impossible to explain how this beam of wood got fixed in the extraordinary position which enabled it to do the damage. It is a square-headed baulk of timber, 12in. by 12in., and 13ft. long, pointed at one end, with no iron upon it, and it was found with the square head driven some 2ft. or 3ft. in the soil and firmly planted there with the pointed end slanted upwards. Now, if the occurrence of such a thing as that is to us now so unaccountable that no reasonable hypothesis of its happening can be suggested, it is obvious that no negligence can be imputed to the conservators in not having anticipated the possibility of such a thing and taken precautions against it. The very fact that it is so unusual shows that is not reasonable to expect that it could have been anticipated and guarded against. The only way in which the plaintiffs could have sustained their case against the defendants under those circumstances is, in my opinion, that they should have shown that this beam had been in that position for so long a time that the defendants knew, or would, if they had exercised reasonable care, have learned, that it was there and was a danger to navigation.

Now, the onus of proving that is unquestionably upon the plaintiffs, and, in my opinion, there is no adequate evidence to sustain their case. I am satisfied that there is no evidence which would justify a court in finding against the conservators that this pile had been there for such a period that they ought to have known about it. Even if we take it that it had been there at the last spring tide, it is clearly not the duty of the conservators to make every fortnight such a close examination as would have told them of the existence of any. thing so thoroughly unexpected and unlikely as this pile in this position. I am therefore of opinion that the plaintiffs have failed to sustain that issue. In my opinion their case only assumes a plausibility through a confusion in the use of the word " pile." It was contended that the vessel ran on a submerged pile at a place which the conservators ought to have known was bristling with piles. The fact of the case is that it is only in an historical sense that the instrument of mischief was a pile at all. It was not acting as a pile when it did the mischief. The shape which it had leads us to conclude that at some period of its existence it had been used as a pile, but it was not a pile in situ. It was merely a floating, water-logged beam of wood that had got into this strange position. The piles with which the place was bristling were piles in situthat is to say, driven into the ground and permanently fixed there. There is no connection whatever between the one use of the word "pile" and the other, and, in my opinion, this place was no more likely a place to find water-logged beams that had once been used as piles than any other place in the river.

BUCKLEY, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. The short outcome of the extraordinary facts of this case seems to me to be this, that there is no reason to suppose that this baulk of timber had been for any length of time in the exact position in which it caused the damage to the plaintiffs' vessel. It is quite impossible to say how long it had been there. The next material outcome of the facts seems to me to be this, that it cannot. possibly be attributed to the conservators as negligence that they did not anticipate that this baulk of timber would be found in this extra

ordinary position with its head downwards and its point upwards in the position in which it was.

There is no negligence on the part of the conservators, it seems to me, in not looking for the pile where no human being could have anticipated, or have any reason to suppose, that this extraordinary phenomenon would present itself to a vessel going through the centre arch of Kew Bridge. The appellants seek to put their case in some such form as this, that this place had so bad a character and so bristled with piles that the conservators ought to have investigated it, not because of the existence of this pile, which nobody could have expected them to know of, but because there were other piles. The argument may be put in a more concrete form thus: there was not negligence in not looking for pile A, but there was negligence in not looking for piles X and Y, which in point of fact have done no damage at all. The contention is that if the conservators had looked for X and Y, they would have found A, and that because they did not look for X and Y, they were negligent in not looking for A., although they had no reason to suppose that A was there.

It seems to me to be impossible to maintain that. In the first place, we are not trying the questionthere is no means of trying it—whether the conservators were negligent in not looking for piles X and Y. The appellants seek to evolve from the fact that under different circumstances damage might have resulted from some different act of negligence the conclusion that the conservators were negli. gent in not doing something which they were not bound to do-viz., look for the particular pile A which caused the damage. It seems to me that no negligence on the part of the conservators has been shown. I think, therefore, the appeal fails. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Thomas Cooper and Co. Solicitor for the conservators, W. S. Bunting.

June 12, 13, 14, and 25, 1907. (Before VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, MOULTON, and BUCKLEY, L.JJ.)

