The newer constitutions of other Western States, such as Wisconsin and Texas, are not less instructive in this respect. Nor is it surprising that efforts should be made in some of the more recent instruments to strike at the combinations called "trusts."

54. RECENT TENDENCIES IN STATE GOVERNMENT.

The last twenty years have witnessed a continuation of the changes in the relative powers of State governors and legislatures referred to in the preceding number. In addition other tendencies have appeared, such for instance as the provision for a larger participation in government by the people through the process of direct legislation. These recent tendencies are the subject of the following article by Dr. W. F. Dodd, written in 1908:

Because of the great mass of detail now introduced into most of our state constitutions and of the fact that they contain much matter of private law, frequent amendments have become necessary in order to adjust constitutional provisions to changing conditions. The tendency to embody statutory matter in state constitutions continues, and the furthest point yet reached in this development is represented by the new constitution of Oklahoma. The adoption of new constitutions and the process of constitutional amendment have become active organs of legislation superior to the ordinary state legislatures. Extreme cases may easily be cited of provisions being inserted in constitutions which might much better have been left to state legislation; such, for example, as the provision of the Oklahoma constitution which prescribes the tests to be applied to determine the purity of kerosene oil, and a North Dakota amendment of 1904 changing the name of the state school for the deaf and dumb. It should be said, however, that the constitution recently adopted by the state of Michigan is an exception to the general tendency in that it confines itself rather closely to matters which may properly be termed constitutional.

For many years the processes of constitutional amendment

have been growing simpler and easier. The increased complexity of constitutions makes frequent amendment necessary, and is forcing the simplification of the amending procedure. The amendment of state constitutions may now be accomplished with little difficulty in most of the states, although the amending procedure is still extremely cumbersome in some states, as, for example, in New Hampshire and Illinois. .

In the state governments there has been a continued development toward the increase of the governor's power and the diminution of the power of the state legislature. Although the state executive power is badly disintegrated there would seem to be a slight tendency to increase the governor's administrative authority, both by statute and by constitutional provisions. The Virginia constitution of 1902 authorizes the governor to suspend executive officers of the state during the recess of the general assembly, the general assembly itself to decide at its next meeting whether the suspended officer shall be restored or removed. The governor of Oklahoma is given power to require information in writing under oath from all officers and commissioners of the state and from all officers of state institutions. By the Alabama constitution of 1901 and by the Michigan constitution of 1908 the governors are given increased power to require information in writing from the executive and administrative officers of these states. But it is with reference to legislation that the increase of the governor's power is most apparent. Ohio by an amendment of 1903 conferred the veto power upon her governor, leaving only two states-Rhode Island and North Carolina-which have no form of executive veto upon state legislation. Virginia in 1902, Ohio in 1903, Kansas in 1904, Oklahoma in 1907, and Michigan in 1908, have conferred upon their governors the additional power to veto separate items in appropriation bills; there are now thirty-three states which confer this power upon their governors. With reference to the making of appropriations Alabama also increases still further the executive power by authorizing the governor, auditor, and attorney-general of that state to prepare a general revenue bill, before each

regular session of the legislature, to be submitted to the legislature for its information.

Ohio by amendment of 1903 confers upon its governor power to veto any section or sections of a bill presented to him and to approve other portions of the bill so presented, following in this respect the Washington constitution of 1889. The Alabama constitution of 1901 permits the governor to propose an amendment to remedy any feature of a bill which he does not approve, and if his proposed amendment is not adopted by the two houses, the bill to become law must be passed over the executive veto. The Virginia constitution of 1902 also gives the governor power to recommend the amendment of a bill if he approves its general purpose, but disapproves any part thereof, and in this state the bill if amended by the two houses or if they fail to amend it in accordance with the governor's recommendation, is again returned to the governor for his approval or disapproval.

