says at p. 753 of the report: "They are a com. pany for maintaining the pier and the harbour. Piers and harbours are no doubt works of great importance to the public, and the maintenance of them is for the public utility. So is a railway, so is a tramway, so is a canal; and one might mention other things in the same category. The company are to spend their money in paying interest on charges, they are to keep up their pier and harbour, and beyond that there is to be a sinking fund provided. They are a commercial company intending to earn, and in fact earning, dividends year by year for the benefit of the shareholders. I do not see myself the distinction between that and a railway company incorporated by special Act with reference to the Lands Clauses Act, and the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, and subsequent Acts." The real basis of that decision is that they could not be treated as a public authority having done something in execution of their Act, or neg lecting their duty under their Act, because it was merely a commercial undertaking. The distinction between that case and this is obvious when all the Acts are considered, because this was a commercial undertaking working for nobody's profit at all, simply working for the benefit of the public, and no pecuniary advantage was derived by anybody. There are borrowing powers, and persons lending them money will get interest on the money; but counsel for the plaintiffs endeavoured to point out that that makes it the same kind of case as the Margate case. To my mind it is not; these people are simply creditors, and nobody in this case takes any profit upon it as a commercial transaction. The result is that those points are, to my mind, all to be decided in favour of the defendants. I think counsel for the defendants simply put this point with regard to the Margate case in this way that the body of the commissioners rendered services with no idea of profit or private gain, or for the benefit of any particular persons -they are simply rendering a public duty. I agree with that view. But I am afraid that that does not dispose of this case, because the next point taken was that there was no duty whatever upon the commissioners in connection with matters complained of in this case. That appears to me to be erroneous when it is to be remembered that sect. 33 of the Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act of 1847 is incorporated in these Acts, and if this second railway staith was authorised to be made by the private Act the Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act applies, and sect. 33 applies, and sect. 2 shows that it applies to any works authorised by the said Acts which have incorporated the Harbours, Docks, and Piers Act; and so the commissioners, although it may be they were under no duty to create and construct the pier and staith, when they had constructed it and opened it to the public, it seems to me that it became their duty under their Act to take proper care to keep it in such a state that ships should be in safety, and to entitle them to charge their tolls, and so forth. But that again does not make an end of this case, because the next point is one of considerable complexity, and it is this: that the staiths were not made under the Act at all or either of them, because it was said (on the points VOL. X., N. S. | [ADM. that were taken about its former structure I have already referred to) that it is 7ft. higher than shown on the plan, and 200 yards away from the position which was shown on the plan, and the point that was there made was made in consequence of the provisions of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845. I am afraid it will take too long to read them through for this judgment, but the sections relied on were sects. 11, 12, and 15, and I think I may state in substance the effect of them. Sects. 11 and 12 deal with this, that the company which is making the railway authorised is not to make it more than 5ft. higher in any place without getting the consent of the owners and occupiers of the land, and so forth, and if they can get those consents they still have to give public notice previous to making alterations, they have to get a certificate from the Board of Trade, and at the end of sect. 12 it says: It shall not be lawful for the company to make such deviations except in conformity with such certificate. It is not said here that the commissioners had any certificate to increase the height more than 5ft. above the level shown and make it up to 7ft., but I think it is tolerably plain from what took place afterwards in connection with the Act of 1872 that they had practically the consent of the surrounding landlord, who was only in this case the Duke of Northumberland. That is the practical position, having regard to the Act of 1872. Then the 15th section provides that it is not lawful for the company to deviate from the line drawn, because there is no line drawn on the plan to show where the railway shall go to a greater extent than 100 yards from the side line. And so the point is made that under those provisions this staith and railway are wholly unauthorised structures. There is no doubt that this is a difficult point, and there are an enormous number of cases in connection with this subject in which railways and other com. panies have exceeded the strict limits of what is