Thompson, 74 Iowa, 119, 37 N. W. 104; | States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 94, 63 United States v. Leathers, 6 Sawy. 17, L. ed. 493, 496, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; Fed. Cas. No. 15,581; United States v. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. Thompson, 12 Fed. 245; United States S. 394, 60 L. ed. 1061, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. v. Mayfield, 177 Fed. 765; United States 658, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 854. v. 36 Bottles of London Dry Gin, 127 Section 2 of the Narcotic Act (38 Stat. C. C. A. 119, 210 Fed. 271; Feeley v. at L. 786, chap. 1, Comp. Stat. § 6287h, United States, 150 C. C. A. 165, 236 Fed. 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 178), we 903; Voves v. United States, 161 C. C. A. give in part in the margin. It is very 227, 249 Fed. 191. So, too, in the col- evident from a reading of [254] it that lection of taxes, the importance to the the emphasis of the section is in public of their collection leads the legis- securing a close supervision of the lature to impose on the taxpayer the bur- business of dealing in these dangerden of finding out the facts upon which ous drugs by the taxing officers of his liability to pay depends, and meeting the government, and that it merely it at the peril of punishment. Reg. v. uses a criminal penalty to secure reWoodrow, 15 Mees. & W. 404, 153 Eng. corded evidence of the disposition of Reprint, 907, 2 New Sess. Cas. 346, 16 such drugs as a means of taxing and reL. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 122; Bruhn v. Rex straining the traffic. Its manifest pur[1909] A. C. 317, 100 L. T. N. S. 306, pose is to require every person deal25 Times L. R. 364, 78 L. J. P. C. N. S. ing in drugs to ascertain at his peril 85. Again, where one deals with others, whether that which he sells comes withand his mere negligence may be danger- in the inhibition of the statute, and, if ous to them, as in selling diseased food or he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance poison, the [253] policy of the law may, of its character, to penalize him. Conin order to stimulate proper care, require gress weighed the possible injustice of the punishment of the negligent per-subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty son, though he be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells. Hobbs v. Winchester Corp. [1910] 2 K. B. 471, 483, 79 L. J. K. B. N. S 1123, 74 J. P. 413, 102 L. T. N. S. 841, 26 Times L. R. 557, 8 L. G. R. 1072. against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided. Doubtless considerations as to the opportunity of the seller to find out the fact, and the difficulty of proof of knowledge, contributed to this conclusion. We think the demurrer to the indictment should have been overruled. Judgment reversed. Mr. Justice Clarke took no part in this decision. The question before us, therefore, is one of the construction of the statute, and of inference of the intent of Congress. The Narcotic Act has been held by this court to be a taxing act, with the incidental purpose of minimizing the spread of addiction to the use of poisonous and demoralizing drugs. United 1Part of § 2 of an act entitled, "An Act or give away any of the aforesaid drugs, to Provide for the Registration of, with shall preserve such order for a period of Collectors of Internal Revenue, and to Im-two years in such a way as to be readily acpose a Special Tax upon, All Persons Who cessible to inspection by any officer, agent, Produce, Import, Manufacture, Compound, or employee of the Treasury Department Deal in, Dispense, Sell, Distribute, or Give duly authorized for that purpose, and the Away Opium or Coca Leaves, Their Salts, state, territorial, district, municipal, and Derivatives, or Preparations, and for Other Purposes," approved December 17, 1914, 38 Stat. at L. 785, 786, chap. 1, Comp. Stat. § 6287h, 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 178. insular officials named in section five of this act. Every person who shall give an order as herein provided to any other person for any of the aforesaid drugs shall, at or before the time of giving such order, make or cause to be made a duplicate thereof on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the commissioner of internal reve Section 2. That it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away any of the aforesaid drugs except in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such article is sold, bartered, ex-nue, and in case of the acceptance of such changed, or given, on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the commissioner of internal revenue. Every person who shall accept any such order, and in pursuance thereof shall sell, barter, exchange, 606 order, shall preserve such duplicate for said period of two years in such a way as to be readily accessible to inspection by the officers, agents, employees, and officials hereinbefore mentioned. 258 U. S. custody Argued March 8 and 9, 1922. 