LEVY LEASING CO. v. SIEGEL. V. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 55 L. ed. 82, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 200; Bertrand v. Taylor, 87 Ill. 235; Breitenbach v. Bush, 44 Pa. 313, 84 Am. Dec. 442; Hoffman Charlestown Five Cent Sav. Bank, 231 Mass. 324, 121 N. E. 15; American Coal Min. Co. v. Special Coal & Food Commission, 268 Fed. 563. Legislative limitation on the use of real property in accordance with the owner's volition has been recognized as constitutional in increasingly numerous instances. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Co. 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209; Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714; St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, Mo. affirmed in 249 U. S. 269, 63 L. ed. 599, 195 S. W. 717, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 274; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 106, 53 L. ed. 923, 930, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 567; Re Wilshire, 103 Fed. 620; Rochester v. West, 164 N. Y. 510, 53 L.R.A. 548, 79 Am. St. Rep. 659, 58 N. E. 673; Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1; Tenement House Dept. v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325, 70 L.R.A. 704, 103 Am. St. Rep. 910, 72 N. E. 231, 1 Ann. Cas. 439; Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 61 L. ed. 472, L.R.A.1918A, 136, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 594. These laws do not impair the obligation of contract. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551, 20 L. ed. 287, 312; Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473-480, 50 L. ed. 274-278, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 58 L. ed. 721, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 76, 77, 59 L. ed. 1204, 1210, 1211, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp. 248 U. S. 372, 375, 63 L. ed. 309, 311, 9 A.L.R. 1420, P.U.R.1919C, 60, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 117. Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court: These two cases were argued and will be disposed of together. A motion to dismiss or affirm was filed in each case, on the ground that each is ruled by the decision in Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 65 L. ed. 877, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465, and both were postponed to the hearing on the merits. 243, 244 approved by the governor September 27, 1920, chapters 942 to 953, inclusive, Laws of New York, 1920. were made in the substantive law, and By these acts a number of changes a number of amendments to remedial statutes, of the state, for the purpose of houses securing to tenants in possession of dwelling purposes, in described cities, or apartments occupied the legal right to continue in possession for until November 1, 1922, by the paysonable rental, to be determined by the ment, or securing the payment, of a reacourts, and for the purpose, also, [244] of encouraging the building of dwellings by providing, under specified conditions, for their exemption from local taxation. to described apartment was leased to the In No. 285 it is alleged: that a defendant from October 1, 1918, October 1, 1920, at the stipulated rental of $1,450 per annum, payable in equal monthly instalments in advance; that while in possession under that lease, in June, 1920, the defendant executed a new lease for two years, beginning on the expiration of the former one October 1, 1920, at a rental increased to $2,160, payable in equal monthly instalments in advance; and that he retober 1, 1920. Judgment for the one fuses to pay the instalment due on Ocmonth's rent is prayed for. on was of the leases, as stated in the complaint, The defendant admits the execution but avers signed under the coercion and duress of that the second one threats of eviction, and that the rent stipulated for is "unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive." He offers to pay the same amount of rent as was paid for the preceding month, and asserts the right to continue in possession under the Emergency Acts. judgment on the pleadings presented A motion for the question of the constitutionality of Laws, and the state courts all held the chapter 944 of the Emergency Housing ercise of the police power. chapter a constitutional and valid ex fendant is a tenant holding over after In No. 287 it is averred: that the deexpiration of his lease; that he refuses to surrender possession, as he stipulated in his lease to do, and that he claims the right to retain possession under chapters 942 and 947 of the Emergency The essential question presented for of action to recover possession except Housing Laws, which suspend the right decision in the Marcus Brown Co. Case under specified conditions, which are was, and in these cases is, the constitu- not applicable. A general demurrer to tional validity of the Emergency Hous- this complaint presented the question ing Laws of the state of New York, of the constitutionality of chapters 942 66 I. ed. and 947 of the laws assailed, and the state courts all sustained them as valid. [245] In terms the acts involved are "emergency" statutes, and, designed, as they were, by the legislature, to promote the health, morality, comfort, and peace of the people of the state, they are obviously a resort to the police power to promote the public welfare. They are a consistent interrelated group of acts essential to accomplish their professed purposes. sorted to as never before; and that unreasonable and extortionate increases of rent had frequently resulted in two or more families being obliged to occupy an apartment adequate only for one family, with a consequent overcrowding which was resulting in insanitary conditions, disease, immorality, discomfort, and widespread social discontent. If this court were disposed, as it is not, to ignore the notorious fact that a grave social problem has arisen from The warrant for