stated by their Act and by the sections to be lawful. But I think it is difficult to find anything to show that there was any effectual remedy or restraint on this except for the benefit of those persons who are affected by what they have done; and a case which was cited in the course of the argument before me-namely, Sir Robert Herron v. Rathmines and Rathgar Improvement Commissioners (67 L. T. Rep. 658; (1892) A. C. 498) -contains one or two passages in the judg ment, one by Lord Halsbury and one by Lord Watson, which deal with this class of case from a broad point of view. Watson, for instance, says: "The only remedy which the court can give is by enjoining the respondents to desist from interfering with the water of the river Dodder until the Act has been complied with, and in my opinion the appellants are entitled to this remedy." I have looked through a great many cases on this subject, and all appear to me to be cases in which somebody has a grievance either by the water being cut off or complaining of the increase of height, deviation, and so on, for which they seek to get an injunction to restrain a company from doing that which is complained of, but I confess I have very considerable difficulty in working that out sufficiently in this case, that when a railway and staiths are within the limits of deviation on land taken for the purpose, and where nobody has complained 3 G Lord in any shape or form, when the commissioners themselves cannot say they have done what is wrong, when the plaintiffs in this case are taking advantage of the staiths, I think it is extremely difficult to make out that this is such a wholly unauthorised structure, even under this Act, as to say that the commission no longer ought to be treated as a public authority acting under the Act and no longer ought to have the benefit of the Public Authorities Protection Act, because we are not complaining of an act you have done in the execution or intended execution of you. powers, nor of any neglect or default of what you have done under your powers, because everything you have done is wholly unauthorised. It seems to me too strong a proposition to be reasonably maintained. Even if that is not a correct view of the effect of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act on the Act of 1867, there still remains a very strong point in favour of the defendants in relation to this Act of 1872; and, although it is perfectly true they say that the following provisions shall be enforced for the protection of the said dues, in terms it gives authority, and not only authority, but more than authority. It says: "The commissioners shall construct a quay and dock within the limits shown on the deposited plan, and shall, in or near the land to be acquired by them as aforesaid under the authority of this Act, and on the land which has been acquired by them under the authority of the Act of 1867, construct and maintain, in such manner as they shall arrange, all requisite railways, railway approaches, and shipping places in connection with the said quay and docks, with all necessary sidings, standage, and conveniences." Even if that is for the protection it may involve something more, especially when I regard this, that at the close of sub-sect. 2 of sect. 5 of the Act of 1872 there is a provision that all persons who use the quay, dock, or rail. way and conveniences provided within this Act or the Act of 1867 shall pay dues to the commissioners authorised by that Act and by the Act of 1867. Well, possibly that section was only put in with a view of dealing with the duke's position, but it seems to me to go beyond the mere limit of that protection, and that the railway and staith in this case might be treated as having beenconstructed under the powers which are there conveyed. But I ought not to omit to say that the only answer that was made to this point that I could appreciate-unless, perhaps, the point was made that this was only for the protection of the duke, which I think it was, and I have already dealt with it-the only substantial point which was dealt with by counsel for the plaintiffs was that the staith and railway were not in connection with the quay, the works being railway and other works connected therewith, and sect. 4, sub-sect. 2, says: "Railways, railway approaches, and shipping places in connection with the said quay and docks." And on sect. 5, sub-sect. 2, he contended that the quay and railway were not connected at all, that the one was not connected with the other because the supports of the railway staiths, although on the quay, were supporting a railway staith above the quay, and if you were going over the top of the quay you were not going on anything connected with it. I confess to my mind that is too great a refinement. It appears to me when there is a quay, and that quay is a shipping [ADM. place alongside which vessels come, it is a work of convenience connected with the quay, because that is practically the only way in which the quay is used, and therefore I am prepared to decide this case on the ground, so far as this point is concerned, that the work may be reasonably treated to be authorised by the Act which confers their power on the commissioners. It would be a very awkward thing indeed for the commissioners if it was not so, because this particular point would not end their difficulty. It is a small matter