every state, "anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." 959; Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 40 L. ed. 1069, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 890. The power in the state legislatures to ratify proposed Federal Amendments. coming entirely from one source, it cannot be limited as to its exercise by another. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 665, 28 L. ed. 274, 278, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368, 65 L. ed. U. S. 425, 442, 30 L. ed. 178, 186, 6994, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511; Hawke v. Sup. Ct. Rep. 1121; Hawke v. Smith, Smith, 253 U. S. 221, 64 L. ed. 871, 10 253 U. S. 231, 64 L. ed. 877, 10 A.L.R. A.L.R. 1504, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; 1504, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; United M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 217, 23 L. ed. 579. L. ed. 563, 564; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 389, 26 L. ed. 567, 571; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, 649, 20 L. ed. 685, 686; 1 Willoughby, Const. p. 523. The validity of the 19th Amendment, so far as its subject-matter is concerned, is even further supported by the recent decision of this court in National Pro hibition Cases (Rhode Island v. Palmer) 253 U. S. 350, 64 L. ed. 946, 40 Sup. Ct Rep. 486, holding the 18th Amendment within the power to amend. The framers of the Constitution, in prescribing the method to be used in amending that instrument, endeavored to establish a way in which it could be altered to meet changed conditions and circumstances, while at the same time guarding against instability from light or frequent innovations. They sought to make changes practicable, but not too easy; to guard equally against that extreme facility which would render the Constitution too mutable and that extreme difficulty which might perpetuate its discovered faults. 2 Story, Const. 5th ed. § 1827; The Federalist, No. 43. This court is bound by, and cannot go behind, the resolutions of the state legislatures ratifying the Amendment. the official notifications by the governors of those states to the Secretary of State of the United States, and the proclamation of the Secretary of State, declaring that the Amendment has become a part of the Constitution. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 190, 26 L. ed. 377, 386; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co. 13 Pet. 415, 420, 10 L. ed. 226, 228; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 307, 7 L. ed. 415, 433; Martin v. Mott 12 Wheat. 19, 31, 6 L. ed. 537, 541: White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, 649, 20 L. ed. 685, 686; Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50, 18 L. ed. 721; Luther V Borden, How. 1, 44, 12 L. ed. 581, 599; Ohio ex rel. Erkenbrecher v. Cox, 257 Fed. 334; Lyons v. Woods, 153 U. S 649, 38 L. ed. 854, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. When the Tennessee house, on the first vote, passed the resolution of ratification, it thereby signified its assent to the Amendment; its power had been exercised and had become final; no subsequent action on its part to reconsider or reverse its former action could be of any legal effect or force; but that being the thirty-sixth state to ratify, the 19th Amendment became from that minute a part of the Constitution of the United States. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221, 64 L. ed. 871, 10 A.L.R. 1504, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378, 1 L. ed. 644; 1 Willoughby, Const. p. 521; Re Opinion of Justices, 118 Me. 544, 5 A.L.R. 1412, 107 Atl. 673; Jameson, Constitutional Conventions, § 583; Dillon v. Gloss, supra. The 19th Amendment was properly ratified in West Virginia. Cushing, Law & Pr. chap. 19, p. 896; Rainey v. United States, 232 U. S. 310, 58 L. ed. 617, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429. Solictor General Beck filed a brief as amicus curiæ. For his contentions, see his brief as reported in Fairchild v. Hughes, ante, 499. Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court: On October 12, 1920, Cecilia Streett Waters and Mary D. Randolph, citizens of Maryland, applied for and were granted registration as qualified voters in Baltimore city. To have their names stricken from the list, Oscar Leser and others brought this suit in the court of common pleas. The only ground of disqualification alleged was that the applicants for registration were women, whereas the Constitution of Maryland limits the suffrage to men. Ratification of the proposed Amendment to the Federal D [136] Constitution, now known as the 19th (41 Stat. at L. 362), had been proclaimed on August 26, 1920 (41 Stat. at L. 1823), pursuant to Revised Statutes, tion; and it transcends any limitations § 205, Comp. Stat. § 303, 9 Fed. Stat. sought to be imposed by the people of a Anno. 2d ed. p. 376. The legislature state. Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U. S. of Maryland had refused to ratify it. 221, 64 L. ed. 871, 10 A.L.R. 1504, 40 The petitioners contended, on several Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; Hawke v. Smith, No. grounds, that the Amendment had not 2, 253 U. S. 231, 64 L. ed. 877, 40 Sup. become part of the Federal Constitution. Ct. Rep. 498; National Prohibition Cases The trial court overruled the contentions (Rhode Island v. Palmer) 253 U. S. 350, and dismissed the petition. Its judg- 386, 64 L. ed. 946, 978, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. ment was affirmed by the court of ap- 486, 588. peals of the state (139 Md. 46, 114 Atl. 840), and the case comes here on writ of error. That writ must be dismissed; but the petition for a writ of certiorari, also duly filed, is granted. The laws of Maryland authorize such a suit by a qualified voter against the board of registry. Whether the 19th Amendment has become part of the Federal Constitution is the question pre-mont-have adopted resolutions of ratifisented for decision. The first contention is that the power of amendment conferred by the Federal Constitution, and sought to be exercised, does not extend to this Amendment, because of its character. The argument is that so great an addition to the electorate, if made without the state's consent, destroys its autonomy as a political body. This Amendment is in character and phraseology precisely similar to the 15th. For each the same method of adoption was pursued. One cannot be valid and the other invalid. That the 15th is valid, although rejected by six states, including Maryland, has been recognized and acted on for half a century. See United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563; Neale v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. 567; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 59 L. ed. 1340, L.R.A.1916A, 1124, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 926; Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368, 59 L. ed. 1349, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 932. The suggestion that the 15th was incorporated in the Constitution, not in accordance with law, but practically as a war measure, which has been validated by acquiescence, cannot be entertained. The second contention is that, in the constitutions of several of the thirty-six states named in the proclamation [137] of the Secretary of State, there are provisions which render inoperative the alleged ratifications by their legis latures. The argument is that, b reason of these specific provisions, the legislatures were without power ratify. But the function of a state legislature in ratifying a proposed Amendment to the Federal Constitution. like the function of Congress in proposing the Amendment, is a Federal function, derived from the Federal Constitu to The remaining contention is that the ratifying resolutions of Tennessee and of West Virginia are inoperative, because adopted in violation of the rules of legisla tive procedure prevailing in the respective states. The question raised may have been rendered immaterial by the fact that since the proclamation the legislatures of two other states-Connecticut and Ver cation. But a broader answer should be pursuant to U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 3929, 4041.. Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 105.] Submitted January 18, 1922. Decided APPEAL from the United States Cir- See same case below, 267 Fed. 61. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Lee D. Mathias submitted the cause for appellant. Mr. P. W. Sullivan was on the brief: Samuels v. United States, 146 C. C. A. 494, 232 Fed. 536, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 711; Missouri Drug Co. v. Wyman, 129 Fed. 623; Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U. S. 510, 518, 60 L. ed. 411, 417, L.R.A. 1916D, 164, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190. A divided medical opinion would not justify appellant's claims. Wilson v. United States, 111 C. C. A. 231, 190 Fed. 427; 12 R. C. L. ¶¶ 71, 310; Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79, 98, 36 L. ed. 82, 90, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U. S. 510, 518, 60 L. ed. 411, 417, L.R.A. 1916D, 164, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190; Edwards v. United States, 161 C. C. A. 596, 249 Fed. 686; Menefee v. United States, 150 C. C. A. 88, 236 Fed. 826. Appellant assumes the burden of establishing that the decision of the Postmaster General, here drawn in issue, is palpably wrong. . S. 497, 48 L. ed. 1092, 24 Sup. Ct. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 Rep. 789; Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53, 58, 57 L. ed. 119, 122, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6. Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court: The appellant, doing business in the The courts have jurisdiction to re-name of "Organo Product Company," in examine and review the action of the Postmaster General in matters of this kind when he is acting without authority of law, or in excess of the power granted to him by law, or has proceeded in violation of an act of Congress, or has misconstrued the legal effect of the statute under which he is acting. American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 47 L. ed. 90, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 152 Fed. 787; People's United States Bank v. Gilson, 88 C. C. A. 332, 161 Fed. 286. en The Postmaster General had no right to issue the fraud order involved in this case because there was no evidence before him tending to support his conclusion that the complainant was gaged in a scheme to defraud by the use of the mails, under the provisions of §§ 3929 and 4041 of U. S. Rev. Stat. (Comp. Stat. §§ 7411, 7573, 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. pp. 137, 231), as amended. American School v. McAnnulty, supra. Solicitor General Beck, Assistant Attorney General Crim, and Mr. Harry S Ridgely submitted the cause for appellee: Appellant claims for his preparation curative properties not justified by medica' opinion. The his bill prayed for an injunction restrain- [139] The appellant was engaged in selling what he called "Organo Tablets," which he advertised extensively through the mails as "recommended and prescribed by leading physicians throughout the civilized world for nervous weakness, general debility, sexual decline or weakened manhood and urinary disorders sleeplessness and rundown system," and various other ailments. Appellant is an old offender, a prior fraud order having been issued against him, under another name, in April, 1918, as a result of which he changed his trade name and modified in a advertising matter. measure his, the Circuit Court of Appeals must be affirmed. The order complained of was entered after an elaborate hearing, of which the appellant had due notice and at which he was represented by counsel, and introduced much evidence. The only error assigned in this court is the affirming by the circuit court of appeals of the decree of the district court, refusing the injunction and dismissing the bill. In argument it is contended that the question decided by the Postmaster General was that the substance which the appellant was selling did not produce the results claimed for it; that this, on the record, was a matter of opinion, as to which there was conflict of evidence; and that therefore the case is within the scope of American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 47 L. ed. 90, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33. Without considering whether such a state of facts would bring the case within the decision cited, it is sufficient to say that the question really decided by the lower courts was not that the substance which appellant was selling was entirely worthless as a medicine, as to which there was some conflict in the evidence, but that it was so far from being the panacea which he was advertising it through the mails to be, that by so advertising it he was perpetrating a fraud upon the public. This was a question of fact which the statutes cited committed to the decision of the Postmaster General, and the applicable, settled rule of law is that the [140] conclusion of a head of an executive department on such a question, when committed to him by law, will not be reviewed by the courts, where it is fairly arrived at and has substantial evidence to support it, so that it cannot justly be said to be palpably wrong and therefore arbitrary. Bates & G. Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 108, 109, 48 L. ed. 894, 895, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595; Smith V. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53, 58, 57 L. ed. 119, 122, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co. 249 U. S. 479, 484, 63 L. ed. 717, 719, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 332; United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 413, 65 L. ed. 704, 709, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 352, and cases cited. An examination of the record fully justifies the conclusion of the Circuit Court of Appeals that it not only fails to show that the Postmaster General had no warrant of law for his order, but that, on the contrary, it shows there was abundant ground for it. The decree of Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting: The statute under which fraud orders are issued by the Postmaster General has been decided or said to be valid so many times that it may be too late to expect a contrary decision. But there are considerations against it that seem to me never to have been fully weighed, and that I think it my duty to state. The transmission of letters by any general means other than the post office is forbidden by the Criminal Code, §§ 183185. Therefore, if these prohibitions are valid, this form of communication with people at a distance is through the postoffice alone; and, notwithstanding all modern inventions, letters still are the principal means of speech with those who are not before our face. I do not suppose that anyone would say that the freedom of written speech is less protected by the 1st Amendment than the freedom of spoken words. Therefore I cannot [141] understand by what authority Congress undertakes to authorize anyone to determine in advance, on the grounds before us, that certain words shall not be uttered. Even those who interpret the Amendment most strictly agree that it was intended to prevent previous restraints. We have not before us any question as to how far Congress may go for the safety of the nation. question is only whether it may make possible irreparable wrongs and the ruin