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addressed to Gov. Meigs of Ohio, a letter, of which the following is an extract:

"Believe all the bearer will tell you. Believe it, however it may astonish you, as much as if it had been told by one of us..... Even a c. is talked of by the . . The bearer will fill the vacancy."

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The doubtful fate of this letter rendered it necessary to use circumspection in its details, and therefore these blanks were left. The word "capitulation" will fill the first, and " commanding general," the other. As no enemy was near us, and as the superiority of our force was manifest, we could see no necessity for capitulating, nor any propriety in alluding to it. We therefore determined in the last resort, to incur the responsibility of divesting the general of his command. This plan was eventually prevented by two of the commanding officers of regiments being ordered upon detachments.

On the 13th the British took a position opposite to Detroit, and began to throw up works. During that and the two following days, they pursued their object without interruption and established a battery for two 18 pounders and an 8 inch howitzer...... About sunset on the evening of the 14th, a detachment of 350 men from the regiments commanded by Col. M'Arthur and myself, was ordered to march to the river Rasin, to escort some provisions, which had some time remained there protected by a party under the command of Capt. Brush.

On Saturday, the 15th, about 1 o'clock, a flag of truce arrived from Sandwich, bearing a summons from Gen. Brock for the suFrender of the town and fort of Detroit, stating he could no longer restrain the fury of the savages. To this an immediate and spirited refusal was returned. About four o'clock their batteries began to play upon the town. The fire was returned and continued without interruption, and with little effect till dark. shells were thrown till eleven o'clock.

Their

At day light firing on both sides recommenced; about the same time the enemy began to land troops at the Springwells, three miles below Detroit, protected by two of their armed vessels. Between 6 and 7 o'clock they effected their landing, and immediately took up their line of march. They moved in a close column of platoons, twelve in front, upon the bank of the river.

The fourth regiment was stationed in the fort; the Ohio volunteers and a part of the Michigan militia, behind some pickets, in a situation in which the whole flank of the enemy would have been exposed. The residue of the Michigan militia were in the upper part of the town to resist the incursions of the savages. Two 24 pounders, loaded with grape shot, were posted on a commanding eminence, ready to sweep the advancing column. In this situation, the superiority of our position was apparent, and

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our troops, in the cager expectation of victory, awaited the approach of the enemy. Not a discontent broke upon the ear: not a look of cowardice met the eye. Every man expected a proud day for his country, and each was anxious that his individual exertion should contribute to the general result.

When the head of their column arrived within about five hundred yards of our line, orders were received from Gen. Hull for the whole to retreat to the fort, and for the twenty-four pounders not to open upon the enemy. One universal burst of indignation was apparent upon the receipt of this order. Those, whose conviction was the deliberate result of a dispassionate examination of passing events, saw the folly and impropriety of crowding 1100 men into a little work which 300 men could fully man, and into which the shot and shells of the enemy were falling. The fort was in this manner filled; the men were directed to stack their arms, and scarcely was an opportunity afforded of moving...... Shortly a white flag was hung out upon the walls. A British officer rode up to inquire the cause. A communication passed between the commanding Generals, which ended in the capitulation submitted to you. In entering into this capitulation the General took counsel from his own feelings only. Not an officer was consulted. Not one anticipated a surrender till he saw the white flag displayed. Even the women were indignant at so shameful a degradation of the American character, and all felt as they should have felt, but he who held in his hands the reins of authority.

Our morning report had that morning made our effective men present fit for duty 1060, without including the detachment before alluded to, and without including 300 of the Michigan militia on duty. About dark on Saturday evening the detachment sent to escort the provisions, received several orders from Gen. Hull to return with as much expedition as possible. About ten o'clock the next day they arrived within sight of Detroit. firing been heard, or any resistance visible, they would have immediately advanced and attacked the rear of the enemy. The situation in which this detachment was placed, although the result of accident, was the best for annoying the enemy and cutting off his retreat that could have been selected. With his raw troops enclosed between two fires, and no hopes of succor, it is hazarding little to say, that very few would have escaped.

I have been informed by Col. Findley, who saw the return of their quarter-master-general the day after the surrender, that their whole force of every description, white, red, and black, was 1030. They had twenty-nine platoons, twelve in a platoon, of men dressed in uniform. Many of these were evidently Canadian mi litia. The rest of the militia increased their white force to about seven hundred men. The number of their Indians could not be

asertained with any degree of precision; not many were visible. And in the event of an attack upon the town and fort, it was a species of force which could have afforded no material advantage to the enemy.

In endeavouring to appreciate the motives and to investigate the causes which led to an event so unexpected and dishonourable, it is impossible to find any solution in the relative strength of the contending parties, or in the measures of resistance in our power. That we were far superior to the enemy; that upon any ordinary principles of calculation we would have defeated them, the wounded and indignant feelings of every man there will testify.

A few days before the surrender, I was informed by Gen. Hull that we had 400 rounds of 24 pound shot fixed, and about 100,000 cartridges made. We surrendered with the fort 40 barrels of

powder and 2500 stand of arms.

The state of our provisions has not been generally understood. On the day of the surrender we had fifteen days' provisions of every kind on hand. Of meat there was plenty in the country, and arrangements had been made for purchasing grain and grinding it to flour. It was calculated we could readily procure three months' provisions, independent of 150 barrels flour, and 1300 head of cattle, which had been forwarded from the state of Ohio, and which remained at the river Raisin, under Capt. Brush, within reach of the army.

But had we been totally destitute of provisions, our duty and our interest undoubtedly was to fight. The enemy invited us to meet him in the field.