1. One of the interests of the United States which the Attorney General has authority and discretion to attend to through one of his subordinates in a state court, under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 367, is that which relates to the safety and custody of United States prisoners in confinement under sentence of Federal courts. In such matters he represents the United States, and may, on its part, practise the comity which the harmonious and effective operation of both systems of courts requires, provided it does not prevent enforcement of the sentence of the Federal courts, or endanger the pris[For other cases, see Executive Departments, oners. II. f, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Criminal law concurrent proceedings trial of imprisoned convict. 2. The fact that a defendant in an indictment is in prison, serving a sentence for another crime, gives him no immunity from the second prosecution. [For other cases, see Criminal Law, III. a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Courts conflict of authority -state and Federal concurrent criminal proceedings. 3. A prisoner, with the consent of the Attorney General, may, while serving a sentence imposed by a district court of the United States, be lawfully taken, on a writ of habeas corpus, directed to the master of the House of Correction, who, as Federal agent, under a mittimus issued out of said district court, has custody of such prisoner, into a state court, in the custody of said master, and there put to trial upon indictments there pending against him, although there is no express statutory authority for the transfer of a Federal prisoner to a state court for such purpose, and notwithstanding the provisions of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5539, that, when any criminal sentenced by a Federal court is imprisoned in the jail or penitentiary of any state or territory, such criminal shall, in all respects, be subject to the same discipline and treatment as convicts sentenced by the courts of the state or territory in which such jail or penitentiary is situated, and that, while so confined therein, he shall be exclusively under the control of the officers having charge of Decided A CERTIFICATE from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, presenting the question whether a prisoner, with the consent of the Attorney General, while serving a sentence imposed by a district court of the United States, may be lawfully taken, on a writ of habeas corpus, directed to the master of the House of Correction, who, as Federal agent, under a mittimus issued out of said district court, has custody of such prisoner, into a state court, in the custody of said master, and there put to trial upon indictments there pending against him. Answered in the affirmative. Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Taft: This case comes here for answer to the following question of law: "May a prisoner, with the consent of the Attorney General, while serving a sentence imposed by a district court of the United States, be lawfully taken on a writ of habeas corpus, directed to the master of the House of Correction, who, as Federal agent, under a mittimus issued out of said district court, has custody of such prisoner, into a state court, in the custody of said master, and there put to trial upon indictments there pending against him?" September 11, 1920, twenty-two indictments were returned against Charles Ponzi in the superior court for Suffolk county, Massachusetts, charging him with certain larcenies. October 1, 1920, two indictments charging violation of § 215 of the Federal Penal Code were returned against him in the United States district court for the district of Massachusetts. November 30, 1920, he pleaded guilty to the first count of one of these, and was sentenced to imprisonment for five years in the House of Correction at Plymouth, Mas Note.-Generally, on concurrent juris-sachusetts, and committed. dietion of Federal and state courts-see notes to Copp v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 12 L.R.A. 725, and Smith v. M'Iver, 6 L. ed. U. S. 152. And see note to this case as reported in 22 A.L.R. 879. April 21, 1921, the superior court issued a writ of habeas corpus, directing the master of the House of Correction, who, as Federal agent, had custody of Ponzi by virtue of the mittimus issued by the district court, to bring him before the superior court, and to have him there from day to day thereafter for trial upon the pending indictments, but to hold the prisoner at all times in his custody as an agent of the United States, subject to the sentence imposed by the Federal district court. Blake, [256] the master of the House of Correction, made a return that he held Ponzi pursuant to process of the United States, and prayed that the writ be dismissed. Thereafter the Assistant Attorney General of the United States, by direction of the United States Attorney General, stated in open court that the United States had no objection to the issuance of the writ, to the compliance with the writ by Blake, or to the production of Ponzi for trial in the superior court, and that the Attorney General had directed Blake