time appoint, not exceeding the dock tonnage, rates, rents, or sums specified in part 1 of the schedule to this Act.

Sect. 26. The tonnage rate which the company may from time to time demand and take in respect of any lighter, barge, or other like craft entering their new dock, lock, or tidal basin, and for lying therein, shall not exceed the rate, rent, or sum which from time to time is charged by them in respect of vessels trading coastwise between the port of London and any port or place in the United Kingdom: Provided always that any lighter, barge, or other light craft entering the new dock, lock, or tidal basin, to discharge or receive ballast or goods to or from on board of any vessel lying therein, shall be exempt from the payment of any rate, rent, or sum, so long as such lighter, barge, or other like craft shall be bonâ fide engaged in discharging or receiving such ballast or goods as aforesaid: Provided, also, that all such ballast or goods so discharged or received shall be exempt from any rate or charge whatever.

The London and St. Katharine and East and West India Docks Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. cxliii.), which was an Act to authorise a working union of the dock companies, provides :

Sect. 57. The rates, rents, or sums to be demanded and taken by the joint committee in respect of vessels for entering into any of the docks, basins, cuts, or entrances of the London company, and for lying therein and for departing therefrom respectively, shall not exceed the rates specified in part 1 of the schedule to the East and West India Dock Company's Extension Act 1882, and sect. 25 of the last-mentioned Act shall extend and apply not only to and in the case of the docks authorised by that Act, but to and in respect of all the docks and basins of the East and West India Company.

Walton, J. at the trial of the actions without a jury held that in neither case were the defendants justified under these Acts in demanding the dues which the plaintiffs paid under protest, and he, therefore, gave judgment for the plaintiffs in each of the actions.

The case is reported 10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 334 (1906); 96 L. T. Rep. 13.

The defendants appealed.

July 26.—Sir R. B. Finlay, K.C.. J. A. Hamilton, K.C., and George Wallace for the defendants.

Scrutton, K.C. and Cranstoun for the plaintiffs.
Cur. adv. vult.

July 31.-VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.J.-In the case of the lighter St. Thomas, which on the morning of the 24th Nov. 1905, entered the St. Katharine Dock with a cargo for the steamship Pladda, which was lying in the dock, she bad by 5 p.m. on Saturday the 25th Nov. discharged her cargo into the steamship Pladda. The steamship Pladda left on the next tide, which was about midnight of the 25th Nov., but the St. Thomas lay in the dock throughout Sunday, the 26th Nov. her owners alleging that Sunday was a non-working day. On Monday, the 27th Nov. the St. Thomas attempted to leave the dock on the early morning tide, but was stopped by the defendants, who demanded 11. 10s. 6d. as dues. The 11. 10s. 6d. was paid under protest, and this action is brought to recover back the money so paid.

There is no question but that the St. Thomas was an exempt barge within the meaning of sect. 136 of the London and St. Katharine

[CT. OF APP.

Docks Act 1864-that is, exempt from any rate or charge whatever so long as she was bona fide engaged in discharging or receiving ballast or goods to or from on board any ship or vessel lying in the docks; and this court held recently (London and India Docks Company v. Thames Steam Tug and Lighterage Company Limited, 97 L. T. Rep. 357 (1907) that these words applied not only to the time during which the barge or lighter was engaged in the physical act of discharging or receiving goods or ballast into or from a vessel lying in the docks, but also to the time during which she was going to the ship to lie alongside, or returning from the ship for the purpose of departure from the docks.