By defeating him the whole country would have been open to us, and the object of our expedition gloriously and successfully ob tained. If we had been defeated we had nothing to do but retreat to the fort, and make the best defence which circumstances and our situation rendered practicable. But basely to surrender without firing a gun.....lamely to submit without raising a bayonet.....disgracefully to pass in review before an enemy as inferior in the quality as in the number of his forces, were circumstances which excited feelings of indignation more easily felt than described. To see the whole of our men flushed with the hope of victory, eagerly awaiting the approaching contest; to see them afterwards dispirited, hopeless, and desponding, at least 500 shedding tears because they were not allowed to meet their country's foe, and to fight their country's battles, excited sensations, which no American has ever before had cause to feel, and which, I trust in God, will never again be felt, while one man remains to defend the standard of the Union.

I am expressly authorized to state, that Col. M'Arthur and Col. Findley and Lieut. Col. Miller viewed this transaction in the

light which I do. They know and feel, that no circumstance in our situation, none in that of the enemy, can excuse a capitulation so dishonourable and unjustifiable. This too is the universal sentiment among the troops; and I shall be surpised to learn, that there is one man who thinks it was necessary to sheath his sword, or lay down his musket.

I was informed by Gen. Hull the morning after the capitulation, that the British forces consisted of 1800 regulars, and that he surrendered to prevent the effusion of human blood. That he magnified their regular force nearly five fold, there can be no Whether the philanthropic reason assigned by him is a sufficient justification for surrendering a fortified town, an army and a territory, is for the government to determine. Confident I am, that had the courage and conduct of the General been equal to the spirit and zeal of the troops, the event would have been as brilliant and successful as it now is disastrous and dishonourable.

Very respectfully, Sir, I have the honour to be,

Your most obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS,

Col. 3d reg. Ohio volunteers.

The Hon. WILLIAM EUSTIS, Sec. of War.

GENERAL HULL'S TRIAL.

On the 3d January, 1814, the members detailed by general orders, to constitute the court for the trial of Brig. Gen. Hull, assembled at Albany, and were as follows, viz.

Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn, President.

Brig. Gen. Joseph Bloomfield,

Col. Peter Little 38th reg.

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Wm. N. Irvine, 42d Lt. Col. James House, artl.

Wm. Scott, 36th.

Wm. Stewart, 88th, J

Members.

Col. J. K. Fenwick, artl.
Robert Bogardus, 41st,
Lt. Col. Richard Dennis 16th,
S. R. Conner, 13th,
J. B. Davis, 32d,
J.W. Levingston, 41st,

Lt. Col. J. G. Forbes, 42d reg. Supernumerary.

Judge Advocate (special) Martin Van Buren, Esq.

Army Judge Advocate, Philip S. Parker, Esq.

Charges exhibited by order of the Secretary of War.

Charge 1......Treason against the United States, between the ninth of April and the seventeenth of August, 1812.

The specifications under this charge were, in substance, as follows:

First Specification, in this.....That the said Brig. Gen. Wm. Hull did traitorously hire, or cause to be hired, at the rapids of the river Miami of the lake, on the 1st day of July, 1812, an unarm

ed vessel, and did then and there traitorously put on board said vessel a trunk containing the official correspondence of the Secretary of war, with the said Brig. Gen. Wm. Hull, touching the expedition of the north-western army, under the said Hull's command; also, the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain; and also, certain official muster-rolls, reports, and returns of the numbers, state, and condition of the said northwestern army....and dispatched the same from the said rapids, with intent that the same should fall into the hands of the said enemy: and that afterwards, on the 2d day of July aforesaid, the said unarmed vessel was captured by the enemy, by means whereof, and in fulfilment of the said traitorous design of the said Brig. Gen. Wm. Hull, the said correspondence, and the said muster-rolls, reports, and returns came to the possession, knowledge, and use of the enemies of the United States: whereby the said Brig. Gen. Wm. Hull, at the rapids of the river of the Miami of the lake aforesaid, did then and there traitorously hold correspondence with, and give intelligence to the enemy; and did then and there traitorously, by the means aforesaid, adhere to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and comfort.

Second specification. Also in this....That afterwards, to wit, on the 8th Aug. 1812, at Sandwich, in the province of Upper Canada, the said Brig. Gen. Wm. Hull did traitorously conspire with the enemies of the United States, to quit and abandon a military post established by the north-western army of the United States, at or near Sandwich aforesaid, with intent to prevent a certain fort called Malden, belonging to the enemy, from being attacked and reduced by the said north-western army of the United States, under the command of the said Brig. Gen. Wm. Hull: and that in pursuance of the said traitorous intention, the said Brig. Gen. Wm. Hull did quit and abandon, and did cause to be quitted and abandoned, the said military post, and did traitorously omit and peglect to make the necessary preparations for attacking and reducing the said enemy's fort called Malden: and did traitorously march, withdraw, and remove the said north-western army of the United States from the said military post at Sandwich aforesaid, to Detroit, in the territory of Michigan: whereby the said Brig. Gen. Hull, on the 8th day of Aug. aforesaid, did traitorously hold correspondence with the enemy, quit, and abandon the said military post at Sandwich aforesaid, omit and neglect the necessary preparations for the reduction of Malden aforesaid, and adhere to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and comfort.

Third specification. Also in this.....That afterward, to wit, at Detroit aforesaid, on the 16th Aug. 1812, the said Brig. Gen. Hull was then and there commander of a certain fort belonging to the United States, called Fort Detroit, and did traitorously conspire with the enemy to surrender and abandon to them the said fort,

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