to comply with the writ. Blake then produced the prisoner, who was arraigned on the state indictments and stood mute. A plea of not guilty was entered for him by the court. May 23, 1921, Ponzi filed in the district court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, directed against the justice of the superior court, and against Blake, alleging in substance that he was within the exclusive control of the United States, and that the state court had no jurisdiction to try him while thus in Federal custody. His petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. An appeal was taken to the circuit court of appeals, the judges of which certify the question to this court on the foregoing facts. Section 239, Judicial Code. Mr. William H. Lewis argued the cause and filed a brief for Charles Ponzi: If the petitioner could not be tried in the state court, pending his sentence, without the consent of the Attorney General of the United States, he could not be tried at all. Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U. S. 83, 48 L. ed. 886, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 605; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 295, 36 L. ed. 440, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617. If the situation were reversed, and Ponzi had been first tried in the state court and sentenced to serve a term in a state jail or prison, and the United States desired to try him upon indictments pending against him in the United States district court, neither the court, nor any judge thereof, could issue a writ of habeas corpus to bring him into that court for trial. Re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 34 L. ed. 500. 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850; Ex parte Dorr, 608 3 How. 103, 11 L. ed. 514; Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75, 2 L. ed. 554. The writ by which Ponzi is brought before the state court for trial is in effect an abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. 3 Bl. Com. *129; Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 98, 2 L. ed. 562. The mittimus itself forbids interference with the body of Ponzi by the state court. Re Jennings, 118 Fed. 479; Com. v. Foster, 122 Mass. 317, 23 Am. Rep. 326, 2 Am. Crim. Rep. 499; Goddard v. Ordway, 101 U. S. 752, 25 L. ed. 1043; Basset v. United States, 9 Wall. 38, 19 L. ed. 548; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 167, 21 L. ed. 876. In all cases of concurrent jurisdiction or otherwise, the court that first acquires jurisdiction holds it to the exclusion of all others, until its judgment is satisfied. McCauley v. McCauley, 202 Fed. 284; State v. Chinault, 55 Kan. 326, 40 Pac. 662; Ex parte Early, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 105; Com. v. Fuller, 8 Met. 318, 41 Am. Dec. 509; Hill Mfg. Co. v. Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. 113 Mass. 495, 18 Am. Rep. 527; Ayers v. Farwell, 196 Mass. 350, 82 N. E. 35; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 253; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176, 28 L. ed. 390, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 21 L. ed. 287; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123, 50 L. ed. 689, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 163, 43 L. ed. 404, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Re Johnson, 167 U. S. 120, 42 L. ed. 103, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735; Opinion of Justices, 201 Mass. 608, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 799, 89 N. E. 174. The state court cannot try Ponzi without jurisdiction over his person; in other words, without custody of the prisoner. 12 Cyc. pp. 196, 220; 16 C. J. 174; 12 Enc. Pl. & Pr. p. 179; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 467, 6 Am. Dec. 88; Hopkins v. Com. 3 Met. 462; McCarty v. State, 16 Ind. 311; People ex rel. Price v. Hayes, 151 App. Div. 561, 136 N. Y. Supp. 857; Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328, 28 L. ed. 1005, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123, 50 L. ed. 689, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Re Johnson, 167 U. S. 120, 42 L. ed. 103, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735; Re Eckart, 166 U. S. 484, 41 L. ed. 1087, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 388, 46 L. ed. 248, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 181; Valentina v. Mercer, 201 U. S. 131, 50 L. ed. 693, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 368. Charles Ponzi, as a prisoner of the United States, is within the dominion 1921. and exclusive jurisdiction of the United, States. The prisoner is within the dominion and jurisdiction of another government, and neither the writ of habeas corpus nor any other process issued under state authority can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. Ableman v. Booth, 21 How, 506, 16 L. ed. 169; Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 28 L. ed. 542, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544; Re Johnson, 167 U. S. 120, 42 L. ed. 103, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 36 L. ed. 429, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Willoughby, U. S. Const. chap. 9, § 72; Bailey, Habeas Corpus, p. 68; Collier's Case, 6 Ops. Atty. Gen. 103; Gormley's Case, 12 Ops. Atty. Gen. 258; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 16 L. ed. 169; Com. v. Horwitz, No. 727, 1915, Suffolk Superior Ct. Criminal Session. Upon the principles of natural justice, the state court should not be permitted to try Ponzi under the circumstances, because he would be subject to double punishment for the same acts. Com. v. Fuller, 8 Met. 316, 41 Am. Dec. 509; Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 21, 14 L. ed. 309. Mr. J. Weston Allen, Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause, and, with Mr. Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., filed a brief for Franklin G. Fessenden et al.: The petitioner must establish clearly either that the law creating the offense is unconstitutional, or that the state court lacks jurisdiction. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 325, 327, 59 L. ed. 969, 979, 980, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582; Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 250, 29 L. ed. 868, 871, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734. The laws creating the offenses with which Ponzi is charged are not unconstitutional. Com. v. Ward, 1 Mass. 473; Com. v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329, 3 Am. Dec. 54; Com. v. Hunt, 4 Met. 121, 38 Am. Dec. 346. The indictments for larceny rest upon Mass. Rev. Laws, chap. 208, § 26, which has been upheld against constitutional attack. Com. v. McDonald, 187 Mass. 585, 73 N. E. 852; Com. v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 509, 106 N. E. 150. The indictments charging Ponzi with being accessory before the fact rest upon Mass. Rev. Laws, chap. 215, §§ 2, 3, which have been upon the statute books since 1830, and have frequently been enforced without question. Com. v. Smith, 11 Allen, 243; Com. v. The jurisdiction of Massachusetts to Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 12 L. ed. 213; United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, 569, 13 L. ed. 257, 261; Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19, 14 L. ed. 306, 308; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 390, 25 L. ed. 717, 724; Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131, 33 L. ed. 287, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47; Crossley v. California, 168 U. S. 640, 641, 42 L. ed. 610, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242; Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 330, 65 L. ed. 287, 289, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 125; Com. v. Walker, 108 Mass. 309; Com. v. Barry, 116 Mass. 1. Even a conviction for the Federal offense is no bar to prosecution for the state offense. Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19, 20, 14 L. ed. 306, 308, 309; Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131, 139, 33 L. ed. 287, 290, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47. To try one already serving a sentence Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 30 L. ed. It is true that, if the accused is serving a sentence, he cannot be admitted to bail, even though the offense for which he is now tried would otherwise be bailable. But this disability flows from his previous conviction, and is in no sense connected with or incident to his present trial. A prison is not an asylum which protects the accused from trial for crimes other than that for which he is presently serving sentence. Ex parte Lamar, supra; Re Blake (D. C. Mass., April 27, 1921); Rigor v. State, 101 Md. 465, 61 Atl. 631, 4 Ann. Cas. 719; State v. Wilson, 38 Conn. 126; Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218; Peri v. People, 65 Ill. 17; Com. v. Ramunno, 219 Pa. 204, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 209, 123 Am. St. Rep. 653, 68 Atl. 184, 12 Ann. Cas. 818; Kennedy v. Howard, 74 Ind. 87; 39 609 People v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 52 Am. Rep. 295, 3 Pac. 597, 5 Am. Crim. Rep. 486; Singleton v. State, 71 Miss. 782, 42 Am. St. Rep. 488, 16 So. 295; People v. Flynn, 7 Utah, 378, 26 Pac. 1114; Huffaker v. Com. 124 Ky. 115, 98 S. W. 331, 14 Ann. Cas. 487; Clifford v. Dryden, 31 Wash. 545, 72 Pac. 96; Ex parte Ryan, 10 Nev. 261; Coleman v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 404, 33 S. W. 1083; Brown v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. Rep. 114, 95 S. W. 1039; Simpson v. State, 56 Ark. 8, 19 S. W. 99; State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 252, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 896, 98 Pac. 122, 17 Ann. Cas. 161; 13 C. J. 1919, §§ 13, 14; 9 Cyc. 875, 876; 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 497. Ponzi was brought before the superior court of Suffolk county upon proper and appropriate process. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75, 97, 2 L. ed. 554, 562; Ex parte Lamar, A.L.R., 274 Fed. 164; Re Blake (D. C. Mass.; April 27, 1921); Rigor v. State, 101 Md. 465, 61 Atl. 631, 4 Ann. Cas. 719; Way v. Wright, 5 Met. 380; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 523, 16 L. ed. 169, 176. Ponzi cannot be heard to assert that the present writ is an invasion of the rights of the United States. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 442, 30 L. ed. 421, 424, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225; Re Andrews, 236 Fed. 300; Ex parte Marrin, 164 Fed. 631; United States v. Marrin, 227 Fed. 314; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 36 L. ed. 429, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617. No right of the United States is in fact infringed by the production of Ponzi for trial in a state court. Am. Crim. Rep. 486; Singleton v. State, 71 Miss. 782, 42 Am. St. Rep. 488, 16 So. 295; People v. Flynn, 7 Utah, 378, 26 Pac. 1114; Huffaker v. Com. 124 Ky. 115, 98 S. W. 331, 14 Ann. Cas. 487; Clifford v. Dryden, 31 Wash. 545, 72 Pac. 96; Ex parte Ryan, 10 Nev. 261; Coleman v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 404, 33 S. W. 1083; Brown v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. Rep. 114, 95 S. W. 1039; Simpson v. State, 56 Ark. 8, 19 S. W. 99; State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 252, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 896, 98 Pac. 122, 17 Ann. Cas. 161; 13 C. J. 1919, §§ 13, 14; 9 Cyc. 875, 876; 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 497; Way v. Wright, 5 Met. 380; Storti's Case, 178 Mass. 554, 52 L.R.A. 520, 60 N. E. 210; Com. v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; 39 Cyc. 730; Randolph v. Donaldson, 9 Cranch, 76, 3 L. ed. 662; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 29 L. ed. 89, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 283; Re Thaw, 91 C. C. A. 657, 166 Fed. 71, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1025. The superior court of Suffolk county has jurisdiction to try Ponzi when produced in the custody of Blake. Ex parte Lamar, A.L.R. 274 Fed. 160; Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 30 L. ed. 421, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700, 32 L. ed. 283, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1204; Re Johnson, 167 U. S. 120, 42 L. ed. 103, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735; Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 51 L. ed. 148, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 7 Ann. Cas. 1047; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 14; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 448, 494; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 Sup. Ct. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, Rep. 111, 292; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 4 L. ed. 579; Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 574, 577, 28 L. ed. 262, 264, 4 Sup. Ct. Pet. 435, 10 L. ed. 1022; Collector v. Rep. 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417; Lewis Day (Buffington v. Day) 11 Wall. 113, v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 36 L. 20 L. ed. 122; Hammer v. Dagenhart, ed. 1011, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136; Schwab 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 3 A.L.R. v. Breggren, 143 U. S. 442, 446, 36 L. ed. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 218, 222, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525; Com. v. 1918E, 724; Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Cody, 165 Mass. 138, 42 N. E. 575; Com. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 541, 29 L. ed. 264, v. Costello, 121 Mass. 371, 23 Am. Rep. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 995; Frank v. Man-277; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, gum, 237 U. S. 309, 328, 59 L. ed. 969, 338, 59 L. ed. 969, 984, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 980, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582; Ex parte 582; Valdez v. United States, 244 U. S. Lamar, A.L.R. -, 274 Fed. 160; Re 432, 445, 61 L. ed. 1242, 1248, 39 Sup. Blake (D. C. Mass.; April 27, 1921); Rigor v. State, 101 Md. 465, 61 Atl. 631,| 4 Ann. Cas. 719; State v. Wilson, 38 Conn. 126; Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218; Peri v. People, 65 Ill. 17; Com. v. Ramunno, 219 Pa. 204, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 209, 123 Am. St. Rep. 653, 68 Atl. 184. 12 Ann. Cas. 818; Kennedy v. Howard. 74 Ind. 87; People v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 52 Am. Rep. 295, 3 Pac. 597, 5 Ct. Rep. 725; Dowdell v. United States, 221 U. S. 325, 55 L. ed. 753, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590; Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U. S. 164, 172, 50 L. ed. 421, 425, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 189; Com. v. Brickett, 8 Pick. 138; Grave's Case, 236 Mass. 497, 128 N. E. 867; Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442, 453, 56 L. ed. 500, 504, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 250, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1138; Com. v. McCarthy, 163 Mass. 458, 40 N. E. 766. |