affirmed a decree of the District Court See same case below, 268 Fed. 117. Mr. Henry L. Brant argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Charles Haldane, Francis L. Patton, Jr., James G. Wilson, and George B. Guthrie, filed a brief for appellant: The "privileges and immunities" section of art. 4, § 2, of the United States Constitution and of the 14th Amendment thereto, protects citizens of other states in the enjoyment of substantial rights, and is not circumvented by statutes designed to discriminate on the mere basis of nonresidence. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, Fed. Cas. No. 3,230; Magill v. Brown, Brightly, N. P. 346, Fed. Cas. No. 8,952; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 20 L. ed. 449; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Re Stanford, 126 Cal. 112, 45 L.R.A. 788, 58 Pac. 462; Re Mahoney, 133 Cal. 180, 85 Am. St. Rep. 155, 65 Pac. 389; Re Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 96 Am. St. Rep. 161, 73 Pac. 424; Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. R. Co. 249 U. S. 522, 63 L. ed. 748, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 Sup Ct. Rep. 228; United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 65 L. ed. 270, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133. "Citizenship" and "residence," while not strictly synonymous, under all cirsas, and his wife is a resident of the her heirs. If she survives him, but state, she must join in the conveyance; before his death he conveys the land, or but when she is not a resident of Kan- it has been sold on execution or other sas, and therefore not subject to its judicial sale, nothing remains for her laws, her signature and conveyance are to take, and she has been deprived of unnecessary, and the husband alone may no right. If there was an attempt to convey a good title. It is competent for convey by the husband alone when his the legislature of each state to declare wife was a resident, the title would rethe mode and manner by which real main in her, because the manner of conproperty situate within the state may veying the land prescribed by statute be transferred by the husband, or by the had not been pursued; and if there was husband and wife, or by judgment and no judicial sale of the land, and it was process of court, so as to devest the not necessary for the payment of debts, husband, or husband and wife, of all a one-half interest would descend to her. estate or interest therein, and also to In such a case, if she was a nonresident provide for the distribution of and the of the state, the conveyance by the right of succession to the estates of de- husband alone would, under the rules ceased persons. It is urged by prescribed for conveying, be sufficient to the plaintiff that the wife is an heir, devest the title, and hence there would and as such is entitled to inherit one half be nothing for her to inherit. It thereof her deceased husband's property, but fore appears that, if the conveyance is that the proviso discriminates against made in the manner prescribed by statwidows who reside outside of the state, ute, there is nothing for either the and deprives them of the right which resident or nonresident widow to inherit. is accorded to a resident widow. The There is really no discrimination bewife, strictly speaking, is not an heir tween the resident and the nonresident of the husband, although she is gener- widow, for each takes one half of all ally spoken of as such; but still, if she the real property which her husband is regarded as an heir, the nonresident owned at the time of his death. When widow is not deprived of any 'privilege the husband's land has been conveyed in or immunity. Under our statute the accordance with law during his life, property of the husband belongs exclu- there is no descent to either, for there sively to him, as the wife's property is is nothing to descend. For reasons that exclusively her own. Neither has any were deemed sufficient, the legislature vested interest or control over the prop-made the signature and conveyance of erty of the other by virtue of the the nonresident wife unnecessary. The marriage relation. The wife has no fact that the wife did not accompany estate in the land of the husband. It her husband to Kansas, or had abanis a mere possibility, depending upon doned him and gone to another state, the death of the husband, or whether he and may or may not have obtained a has devested himself of the title prior divorce elsewhere, thus leaving the to his death. If he survives her, no status of the parties in doubt, and interest is taken by nor transmitted to making it difficult to obtain a perfect cumstances, are practically so, so far as they are used in the Oregon statutes and as they apply to the case at bar. Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. R. Co. 249 U. S. 522, 63 L. ed. 748, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228. The right to succeed to property in one state by a citizen residing in another state is protected by art. 4, § 2, of the Federal Constitution, and by the 14th Amendment thereto. Magill v. Brown, Brightly, N. P. 346, Fed. Cas. No. 8,952; Re Stanford, 126 Cal. 112, 45 L.R.A. 788, 58 Pac. 462; Re Mahoney, 133 Cal. 180, 85 Am. St. Rep. 155, 65 Pac. 389; Re Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 96 Am. St. Rep. 161, 73 Pac. 424. A state has no right to penalize a person for removing from the state, either by fine or tax or the deprivation of any property right, based merely on such removal. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 36, 18 L. ed. 745; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. R. Co. 249 U. S. 522, 63 L. ed. 748, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228. The right of dower is just as fundamental and substantial as the right of inheritance or succession to property; and the states may not discriminate against citizens of other states in applytransfer of land in many cases, may have been deemed sufficient reason for prescribing this rule of conveyance. The statute was enacted shortly after the admission of the state, and when it was rapidly increasing in population, through immigration from many of the eastern states and also foreign countries, many coming without their wives and families; and possibly the rule was adopted to avoid inconvenience and deception in the transfer of real property. The 'immunities' and 'privileges' referred to in the Federal Constitution would not, in any event, include the claim made by the plaintiff. Those terms mean that all citizens of the United States shall have the right to acquire property and hold it, and this property shall be protected and secured by the laws of the state in the same manner as the property of the citizens of the state is protected; that this property shall not be subject to any burdens or taxes not imposed on the property of citizens of the state."" ing laws of dower, inheritance, or succession. Magill v. Brown, supra; Re Stanford, 126 Cal. 112, 45 L.R.A. 788, 58 Pac. 462; Re Mahoney, 133 Cal. 180, 85 Am. St. Rep. 155, 65 Pac. 389; Re Johnson, supra. B. Kerr submitted the cause for appelMessrs. Charles H. Carey and James lees. Mr. Omar C. Spencer was on the brief: A woman not a resident of the state is not entitled to dower in the lands therein of which her husband did not die seised. Thornburn v. Doscher, 32 Fed. 810; Cunningham v. Friendly, 70 Or. 222, 139 Pac. 928, 140 Pac. 989; Woolsey v. Draper, Or. 201 Pac. 730; Pratt v. Tefft, 14 Mich. 191; Ligare v. Semple, 32 Mich. 438; Stringer v. Dean, 61 Mich. 196, 27 N. W. 886; Bennett v. Harms, 51 Wis. 251, 8 N. W. 222; Ekegren v. Atkins v. Atkins, 18 Neb. 474, 25 N. W. Marcotte, 159 Wis. 539, 150 N. W. 969; 724; Miner v. Morgan, 83 Neb. 400, 119 N. W. 781; Burr v. Finch, 91 Neb. 417, 136 N. W. 72; Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 13 L.R.A. 282, 27 Pac. 137. The right of a state to define marital property rights as between residents and nonresidents is directly recognized by the Supreme Court. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591, 15 L. ed. 497. There is a just ground for the distinc See also Thornburn v. Doscher, 32 Fed. 810; Pratt v. Tefft, 14 Mich. 191; Ligare v. Semple, 32 Mich. 438; Atkins v. Atkins, 18 Neb. 474, 25 N. W. 724; Cunningham v. Friendly, 70 Or. 222, 139 Pac. 928, 140 Pac. 989, which recognized the constitutionality of similar statutes, no direct point, however, being made as to the constitutionality of the statute. The court in the Thornburn Case, supra, said: "It rests with the legislature to say what interest, if any, married persons shall have in the property of each other, as an incident of the relation between them. It may give or withhold dower altogether, or it may, for the security of titles and the protection of innocent purchasers, provide that a nonresident woman, whose very existence is probably unknown within the state, and is practically disavowed by the husband, shall not be entitled to dower of lands which he has disposed of without her concurrence or consent, and ostensibly as a single man.” tion between residents and nonresidents in the statute, and therefore § 2, of art. IV., of the Federal Constitution, does not apply. LaTourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 63 L. ed. 362, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2; Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co. 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 64 L. ed. 445, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221; Citizens Nat. Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99, ante, 149, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15. Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court: By a bill filed in the district court of the United States for the district of Oregon, appellant asserted a dower right in one half part of certain land in possession of the railway company. The bill was dismissed on motion of the railway company, and the company was awarded judgment for costs. On appeal by the complainant in the suit, the judgment was affirmed. Against the affirmance this appeal is prosecuted. The law of Oregon provides: "The widow of every deceased person shall be entitled to dower, or the use, during her natural life, of one half of the lands whereof her husband was seised of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage, unless she is lawfully barred thereof." § 7286. "A woman being an alien shall not on that account be barred of her dower; and any woman residing out of the state shall be entitled to dower of the lands of her deceased husband lying in this state of which her husband died seised, and the same may be assigned to her, or recovered by her, in like manner as if she and her deceased husband had been residents within the state at the time of his death." § 7306. of citizenship, either state or Federal, The further contention, based on the The court of appeals considered this contention, and it is difficult to add anything