NELSON AND SONS LIMITED v. NELSON LINE, LIVERPOOL, LIMITED; AND Re ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE SAME. (a)

APPEAL FROM THE KING'S BENCH DIVISION. Charter-party-Lay days-Sundays and holidays excepted from working days-Loading on holi. days-Days saved in loading-Dispatch money -Agreement to load a two-weekly service of ships-Regularity not a condition precedent. By an agreement for the carriage of frozen meat from the River Plate to Liverpool it was agreed that, for a period of one year, the shipowners should provide a two-weekly service of ships, sailing at intervals of fourteen days, and that the charterers should fill the insulating chambers with frozen meat.

Held, by Vaughan Williams and Buckley, L.JJ. (Moulton L.J. dissenting), that, upon the terms of the agreement, the exact observance by the shipowners of the period of a fourteen days interval between each ship was not a condition (a) Reported by E. MANLEY SMITH, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

The charterers did part of the loading of a ship on two holidays, but there was no evidence of any express agreement under which the loading was so carried on, nor at whose suggestion it took place.

Held, by Vaughan Williams and Buckley, L.JJ. (Moulton, L.J. dissenting), that there was an implied agreement between the parties that these two holidays should be counted as working days" within the charter-party.

66

The charterers loaded a ship in two days less than the number of lay days that were allowed by the charter-party, one of such days being a Sunday.

Held, by Vaughan Williams and Buckley, L.JJ. (Moulton, L.J. dissenting), that the Sunday was not a day "saved in loading" which entitled the charterers to be paid dispatch money. Branckelow Steamship Company v. Lamport and Holt (10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 472 (1897); 96 L. T. Rep. 886n.; (1907) 1 K. B. 787n.) and The Glendevon (7 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 439; 70 L. T. Rep. 416; (1893) P. 269) approved. THESE were appeals from the judgment of Channell, J. at the trial of the action without a jury (10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 472, note (b) (1907), and from the judgment of Bray, J. upon a special case stated by an arbitrator (10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 390 (1907). The plaintiffs were charterers and the defendants were shipowners.

By an agreement dated the 18th June 1904 the Nelson Line, Liverpool, Limited, described therein as "the owners," agreed to carry frozen meat for James Nelson and Sons Limited, described therein as "the charterers," from the River Plate to Liverpool or London.

The agreement recited that the owners had services of cargo and live stock steamers which they were running, or proposed to run, as a twoweekly line from the River Plate to the port of Liverpool and as a monthly line from the River Plate to the port of London, and that the charterers had agreed to ship their output to the United Kingdom of frozen meat and offal by the said lines, and that the owners had agreed to carry the same on the conditions thereinafter contained. It then provided (inter alia):

Clause 1. The owners engage as from the date when their respective vessels arrive in the River Plate and are ready to load outwards to place the vessels of the line from time to time sailing in the lines herein specified or other vessels of equal capacity at the disposal of the charterers for the carriage from the River Plate of frozen meat and the charterers agree to ship in each vessel so much frozen meat and offal as will fill such insulated chambers.

Clause 2.

the service of the lines hereunder

is, sabject as hereinafter provided, to be a two-weekly one to the port of Liverpool and a monthly one to the port of London, having the sailings at intervals of fourteen days and thirty days respectively, and to last

VOL. X., N. S.

for one year from the 1st Jan. 1904, and to be subject to continuance as hereinafter provided.

Clause 6. On arrival of each steamer at the loading berth in the River Plate, notice shall be given to the charterers or their agents in writing of her readiness to load; such notice shall not be given until the temperature of the insulated chambers for frozen meat sball have been reduced to at least 22 degrees Fahrenheit, and the temperature shall be maintained thereat, or lower, up to the time of shipment commencing. . The aforesaid notice of readiness shall be left at the office or place of business of the charterers in the River Plate between the hours of 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. Twelve hours after the receipt of such notice the lay days of the steamer shall commence, provided the aforesaid temperature of 22 degrees Fahrenheit shall have been maintained in the insulated chambers set apart for frozen meat

since the

beginning of such notice or as soon thereafter as the temperature may have been maintained at that temperature for a period of twelve hours. Seven weather working days (Sundays and holidays excepted) to be allowed by owners to charterers for loading. For any time beyond the periods above provided the charterers shall pay to the owners demurrage at the rate of 401. (forty pounds) per day, and so in proportion for any part of a day, payable day by day. For each clear day saved in loading the charterers shall be paid, or allowed by the owners, the sum of 201. The charterers shall be at liberty to send the meat alongside and the vessels of the line shall receive it by night, if required by the charterers to do so, they (the charterers) paying all extra expenses caused to the owners through so doing.