Although the state governors in no case possess more than a limited veto, subject to be overcome by subsequent legislative action, it should nevertheless be borne in mind that appropriation bills and other important acts are usually passed during the last days of legislative sessions when repassage over executive disapproval is practically impossible; the governor thus in many instances exercises what is equivalent to an absolute veto. A constitutional amendment adopted by California in 1908 increases from ten to thirty days the time within which the governor may approve bills after the adjournment of the legislature, and is clearly intended to give him more time to consider legislation which must fail unless he does not approve it. Wisconsin in 1908 increased from three to six days the time within which the governor must disapprove a measure in order to prevent its enactment, evidently for the purpose of giving him more time to consider legislation. The constitutional provisions extending the veto power have, it would seem, the very definite purposes of placing upon state governors a larger share of the responsibility for state legislative activities.

The introduction of the initiative and referendum for state

laws will, however, weaken the governor's power over legislation. The constitutional provisions of South Dakota, Oregon, Montana, Oklahoma, and Missouri, and the proposed amendment in North Dakota, expressly provide that the veto power of the governor shall not extend to measures referred to a vote of the people; in Maine definite provision is made by which the governor's veto of measures initiated by petition may be overcome by the use of the referendum. The referendum in Maine, Oregon and Oklahoma, and the proposed referendum in North Dakota extend to sections or to parts of bills as well as to entire measures, and thus give to the people a revisory power over state legislation broader than that conferred upon the governors in any states except Washington and Ohio. Nevada by its amendment for the compulsory referendum, and Michigan in introducing the optional referendum apply the referenda only to laws enacted by the regular legislative organs of these states, and thus preserve the governor's influence over legislation.

The first state constitutions conferred almost the whole power of government upon the legislatures, but since the end of the American Revolution there has been a fairly constant movement away from legislative supremacy in the States. The distrust of legislatures has been to a large extent responsible for the extension of the powers of the other departments of government, and for the numerous specific limitations which have been placed upon the exercise of the legislative power. The diminution of legislative power has been brought about (1) by the assumption of legislative functions by constitutional conventions, and by the adoption of legislation through constitutional amendment; (2) by the extension of popular legislation through the adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall; these institutions will almost necessarily reduce the already slight responsibility of state legislature; (3) by the extension of the governor's share in legislation, so that a large part of the responsibility may be fixed upon him for legislation that is enacted; (4) by the imposition of positive restrictions upon the power of the legislature, by the granting

to cities of control over their own governmental affairs, and by making legislative sessions less and less frequent.

Mississippi in 1890 took the first step toward quadrennial sessions by providing for one regular session of the legislature every four years, and for a special session in the interval between regular sessions, so as to make the sessions biennial, but with a definite limitation as to the subjects to be considered at the special session and as to its duration. Alabama in 1901 provided specifically for quadrennial sessions, and is the first state to provide that its legislature shall meet at such infrequent intervals. In 1902 a proposed constitutional amendment for regular biennial sessions was defeated in Mississippi; and in 1908 a proposed amendment for a return to biennial sessions was defeated in Alabama. The movement for less frequent legislative sessions will hardly turn backward, and the need for frequent sessions is disappearing with the enactment of ordinary legislation by constitutional amendment and revision, and with the adoption of the initiative and referendum as in Oregon where laws may be enacted without the participation of the legislature.

The restrictions upon local and special legislation have been brought about to a large extent by the abuse of legislative power, and will probably prove an advantage to the legislatures themselves by confining their attention to general measures, whereas legislatures have in the past devoted a large part of their time to local problems which might much better have been left to the local governments. Alabama, Virginia, and Oklahoma specify in detail a number of subjects upon which local, special, and private legislation may not be enacted; and such special legislation as may be enacted is subject to rules of procedure intended to prevent abuse. Special acts for the incorporation of cities have been forbidden in Alabama, Oklahoma, and Michigan. Virginia permits special legislation relating to the organization of cities and towns by a vote of twothirds of all members elected to each house of the legislature. The Virginia constitution, besides forbidding special legislation upon a number of specified subjects, also requires that in