and information of the evils to be rem-, control of weighing facilities; control of edied upon which the bill was framed.

stock coming into the Chicago stock- Ann. Cas. 764; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. yards and going out, only a small per- S. 33, 37-39, 60 L. ed. 131, 133, 134 centage, less than 10 per cent, is shipped L.R.A.1916D, 545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, from or to Illinois. Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 345, 355, 60 L. ed. 679, 680, 686, L.R.A.1917A, 421, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 276, 62 L. ed. 1101, 1107, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 532, 61 L. ed. 755, L.R.A.1917E, 938, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024; Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 281, 64 L. ed. 260, 266, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Public Service Co. v. Corboy, 250 U. S. 153, 159, 63 L. ed. 905, 908, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 219, 220, 27 L. ed. 171, 181, 182; American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 109, 110, 47 L. ed. 90, 96, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620, 56 L. ed. 570, 576, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 525, 540, 58 L. ed. 1440, 1456, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 965; Northern P. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 152, 63 L. ed. 897, 905, P.U.R.1919D, 705, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, 18 N. C. C. A. 878; Santa Fe P. R. Co. v. Lane, 244 U. S. 492, 498, 61 L. ed. 1275, 1280, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 714; Tedrow v. A. T. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Co. 255 U. S. 98, 65 L. ed. 524, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303; Kennington v. Palmer, 255 U. S. 100, 65 L. ed. 528, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303; Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606, 62 L. ed. 892, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 395; International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 63 L. ed. 211, 2 A.L.R. 293, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68; Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co. 198 U. S. 236, 250, 49 L. ed. 1031, 1039, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 637.

The complaints of the shippers of live stock against the charges and practices, working to their prejudice, in the conduct of the stockyards, the commission men, and the dealers, were, first, suppression of competition in purchases through agreement by which one packer would buy a carload or trainload of cattle and turn over half of it to the only other packer buying in the local market. Second, "wiring on." A shipper would send a carload or trainload of stock to one stockyard. Finding the market unsatisfactory, he would ship them further east. The packers' agents were promptly advised at the second stockyards, and, controlling the price there, they made it the same as at the first stockyards, though the shipper had paid the freight and had to stand the "shrink" of the cattle from the journey. Third, the charges in the stockyards for hay and other facilities were excessive. Fourth, the duplication of commissions through the collusion of the commission men and the dealers, by which commission men would sell at a lower price to dealers than to outside buyers, and drive the latter to buying from dealers through commission men, forcing two commissions. Fifth, the monopoly conferred by the stockyards owner on a company in which packers were largely interested, of buying at a fixed price of $5 a head all dead cattle for rendering purposes, when they were worth more. Sixth, the frequency with which commission men reported to shippers that live stock had been crippled and had to be sold in that condition at a lower price, arousing suspicion as to the fact, [503] and, if it was a fact, as to the cause, of the crippling. Pages 22, 23, 24, also 466 et seq., 1086, 2125, 2244, et seq. Committee of House Hearings-Committee of Agriculture, vol. 220-2, 66th Congress, 2d Session.

Mr. Elwood G. Godman argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Edwin W. Sims, Albert G. Welch, and Frederic R. De Young, filed a brief for appellants in No.

687:

A court of equity has power to enjoin threatened action by an official under an unconstitutional law, or threatened action under a constitutional law in excess of the power granted by such law.

Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 163, 165, 52 L. ed. 714, 730, 731, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441, 14

The individual appellants are not engaged in interstate commerce.

Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 326, 4 L. ed. 102; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 405, + L. ed. 601; United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 325, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. ed. 257, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1091; Robbins v. Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 497, 30 L. ed. 694, 697, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592; Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 655, 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207: Hopkins v. 39 L. ed. 297, 300, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. United States, 171 U. S. 578, 43 L. ed. 290, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40; Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 43 L. ed. 300, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50; Browning v. Waycross, 233 U. S. 16, 58 L. ed. 828, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578; General R. Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 500, 62 L. ed. 854,

Rep. 526, 14 Ann. Cas. 1031; United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Kentucky, 231 U. S. 394, 58 L. ed. 283, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; Wagner v. Covington, 251 U. S. 95, 103, 64 L. ed. 157, 167, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93; Danciger v. Cooley, 248 U. S. 319, 324, 327, 63 L. ed. 266, 269, 270, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334, 343, 58 L. ed. 988, 992, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592; Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, 57 L. ed. 615, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 412, 51 L. ed. 540, 546, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360; Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, 43 L. ed. 290, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40; Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 43 L. ed. 300, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50; Winslow v. Federal Trade Commission, 277 Fed. 206; Ward Baking Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 264 Fed. 330; Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 655, 39 L. ed. 297, 300, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207.

