after she came afloat on December 14, 1916.

Seaboard Transp. Co. v. Boston, C. C. & N. Y. Canal Co. 270 Fed. 525, 256 U. S. 692, 65 L. ed. 1174, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534; The Oregon, 158 U. S. 186, 194, 195, 39 L. ed. 943, 948, 949, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 804.

Mr. William R. Sears also filed a brief for respondent:

The circuit court of appeals did not err in holding that the Bay Port's owner and the cargo owner were not entitled to recover for any injuries resulting from allowing the Bay Port to enter the canal.

The Germanic (Oceanie Steam Nav. Co. v. Aitken) 196 U. S. 589, 49 L. ed. 610, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 317; The Iroquois, 194 U. S. 240, 247, 48 L. ed. 956, 959, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 640, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 638; The Carib Prince, 170 U. S. 655, 658, 42 L. ed. 1181, 1182, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 753; Compañia de Navigacion v. Brauer, 168 U. S. 104, 123, 42 L. ed. 398, 406, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 12.

Mr. Samuel Park argued the cause, and, with Mr. Henry E. Mattison, filed a brief for the T. A. Scott Company:

The request of the White Oak Transportation Company to the respondent, to go to the assistance of the Bay Port, implied a salvage contract, in the performance of which the respondent would be liable only for failure to act in good faith and with reasonable judgment and skill.

The Excelsior (Potomac, S. B. Co. v. Baker Salvage Co.) 123 U. S. 40, 31 L. ed. 75, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; The Queen of the Pacific, 10 Sawy. 303, 21 Fed. 470; Great Lakes Towing Co. v. St. Joseph-Chicago S. S. Co. 165 C. C. A. 261, 253 Fed. 635; The Infanta Maria Teresa (United States v. Taylor) 188 U. S. 289, 47 L. ed. 479, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 412: The S. C. Schenk, 85 C. C. A. 384, 158 Fed. 63.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered opinion of the court:

negligence in dealing with the steamer after it had grounded; but this company has been exonerated and is not before us. In May, 1917, the Transportation Company filed a libel against the Canal Company, to charge it with a total loss of the steamer and freight, and in March, 1918, the Northern Coal Company intervened, seeking to hold the Canal Company for a total loss of the cargo, which was coal. The causes were heard together below, and were consolidated by agreement for hearing and determination upon one record here. The district court found no negligence on either side, and dismissed all the [348] libels. 251 Fed. 356. The circuit court of appeals held the Transportation Company liable to the Canal Company, and reversed the decree in that cause. 265 Fed. 538. It also dismissed the intervening petition of the owner of the coal. 267 Fed. 176.

We agree with the circuit court of appeals that the owners of the Bay Port and the Canal Company both ought to have known that it was unsafe to take the vessel through the canal. We agree with the dissenting judge in the circuit court of appeals that the loss of the cargo must be attributed to the joint negligence of the two; and we are of opinion that the amount of that lossthat suffered by the vessel and that suffered by the canal-should be added together and divided between the Bay Port and the Canal.

The Bay Port was a lake-built steamer of the whaleback type, 265 feet long and of 38 feet beam, which had been brought to the Atlantic. When deeply laden she steered somewhat awkwardly, but as well as other vessels of the type. She was loaded with 2,393 tons of coal, and had a draft of 18 feet, 2 inches aft, and 17 feet, 8 inches forward, when, soon after noon on December 13, 1916, she appeared at the western or Wing's Neck entrance to the canal. Her captain was a man of experience and had the gone through the canal twice with the Bay Port when empty, never when loaded. He had been solicited by the Canal Company to go by way of the canal, the company representing the canal to be 25 feet deep throughout, as its charter required. Mass. Act of 1899, chap. 448, § 3.