The St. Thomas, in my judgment, when she left the dock on Monday, the 27th Nov. was doing an act which was part and parcel of her entry into the docks to discharge goods into the Pladda. The question that we have to decide in this case arises from the fact that the St. Thomas did not leave the dock on the next available tide after the Pladda left, but lay in the dock throughout Sunday, the 26th Nov. her owners alleging that Sunday was a non-working day. Walton, J. has decided that Sunday was a working day, and that however prudent it may have been from the point of view of the master of the St. Thomas for him not to depart from the dock during the only two or three hours before midnight, during which a barge of her draught and class could leave the dock, being bound down the river Thames, and therefore able to proceed only on an ebb tide, and however reasonable it might be from his point of view for him to keep the barge within the dock for the Sunday, yet it was not reasonable that the barge should have the convenience of lying in the dock for Sunday without the obligation to pay the dock company for affording the barge that convenience. Walton, J. would have found in favour of the dock company had it not been that he arrived at the conclusion that the rate charged by the dock company when they obtained payment of the 17. 10s. 6d. from the master of the barge was a rate which the bargemaster was not liable to pay-in other words, was a bad rate. He begins by referring to the unreported case of the London and India Docks Company v. Union Lighterage Company, before the Lord Chief Justice, and Kennedy and Ridley, JJ. (Div. Court, May 23, 1905) a transcript of the shorthand writer's note of the judgments herein has been supplied to us-in which it was decided that where a lighter has come into a dock with cargo for a steamer lying in the dock, or to receive cargo from a vessel lying in the dock, and the lighter remains in the dock for a longer time than is reasonably necessary, the dock company cannot make a charge in respect of such unreasonable delay unless they have made some rate fixing the amount to be paid. Walton, J. goes on to consider whether the rate charged in this case is a bad rate, and comes to the conclusion that the rate charged is a bad rate.

Before discussing the grounds on which Walton, J. arrived at this conclusion, I feel bound to say that I am not satisfied that an exempt lighter can be charged for unreasonable delay so long as she is bonâ fide engaged in discharging or receiving goods or ballast to or from a ship lying in the dock. I doubt whether the dock company

can charge any rate so long as the delay is a delay which is not inconsistent with the barge being bona fide so engaged. Surely if there is any work to be done by those in charge of the lighter in the physical act of receiving or discharging from or to the vessel, the exempt vessel could not be charged a rate for lying in dock unless the receiving or discharging were so conducted as to negative the lighter being boni fide engaged in receiving or discharging from or to a vessel lying in the docks; so I think in a case of delay in departure no rate can be charged unless the. delay negatives the lighter being bona fide engaged in such loading or discharging. I think, therefore, one must test reasonableness from the point of view of the master of the craft which, in order to be exempt, has to be bona fide engaged.

In my judgment, the St. Thomas was bonâ fide engaged in such work, both when she did not depart during the two or three hours before the midnight high tide and also during Sunday.

The ground on which Walton, J. decides that the rate is a bad rate is this. He says: "The dock company have got a right to make a rate for the time during which the lighter remains in dock beyond the time that is reasonably necessary for discharging or receiving the goods; but if the lighter is an exempt lighter, and does remain longer than is necessary, I do not think that entitles the dock company to impose a rate upon such a lighter for departing from the dock. The dock company may impose these charges for entering, lying in the dock, and departing therefrom; but if the lighter is an exempt lighter, it certainly is exempt in respect of entering, and I think it is exempt in respect of departing, and it is exempt in respect of lying in the dock, so long as it does not lie longer than is reasonably necessary for the purpose of discharging or receiving cargo. Therefore if by this rate the dock company imposed a charge upon this lighter, which was an exempt lighter, for departing from the dock, then I think it is a bad rate. If it were treated as a charge merely for the time occupied beyond what was reasonably necessary, as a charge for lying in the dock, then I think that it is a bad rate, because if it is good, it must be good within the terms of sect. 25 of the Act of 1882, and Part 1 of the schedule. Part 1 of the schedule, which gives the maximum rate, is this: Vessels entering to load or discharge cargo, 1s. 6d. per ton register.' This lighter was exempt for entering. Then as to rent, and this is the only rate for rent which is given in the schedule: 'Rent to commence from date of entrance, or at such time thereafter as may be from time to time fixed by the company, 2d. per week per ton register.' I am of opinion that for lying in the dock longer than is necessary the dock company cannot charge more than 2d. Therefore I think this rate is bad." Taking the view that I do, it is not necessary for me to determine the point that is raised in the passage that I have read from the judgment of Walton, J., but if it were necessary to raise it I agree with that view.