compared with the point as to whether they succeed in getting solicitor and client costs in this case. It is not at all a small matter if they have no right to levy any tolls in this case and no right to do anything of that kind. One other point I should wish to refer to, it may not be necessary to express a definite opinion on it, but it is on the terms of the Act itself of 1893. The first section I have already read; there are just two sentences which are important -the object is to give protection against "any action, prosecution, or proceeding." There was a point made on this by counsel for the defendants, which, even if it could be successfully established, that these works were not strictly authorised by the Act, and he stated that what was complained of having been done was that the defendants had done something which they were not authorised to do, and that had done damage. And the point counsel for the defendants took was that even if that was not done in pursuance of an actual authority, it was done, at any rate, in intended execution of an Act of Parliament, and of their public duty, or authority. The answer made by counsel for the plaintiffs was that that could only be a sound point if the duty was in fact established; that is to say, that unless there was a structure made within the terms of the Act so as to bring in the Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act there never was any duty at all, and therefore, as the matter was a wholly unauthorised structure, the Act could not apply. I am not quite sure myself that that answer is a sound one. I think possibly if these sections are construed without the light of any decision before it might be said that the words "act done" meant something that was being complained of, not in the negligent way of doing the act, but in fact that the act was done itself either in pursuance, execution, or intended execu tion of the Act of Parliament, or public duty, or authority; and that the latter part, namely, something which is done where the proceeding is in respect of a neglect, or a default, that the execution of such act, duty, or authority, might be limited to a case where there was in fact a constituted duty, or authority. But there is one case which seems to go a little farther than that view, though not on this particular section, and that is the case of Joliffe v. Wallasey Local Board (29 L. T. Rep. 582; 2 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 146; L. Rep. 9 C. P. 62). The Wallasey Local Board had erected a pier at New Brighton, and had placed an anchor out which was part of the means of keeping the pier in its place, and had neglected properly to buoy the anchor. And one point was taken in that case that all the material part of the works were outside the powers of the Wallasey Local Board, and that, at any rate, even if they were within the powers of the Wallasey Local Board the neglect to put a buoy ADM.] ASSHETON-SMITH AND OTHERS v. OWEN. was not an act done; the act done was putting the anchor, and what was complained of was not putting the anchor, but neglecting to buoy it. That case does not really distinctly decide what is necessary for the present case, because I think the court decided that these works were in fact authorised by the Acts which gave the power to erect them, but they did decide this further, that an act done includes not only the act itself but the negligently doing of the act, and there are several passages in the judgment of Keating, J. and Brett, J.-as he was then-afterwards Lord Esher, which show that the words "act done are not limited merely to the doing of the act, but doing it in an improper manner, and at p. 88 of the 9th volume of the Common Pleas Reports the late Lord Esher said this: "But Mr. Aspinall takes another point. He says, as the anchor was negligently placed out of the limits of the board's jurisdiction, the omission to mark its position could not be a thing done, or intended to be done, under the provisions of the Act; that is to say, that, though a negligent omission may give them a right to notice, yet for a negligence upon a negligence they are not entitled to notice. That proposition cannot, as it seems to me, be maintained. All the conduct which gave rise to the cause of action was something which was bona fide intended to be done by the defendants under the provisions of the Act." Well, if that is strictly applicable to this section of the Act of 1893 now under consideration, it is an authority in favour of the defendants. Speaking for myself, I should have thought that it was, to say the least, doubtful on that section. Where you have to contrast between the act done, which is complained of, and neglect or default which is complained of, different considerations might apply, and I only deal with this point rather for the purpose of noticing it, and showing that I have not neglected it before concluding my judgment, because the defendants' position seems to me to be covered by what I have already said. But I think it is quite possible that this section may be construed so as to give protection to a body in the position of the defendants if they do something in the honest belief that their Acts are being complied with, and intend to comply with them, and then a complaint is made that they have not done what they ought to have done, and bave not done properly what they have in fact done. They require this protection if they have any protection as a public authority at all, just as much as if they are being sued for neglect of an admitted duty. I prefer to place my judgment on this point on the other parts of the case, because I think they are more important to the commissioners. For these reasons I am of opinion that the commissioners are entitled to have their costs taxed as between solicitor and client. Judgment has already been entered for them, but it must be added that they are to have their costs on that footing, and in taxing the costs the registrar will do so on the assumption that the arguments which began after the 22nd May were continued without a break and finished within a reasonable time. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Ince, Colt, and Ince. Solicitors for the defendants, Thomas Cooper and Co., for Clayton and Gibson, Newcastle-onTyne. HOUSE OF LORDS. [H. OF L. Feb. 25, 26, and March 18, 1907. (Before the LORD CHANCELLOR (Loreburn), Lords MACNAGHTEN, JAMES OF HEReford, and ATKINSON.) ASSHETON-SMITH AND OTHERS v. OWEN. (a) ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL IN ENGLAND. Port-Limits of port-Fiscal port-Docks excavated contiguous to port-Carnarvon Harbour Acts 1793 (33 Geo. 3, c. cxxiii.) and 1809 (49 Geo. 3, c. xxiv.). The "port of Carnarvon " within the Carnarvon Harbour Acts 1793 and 1809 must be construed to mean the fiscal port, not the port in its ordinary sense. Therefore, where a landowner had constructed docks and quays of his own on his own land, at a place in the Menai Straits about four miles north of the harbour of Carnarvon, which place was, at the time of the passing of the Carnarvon Harbour Acts, dry land, and was in the habit of loading vessels at such quays with slates from quarries on his land, which vessels usually passed out at the north end of the straits without passing or using the harbour of Carnarvon, and returned by the same route bringing goods for the use of the landowner, which were unloaded at his quays: Held, that the docks and quays so constructed must be considered as an extension of the port, being within the limits of the fiscal port, and that the harbour trustees were entitled to demand tolls from the vessels using the docks, and dues on the goods shipped or landed at the quays, in accordance with their Acts. Judgment of the court below affirmed. The case is reported 10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 164; 94 L. T. Rep. 42; (1906) Í Ch. 179. The action was brought by the appellants against the respondent, who was the collector and treasurer of the Carnarvon Harbour Trust, they being able by statute to be sued in his name, for a declaration that Port Dinorwic, where the plaintiff Assheton-Smith and his predecessors in title had constructed docks, wharves, and quays, was not within the limits of the port or harbour of Carnarvon; that the trustees were not entitled to claim tolls on vessels passing through_the north end of the Menai Straits to or from Port Dinorwic, or any dues or rates on goods loaded or unloaded on or from such vessels at the docks, wharves, or quays of the plaintiffs; and an injunction restraining the trustees from claiming from or enforcing payment by the plaintiff's of any such tolls, dues, or rates as above mentioned. The facts appear from the headnote above and from the report in the court below, where the sections of the Carnarvon Harbour Acts of 1793 and 1809 are set out. Danckwerts, K.C., P. O. Lawrence, K.C., and Peterson, K.C. appeared for the appellants, and contended that Port Dinorwic, which was situated (a) Reported by O. E. MALDEN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. H. OF L.] ASSHETON-SMITH AND OTHERS v. OWEN. in the Menai Straits, about four miles to the north of Carnarvon, was not within the limits of that port in the ordinary meaning of the words, and the Acts must be construed in accordance with the ordinary use of language. Straits may be divided between two jurisdictions: Reg. v. Cunningham, 1 Bell's Cr. Cas. 72; 28 L. J. 66, M. C.; Wright v. Harris, 49 J. P. 628; Reg. v. Kleyn, 2 Ex. Div. 63; Direct United States Cable Company v. AngloAmerican Telegraph Company, 36 L. T. Rep. 265; 2 App. Cas. 394; Reg. v. Musson, 8 E. & B. 900; Embleton v. Brown, 3 E. & E. 234; 30 L. J. 1, Hale de Jure Maris, c. 4, p. 10. At common law it is part of the prerogative of the Crown to fix the limits of a port, and to grant to a subject a franchise of a port empowering him to levy tolls. The real question is the distinction between the "port" in the ordinary, local, shipping sense, and in the artificial fiscal sense. See Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & Ald. 268. The words of an Act of Parliament must be construed at any time in the same sense that they bore when it was originally passed. See Rex v. Cockerton, 84 L. T. Rep. 488; (1901) 1 K. B. 726; Attorney-General v. County Council of West Riding of Yorkshire, 95 L. T. Rep. 845; (1907) A. C. 29. When these Acts were passed, what is now Port Dinorwic was dry land. As to the interpretation of statutes, see Metropolitan Water Board v. New River Company, Stockton and Darlington Railway Company v. Hull Dock Company v. Priestly, 1 Nev. & Man. 85; Kingston-upon-Hull Dock Company v. Browne, 2 B. & Ad 43. All these cases lay down that a tax must be clearly and unambiguously imposed to make the subject liable, and that private Acts of Parlia ment are to be construed strictly against the promoters. [The LORD CHANCELLOR.