On December 13, 1916, the steamer Bay Port, while passing through the Cape Cod canal, ran ashore on the south bank, and the next day sank diagonally across it. In January, 1917, the Canal Company filed a libel against the White Oak Transportation Company, the owner of the steamer, to recover for damages suffered by the canal and the obstruction of traffic through it. It also filed a libel against the T. A. Scott Company, Inc., a wrecking company, for

Having got permission, the Bay Port started in tow of a tug with a competent pilot. The tide was about half out, running west at about 3 knots an hour. After proceeding halfway through the canal the vessel passed over a shoal

where there was not more than 21 or "She is yours." The pilot assumed 22 [344] feet of water, and soon after command and started to carry out the sheered toward the north bank and superintendent's wish. Everybody at then toward the south bank, where the time thought that the proper course, she grounded, at about a thousand feet and we cannot think that the master was from the shoal. It is strongly argued to blame for not overriding the judgment that this and the shoal next to be of the local experts, with which his own mentioned caused the trouble, but, not- concurred, on general grounds. On the withstanding The Pennsylvania, 19 other hand, as we have said, we agree Wall. 125, 22 L. ed. 148, we will ac- with the circuit court of appeals, and cept the finding of the two courts in any event we find that the evidence that they were not the proximate cause. recited by it shows, that the company Two tugs and the superintendent of the had notice, and that the master of the canal came to the help of the Bay Port, vessel ought to have known, that it was but could not get her off, as the tide was unsafe and improper to try to carry falling. The tugs kept her upon the this vessel, loaded as it was, through bank, and the next morning a hole was the canal. Both parties, therefore, are discovered in her bottom, but was responsible for all the damages, includplugged. Arrangements had been made to lighten the cargo when, unexpectedly, about 10:15 A. M., she slid into the channel. The pilot with whom she started had left, but another canal pilot, who seems to have taken his place, ran upon the bridge and directed the captain to start his engines at full speed to prevent her drifting upon the opposite bank. She was down at the head from 18 to 30 inches, with a list to port of from 15 to 24 inches. Since 6 A. the tide had been running to the east, the direction in which the steamer was going, and the pilot ordered a tug to take her in tow, and started toward the east. The Bay Port proceeded about a mile; but, after she had passed another shoal spot by some 2,000 feet, sheered again two or three times and 'stranded on the north bank, the bow came clear and swung down stream, and then she sank and became a total loss.

M.

ing the loss of cargo, and they should be divided between the two. The cargo owner, however, having proceeded only against the Canal Company, is entitled to a decree against that company for the full amount. The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302, 23 L. ed. 863; The New York, 175 U. S. 187, 209, 210, 44 L. ed. 126, 135, 136, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67.

Decree of Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Decree to be entered that the Northern Coal Company recover its damages and costs from the Boston, Cape Cod, & New York Canal Company; that the White Oak Transportation Company exonerate the Boston, Cape Cod, & New York Canal Company from one half of the above damages and costs, and that the damages and costs of the White Oak Transportation Company and the Boston, Cape Cod, & New York Canal Company be equally divided be tween those two companies.

[346] STANDARD FASHION COMPANY, Petitioner,

V.

MAGRANE-HOUSTON COMPANY.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 346-357.)

The circuit court of appeals thought that the master was responsible for the loss because he did not displace the pilot and prevent the vessel proceeding before she was fully pumped out, the cargo adjusted, and slack water had come, which he might have done by holding her in the channel by the tugs that were present, or by tying up to some dolphins that he passed. Upon Sale - construction of contract — term. this point we agree with the reasoning 1. Under a sales contract running for of the district court. The emergency a term of two years, and from term to was serions. The canal regulations pro- term thereafter until terminated by three vided [345] that, in the event of months' notice in writing, given within grounding, the canal authorities should Note. On monopolies, generally-see have the right to direct all operations notes to Fowle v. Park, 33 L. ed. U. S. for floating the vessel. The super- 67; United States v. Trans-Missouri intendent of the canal, while present, Freight Asso. 41 L. ed. U. S. 1008; and had told the pilot that he wanted to United States v. United States Steel get the vessel out of the canal as soon Corp. 8 A.L.R. 1140. as possible. The captain regarded that as the understanding of all concerned. The wreckers called out to the pilot:

On illegal trusts under modern antitrust laws-see note to Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co. 64 L.R.A. 689.

thirty days after the expiration of any two, tition, or tend to create a monopoly in any years' term, the agency to continue dur-line of commerce.

ing such three months, the notice not having [For other cases, see Monopoly, II. b, în Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] been given, the contract was continued in force for two years and three months from the date of the expiration of the last preceding contract period.

[For other cases, see Sale, I. b, in Digest

Sup. Ct. 1908.]

Appeal moot case.

2. The expiration of the term of a sales agency contract pending suit to restrain its violation does not cause the case to become moot, where the bill prayed an assessment of damages so far as capable of ascertain ment, and the record shows that such damages were capable at least of partial ascer

tainment.