I will now deal with the case of the Jew. The Jew went into the Royal Albert Dock on the 23rd Nov. 1905, in the morning, with goods for the steamer called the Matiana. The Matiana finished her loading on Saturday, the

25th, about noon. The Matiana left the dock without taking the goods which had been brought for her on board the Jew. They were shut out. The Jew did not leave the dock; she remained in the dock just as the St. Thomas remained in, through Sunday and until Monday morning. On the Monday morning, the 27th, the lighter was ordered not to leave the dock, but to transfer her cargo to the steamship Somali, which was expected, and which arrived in dock about noon on Monday. The Jew thereupon went to the Somali to put the goods which she had on board the Somali. The payment in question which the plaintiffs are seeking to recover back was demanded on the 28th, and was paid under protest. So far the case of the Jew is the same as the case of the St. Thomas, except that the St. Thomas discharged her cargo into the Pladda in accordance with the intention with which she entered the dock, whereas the Jew did not load the Matiana as she intended when she entered the dock, but loaded the Somali, a ship which was not lying in the dock when the Jew entered the dock. Walton, J. has held that the dock company cannot charge in respect of the 23rd, 24th, or 25th Nov. He says, and I think rightly, that his decision follows from the decision of Kennedy and A. T. Lawrence, JJ. in the London and India Docks Company v. Thames Steam Tug and Lighterage Company (95 L. T. Rep. 506 (1906); affirmed 97 L. T. Rep. 357). I agree that the effect of that case is that the lighter does not lose its privilege because the cargo which it brought in for some vessel was shut out.

The contention urged before us on behalf of the dock company has been that, according to the true construction of sect. 136, the words

“lying therein " mean lying therein at the time of the entry of the lighter entering into the docks, and that as the Somali was not lying therein at the time of the entry of the Jew into the dock, the exemption which arose for the purpose that the Jew should discharge goods into the Matiana is not available, since she proceeded to discharge into a vessel, the Somali, which was not lying in the dock when she entered. Now the words of sect. 136 are these: [His Lordship read the section].

In my judgment the words "lying therein " mean lying therein at the time of the discharge of the goods from the lighter into any ship or vessel lying therein, and do not mean at the time of the entry of the lighter into the dock. It is urged that the words "lying therein " upon that construction are surplusage and useless, since the barge which entered the dock could not discharge into, or receive from, a vessel unless the vessel were in the dock. My answer is that the words are not meaningless, for they describe that which is the truth, and that if the construction contended for was intended, "a ship or vessel" would have been more natural than "any ship or vessel." Moreover, it seems to me that if the Legislature intended that the barge or lighter entering the dock should only be exempt if it was going to render a service to a ship or vessel lying in the dock at the time when the lighter entered therein, it would have been very easy to have said so plainly.

In my judgment, in a case like this, in which it is sought to throw upon lightermen, who

CT. OF APP.]

at one time were entitled to free water in the docks, a tax on entering unless they were entering to load a particular ship lying in the dock at the time of entry, the dock company must point to plain words, and that if the words are ambiguous the dock company cannot enforce such a tax. Moreover, if a barge loses its exemption if she renders a service to a vessel which was not in the dock when the barge entered, it would seem that the goods would be liable to a rate; which is inconsistent with the concluding words in sect. 136 itself. I think that the observation of Lord Brougham in Stockton Railway Company v. Barrett (11 Cl. & Fin. 590, at p. 607), that "in dubio you are always to lean against the construction which imposes a burden on the subject," applies in this case, and is not excluded by the principles of construction enunciated by Lord Cairns in Pryce v. Monmouthshire Canal and Railway Companies (40 L. T. Rep. 630 (1879); 4 App. Cas. 197). The present exemption section is not one which moderates and limits a right to payment for services rendered which might otherwise exist. It is really an exemption introduced for the purpose of excepting from the rating power of the docks the right of free water, which belonged to lighters before the Dock Acts were passed, and really is a qualification of a pre-existing right of the subject. I have only to add that, having looked at the ships' entry book (and here, if I am making a mistake, I hope I may be corrected, because I only got the book after the argument, and it may be I have misread it) and the craft book, I do not find that in the craft book there is ever mentioned the name of the ship into which or from which the lighter is going to discharge or receive goods or ballast. This does not look as if the dock company have in practice acted on the construction now put forward by them. It was urged that if the exemption applies to lighters going in which render service to a ship not lying in the dock at the time of the entry of the lighter into the dock, the result would be that lighters might enter to ply for engagements. We have not got to decide this question, but I do not shrink from the idea that this result may have been contemplated by the Legislature. It is for the benefit of the public and of ships coming to the docks that lighters should be ready to render services. I think that this appeal should be dismissed with costs. I have the craft book in my hands, and I have looked at the entries of these two ships. It does not say in either case to what ship lying in the docks the barge was to render service.