On the 5th March the Highland Heather, a vessel of the defendants' line, having arrived at the plaintiffs' factory at Las Palmas, in the River Plate, notice was given at 2 p.m. that she was ready to load.

On the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, and 13th March loading took place, and finished at 8.30 a.m. on the 14th March.

The 11th March was a Sunday, and on that day no loading took place.

The 13th and 14th March were public holidays, but loading took place on those two days; there was no evidence to show at whose suggestion the loading took place, nor whether there was any agreement in relation thereto.

On the 11th March the Highland Enterprise, another vessel of the defendants' line, arrived; and notice of her readiness to load was given on the 14th March. Her loading began on the 21st and finished on the 27th March.

The action was brought to recover the sum which the charterers had paid to the owners under protest. in respect of demurrage, and for 401. dispatch money, the charterers contending that two days had been saved in loading, in respect of which they were entitled under the agreement to 401. dispatch money.

The owners contended that the holidays counted as working days because loading had taken place on them, so that the number of lay days allowed under the agreement had been exceeded; and they claimed demurrage for fourteen and a half hours, or, alternatively, six and a half hours.

At the trial of the action, Channell, J. gave judgment for the owners: (10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 472, note (b) (1907); 96 L. T. Rep. 887n.; (1907) 1 K. B. 788n).

In the second case a dispute had arisen between the parties which, under an arbitration clause in the agreement, had been referred to arbitra

tion.

4 A

The following cases were cited:

Commercial Steamship Company v. Boulton, 3
Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 111 (1875); 33 L. T.
Rep. 707; L. Rep. 10 Q. B. 346;
Laing v. Hollway, 3 Q. B. Div. 437;
The Glendevon (ubi sup.) ;

The Katy, 7 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 510, 527 (1894); 71 L. T. Rep. 709; (1895) P. 56;

The Moorcock, 6 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 357, 373 (1888);
60 L. T. Rep. 655; 14 P. Div. 64;
Houlder v. Weir, 10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 81 (1905);
92 L. T. Rep. 861; (1905) 2 K. B. 267 ;
Whittall and Co. v. Rahtken's Shipping Company
Limited, 10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 471 (1907); 96
L. T. Rep. 885; (1907) 1 K. B. 783;
Branckelow Steamship Company v. Lamport and
Holt, 10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 472, note (a) (1897);
96 L. T. Rep. 886n.; (1907) 1 K. B. 787n;
Nielsen and Co. v. Wait and Co., 5 Asp. Mar. Law
Cas. 553 (1885); 54 L. T. Rep. 344; 16 Q. B.
Div. 67;

Yeoman v. The King, (1904) 2 K. B. 429.

Cur.adv. vult.

June 25.-VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.J. read the following judgment:-The one judgment I am going to deliver will apply to both cases. There are two points in this case: one relates to the sequence of sailings, the other relates to the exception of Sundays and holidays from the lay days.

The contract was contained in a charterparty, and related to the carriage by the defendants, who are called the owners, of frozen meat of the plaintiffs from the River Plate to Liverpool or London, as the case might be. The plaintiffs' claim is for dispatch money due under the charter-party, and for the return of a sum of money paid under protest by the plaintiffs to the defendants in respect of demurrage. The contract begins with a preliminary statement, the terms of which I will read hereafter. This charter-party agreement, dated the 18th June 1904, provided (inter alia), first, that the owners, the defendants, engage as from the date when their respective vessels arrive in the River Plate and are ready to load outwards, to place the vessels of the line from time to time sailing in the lines named in the schedule thereto or other vessels of equal capacity at the disposal of the charterers for the carriage from the River Plate of frozen meat; and by clause 2: "The installation and machinery are, subject as hereinafter

provided, to be of sufficient power to cool the frozen meat chambers and keep them at a temperature of 22 degrees Fahrenheit. The service of the lines hereunder is, subject as hereinafter provided, to be a two-weekly one to the port of Liverpool and a monthly one to the port of London, having the sailings at intervals of fourteen and thirty days respectively, and to last for one year from the 1st Jan. 1904, and to be subject to continuance as hereinafter provided." The contention of the plaintiffs is that this stipulation that there was to be an interval of fourteen days is a condition precedent to the obligation of the plaintiffs, the charterers, to load as provided in clause 6 of the contract; and the plaintiffs contend that, if the vessel did not arrive in time to enable them, using the stipulated lay days period, to load it for a sailing date, they could refuse to load.