[For other cases, see Appeal and Error, VII.
i, 3, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]
Sale

what constitutes

contract of agency.

when not

3. A contract between a manufacturer of patterns for garments and a retail dry goods company, under which full title and dominion to the patterns placed on sale by the latter passed to it, is a contract of sale, although the instrument itself denomi

nates it as one of agency.

[For other cases, see Sale, I. a, in Digest Sup.

Ct. 1908.] Statutes reports.

construction committee

4. Reports of committees concerned with the enactment of congressional legis lation may not be looked to in aid of construction where the words of the statute are plain and their meaning is apparent. [For other cases, see Statutes, II. a, in DiClayton Act contract of

gest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Monopoly sale

[No. 20.]

Argued January 25, 1921. Restored to the
docket for reargument, April 11, 1921.
Decided
Reargued January 16, 1922.
April 10, 1922.

N WRIT of Certiorari to the United

the First Circuit to review a decree which affirmed a decree of the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, dismissing the bill in a suit to restrain the violation of a sales contract. Affirmed. See same case below, 170 C. C. A. 593, 259 Fed. 793.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Charles E. Hughes argued the cause on original argument, and, with Messrs. Robert G. Dodge, Herbert Noble, and James B. Sheehan, filed a brief for petitioner:

The contract in this case is not within the Clayton Act, and is a contract of agency, or, if not one of strict agency, is one of joint adventure, in which each party has an interest in the conduct of the business, and the restricted provisions in it are regulatory of the business to be conducted under it, and necessary for the protection of both parties.

The decisions of the courts below give an effect to § 3 of the Clayton Act which, in view of the state of the law at the time of its passage, Congress cannot have intended.

Weiboldt v. Standard Fashion Co. 80 purchaser's covenant not to deal in goods of competitor of seller. Ill. App. 67; Willcox & G. Sewing Mach. 5. A contract between a retail dry Co. v. Ewing, 141 U. S. 637, 35 L. ed. goods company and a manufacturer of pat 886, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 94; Pictorial Reterns for garments, controlling, through it-view Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co. 255 Fed. 206. self or the holding company which controls it and two other pattern companies, two fifths of all the agencies in the United States, by which the retailer agreed not to sell or permit to be sold on its premises during the term of the contract any other make of patterns, violates the provision of the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, § 3. which condemns sales or contracts of sale on condition, agreement, or understanding that the purchaser shall not use or deal in the goods of a competitor of the seller where the effect of such sale or contract, or such condition, agreement, or understand ing, may be substantially to lessen compeOn contracts in partial restraint of trade as affected by modern anti-trust acts-see notes to Lanyon v. Garden City Sand Co. 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 446; and Baird v. Smith, L.R.A.1917A, 379.

Co. D. R. Wilder Mfg. V. Corn Products Ref. Co. 236 U. S. 165, 59 L. ed. 520, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 118; Cole Motor Car Co. v. Hurst, 142 C. C. A. 572, 228 Fed. 284; Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co. 64 L.R.A. 689, 60 C. C. A. 290, 125 Fed. 454; Re Greene, 52 Fed. 104; Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 203 Mass. 122, 133 Am. St. Rep. 283, 89 N. E. 189; Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co. 30 App. Div. 564, 52 N. Y. Supp. 433, 157 N. Y. 60, 43 L.R.A. 854, 68 Am. St. Rep. On legality of combinations or agree- 749, 51 N. E. 408; Standard Fashion Co. ments which restrict the class of persons V. Siegel-Cooper Co. 44 App. Div. 121, to whom commodities shall be sold, or 60 N. Y. Supp. 739; Butterick Pub. Co. from whom they shall be bought-see v. Rose, 141 Wis. 533, 124 N. W. 647; note to Cleland v. Anderson, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 136.

(N.S.) 843, 136 N. W. 1113; Brown v. Rounsavell, 78 Ill. 589; Southern Fire Brick & Clay Co. v. Garden City Sand Co. 223 Ill. 616, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 446, 79 N. E. 313, 7 Ann. Cas. 50; Ferris v. American Brewing Co. 155 Ind. 539, 52 L.R.A. 305, 58 N. E. 701; Ripy v. Art Wall Paper Mills, 41 Okla. 20, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 33, 136 Pac. 1080; Walsh v. Dwight, 40 App. Div. 517, 58 N. Y. Supp. 91; Weiboldt v. Standard Fashion Co. 80 Ill. App. 67; Sullivan v. Rime, 35 S. D. 75, 150 N. W. 556; Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Co. v. Greenwood Hardware Co. 75 S. C. 378, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 501, 55 S. E. 973, 9 Ann. Cas. 902; Staroske v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. 235 Mo. 67, 138 S. W. 36; Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Osborne, 177 Iowa, 208, L.R.A.1917B, 803, 158 N. W. 566; Rose v. Gordon, 158 Wis. 414, 149 N. W. 158. Such decisions as have been made under § 3 of the Clayton Act sustain the plaintiff's position.