this legislative re- the insufficient supply of dwellings in sort to the police power was the convic- all large cities of this and other countion on the part of the state legislators tries, resulting from the cessation of that there existed in the larger cities of building activities, incident to the war, the state a social emergency, caused by nevertheless, these reports and the very an insufficient supply of dwelling houses great respect which courts must give to and apartments, so grave that it con- the legislative declaration that an stituted a serious menace to the health, emergency existed would be amply suffimorality, comfort, and even to the peace cient to sustain an appropriate resort of a large part of the people of the to the police power for the purpose of state. That such an emergency, if it dealing with it in the public interest. really existed, would sustain a resort, The argument heard in these cases, otherwise valid, to the police power for and further examination of the subject, the purpose of dealing with it, cannot confirm us in the assumption made in be doubted, for, unless relieved, the the Marcus Brown Co. Case (256 U. S. public welfare would suffer in respects 170, 198), that the emergency declared which constitute the primary and un-existed when the acts were passed. disputed, as well as the most usual, It is strenuously argued, as it was in basis and justification for exercise of that power. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 65 L. ed. 865, 16 A.L.R. 165, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458, and in the Marcus Brown Co. Case, supra, that the relation of landlord and tenant is a private one, and is not so affected by a public interest as to render it subject to regulation by the exercise of the police power. In the enactment of these laws the legislature of New York did not depend on the knowledge which its members had of the existence of the crisis relied upon. In January, 1919, almost two years before the laws complained of were enacted, the governor of the state It is not necessary to discuss this conappointed a "Reconstruction Commis- tention at length, for so early as 1906, sion," and about the same time the legis- when the Tenement House Act of New lature appointed a committee known York, enacted in 1901, was assailed as the "Joint Legislative Committee on as an unconstitutional interference Housing," to investigate and report up- with the right of property in land, on housing conditions in the cities of [247] on substantially all of the the state, and a few months later the grounds now urged against the Emermayor of New York appointed a sim-gency Housing Laws, this court, in a ilar committee. The membership of per curiam opinion, affirmed a decree these committees comprised many men of the court of appeals of New York and women representative of the best (179 N. Y. 325, 70 L.R.A. 704, 103 Am. intelligence, character, and public serv- St. Rep. 910, 72 N. E. 231, 1 Ann. Cas. ice in the state and nation, their in- 439), sustaining regulations requiring vestigations were elaborate and thor- large expenditures by landlords as a valough, and in their reports, placed before the legislature, [246] all agree: that there was a very great shortage in dwelling-house accommodations in the cities of the state to which the acts apply; that this condition was causing widespread distress; that extortion in most oppressive forms was flagrant in rent profiteering; that, for the purpose of increasing rents, legal process was being abused and eviction was being re id exercise of the police power. Moeschen v. Tenement House Dept. 203 U. S. 583, 51 L. ed. 328, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781. To require uncompensated expenditures very certainly affects the right of property in land as definitely, and often as seriously, as regulation of the amount of rent that may be charged for it can do. Many decisions of this court were cited as sufficient to justify the summary disposition there made of the question, as one even then so settled by authority as not to be longer open to discussion. In the opinion in Block v. Hirsh, supra, this court cites in support of this same conclusion, under the circumstances there disclosed, which are not to be distinguished from those presented in this case, the later cases following: Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co. 200 U. S. 527, 50 L. ed. 581, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 4 Ann. Cas. 1174; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 53 L. ed. 923, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 567; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 58 L. ed. 713, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 359; St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269, 63 L. ed. 599, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 274; Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U. S. 510, 63 L. ed. 735, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357. These authorities show that, from time to time, for a generation, as occasion arose, this court has held that there is no such inherent difference in property in land, from that in tangible and intangible personal property, as exempts it from the operation of the police power in appropriate cases, and in both the Marcus Brown and Block Cases, supra, it | was held, in terms, that the existing circumstances clothed the letting of buildings for dwelling purposes with a public interest sufficient to justify restricting property rights in them to the extent provided for in the laws in those cases objected to. In the opinion in the Marcus Brown Co. Case it is said that the defendanttenants, holding over after their lease [248] had expired, relied upon chapters 942 and 947 of the New York Housing Laws, and that the landlord challenged their validity; but this court held them valid. We have seen that in No. 287, here under consideration, the defendanttenant is holding