They contended that they were not hound to commence loading until such date as, using the stipulated lay days period, would make the ship to sail fourteen days from the previous ship's sailing. It was under this claim that the plaintiffs, in the case of the Highland Enterprise, which arrived at the plaintiffs' wharf on or about the 11th March 1906, being seven days only from the commencement of loading the preceding ship, the Highland Heather, claimed to be entitled to begin to load the Highland Enterprise on the 21st March 1906, and continue loading on the 22nd, 23rd, 24th, and 26th March, finishing on the 27th March at 9 a.m. The plaintiffs claim under these circumstances two days' dispatch money, and deny that they have incurred any demurrage. The defendants, on the other hand, insist that the loading ought to have commenced twelve hours after the presentation of the notice of readiness to load on the 14th March; and by a threat to exercise a lien over the cargo they compelled payment of 171. 138. 4d. by way of demurrage, which is the money the return of which is claimed by the plaintiffs in this action.

In my judgment Channell, J. was right when he held that the observance of the period of interval of fourteen days was not an absolute condition constituting a condition precedent to the obligation of the plaintiffs to load, and that the late arrival or non-arrival of a vessel at the proper time is not a justification for refusing to load the next vessel when she arrives, but can only form at the most a ground for claiming damages, and that the inconvenience which may arise as to the loading of the next vessel will be part of the damages consequential upon the late arrival, presuming the late arrival to constitute a breach of the charter-party, if the damages are recoverable at all. The obligation to load upon the charterers receiving notice in writing of the steamer's readiness to load is by clause 6 absolute, subject only to the performance of the condition as to temperature in that clause. The provisions of clauses 3 and 7, and the last part of clause 5, seem to me inconsistent with the intention that it should be a condition precedent to the obligation to load that each steamer should arrive at a fixed date or at a date approximately ascertain able. The date seems to me clearly flexible, and not a fixed date. I am by no means certain that the steamer arrived so late as to constitute a breach of the charter-party, or, having regard to the fact that it is obvious that the charterers must have contemplated when they entered into

the charter party the possibility that Liverpool | steamers and London steamers might overlap at Las Palmas, that the charterers did not take the risk of such overlapping, especially as there was only one loading berth. The dates for arrival, to use the expression of Lord Lindley in Potter and Co. v. Burrell and Sons (8 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 200 (1896); 75 L. T. Rep. 491; (1897) 1 Q. B. 97), are not "cardinal dates." plaintiffs say that; if you look at the whole charter-party and read the latter part of clause 2 and the recital, you will find that the arrival at intervals of fourteen days is a condition precedent to the obligation to load.

The

I do not agree; not only because a rigid period of fourteen days is inconsistent with the clauses to which I have called attention, but because, in my opinion, the preliminary recital and the latter part of clause 2, upon their true construction, were not intended to constitute arrival of the ships at fortnightly intervals a condition precedent to the obligation to load.

The preliminary recital runs thus: "Whereas the owners have services of cargo and live stock steamers which they are running, or propose to run, as a two-weekly line from the River Plate to the port of Liverpool and as a monthly line from the River Plate to the port of London, and the charterers have agreed to ship their output for the United Kingdom of frozen meat and offal by the said lines, and the owners have agreed to carry same on the conditions hereinafter contained." And the latter part of clause 2 runs thus: "The service of the lines hereunder is, subject as hereinafter provided, to be a two-weekly one to the port of Liver. pool and a monthly one to the port of London, having sailings at intervals of fourteen and thirty days respectively."

The object of the words which I have quoted is, in my opinion, not to make the sailings at such intervals, or the arrivals at Las Palmas, conditions precedent to the obligation to load, or that there should be sailings or arrivals at fixed dates, but merely that generally the sailings and arrivals should be, so far as may be consistent with the clauses thereafter appearing in the charter-party, at regular intervals in the one case of fourteen, and in the other case of thirty, days. I find nothing in the charter-party to lead me to the conclusion that the sailings of the ships were intended to be determined absolutely by the arrival of previous steamers; and I find nothing in the facts to lead me to the conclusion that the various arrivals, in fact, were such as to frustrate the commercial venture. This determines the first point.