George Wallace.-Your Lordship is correct about the book, which is merely a record kept at the pierhead of the actual entry of the ships. The men at the pierhead are not concerned with the lightermen. What is kept is the docking note, which is supplied by each craft as it comes in, which does state in terms the ship for which the lighter is bound.

BUCKLEY, L.J.-That is after the Act of 1902. George Wallace.-Yes.

VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.J. That I am aware of.

MOULTON, L.J.-These two actions are actions brought for trifling sums of money, but they are, of course, for the purpose of ascertaining the interpretation by the court of the powers of the VOL. X., N. S.

[CT. OF APP.

dock companies to make certain charges, and, so far as I can see, have adequately raised these grave questions of law, of great importance to the mercantile community, which they were intended to raise.

In both cases they relate to charges that the dock companies are entitled to make upon lighters which enter the docks and load or unload ships lying therein, ships which do not, or the consignees of the goods of which do not, choose to avail themselves of the alternative method of overside delivery on to the quays. In the present case we have only got to deal with the St. Katharine Dock, and I think it is important to bear that in mind because these rates are statutory rates, and although a process of assimilating the statutes which relate to the various docks along the Thames has been going on for many years it is not yet complete, and the statutes which regulate the St. Katharine Dock are not the same as those which regulate certain other docks.

I shall, therefore, in the first instance, examine the clauses of the statutes which give power to the company to impose charges or rates upon lighters. They commence with, and are based on, certain clauses in the London and St. Katharine Docks Act 1864, the history of which is not wholly unimportant. If you go into the years that elapsed before that Act (which was more or less, I think, a consolidating Act, although it also effected important changes), you find that various docks had been independently started by different companies, each of them getting a private Act, and that a process of coalescence or combination had gone on, so that the docks had grouped themselves in all cases by an amalgamating Act, and that the terms of that amalgamating Act to some extent followed those of their original creating Acts, but by no means absolutely. The earlier Act, which related to the St. Katharine Dock, had clauses corresponding to those to which I have referred, but by no means in the same terms, and it is clear to me that the language of these clauses was settled very carefully. The words were not chosen lightly to express the powers of charging and the exemption with which we have to do in this case, but I do not like appealing to previous or subsequent Acts for the purpose of construing an Act which is in force. It appears to me as a rule to be dangerous, though the previous Acts throw light on the surrounding circumstances during which the Act in question was passed. The fundamental clause which regulates the power of charging is sect. 132 of the London and St. Katharine Docks Act 1864. [His Lordship read the section.] The sole limit, therefore, to charge, so far as that section is concerned, is that the charge must be reasonable. The first question that meets us there is, what is the mean. ing of the word "vessel" as used in that clause? For that purpose one has to turn to the interpretation clauses. Sect. 4 contains the not uncommon provision that "The several words and expressions to which by the Acts in whole or in part incorporated with this Act meanings are assigned have in this Act the same respective meanings, unless excluded by the subject or context." On turning to sect. 3, which declares what Acts were incorporated with this Act of 1864, one finds the Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses

4 0

Act 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 27), which does give a definition of the word "vessel," a definition wide enough not only to include sea-going vessels, but craft of all kinds, including lighters. We therefore have it that the word "vessel" includes lighters unless there is something in the subject or context which excludes it. When one turns back to the charging clause one sees that so far from the context excluding this interpretation of the word "vessel" it specifically points to its being included in all its width, for sect. 133, which, though numbered separately, is a proviso to sect. 132, says: [His Lordship read the section.] That proviso shows that the power of charging extended to lighters, because it is a proviso that the charge to lighters under sect. 132 shall not exceed the charges imposed on coastwise vessels. So that we have it clearly here that under sect. 132 and sect. 133 there is a power of charging lighters and such like craft up to and not exceeding the actual rates in force in respect of coastwise vessels, those rates in their turn being restricted to that which is reasonable; but with respect to lighters there is another clause of prime importance in this case; it is clause 136, which reads as follows: [His Lordship read the section.]