over after the expiration of his lease, and that he justifies under chapters 942 and 947. Thus, this No. 287 presents precisely the same questions of fact and law as the Marcus Brown Co. Case presented, and must be ruled by it. 944 of the Emergency Housing Laws, providing that: "It shall be a defense to an action for rent accruing under an agreement for premises in a city," etc., "occupied for dwelling purposes, that such rent is unjust and unreasonable, and that the agreement under which the same is sought to be recovered is oppressive." Section 4 of this chapter provides that nothing therein contained shall prevent a plaintiff from pleading and proving in such action a fair and reasonable rent for the premises, and recovering judgment therefor. It is contended that the validity of this chapter 944 was not directly presented in the Marcus Brown Co. Case, and that the impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution was not considered or decided in that case, as it must be in this one. To this there are two answers, either of which is sufficient. The first is that the defense sustained in this case, by the court below, was provided for by chapter 136 of the Laws of New York, in effect when the lease involved was executed. [249] The provision was simply carried into chapter 944 when that chapter was amended in September, 1920, and, of course, a lease made subsequent to the enactment of a statute cannot be impaired by it. Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437, 446, 47 L. ed. 249, 253, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234. The second answer is that reference to the report of the Marcus Brown Case shows that this constitutional objection was urged in the briefs, and the court says, in its opinion: "The chief objections to these acts have been dealt with in Block v. Hirsh. laid upon the impairment of the obligaIn the present case more emphasis is tion of the contract of the lessees to surrender possession, and of the new lease, which was to have gone into effect upon October 1, last year. But contracts are made subject to this exercise of the power of the state when otherwise justified, No. 285 is a suit against a tenant who, as we have held this to be. Manigault v. during the term of a lease, which he Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 480, 50 L. ed. 274, avers was executed under the coercion 277, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127; Louisville & and duress of a threat of eviction, re- N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 482, fuses to pay the amount of rent stipulat-55 L. ed. 297, 303, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 671, ed therein, which he alleges is "unjust, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265; Chicago & A. R. unreasonable, and oppressive." He offers Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 76, 77, to pay the same rent that he paid for the next preceding month. Such a case falls within the precise terms of chapter 59 L. ed. 1204, 1210, 1211, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Service Corp. 248 U. S. 372, 375, 63 L. ed. 309, 311, 9 A.L.R. 1420, P.U.R.1919C, 60, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 117; Producers Transp. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228, 232, 64 L. ed. 239, 242, P.U.R.1920C, 574, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131." Palpably, as to this constitutional objection to chapter 944, the prior decision is ruling. It is also urged that chapter 944 is invalid because the provision that "it shall be a defense to an action by a landlord that the rent demanded is unjust and unreasonable, and that the agreement under which it is sought to be recovered is oppressive," is too indefinite a standard to satisfy the due process of law clause of the Constitution. 1. The punishment of a person for an act in violation of law, when ignorant of the facts making it so, is not necessarily a denial of due process of law. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, IV. b, 9, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Indictment knowledge - statutory offense sale of narcotics. 2. An indictment for violating the prohibition of the Harrison Antinarcotic Act of December 17, 1914, § 2, against selling narcotic drugs to persons not having a written order in official form, need not charge that the defendants sold the inhibited drugs knowing them to be such, the statute not making such knowledge an element of the [For other cases, see Indictment. II. a: Food and Drugs, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1918 Supp.] [No. 480.] offense. 1922. The report of the Marcus Brown Case shows that this contention was urged in briefs by the same counsel presenting it here, and it is apparent that the standard was impliedly approved as valid in that case, as it was very [250] elearly approved in the Hirsh Case, supra, the court saying: "While the act is in force, there is little to decide except as to Argued March 7, 1922. Decided March 27, whether the rent allowed is reasonable, and upon that question the courts are given the last word." The standard of the statute is as definite as the "just compensation" standard adopted in the 5th Amendment to the Constitution, and therefore ought to be sufficiently definite to satisfy the Constitution. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co. 255 U. S. 81, 65 L. ed. 516, 14 A.L.R. 1045, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298, dealing with definitions of crime, is not applicable. Several other contentions are pressed upon the attention of the court, chiefly with respect to the modifications of the remedial statutes, but such as were not specifically dealt with in the Marcus Brown Co. and Block Cases, impress us as quite unimportant. Given a constitutional substantive statute, enacted to give effect to a constitutional purpose, the states have a wide discretion as to the remedies which may be deemed necessary to achieve such a result, and it is very clear that that discretion has not been exceeded in this instance by the state of New York. It results that the judgments of the state court must be affirmed. Affirmed. Dissenting: Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Van Devanter, and Mr. Justice McReynolds. IN ERROR to the United States Dis trict Court for the Southern District of New York to review a judgment which sustained a demurrer to and quashed an indictment charging the violation of the Harrison Antinarcotic Act. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. William C. Herron argued the filed a brief for plaintiff in error: cause, and, with Solicitor General Beck, cal common law, that knowledge of the In spite of the doctrine of the classiessential facts is, as a general thing, necessary, the legislature may dispense with the requisite of knowledge even Note.-On what constitutes due process of law, generally-see notes to People v. O'Brien, 2 L.R.A. 255; Kuntz v. Sumption, 2 L.R.A. 655; Re Gannon, 5 L.R.A. 359; Ulman v. Baltimore, 11 304; Pearson v. Yewdall, 24 L. ed. U. S. L.R.A. 224; Gilman v. Tucker, 13 L.R.A. 436; and Wilson v. North Carolina, 42 L. ed. U. S. 865. On necessity of alleging knowledge or intent-see notes to State v. Cornish, 11 L.R.A. 191, and Com. v. Weiss, 11 L.R.A. 532. On furnishing or prescribing by physician of habit-forming drugs-see note to Com. v. Noble, L.R.A.1918E, 669. where a written constitution prescribes The indictment charged them with unthe requirement of due process of law in all criminal prosecutions. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57, 67, 68, 54 L. ed. 930, 934, 935, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663. The legislature may well consider that the intent or knowledge of the defendant is immaterial, in view of the widespread evil which his acts cause equally whether done with or without knowledge. lawfully selling to another a certain amount of a derivative of opium and a certain amount of a derivative of coca leaves, not in pursuance of any written order on a form issued in blank for that purpose by the commissioner of internal revenue, contrary to the provisions of § 2 of the act. The defendants demurred to the indictment on the ground that it failed to charge that they had sold the inhibited drugs knowing them to be such. The statute does not make such knowledge an element of the offense. district court sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment. The correctness of this ruling is the question before us. The Stroud, Mens Rea, pp. 39, 50; 16 C. J. § 42, p. 76; Hobbs v. Winchester Corp. [1910] 2 K. B. 483, 79 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1123, 74 J. P. 413, 102 L. T. N. S. 841, 26 Times L. R. 557, 8 L. G. R. 1072; Com. v. Smith, 166 Mass. 375, 44 N. E. 503; Com. v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 31 While the general rule at common law L.R.A.(N.S.) 467, 93 N. E. 249, 20 Ann. was that the scienter was a necessary eleCas. 1152; State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. ment in the indictment and proof of 166, 43 N. E. 163; United States v. every crime, and this was followed in Leathers, 6 Sawy. 27, Fed. Cas. No. regard to statutory crimes, even where 15,581; United States v. Thompson, 12 the statutory definition did [252] not in Fed. 245; United States v. Mayfield, 177 terms include it (Reg. v. Sleep, 8 Cox, C. Fed. 769; United States v. 36 Bottles C. 472, Leigh & C. C. C. 44, 30 L. J. Mag. of London Dry Gin, 127 C. C. A. 119, Cas. N. S. 170, 7 Jur. N. S. 979, 4 L. T. 210 Fed. 271; Feeley v. United States, N. S. 525, 9 Week. Rep. 709), there has 150 C. C. A. 165, 236 Fed. 903; Voves v. been a modification of this view in reUnited States, 161 C. C. A. 227, 249 Fed. spect to prosecutions under statutes the 191; United States v. Mathie, 274 Fed. purpose of which would be obstructed 225; People v. Hatinger, 174 Mich. 333, by such a requirement. It is a ques140 N. W. 648; United States v. Jin tion of legislative intent, to be conFuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 402, 60 L. ed. strued by the court. It has been ob1061, 1064, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658, Ann. jected that punishment of a person for Cas. 1917D, 854; United States v. Dore- an act in violation of law, when ignorant mus, 249 U. S. 86, 94, 63 L. ed. 493, 496, of the facts making it so, is an absence 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; Reg. v. Woodrow, of due process of law. But that objec 15 Mees. & W. 404, 153 Eng. Reprint, tion is considered and overruled in Shev907, 2 New Sess. Cas. 346, 16 L. J. Mag. lin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. Cas. N. S. 122; Phile v. The Anna, 157, 69, 70, 54 L. ed. 930, 935, 936, 30 Sup. Dall. 197, 207, 208, 1 L. ed. 98, 102, 103; Bruhn v. Rex [1909] A. C. 317, 100 L. T. N. S. 306, 25 Times L. R. 364, 78 L. J. P. C. N. S. 85; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 57, 58, 55 L. ed. 364, 368, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364; United States v. Malone, 9 Ct. Rep. 663, in which it was held that, in the prohibition or punishment of particular acts, the state may, in the maintenance of a public policy, provide "that he who shall do them, shall do them at his peril, and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance." Many instances of this are to be found Fed. 897. error. Mr. Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the district court under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907 (34 Stat. at L. 1246, chap. 2564, Comp. Stat. § 1704, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 149). Defendants in error were indicted for a violation of the Narcotic Act of December 17, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 786, chap. 1, Comp. Stat. § 6287h, 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 178). Com. what is called the police power, where 605 |