-Is there not a distinction between a profit-earning company and such a body as the corporation of town?] There is no real distinction. The harbour trustees are seeking to impose a tax on the public. It is not put on the ground of profitearning in the cases, but includes everyone who wishes to impose a tax on the public. See also Gildart v. Gladstone, 11 East, 675; In this case the ships going to or from Port Dinorwic for the most part pass in and out at the north end of the straits, and do not come near the local harbour of Carnarvon at all, or derive any benefit from it, and the tolls are imposed upon those who receive a benefit from the use of the harbour in its ordinary shipping sense, not in the fiscal sense. The trustees do not clean or maintain the appellants' docks. See Trustees of Clyde Navigation v. Laird, 8 App. Matson v. Scobell, 4 Burr. 2258; [H. OF L. Harvey v. Mayor of Lyme Regis, 21 L. T. Rep. Reg. v. Hannam, 2 Times L. Rep 234; Sailing Ship Garston Company v. Hickie, 53 The appellants and their predecessors in title bave paid the tol.s in former years, but contemporary usage is not conclusive in the interpretation of statutes. See Northam Bridge Company v. The Queen, 55 L. T. Warmington, K.C., Eldon Bankes, K.C., and Montgomery, who appeared for the respondent, were not called on to address their Lordships. At the conclusion of the argument for the appellants their Lordships took time to consider their judgment. March 18.-Their Lordships gave judgment as follows: The LORD CHANCELLOR (Loreburn). - My Lords: The main question raised in this case is whether or not Port Dinorwic and certain docks, quays, and wharves there situated are “within the limits of the said port" of Carnarvon as those words are used in the 5th section of a private Act of Parliament passed in 1809. This private Act follows upon and supplements another private Act passed in 1793. Now, it is admitted that rates and duties have been paid for a long series of years by the late Mr. Assheton-Smith and his predecessors in title upon the footing that the places in question were within the said port. But it is now maintained that the words "the limits of the said port" mean the limits of the local or popularly understood port of Carnarvon, and not the wider limits of the fiscal port of Carnarvon. If so, then, as these places are not within the local port, the rates and duties ought not to have been paid and are not now payable. In my opinion, the words "limits of the said port mean the limits of the fiscal port. Those limits were in 1809 already perfectly ascertained by a return of commissioners dated the 21st Nov. 1723, which, pursuant to certain general Acts, settled 'the extent, bounds, and limits of the said port." I think that the 5th section of the Act of 1809 was worded in accordance with that return, and meant to embrace all the limits therein settled. It is reasonable that it should have been so, for a clause imposing rates and duties presumably refers to some known area. The area of the fiscal port was rigidly ascertained; but the area of the local or popularly understood port is indefinite and unascertained. I agree also with Cozens-Hardy, L.J. in thinking that sect. 7 of the Act of 1809 confirms this view, and is inconsistent with any other. Nor can I find, upon examination of the two private Acts, any expressions which are incompatible with the view that rates and duties were to be imposed throughout the fiscal port. I will not go through the sections. It was argued that in cases of doubt we ought to consider the benefits bestowed by the Act in return for the taxation, and to measure the incidence of the tax by the extent of the benefit. I do not think that there is really any doubt here, but if there be, then it seems to me that 66 H. OF L.] ASSHETON-SMITH AND OTHERS v. OWEN. this argument tells against the appellants. The entire area of the fiscal port derives benefit from the works and services provided for in these two private Acts, the execution and maintenance of which is in part, at all events, made possible by the tax which the appellants seek to escape while reaping its fruits. In regard to the contention of the appellants that the loading and unloading at a dock or quay constructed by excavation by the appellants predecessors in title on places where there was dry land in 1809 is not loading or unloading within the port as it existed in 1809, I think that the point cannot be seriously argued. It seems impossible, for example, to suppose that, if a frontager on the Thames chose to excavate some hundreds of feet long and some 50ft. deep of his frontage backward from the river, he could then construct a quay there and say that in loading and unloading he was outside the Port of London. Yet that is the logical conclusion of the appellants' argument. These places must be in some port, and, in my opinion, are in the port of Carnarvon. Nor, indeed, is any other port suggested. I am therefore of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed with costs. Lord MACNAGHTEN and Lord JAMES OF HEREFORD Concurred. Lord ATKINSON.