to its opinion. It pointed out that the Oregon statute was taken from the laws of Michigan adopted in 1846 and sustained.1 The example of Michigan was followed in Wisconsin, Kansas, and Nebraska, and sustained by the courts of those states.2 [319] To the decisions of those courts we may add Thorburn v. Doscher, United States circuit court for Oregon, 13 Sawy. 60, 32 Fed. 810, which sustained the Oregon statute as did the supreme court of Oregon in Cunningham v. Friendly, 70 Or. 222, 139 Pac. 928, 140 Pac. 989. And we may add also Appellant adduces against the validity of $7306, the provision of § 2 of Richards v. Bellingham Bay Land Co. article 4 of the Constitution of the 4 C. C. A. 290, 7 U. S. App. 494, 54 United States that "the citizens of each Fed. 209, which decided to be legal a state shall be entitled to all the privi-like statute of the state of Washington. leges and immunities of citizens in the And Blackstone speaks of dower as havseveral states," and the provisions of the 14th Amendment, which declare that no state shall "make or [318] or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," or "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," or "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Dower is not a privilege or immunity ing become "a great clog to alienation," 1Pratt v. Tefft, 14 Mich. 191; Ligare v. Mich. 203, 27 N. W. 886. 2 Bennett v. Harms, 51 Wis. 251, 8 N. W. 222; Ekegren v. Marcotte, 159 Wis. 539, 150 N. W. 969; Atkins v. Atkins, 18 Neb. 474, 25 N. W. 724; Miner v. Morgan, 83 Neb. 400, 119 N. W. 781; Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 13 L.R.A. 282, 27 Pac. 137. 258 U. S.. lies." 1 Washb. Real Prop. 5th ed. 278, | expectancy or possibility. In that conin note. The cases recognize that the limitation of the dower right is to remove an impediment to the transfer of real estate, and to assure titles against absent and probably unknown wives. And such is the purpose of the Oregon statute, and the means of executing the purpose appropriate, and a proper exereise of classification. It satisfies, therefore, the constitutional requirement of the equal protection of the laws; and we proceed to the inquiry whether the statute is otherwise valid. Appellant's contention is that, though she be living in New York, it is her privilege, under the 14th Amendment, to resist the law of Oregon as a limitation of her dower rights; that is, a limitation of rights in property situated in Oregon. The contention might be tenable if the legislature of a state was required to grant dower rights. As repellent of that proposition, the difference the laws of the states exhibit in the rights that attach to the marriage relation may be adduced. The states greatly differ as to what lands are dowable, and as to what claims are paramount to dower, and, to some extent, how it will be barred. 4 Kent, Com. 35, et seq. dition of things, the lawmaking power may deal with it as may be deemed proper. It is not a natural right. It is wholly given by law, and the power that gave it may increase, diminish, or otherwise alter it, or wholly take it away. It is upon the same footing with the expectancy of heirs, apparent or presumptive, before the death of the ancestor. Until that event occurs, the law of descent and distribution may be molded according to the will of the legislature." The ruling is a deduction or incident of the more general principle expressed in Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565, 569, 6 L. ed. 161, 162, "that the title to, and the disposition of, real property, must be exclusively subject to the laws of the country where it is situated." And this was so considered and the case cited in Thomas v. Woods, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1180, 97 C. C. A. 535, 173 Fed. 585, 593, 19 Ann. Cas. 1080, along with a number of other cases, to sustain the court in the declaration and decision that "the right of dower in real property is determined by the laws of the state in which the property is situated." [321] From these cases it results, as said by the circuit court of appeals, that, "the legislature having this power to give or withhold dower, it follows that it has the power to declare the manner in which the dower right may be barred, or the grounds upon which it may be forfeited, and if so, it has the right to provide that it may be barred by the wife's nonresidence in the state." [268 Fed. 120.] The action of the court, affirming the decree of the District Court, is affirmed. UNITED STATES, Appt., V. BETHLEHEM STEEL COMPANY. The granting of dower, therefore, is a matter of statutory regulation. It was so decided by the United States circuit court of Oregon in 1887 (Thorburn v. Doscher, supra), Judge Deady expressing it as follows: "It rests with the legislature to say what interest, if any, married [320] persons shall have in the property of each other, as an incident of the relation between them. It may give or withhold dower altogether. Or it may, for the security of titles and the protection of innocent purchasers, provide that a nonresident woman whose very existence is probably unknown within the state, and is practically disavowed by the husband, shall not be entitled to dower of lands which he has disposed of without her concurrence or consent, and ostensibly as a single man." The law thus declared has been the law of Oregon for sixty-five years. There is a distinction between dower created by the parties and that given by law, and the latter "it is believed to be Note. On implication from use of the only kind which ever obtained in patented article of promise to pay royalthis country." Randall v. Kreiger, 23 ty-see note to May v. Western Lime Wall. 137, 148, 23 L. ed. 124, 126. Ex- Co. 