join his army, as well as one sent from fort Detroit, under the command of Col. M'Arthur, should be included in the above stipulation, it is accordingly agreed to. It is however to be under. stood, that such parts of the Ohio militia as have not joined the army, will be permitted to return home, on condition that they will not serve during the war.....their arms, however, will be delivered up, if belonging to the public.

Article 5th. The garrison will march out at the hour of 12 o'clock this day, and the British forces take immediate possession of the fort. J. M’DOWELL, Lt. Col. Militia B. A. D. C.

J. B. CRAIG, Maj. A. D. C.

Commanding the N. W. army.

5th U. S. Infantry. E. BRUSH, Col. 1st Reg.

Michigan Militia. APPROVED. ISAAC BROCK, Maj. Gen. The army at 12 o'clock this day will march out of the east gate, where they will stack their arms and will be then subject to the articles of capitulation.

WM. HULL, Brig. Gen.

Commanding N. W. army. (Capitulation herewith published.) An , article supplementary to the articles of capitulation con. cluded at Detroit, 16th August, 1812.

It is agreed that the officers and soldiers of the Ohio militia and volunteers shall be permitted to proceed to their respective homes, on this condition, that they are not to serve during the present war, unless they are exchanged. (Signed)

W. HULL, Brig. Gen. Commanding N.

ISAAC BROCK, Maj. Gen. An article in addition to the supplementary article of the capitulation concluded at Detroit, 16th Aug. 1812.

It is further agreed that the officers and soldiers of the Michigan militia and volunteers, under the command of Major Wetherell, shall be placed on the same principles as the Ohio volunteers and militia are placed by the supplementary article of the 16th inst. (Signed)

W. HULL, B.ig. Gen. Commanding N. W. army U. S.


Fort George, Aug. 26, 1812. SIR.....Enclosed are the articles of capitulation, by which the fort of Detroit has been surrendered to Major Gen. Brock, command'ing bis Britannic majesty's forces in Upper Canada, and by which the troops have become prisoners of war. My situation at pres. ent forbids me from detailing the particular causes which have led to this unfortunate event. I will, however, generally observe, that after the surrender of Michillimackinac, almost every tribe and nation of Indians, excepting a part of the Miamies and Delawares, north from beyond lake Superior, west from beyond the Mississippi, south from the Ohio and Wabash, and east from every part of Upper Canada, and from all the intermediate country, joined in open hostility under the British standard, against the army I commanded, contrary to the most solemn assurances of a large portion of them to remain neutral ; even the Ottawa chiefs from Arbecrotch, who formed the delegation to Washington the last summer, in whose friendship I know you had great confi. dence, are among the hostile tribes, and several of them distinguished leaders. Among the vast number of chiefs who led the hostile bands, Tecumseh, Marpot, Logan, Walk-in-the-water, Split-log, &c. are considered the principals. This numerous assemblage of savages, under the entire influence and direction of the British commander, enabled him totally to obstruct the only communication which I had with my country. This communication had been opened from the settlements in the state of Ohio, two hundred miles through a wilderness, by the fatigues of the army which I marched to the frontier on the river Detroit. The body of the lake being commanded by the British armed ships, and the shores and rivers by gun-boats, the army was totally de. prived of all communication by water. On this extensive road is depended for transportation of provisions, military stores, medicine, clothing, and every other supply, on pack-horse ......All its operations were successful until its arrival at Detroit, and in a few days it passed into the enemy's country, and all opposition seem. ed to fall before it. One month it remained in possession of this country, and was fed from its resources. In different directions detachments penetrated sixty miles in the settled part of the prorince, and the inhabitants seemed satisfied with the change of situation, which appeared to be taking place.....the militia from Amherstburg were daily deserting, and the whole country, then under the controul of the army, was asking for protection. The Indians generally, in the first ipstance, appeared to be neutralized, and determined to take no part in the contest. The fort of Am herstburg was eighteen miles below my encampment: single cannon or mortar was on wheels suitable to carry before that place. I consulted my officers, whether it was expedient to make an attempt on it with the bayonet alone, without cannon to make a breach in the first instance. The council I called was of the opinion it was not..... The greatest industry was exerted in making preparation, and it was not until the 7th of Aug. that two

Not a

24-pounders, and three howitzers were prepared. It was then my intention to have proceeded on the enterprize. While the operations of the army were delayed by these preparations, the clouds of adversity had been for some time, and seemed still thickly to be gathering around me. The surrender of Michillimackinac opened the northern bive of Indians, and they were swarming down in every direction. Reinforcements from Niagara had arrived at Amherstburg under the command of Colonel Proctor. The desertion of the militia ceased. Besides the reinforcements that came by water, I received information of a very considerable force under the command of Maj. Chambers, on the river Le French, with four field-pieces, and collecting the militia on his route, evidently designed for Amherstburg; and in addi. tion to this combination, and increase of force, contrary to all my expectations, the Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas, Potta watamies, Munsees, Delawares, &c. wit hwhom I had the most friends ly intercourse, at once passed over to Amherstburg, and accepted the tomabawk and scalping knife. There being now a vast number of Indians at the British post, they were sent to the river Huron, Brownstown, and Magaugo, to intercept my communication. To open this communication, I detached Maj. Vanhorne, of the Ohio volunteers, with two hundred men to proceed as far as the river Rasin, under an expectation he would meet Captain Brush, with one hundred and fifty men, volunteers from the state of Ohio, and a quantity of provision for the army. An ambuscade was formed at Brownstown, and Maj. Vanhorne's detachment defeated, and returned to camp without effecting the object of the expedition,