Sperry & H. Co. v. Fenster, 219 Fed. 755; Elliott Mach. Co. v. Center, 227 Fed. 124; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. 227 Fed. 507, 234 Fed. 127, 264 Fed. 138; Cocoa Cola Co. v. Butler, 229 Fed. 224; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. 148 C. C. A. 660, 235 Fed. 398; Pictorial Review Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co. 255 Fed. 206; Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Diamond State Fibre Co. 268 Fed. 121; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co. 224 Fed. 566, 141 C. C. A. 594, 227 Fed. 461; Ford Motor Co. v. Benjamin E. Boone, 156 C. C. A. 621, 244 Fed. 335.

Although the time for an injunction has expired, the plaintiff is entitled to relief in equity.

205 Fed. 539; Montgomery Light &
Water P. Co. v. Montgomery Traction
Co. 219 Fed. 963; Re Consumers' Albany
Brewing Co. 224 Fed. 235; Automobile
Ins. Co. v. Guaranty Securities Corp. 240
Fed. 222; Javierre v. Central Altagracia,
217 U. S. 502, 54 L. ed. 859, 30 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 598.

original argument.
No appearance for respondent on

Mr. Herbert Noble argued the cause on reargument, and, with Messrs. Robert G. Dodge and James B. Sheehan, filed a brief for petitioner.

Solicitor General Beck, by special leave of court, argued the cause on reargument, and, with Special Assistants to the Attorney General Brown and Field, filed a brief as amici curiæ, for the United States, in place of respond

ent.

Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner brought suit in the United States district court for the district of Massachusetts to restrain the respondent from violating a certain contract concerning the sale of patterns for garments worn by women and children, called Standard patterns. The bill was dismissed by the district court, and its decree was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 170 C. C. A. 593, 259 Fed. 793.

Petitioner is a New York corporation, engaged in the manufacture and distribution of patterns. Respondent conducted a retail dry goods business at the corner of Washington street and Temple place, in the city of Boston. On November 14, 1914, the parties entered Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 203 into a contract by which the petitioner Mass. 122, 133 Am. St. Rep. 283, 89 granted to the respondent an agency for N. E. 189; Standard Fashion Co. v. the sale of Standard patterns at reSiegel-Cooper Co. 157 N. Y. 60, 43 L.R.A. spondent's store, for a term of two 854, 68 Am. St. Rep. 749, 51 N. E. 408; years from the date of the contract, and Butterick Pub. Co. v. Rose, 141 Wis. from term to term thereafter until 533, 124 N. W. 647; Peerless Pattern the agreement should be terminated as Co. v. Gauntlett Dry Goods Co. 171 thereinafter provided. Petitioner agreed Mich. 158, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 843, 136 to sell to respondent Standard patterns N. W. 1113; Singer Sewing Mach. Co. [352] at a discount of 50 per cent v. Union Buttonhole & Embroidery Co. from retail prices, with advertising matHolmes 253, Fed. Cas. No. 12,904; God ter and publications upon terms stated; dard v. Wilde, 17 Fed. 845; Chicago & and to allow respondent to return disA. R. Co. v. New York, L. E. & W. R. carded patterns semiannually between Co. 24 Fed. 516; Harrison v. Glucose January 15th and February 15th, and Sugar Ref. Co. 58 L.R.A. 915, 53 C. C. A. July 15th and August 15th, in exchange 484, 116 Fed. 304; General Electric Co. at nine-tenths cost for other patterns, v. Westinghouse Electric Co. 151 Fed. to be shipped from time to time there664; Texas Co. v. Central Fuel Oil Co. after. The contract provided that pat114 C. C. A. 21, 194 Fed. 22; Reece terns returned for exchange must have Folding Mach. Co. v. Earl & Wilson,' been purchased from the petitioner, and