A stipulation, made before judgment in the court below, that "in the Supreme Court of the United States this cause shall be submitted to the court without any oral argument, either side, however, having the right to file a printed brief or briefs," is not a submission under the 20th Rule; and, under such a stipulation, this court will not apply that rule to the case on the suggestion of one of the parties against the protest of the other. Glen v. Fant, 123.

SUBROGATION.

1. The doctrine of subrogation in equity requires, 1, that the person seeking its benefit must have paid a debt due to a third party before he can be substituted to that party's rights; and, 2, that in doing this he must not act as a mere volunteer, but on compulsion, to save himself from loss by reason of a superior lien or claim on the part of the persou to whom he pays the debt, as in cases of sureties, prior mortgages, &c. The right is never accorded in equity to one who is a mere volunteer in paying a debt of one person to another. Etna Life Insurance Co. v. Middleport, 534.

2. The town of Middleport having, in pursuance of a statute of Illinois, voted an appropriation to the Chicago, Danville and Vincennes Railroad Company, to be raised by a tax on the property of the inhabitants of the town, issued bonds, payable with interest to bearer, for a sum large enough to include interes. and the discount for which they could be sold, and delivered them to the railroad company, and they were accepted by that company, and sold and delivered to plaintiff. Held: (1) That the purchase of these bonds by plaintiff was no payment of the appropriation voted by the town to the railroad company.

(2) That, the bonds having been held to be void in a suit between the
plaintiff and the town, this did not operate as a subrogation of the
plaintiff to the right of the company, if any such existed, to enforce
the collection of the appropriation voted by the town. Ib.

SUPREME COURT.
See JURISDICTION, A.

SURETY.

See JUDGMENT, 4, 5;

NATIONAL BANK.

TAX AND TAXATION.

1. The owner of an undivided half interest in personal property in posses-
sion of the whole of it, is liable for the entire tax upon it, and is not
released from that liability by the payment of one-half of the tax upon
the whole. Chapin v. Streeter, 360.

2. A and B were joint owners of the furniture of a hotel. A carried on
the hotel, and leased of B his half interest in the furniture at an agreed
rent, which was not paid as it became due. The taxes on the furni-
ture being unpaid, A paid one-half of the amount due for taxes, and
the officer distrained, advertised and sold to C the undivided half of B
therein for the other half. A then hired this undivided half of Cat
an agreed rental, and the rent was paid. B brought suit against A to
recover the rent due under the lease from him. Held, that A was
liable for the whole tax, and being in exclusive possession of the
property, under his contract with B, it was his duty to pay it, and that
the officer was as much bound to satisfy the tax out of A's interest in
the property as out of B's, and that the facts above stated constituted
no defence against B's action for the rent; nor the further fact that B
notified A that if he paid his half of the taxes, he would not allow it
in settlement. Ib.

TAX SALE.

In an action to set aside and have declared void a tax deed, made upon a
sale for taxes of the plaintiff's land, upon the ground of a discrimina-
tion in the assessment against the plaintiff as a non-resident, it appear-
ing that the laws under which it was made did not require the assess-
ment to be more favorable to resident owners than to non-residents,
and that the question to be decided related only to the action of a
single assessor, or to the action of a board of equalization, and there
being no sufficient evidence of such a discrimination against the
owner of the lands; Held, that mere errors in assessment should be
corrected by proceedings which the law allows before such sale, or
before the deed was finally made. Beeson v. Johnson, 56.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

See DAMAGES.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

See TREASURY SETTLEMENTS.

TREASURY SETTLEMENTS.

Settled accounts in the Treasury Department, where the United States
have acted on the settlement, and paid the balance therein found due,
cannot be opened or set aside years afterwards merely because some of
the prescribed steps in the accounting, which it was the duty of a head
of a department to see had been taken, had been in fact omitted; or
on account of technical irregularities, when the remedy of the party
against the United States is barred by the statute of limitation, and
the remedies of the United States are intact, owing to its not being
subject to an act of limitation. United States v. Johnston, 236.

TREATY.

1. The treaty of February 8, 1867, with the Dominican Republic (art. 9)
provides that "no higher or other duty shall be imposed on the impor-
tation into the United States of any article the growth, produce, or
manufacture of the Dominican Republic or of her fisheries, than are
or shall be payable on the like articles the growth, produce, or manu-
facture of any other foreign country or of its fisheries." The conven-
tion of January 30, 1875, with the king of the Hawaiian Islands
provides for the importation into the United States, free of duty, of
various articles, the produce and manufacture of those islands (among
which were sugars), in consideration of certain concessions made by
the king of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. Held, that
this provision in the treaty with the Dominican Republic did not
authorize the admission into the United States, duty free, of similar
sugars, the growth, produce, or manufacture of that republic, as a
consequence of the agreement made with the king of the Hawaiian
Islands, and that there was no distinction in principle between this case
and Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U. S. 116. Whitney v. Robertson, 190.
2. By the Constitution of the United States a treaty and a statute are
placed on the same footing, and if the two are inconsistent, the one
last in date will control, provided the stipulation of the treaty on the
subject is self-executing. Ib.