In my letter of the 7th inst. you have the particulars of that transaction with a return of the killed and wounded. Under this sudden and unexpected change of things, and having received an express from Gen. Hall, commanding opposite the British shore on the Niagara river, by which it appeared that there was no prospect of any co-operation from that quarter, and the two senior officers of the artillery having stated to me an opinion that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to pass the Turkey river and river Aux Cannard, with the 24 pounders, and that they could not be transported by water, as the Queen Charlotte, which carried eighteen 24 pounders, lay in the river Detroit above the mouth of the river Aux Cannard : and as it appeared indispensa. bly necessary to open the communication to the river Rasin and the Miami, I found myself compelled to suspend the operation against Amherstburg, and concentrate the main force of the army at Detroit. Fully intending at that time, after the communication was opened, to re-cross the river, and pursue the object at Amherstburg, and strongly desirous of continuing protection to a


very large number of the inhabitants of Upper Canada, who had voluntarily accepted it under my proclamation, I established a fortress on the banks of the river, a little below Detroit, calculated for a garrison of three hundred men.

On the evening of the 7th, and morning of the 8th inst, the army, excepting the garrison of 250 infantry, and a corps of artillerists, all under the command of Maj. Denney, of the Ohio volunteers, recrossed the river, and encamped at Detroit. In pursuance of the object of opening the communication, on which I considered the existence of the army depending, a detachment. of 600 men, under the command of Lieut. Col. Miller, was immediately ordered.

For a particular account of the proceedings of this detachment, and the memorable battle which was fought at Magaugo, which reflects the highest honour on the American arms, I refer you to my letter of the 13th of Aug. inst. a duplicate of which is enclosed, marked G. Nothing, however, but honour was acquired by this victory; and it is a painful consideration, that the blood of 75 gallant men could only open the communication, as far as the points of their bayonets extended. The necessary care of the sick and wounded, and a very severe storm of rain, rendered their return to camp indispensably necessary for their own comfort. Captain Brush, with his small detachment, and the provisions being still at the river Rasin, and in a situation to be destroyed by the savages, on the 13th inst. in the evening, I permitted Cols. M’Arthur and Cass to select from their regiment 400 of their most effective men, and proceed on an upper route through the woods, which I had sent an express to Capt. Brush to take, and had directed the militia of the river Rasin to accompany him as a reinforcement, The force of the enemy continually increasing, and the necessity of opening the communication, and acting on the defensive becoming more apparent, I had, previous to detaching Cols. M'Arthur and Cass on the 11th inst. evacuated and destroyed the fort on the opposite bank. On the 13th, in the even-, ing, Gen. Brock arrived at Amherstburg, about the hour Cols. M'Arthur and Cass marched, of which, at that time, I had received no information.

On the 15th I received a summons from him to surrender fort Detroit, of which the paper marked A is a copy. My answer is inarked B. At this time I had received no information from Cols. M'Arthur and Cass. An express was immediately sent, strongly escorted, with orders for them to return. On the 15th, as soon as Gen. Brock received my letter, his batteries opened on the town and fort, and continued until evening. In the evening all the British ships of war came nearly as far up the river as Sandwich, three miles below Detroit. At day light, on the 16th, (at which time I had received no information from Cols. M'Arthur

and Cass, my expresses sent the evening before, and in the night, having been prevented from passing by numerous bodies of Indians) the cannonade recommenced, and in a short time I receiv. ed information that the British army and Indians were landing below the Spring-wells, under the cover of their ships of war. At this time the whole effective force'at my disposal at Detroit, did pot exceed eight hundred men. Being new troops, and unaccustomed to a camp life : baving performed a laborious march; having been engaged in a number of battles and skirmishes, in which many had fallen, and more had received 'wounds, in addition to which a large number being sick and unprovided with medicine, and the comforts necessary for their situation ; are the general causes by which the strength of the army was thus reduced. The fort at this time was filled with women, children, and the old and decrepid people of the town and country; they were unsafe in the towo, as it was entirely open and exposed to the enemy's batteries. Back of the fort, above or below it, there was no safety for them on account of the Indians. In the first instance the enemy's fire was principally directed against our batteries ; towards the elose, it was directed against the fort alone, and almost every shot and shell bad their effect.

It now became necessary either to fight the enemy in the field; collect the whole force in the fort ; or propose terms of capitulation. I could not have carried into the field more than six hundred men, and left any adequate force in the fort.

There were landed at that time of the enemy a regular force of much more than that number, and twice the number of Indians. Considering this great inequality of force, I did not think it expedient to adopt the first measure. The second must have been attended with a great sacrifice of blood, and no possible advantage, because the contest could not have been sustained more than a day for the want of powder, and but a very few days for the want of provisions. In addition to this, Cols. M'Arthur and Cass would have been in a most hazardous situation. I feared nothing but the last alternative. I have dared to adopt' it.....I well know the high responsibility of the measure, and I take the whole of it on myself. It was dictated by a sense of duty, and a full conviction of its expediency. The bands of savages which had then joined the British force were numerous beyond any former example. Their numbers have since increased, and the history of the barbarians of the north of Europe does not furnish examples of more greedy vi. olence than these savages have exhibited. A large portion of the brave and gallant officers and men I commanded would cheerfully have contested until the last cartridge had been expended, and the bayonets worn to the sockets. I could not consent to the useless sacrifice of such brave men, when I knew it was impossible for

« ForrigeFortsett »