Beyond question, both from the language of that clause itself and from the history of the subject-matter, this was an exemption put in in favour of those who worked lighters on the Thames, and who, previous to the formation of the docks, had been accustomed to assist in unloading or loading vessels that lay in the river. When one turns to the previous Acts which related to this dock one finds that in the earlier Acts there were clauses with like intention, though different in language. I see in the Act of 6 Geo. 4, c. cv., which was, if I remember rightly, the Act under which the St. Katharine Docks were constructed, it was provided by sect. 116 that "all lighters and craft entering into the said docks, basins, or cuts to discharge or receive ballast or goods to or from on board any ship or vessel shall be exempted from the payment of any rate; and also all such ballast or goods so discharged or received shall be exempt from any rate, dues, or charge whatsoever."

Therefore in the previous clause these by no means unimportant words " lying therein were absent. Shortly after that I find, on looking at the legislation which related to other docks, which also had some peculiarly expressed clauses in their earlier Acts, that the clause thus phrased appears as early as 1831, and has been consistently adhered to ever since. So that I confess that I approach the interpretation of this clause with the feeling that the language has been carefully chosen, and that the language is not merely the repetition in subsequent Acts of Parliament of phraseology consecrated by long usage, but it is one chosen de novo for this dock to express what are to be the rights given to the parties in the future.

Now, what is the meaning of this section? For my own part, so far as my own personal opinion is concerned, the meaning is not doubtful. It says, "All lighters and craft entering into the docks, basins, locks, or cuts to discharge or receive ballast or goods to or from on board of any ship or vessel lying therein shall be exempt." Those

words describe the qualification that a lighter must have at the moment of entry to justify its being allowed to enter free. The previous clauses, 132 and 133, do give specific power to the dock companies to charge vessels-that is to say, to charge lighters-for entering. An exemption which entitled them therefore to pass without charge must depend on the qualification which they then possessed, and it appears to me that that qualification is expressed in the words I have just read, and that the whole of those words must be taken as going to its description. If that be so, the lighter at the moment of entry must be a lighter entering "to discharge or receive ballast or goods to or from on board of any ship or vessel lying therein," and the ship must, in order that the qualification may be possessed, be a ship then lying therein. Otherwise these words "lying therein are absolute surplusage. Now, I think it is not unjustifiable to point out that although words which have been used in a clause previous might perhaps be dropped out because they were realised to be complete surplusage, I cannot think that would have been introduced in this way if they were introduced for no purpose whatever; so that the history of the Acts would make me lean to giving some substantial meaning to these words. But I do not rely upon that. It appears to me that we ought to give a meaning to these words. which accounts for their presence there if we can do so fairly and without straining the meaning of the language. So far from our having to strain the meaning of the language to give them this signification, it appears to me to be the natural signification which they bear, and, moreover, the words which follow the part of the section which I have read appear to me to point still more clearly to the fact that a lighter, in order to be entitled to claim this exemption, must be going to a specific vessel.

It says, 66 so long as the lighter or craft is boná fide engaged in so discharging or receiving the ballast or goods." The words "the ballast or goods" point, in my opinion, to specific ballast and specific goods-that is, the ballast to be taken to a vessel, or the ballast to be taken out of the vessel and removed, and similarly with regard to the goods. Therefore the exemption, in my opinion, applies to lighters that are going to take goods to a specific vessel, that specific vessel being a vessel lying in the dock at the time when the exemption is claimed. The last clause (which for other reasons I do not think important to enter into here) I think must have been put in more ex abundanti cautela than for any other reason, inasmuch as I cannot find any charges in respect of goods delivered into lighters. But it supports the interpretation I have just given, for it says, "All the ballast or goods so discharged or received shall be exempt from any rate or charge what

CT. OF APP.]

All I can say is, if reasonableness is to guide us at all in the interpretation of an Act of Parliament, the interpretation that is put on those words by the dock company appears to me far more reasonable. It prevents what in my opinion must, in practical work, be a serious danger to a dock company, and through them to the mercantile public generally from too wide an exemption in favour of the lighters. It prevents lighters loitering in the docks and filling up the dock's space and obstructing the movements of the ships, because that is the sort of place where they are most likely to get a job. I compare it in my own mind to privileges granted to porters, we will say, of going upon a pier to take passengers' luggage, or to receive passengers' luggage. It would make all the difference in the convenience of working that pier whether the privileges were given to the porters who brought luggage with them or came to get the luggage of a specific passenger, and when they had received it had to take it away, or whether there was a general power to persons of that business to place themselves on the pier in the hope that they might get a job of that kind.