The next point is about the holidays. The words are: "Seven weather working days (Sundays and holidays excepted) to be allowed by owners to charterers for loading. For

any time beyond the periods above provided the charterers shall pay to the owners demurrage at the rate of 401. per day, and so in proportion for any part of a day, payable day by day. For each clear day saved in loading the charterers shall be paid or allowed by the owners the sum of 201. The charterers shall be at liberty to send the meat alongside, and the vessels of the line shall receive it by night, if required by the charterers to do so, they (the charterers) paying all extra expenses caused to the owners through so doing." The charterers loaded in the case of the

Highland Heather on the 13th and 14th March, although those days were holidays. There was no express agreement, nor was there any evidence, as to on whose suggestion or on what terms the work was done. The plaintiffs allege that the 13th and 14th March could not count as lay days, and they claimed 401. dispatch money in respect thereof, and denied that any demurrage had been incurred. The defendants allege that the 13th and 14th March counted as lay days as they were worked on; they also allege that the lay days began at 2 a.m. on the 6th March and ended at the close of working hours-namely, at 6 p.m. on the 13th March; or, alternatively, that the lay days ended on the 14th March at 2 a.m. They therefore claimed that demurrage in respect of fourteen and a half hours, or, in the alternative, six and a half hours, had been incurred on the footing that a day in the charter-party meant a calendar day, and not a period of twenty-four hours. No dispatch money, they allege, had been earned.

Now, there can be no doubt but that the charterers' allowance of lay days is an allowance of seven weather working days (Sundays and holidays excepted) for loading that is to say, seven weather working weekdays, not being holidays, for loading. It follows from this that unless some fresh agreement is made, the charterers are entitled to seven working weekdays, not Sundays or holidays, for loading, and that demurrage will not begin until seven such working weekdays, not Sundays or holidays, have been exhausted, and the charterers will be entitled to dispatch money if the seven weekdays are unexhausted at the date when the loading is completed.

The whole question is whether any agreement can be found that, if a holiday is worked on, such day must count as a working weekdaythat is, as one of the seven days allowed for loading. It is clear that there was no express agreement, and therefore a fresh agreement must be an agreement inferred from the fact that loading was done on these holidays which could only have been by the acquiescence of the ship. owners and charterers. The decision of Lord Russell of Killowen in Branckelow Steamship Company v. Lamport and Holt (10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 472 (1897); 96 L. T. Rep. 886n.; (1907) 1 K. B. 787n.) is a clear authority that in a case where Sundays and holidays are excepted from the lay days-that is, where the allowance of lay days is an allowance of days which are neither Sundays nor holidays-and the charterers have asked the master to allow them to load on Sunday, and they do so load, it may fairly be inferred therefrom that both parties have agreed to treat that day as a working day; and he says that the same observations would apply to a recognised holiday. Except for the absence of the express request by the master, that case is a distinct authority in the present case, but of course it does not bind us in the Court of Appeal. The Katy (ubi sup.) is so far an authority in the present case, and it seems to me to decide that if the lay days are counted, not according to the calendar but as periods of twenty-four hours, that if for the convenience of all parties a portion of a day not a working day-that is, a day on which the shipowner was not bound to receive the cargo to be loaded-is used, it may be counted as a