38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360; Wagner v. Coving-, 209 U. S. 405, 52 L. ed. 855, 28 Sup. Ct. ton, 251 U. S. 95, 64 L. ed. 157, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. ed. 715, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475; New York ex rel. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21, 48 L. ed. 325, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202; Blumenstock Bros. Adv. Agency v. Curtis Pub. Co. 252 U. S. 436, 64 L. ed. 649, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385; Arkadelphia Mill Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. 249 U. S. 134, 63 L. ed. 517, P.U.R.1919C, 710, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 20-22, 32 L. ed. 346, 350, 351, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; Ward Baking Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 264 Fed. 330; Winslow v. Federal Trade Commission, 277 Fed. 206; Ficklen v. Taxing Dist. 145 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 601, 4 Inters Com. Rep. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 810; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 45 L. ed. 186, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128; Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U. S. 405, 52 L. ed. 855, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, 14 Ann. Cas. 1031; New York ex rel. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21, 48 L. ed. 325, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202.

The act violates the 5th Amendment to the Constitution because of the arbitrary classification of stockyards subject to the

act.

Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 272, 276, 15 L. ed. 372, 374; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 721; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 292; United States v. Armstrong, 265 Fed. 683; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Willoughby, Const. p. 874.

Mr. Levy Mayer argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants in No. 691:

Appellants are not engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore those parts of the Stock Yards Act which seek to control and regulate their business are unconstitutional.

Re Greene, 52 Fed. 113; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 272, 62 L. ed. 1101, 1105, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 384, 48 L. ed. 679, 719, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; Blumenstock Bros. Adv. Agency v. Curtis Pub. Co. 252 U. S. 436, 442, 64 L. ed. 649, 653, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385; Ware & Leland v. Mobile County,

Solicitor General Beck argued the Attorney General Esterline and Mr. Baycause, and, with Special Assistant to the ard T. Hainer, filed a brief for appellees:

The commission merchants and traders with, and so directly a part of, the current or dealers are so completely identified of interstate commerce in live stock, flowing through the Union Stockyards, as tions within the power of Congress to clearly to bring them and their transacregulate under the Packers and Stockyards Act.

Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 398, 49 L. ed. 518, 525, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276, 122 Fed. 531; United States ex rel. Wilson v. The William, Fed. Cas. No. 16,700, 2 Am. L. J. (Hall) 271; United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199, 203, 63 L. ed. 936, 940, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445; Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 265, ante, 227, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 101; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 277, ante, 234, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 105; Dahnke-Walker Mill. Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, ante, 239, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106.

The classification made in the act is not arbitrary.

Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 354, 61 L. ed. 755, 776, L.R.A.1917E, 938, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024.

The provisions relating to the promulgation of rules and regulations by the Secretary of Agriculture, the publishing and filing schedules showing rates and charges for services, etc., have precedent. Interstate Commerce Commission V.

Mr. Chief Justice Taft, after making the foregoing statement of the case, delivered the opinion of the court:

Section 316 of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 makes applicable to suits for injunction against the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture the same procedure, original and appellate, provided in the Act of October 22, 1913 (38 Stat. at L. 208, 219, 220, chap. 32, Comp. Stat. § 3279, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 169), for suits for injunction against the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The latter act gives a right to a direct appeal to this court from the granting or refusing an interlocutory injunetion. Hence the appeals herein are properly prosecuted.

Goodrich Transit Co. 224 U. S. 194, 56, to unreasonable prejudice therein, or to L. ed. 729, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; Texas do any of a number of acts to control v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 258 prices or establish a monopoly in the U. S. 158, ante, 531, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261. business. It constitutes the Secretary of Agriculture a tribunal to hear complaints and make findings thereon, and to order the packers to cease any forbidden practice. An appeal is given to the circuit court of appeals from these findings and orders. They are to be enforced by the district court by penalty if not appealed from and if disobeyed. Title 3 concerns the stockyards, and provides for the supervision and control of the facilities furnished therein in connection with the receipt, purchase, sale on commission basis, or otherwise, of live stock and its care, shipment, weighing, or handling in interstate commerce. A stockyard is defined to be a place conducted for profit as a public market, with pens in which live stock are received and kept for sale or shipment in interstate commerce. Yards with a superficial area less than 20,000 square feet are not within the act. Stockyard owners, commission men, and dealers, are recognized and defined, and the two latter are required to register. The act requires that all rates and charges for services and facilities in the stockyards, and all practices in [514] connection with the live stock passing through the yards, shall be just, reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and nondeceptive, and that a schedule of such charges shall be kept open for public inspection, and only be changed after ten days' notice to the Secretary of Agriculture, who is made a tribunal to inquire as to the justice, reasonableness, and nondiscriminatory or nondeceptive character of every charge and practice, and to order that it cease, if found to offend, with the same provisions for appeal and enforcement in court as in the case of offending packers. The Secretary is given power to make rules and regulations to carry out the provisions, to fix rates or a minimum or maximum thereof, and to prescribe how every packer, stockyard owner, commission man, and dealer shall keep accounts.

In each bill the averments are sufficient, if the act be invalid, to show equitable grounds for injunction in the severe penalties incurred for failure to comply with the act before opportunity can be given to test its validity. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. ed. 714, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441, 14 Ann. Cas. 764.