-My Lords: Two questions are raised for decision in this case. First, what is the true meaning of sect. 5, the charging section in a confused and ill-drawn local Act (49 Geo. 3, c. xxiv.) passed in the year 1809, which is in pari materia with an earlier local Act, equally confused and equally ill-drawn (33 Geo. 3, c. cxxiii.), passed in the year 1793, which must be construed together with it? And, second, the question whether the owner of land abutting on the foreshore of a port or harbour in which dues are levied under statutory authority for the loading or unloading of ships who excavates contiguous to this foreshore a dock in his land, and also a canal to conduct the water of the harbour into that dock, can, by loading and unloading his ship in the dock so constructed, escape the liability to dues ? 1 concur with Stirling and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ. that these new works must be regarded as an artificial extension of the port or harbour, and that it would not be consistent either with common sense or reason to hold that the person loading and unloading ships within the limits of the extension should escape liability to the appropriate tolls or dues. I therefore dismiss this question from further consideration. and 66 I There remains the question of the proper construction of the language of the statutes. concur with the judges of the Court of Appeal in thinking it a difficult question. As I understood Mr. Danck werts, he was towards the end of his argument obliged, rather reluctantly, to admit that the expressions "port of Carnarvon " harbour of Carnarvon" meant the same thing-namely, the local port of Carnarvon, as distinguished from the fiscal port, and, further. that this local port had no defined or ascertained limits. I gather from the judgment of Vaughan Williams, LJ., if I rightly understand it, that he was of opinion that, while the word port in the charging sections should be construed to include the port of Dinorwic, it did not mean the fiscal 66 [H. OF L. port. And after dealing with the payment of dues by Mr. Assheton-Smith, his predecessors in title, and others for many years for loading and unloading vessels in Dinorwic, he apparently condensed the reasons for his judgment on this point in the following sentence: "And I think that we ought in the light of this practice to hold that the words 'within the limits of the said port of Carnarvon' in the sections relating to the loading and unloading of vessels within the limits of the said port, whether these words do or do not extend to the whole Customs port, extend at least to an area which covers Port Dinorwic." The other Lords Justices adopted the construction contended for by the trustees, and held that the word "port" meant the fiscal port, whose limits had been defined by the commissioners acting under 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11. For myself I must confess that I am unable to form any conception of what the extent or limits of that port must be, which is at once larger than the local port, smaller than the fiscal port, and yet extensive enough to include within it the port of Dinorwic. And I am unable to find anything in either of the private Acts to suggest that such a port comes within their purview. In the interpretation of these statutes the choice must therefore, I think, lie between the fiscal port and the local port, and, in my opinion, it has been rightly made in favour of the former. In the year 1793 the limits of the fiscal port remained as they had been ascertained and defined by the order of the commissioners of the 21st Nov. 1723. The port extended from the Britannia Rock to Afon-Hen. The open places for loading and unloading goods within this fiscal port, styled the port of Carnarvon, had been by the same order defined. They are either embraced within the harbour, or local port, or immediately contiguous to it. The first thing that strikes one on looking into the Act of 1793 is this, that the ex officio members of the body of trustees constituted for putting the Act in force are not only the mayor, deputy-mayor, and bailiff of the town and liberty of Carnarvon, but the justices of the peace for the entire county of Carnarvon, and the officers whose jurisdiction and authority extended over the entire fiscal port, the collector, comp troller, and surveyor of the Customs of the Port of Carnavon (i.e., the fiscal port) for the time being; and that by the fasciculus of sections from 6 to 18 inclusive powers over practically the whole area of the fiscal port, such as are usually conferred on port or harbour authorities, are given to these trustees. Sect. 8 clearly contemplates the existence of banks and shores existing in the port of Carnarvon upon which buoys and beacons are to be placed, as well as banks and shores leading to the port of Carnarvon. It is impossible, in my opinion, to hold that in this section the words "port of Carnarvon can be confined to the harbour or local port, or more especially when it is remembered that sect. 10 evidently contemplates that the harbour should be thoroughly scoured and all obstructions removed from it. Again, sect. 9 authorised the erection of a lighthouse at Llandwyn Point, and sect. 12 vests in the trustees all the works they may erect in pursuance of the Act wherever situate, as well as the ground on which these works stand. The expression "port of Carnarvon" only occurs in three sections of the Act preceding the 16th section-namely, the first, second, and third. In the first and second |