lay day; and in arriving at this conclusion it followed the decision in Commercial Steamship Company v. Boulton (33 L. T. Rep. 707; 3 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 111 (1875); L. Rep. 10 Q. B. 346) in respect of the charter-party of the Boston. It is to be observed that in that case the question was whether a portion of a day was to be deducted from the loading time, and the jury found, and were held to be justified in finding, that the time of loading was to be deducted even though the loading took place in consequence of pressure put upon the charterers by the master. In The Katy (ubi sup.), which was a case of unloading which had to com. mence not at a fixed period, but at a reasonable time after the ship arrived, the court were of opinion that if nothing had happened on the Saturday, the day when the ship arrived, but on which she was not cleared till 10 a.m., when the master gave notice to the consignees of the cargo that the vessel was ready to discharge, the lay days would not have commenced until the Monday, but nevertheless, as the consignees chose to treat Saturday as an unloading day, Saturday must be treated as an unloading or lay day. The shipowner was not bound to deliver, and the consignees were not bound to receive, on the Saturday; either might have refused, and the consignees did at first refuse; but, instead of waiting until the Monday, the parties came to an agreement involving the waiver by one side of their strict rights, and the unloading did in fact begin at one o'clock in the afternoon of the Satur. day with the consent of the consignees, possibly owing to considerations as to the nature of the cargo. This is the statement by Rigby, L.J. at the end of the case. He infers an agreement involving the waiver of the strict rights of the parties, and does so in a case in which the consignees, whose strict rights were held to have been waived by unloading on Saturday, did so at the instance of the master of the ship.

I have no doubt myself but that an agreement to treat a holiday as a loading day may be inferred from the conduct of the charterers in a case where the charterers have a right by the terms of the charter-party to a given number of lay days which are not holidays, and I do not think that such an inference is excluded by the absence of evidence as to on whose suggestion and on what terms the work was done. I think that the judgment of Channell, J. should be affirmed. I think that the holidays worked on were rightly counted amongst the lay days; and, with regard to the dispatch money in the arbitration case, I agree with the judgment Buckley, L.J. is about to deliver.

MOULTON, LJ-These two cases arise out of a contract which is of a very peculiar character, and is very complicated in its nature. Two of the points raised are points of general importance by reason that this contract includes as part of its stipulations which are so much of the nature of a charter-party that the points are common to a vast number of ordinary charter-parties, which are not linked together in the complicated relationships of the contract in question. I shall deal with these two points of general interest first They relate to rules of interpretation which, as I have said, will affect a very large number of charter-parties, and the contention of the respondents here that there is, in respect of each of

them, direct authority binding on courts of first instance, but which we are entitled to review, is, I think, broadly speaking, supported; for if the cases to which the respondents refer us were rightly decided, it is difficult to distinguish the present case from them.

I shall therefore commence by considering these authorities, and then I shall pass to the exact case before the court in order to discover whether, if I am of opinion that these cases were wrongly decided, there is anything special in the present case which will justify our treating it as an exception. The two points in question relate to provisions for loading contained in clause 6 of this contract. They read as follows: "Seven weather working days (Sundays and holidays excepted) to be allowed by owners to charterers for loading. For each clear

day saved in loading the charterers shall be paid or allowed by the owners the sum of 201." In the present case the charterers and the shipowners, though not required to do so by the contract, did, as a matter of fact, work on two holidays, and the ship was loaded within the period allowed it by the above provisions; but the respondents claim that, as a matter of law, the court must presume that the working on the two holidays was in virtue of a contract that those holidays should be counted as working days, and should be taken out of the period allowed under clause 6, so that the owners are entitled to payment for two days' demurrage, although the ship was in fact loaded within the specified time. There is no pretence that any such contract was in fact made, and, although witnesses (including the captain of the vessel) were called at the trial by the shipowners to give evidence as to the circumstances of the ship's loading, no questions were asked them as to any terms whatever having been arranged in connection with the conjoint working of the charterers and the shipowners on the days in question. The case for the shipOwners, the respondents in this court, is based on the decision of the late Lord Russell of Killowen in Branckelow Steamship Company v. Lamport and Holt (ubi sup.) and the cases that followed it, and they also contend that the Court of Appeal in the case of The Katy (ubi sup.) laid down the same rule of law. I am of opinion that the decision in The Katy does not warrant the interpretation put upon it by the respondents for reasons that I will presently give, but that the decision in the case of Branckelow Steamship Company v. Lamport and Holt, and the subsequent decisions that follow that case, do support the contention of the respondents.

I propose, therefore, to consider whether they can be supported in law. They lay down that where a charterer is allowed a certain number of lay days (Sundays and holidays excepted), and work is actually done on excepted days, the court must presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that it was upon terms that these days should count as working days, and that the period allowed for loading should be correspondingly shortened. In my opinion this proposition cannot be supported.

It will be observed that the question has nothing to do with the interpretation of the contract contained in the charter-party. By the terms of that document the charterers are allowed a certain period for loading, and that