3. The distinction between this case and Whitney v. Robertson, ante, 190,
does not warrant a different disposition of it. Kelley v. Hedden, 196.

TRUST.

1. In a suit by a stranger against a trustee, to defeat the trust altogether,
the cestui que trust is not a necessary party, if the powers or duties of
the trustee with respect to the execution of the trust are such that
those for whom he holds will be bound by what is done against him
as well as by what is done by him. Vetterlein v. Barnes, 169.

See EQUITY, 8;
LOCAL LAW, 8.

VOL. CXXIV-50

UNITED STATES.

See TREASURY SETTLEMENTS.

WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT.

An arbitration was had in 1863 between the Great Falls Manufacturing Company and the Secretary of the Interior (on behalf of the United States) in regard to the amount of compensation to be paid to the company for its land, water rights and other property to be taken for the Washington aqueduct. The arbitrators reported four alternative plans for the construction of the proposed work, and decided that if Plan 4 should be adopted, involving only a dam from the Maryland shore to Conn's Island, the United States should pay as damages the sum of $15,692; but that if Plan 1 should be adopted, involving the construction of a dam from the Maryland shore across the Maryland Channel and Conn's Island to the Virginia shore, the company should receive as damages the sum of $63,766, and should also have the right to build and maintain a dam and bulkhead across the land of the United States in Virginia, and to use the water, subject to the superior right of the United States to its use for the purposes of the aqueduct. The United States constructed the aqueduct, adopting substantially Plan 4. The company sued in the Court of Claims for compensation, and recovered a judgment for $15,692, which was affirmed here, 112 U. S. 645. By an act of Congress passed in 1882, for increasing the water supply, provision was made for the acquisition of further property and further rights, and for the extension of the dam across Conn's Island to and upon the Virginia shore. This statute provided for a survey and for the making and filing of a map of the property to be taken and acquired under it, and also for notice of the filing to the parties interested, for appraisements of property taken, for awards of damages, and for payment of the awards on receiving conveyances of the lands, &c., taken. A right was also given to each owner dissatisfied with the award in his case, to proceed for damages in the Court of Claims against the United States within one year from the publication of the notice. Under this act of 1882 a dam was constructed substantially in accordance with Plan 1, and other property and other rights of the Great Falls Company were taken in the construction, but no provision was made for a canal and bulkhead, whereby the company could use the surplus water. On the last day of the year after the filing of the notice under the statute, the company filed its petition in the Court of Claims to recover damages for the taking of its property, and then filed this bill in the Circuit Court, alleging that that petition had been filed from fear that the company might lose any benefit of the act by limitation, and to save its rights, and for no other purpose; that the survey and map were defective inasmuch as land had been taken from the company which was not included in them; that the notice of the filing of the map had not

been given as required by the statute, but was materially defective; and that the act requiring the company to submit its rights to the judgment of the Court of Claims was unconstitutional in that, among other things, it made no provision for ascertaining the amount of compensation by a jury. For relief the bill prayed that the structures commenced might be removed, or, if it should appear that the property had been legally condemned, that an issue be framed, triable by jury, to ascertain the amount of plaintiff's damage, and that judgment be given for the sum found. Defendant demurred and, the demurrer being sustained, the bill was dismissed. Held: (1) That the United States having adopted and executed Plan 4, neither party was bound by the award as to Plan 1; and as no reservation had been made by the act of 1882 as to the bulkhead or canal for the use of the surplus water, that the officers charged with the construction of the dam were not bound to concede such rights to the company, though the United States were bound to make compensation for whatever rights or property of the company were taken and appropriated to public use; (2) That, as the survey and map had been made in good faith and undoubtedly embraced most of the property taken if it happened that any tract taken was not included in them, the proceedings were not invalidated by the omission, but the United States were bound to make compensation for the omitted tract as if it had been included in the map; (3) That defects in the notice were waived by filing the petition in the Court of Claims; (4) That the commencement of that proceeding was a waiver of any constitutional objection against the taking of the company's property or of the settlement of the amount of the damage therefor by the Court of Claims; but this was decided without intending to express a doubt as to the constitutionality of the act of 1882; (5) That the purpose with which the plaintiff invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was immaterial. Great Falls Manufacturing Co. v. The Attorney General, 581.