I can well believe that if some of the earlier clauses left it doubtful which of those two interpretations was to be taken, the Legislature would feel it its business to limit the interpretation to that which I have described as the more reasonable one, and, if so, would in my opinion have adequately performed its object if it had adopted the language which we find in sect. 136. Those are the clauses on which the power of the dock company to charge rates on lighters are founded. Those clauses have only been modified, so far as I can find, by two Acts. The first of those is the Act of 1888, but before we go to that Act of 1888 one intermediate event must be mentioned, which explains the clause to which I shall have to refer. In the year 1882 the East and West India Dock Company were desirous of building a dock far down the river in order to accommodate large vessels, and accordingly obtained the Act called the East and West India Dock Company's Extension Act 1882, under which Tilbury Dock was built. By sect. 25 of that Act a limitation was put upon the charges which might be demanded from vessels for entering, lying in, or departing from that dock, which was expressed in the first schedule of that Act. It applied, however, only to the Tilbury Dock, and therefore would be, for the purposes of this case, quite immaterial were it not for subsequent legislation. But in the year 1888 an amalgamation was made, called in the statute to which I am going to refer "a working union," between the London and St. Katharine Dock Company and the East and West India Dock Company, the two great groups under which the London docks had at that time

arranged themselves. The Legislature had, of course, the right to impose terms as a condition of permitting this amalgamation, which might have important effects upon the mercantile community. One of the most important of the terms imposed as the price of this amalgamation is to be found in sect. 57 of the London and St. Katharine and the East and West India Docks Act 1888, which was the Act to which I have referred, permitting the working union: [His Lordship read sect, 57]. Therefore, the fundamental

[CT. OF APP.

charging sections which appear in the 1864 Act, which require the charges to be reasonable, but put no other restriction upon them, are now modified by an absolute restriction that these charges shall not exceed those that appear in the first schedule of the Tilbury Docks Act. I have now exhausted the statutory power of toll or charge upon lighters, but I have not exhausted the legislative provisions which bear upon the clauses which we have here to interpret.

The last clause to which I have to refer for that purpose, in my opinion, throws a very strong light on the interpretation which we ought to put upon the clauses which give the statutory power of imposing tolls. I refer to sub-sect. 10 of sect. 16 of the London and India Docks Company (Various Powers) Act 1902 (2 Edw. 7, c. ccxliii ). Between the period of 1888 and the date of this Act, 1902, another step had taken place in the process of consolidation of the London Docks. By the Act of 1888 a working union had been created between the London and St. Katharine Dock group and the East and West India Dock group. In 1900 that became an amalgamation. The Act of 1902 is an Act giving various powers to this amalgamated undertaking. Sub-sect. 10 reads as follows: "The person in charge of any craft entering the dock shall before leaving the entrance lock truly state in writing to the dockmaster the name of the ship, quay, berth, or place in the dock for which such craft is bound, and give all other information that may reasonably be required by the company as to the business in respect of which such craft is so entering the dock, in default whereof such person shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 51. for each offence, and the dockmaster may refuse to allow such craft to enter the dock or may remove or moor and detain the same therein in such position as he may think fit, or may remove the same beyond the prescribed limits, and the reasonable charge for such mooring, detention, and removal shall be recoverable in a court of summary jurisdiction by the company as a civil debt from the owner of such craft."

That is not a clause varying the statutory powers of toll. If it were, I should hesitate very much in using it in any way to interpret a preceding Act of Parliament, but it is a clause for creating machinery for working different existing powers of toll, and it may throw very great light on what the Legislature considered were the existing powers of toll. It seems to me that you cannot read this with regard to the question of ship without seeing that it puts the strongest emphasis on the necessity of the barge being bound for a specific ship or place in the dock before entering the dock. Of course the barge might go for the purpose of lying up; I am not dealing with that, but I am taking the case of where the barge claims the right of entry because it is going to put cargo on board a ship, or to receive cargo or ballast from a ship, and when I find in order to give a machinery which will render those powers effective you can require from the bargeowner, as soon as he enters, the name of the ship, and if he does not give the name of the ship you can refuse to allow him to enter, it strengthens my belief very greatly that the right of entry depended on the bargeowner being able to mention the specific ship which he was going to serve, and