We have framed the statement of the case, not for the purpose of deciding the issues of fact mooted between the packers and their accusers before the Federal Trade Commission or the Committees of Agriculture in Congress, but only to enable us to consider and discuss the act whose validity is here in question in the light of the environment [513] in which Congress passed it. It was for Congress to decide, from its general information and from such special evidence as was brought before it, the nature of the evils actually present or threatening, and to take such steps by legislation within its power as it deemed proper to remedy them. It is helpful for us, in interpreting the effect and scope of the act, in order to determine its validity, to know the conditions under which Congress acted. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238, 62 L. ed. 683, 687, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 1207; Danciger v. Cooley, 248 U. S. 319, 322, 63 L. ed. 266, 268, 39ing the form of rate schedules, the reSup. Ct. Rep. 119.

The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 seeks to regulate the business of the packers done in interstate commerce, and forbids them to engage in unfair, discriminatory, or deceptive practices in such commerce, or to subject any person

The bills aver that the Secretary has given the notice which requires appellants to register, and has announced proposed rules and regulations, prescrib

quired reports, including daily accounts of receipts, sales, and shipments, forbidding misleading reports to depress or enhance prices, prescribing proper feed and care of live stock, and forbidding a commission man to sell live stock to another in whose business he is interested,

without disclosing such interest to his principal.

The object to be secured by the act is the free and unburdened flow of live stock from the ranges and farms of the West and the Southwest through the great stockyards and slaughtering centers on the borders of that region, and thence, in the form of meat products, to the consuming cities of the country in the Middle West and East, or, still as live stock, to the feeding places and fattening farms in the Middle West or East, for further preparation for the market.

live stock, in the mala fides of the sale, in the exorbitant prices obtained, in the unreasonableness of the charges for services rendered.

The stockyards are not a place of rest or final destination. Thousands of head of live stock arrive daily by [516] carloads and trainload lots, and must be promptly sold and disposed of and moved out to give place to the constantly flowing traffic that presses behind. The stockyards are but a throat through which the current flows, and the transactions which occur therein are only incident to this current from the West to the East, The chief evil feared is the monopoly and from one state to another. Such of the packers, enabling them unduly and transactions cannot be separated from the arbitrarily to lower prices to [515] the movement to which they contribute, and shipper who sells, and unduly and arbi- necessarily take on its character. The trarily to increase the price to the con- commission men are essential in making sumer who buys. Congress thought that the sales without which the flow of the the power to maintain this monopoly was current would be obstructed, and this, aided by control of the stockyards. An- whether they are made to packers or other evil which it sought to provide dealers. The dealers are essential to the against by the act was exorbitant charges, sales to the stock farmers and feeders. duplication of commissions, deceptive The sales are not, in this aspect, merely practices in respect to prices, in the pas- local transactions. They create a local sage of the live stock through the stock-change of title, it is true, but they do yards, all made possible by collusion be- not stop the flow; they merely change tween the stockyards management and the the private interests in the subject of commission men, on the one hand, and the the current, not interfering with, but, packers and dealers on the other. Ex- on the contrary, being indispensable to, penses incurred in the passage through the stockyards necessarily reduce the price received by the shipper, and increase the price to be paid by the consumer. If they be exorbitant or unreasonable, they are an undue burden on the commerce which the stockyards are intended to facilitate. Any unjust or deceptive practice or combination that unduly and directly enhances them is an unjust obstruction to that commerce. The shipper whose live stock are being cared for and sold in the stockyards market is ordinarily not present at the sale, but is far away in the West. He is wholly dependent on the commission men. The packers and their agents, and the dealers who are the buyers, are at the elbow of the commission men, and their relations are constant and close. The control that the packers have had in the stockyards by reason of ownership and constant use, the relation of landlord and tenant between the stockyards owner, on the one hand, and the commission men and the dealers, on the other, the power of assignment of pens and other facilities by that owner to commission men and dealers, all create a situation full of opportunity and temptation, to the prejudice of the absent shipper and owner in the neglect of the

its continuity. The origin of the live stock is in the West; its ultimate destination, known to, and intended by, all engaged in the business, is in the Middle West and East, either as meat products or stock for feeding and fattening. This is the definite and well-understood course of business. The stockyards and the sales are necessary factors in the middle of this current of commerce.

The act, therefore, treats the various stockyards of the country as great national public utilities to promote the flow of commerce from the ranges and farms of the West to the consumers in the East. It assumes that they conduct a business affected by a public use of a national character and subject to national regulation. That it is a business within the power of regulation by legislative action needs no discussion. That has been settled since the case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77. Nor is there any doubt that, in the receipt of live stock by rail, and in their delivery by rail, the stockyards are an interstate commerce [517] agency. United States v. Union Stock Yards & Transit Co. 226 U. S. 286, 57 L. ed. 226, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83. The only question here is whether the business done in the stockyards between the receipt of the live