of a business in the hope of preventing some The cases of a private wrong that generally is accomplished without the aid of the mail. Usually private swindling does not depend upon the post office. If the execution of this law does not abridge freedom of speech, I do not quite see what could be said to do so. Even if it should be held that the prohibition of other modes of carrying letters was unconstitutional, as suggested in a qualified way in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. ed. 877, it would not get rid of the difficulty to my mind, because the practical dependence of the But the decision in that case admits that public upon the postoffice would remain. letters would be valid. possibly, at least, the prohibition as to That case was not dealing with sealed letters. The decisions thus far have gone largely, if not wholly, on the ground that if the government chose to offer a means of transportation which it was not bound to offer, it could choose what it would transport; which is well enough when neither law, after the completion of an elevated viaduct nor the habit that the government's action effecting a change of grade in a street, is has generated has made that means the not a contract right in the sense of the only one. But when habit and law prohibition of U. S. Const. art. 1, § 10, against the impairment of contract obligacombine to exclude every other, it seems tions. to me that the 1st Amendment in terms [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, 10451067, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.J forbids such control of the post as was exercised here. I think it abridged freedom of speech on the part of the sender of the letters, and that the appellant had such an interest in the exercise of the right that he could avail himself of it in this case. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 62 L. ed. 149, L.R.A.1918C, 210, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201. Mr. Justice Brandeis concurs in this opinion. [142] GERTRUDE CRANE, as Administratrix, etc., of George W. Sauer, Deceased, Plff. in Err., V. LOUIS H. HAHLO, George P. Nicholson, and Jacob A. Cantor, as and Constituting the Board of Revision of Assessments of the City of New York, et al. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 142–149.) Constitutional law-impairing contract obligations-what are contracts. 1. The word "contracts" in U. S. Const. art. 1, § 10, forbidding a state to impair the obligation of contracts, is used in its usual or popular sense as signifying an agreement of two or more minds, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do certain acts. Mutual assent, express or implied, to its terms, is of its very essence. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, 10451067, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Constitutional law impairing con Constitutional law - due process of law 4. No one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure, and so long as a substantial and efficient remedy remains or is provided, due process of law is not denied by the legislative change. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, IV. b, 8, a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Constitutional law equal protection of the laws - remedies and procedure. 5. An owner of property abutting on a street in which an elevated viaduct has been constructed, effecting a change of grade, is not denied the equal protection of the laws merely because the official board having final jurisdiction over the amount of the damages sustained is composed of three city officials, appointed by the mayor, with power to pass on claims against it. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, IV, a, 7, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 107.] tract obligations-right of statutory Argued January 20 and 23, 1922. Decided February 27, 1922. origin. 2. An abutting owner's vested property right, of statutory origin, to compensation IN ERROR to the Supreme Court, Ap Note.-Generally, as to what laws are void as impairing obligations of contracts-see note to Franklin County Grammar School v. Bailey, 10 L.R.A 405; Bullard v. Northern P. R. Co. 11 L.R.A. 246; Henderson v. Soldiers & S Monument Comrs. 13 L.R.A. 169; and Fletcher v. Peck, 3 L. ed. U. S. 162. As to what constitutes due process of law, generally-see notes to People v. O'Brien, 2 L.R.A. 255; Kuntz v. Sump tion, 2 L.R.A. 655; Re Gannon, 5 L.R.A. 359; Ulman v. Baltimore, 11 L.R.A. 224; Gilman v. Tucker, 13 L.R.A. 304; Pearson v. Yewdall, 24 L. ed. U. S. 436. and Wi'son v. North Carolina, 42 L. ed. U. S. 865. partment, of the State of New York, to review a judgment entered pursuant to a remittitur from the Court of Appeals of that state, which reversed a judgment of such Appellate Division, affirming an order of a Special Term of the Supreme Court in and for the County of New York, denying a motion to dismiss a writ of certiorari. Affirmed. See same case below in supreme court, 189 App. Div. 900, 178 N. Y. Supp. 910; in court of appeals, 228 N. Y. 309, 127 N. E. 402. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. John M. Harrington argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Archibald R. 258 U. S. |