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 333. pressing the power of the legislature On payment for private property over it, the court said: "During the taken for public use-see note to Withlife of the husband the right is a mere ers v. Buckley, 15 L. ed. U. S. 816. im (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 321-327.) Claims against United States plied contract - use of patent. Where the Federal government uses a patented invention with the consent and express permission of the owner, and does not repudiate the title of such owner, an implied contract to pay a reasonable com- | United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262, pensation for such use arises. [For other cases, see Claims, 122-127; United States, VI. c, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 127.] 32 L. ed. 442, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104; United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 47 L. ed. 539, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349; United States v. Berdan Firearms Mfg. Co. 156 U. S. 556, 39 L. ed. 531, 15 Argued March 16, 1922. Decided April 10, Sup. Ct. Rep. 420. 1922. The claimant, the Bethlehem Steel Lawson, Contr. § 39. APPEAL from the Court of Claims to Company, is entitled to recover in this action. review a judgment awarding compensation to the owner of a patent for its use by the United States government. Affirmed. See same case below, 53 Ct. Cl. 348. Special Assistant to the Attorney General Morris argued the cause, and, with Solicitor General Beck and Special Assistants to the Attorney General Knight and Varney, filed a brief for appellant: There must be a definite intention to take private property for public use before a contract, other requirements being satisfied, will be implied. Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 217, 224, 48 L. ed. 414, 417, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 238; United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 47 L. ed. 539, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349; Tempel v. United States, 248 U. S. 121, 63 L. ed. 162, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56: Sanguinetti v. United States, 55 Ct. Cl. 144; Barrett v. Hall, 1 Mason, 472, Fed. Cas. No. 1,047; United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262, 32 L. ed. 442, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104. Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court: Suit by the Steel Company to recover royalties for the use by the United States of a patented invention owned by the company. On November 7, 1891, the United States, by and through the Ordnance Bureau of the War Department, contracted with the Bethlehem Iron Company for the manufacture of 100 guns of 8-inch, 10-inch, and 12-inch caliber, which were to be equipped with the usual breech mechanism, then known as "model 1888 M 2." On November 21, 1893, and pending the execution of the contract, Owen F. Leibert, an employee of the Bethlehem Iron Company, made application for an improvement in breech mechanism for ordnance. The company notified the Bureau of the invention and of an application for a patent. It suggested that the Bureau have the application made special. This the Bureau did, and Messrs. George W. Dalzell and Clara patent was issued to Leibert on March ence P. Byrnes argued the cause, and 20, 1894. with Mr. Robert C. Hayden, filed a brief for appellee: The government used the claimant's invention under an implied contract between the government and the claimant. Hence the court of claims had jurisdietion to entertain the cause. William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. International Curtis Marine Turbine Co. 246 U. S. 28, 40, 62 L. ed. 560, 565, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 271; United States v. Société Anonyme des Anciens Etablissements Cail, 224 U. S. 309, 56 L. ed. 778, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 479; Tempel v. United States, 248 U. S. 121, 131, 63 L. ed. 162, 165, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56; Chitty, Contr. chap. 1, § 1; United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co. 112 U. S. 645, 28 L. ed. 846, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306; Hollister v. Benedict & B. Mfg. Co. 113 U. S. 59, 28 L. ed. 901, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 717; Bigby v. United States, 188 U. S. 400, 47 L. ed. 519, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468; In February, 1894, the Bureau requested full information as to the patent, and that it be permitted to use the same at the Watervliet Arsenal in an experimental test on a 12-inch gun. The request was granted and the Bureau prepared drawings for the test. On December 23, 1895, while the Leibert mechanism was in course of construction, the Chief of Ordnance forwarded to the commanding officer of the arsenal a communication [324] showing a form of mechanism, saying that it seemed to possess marked merit, and that it was a modification of the Leibert design, from which it differed "mainly in the mode of operating the withdrawal block, and in the pitch of the segmental rack to give increased power for rotation." The commanding officer reported that the design was deemed superior to the |