"

The Attorney-General (Sir Robert B. Finlay, K.C.) (Henry Sutton and H. Stuart Moore with him) for the appellant.-The question is whether the defendant was entitled to claim to be tried by a jury, or whether, as the Board of Trade allege, he was liable to be tried summarily. It turns on sect. 680 of the Merchant Shipping Act, and sub-sect. 1 (b) is the important clause, and sect. 681 also throws some light on the matter. The offence charged against the defendant was the offence under sect. 218 of the Act, known as crimping. The right to a trial by jury is claimed under sect. 17 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879. [Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J.-There being the liability to imprisonment for a term exceeding three months, why is the defendant not entitled to be tried by a jury?] Because sect. 680, sub-sect.1 (b), says that the offence "shall be prosecuted summarily," and in the " manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts." This being a case in which it is vital that the proceeding and the trial should be taken at once, the Legis. lature has provided that the accused shall be tried summarily and at once in the way provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts. It is conceded that there being a liability to imprisonment for six months, sect. 17 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 would apply apart from the provision in sect. 680 of the Merchant Shipping Act, which is substantially the same as the corresponding provision in sect. 518 (3) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854. Effect must be given to the words" shall be prosecuted summarily "; and it is essential that it should be so, as otherwise if the ship were to depart there would be a failure of justice. It is important for shipping purposes that the matter should be quick. In sub-sect. 1 (a) of sect. 680, under which the accused may receive imprisonment up to two years, the word "may is used-the offence "may" be prosecuted summarily; whereas under (b) the word "shall" is used-the offence "shall' "be prosecuted summarily. The use of the word "may" in the first clause makes all the difference, and the fact that in the second clause-clause (b)-the Legislature change the language into the imperative form, and say that for offences under clause (b) the offence "shall" be prosecuted summarily, makes all the difference. Under that clause the necessities of the prosecution are more in view, and it would not be giving effect to the whole of the language and to the difference in the language in these two clauses to uphold the magistrate's decision. Sect. 681 also tends to show that the intention was to have the whole proceeding summarily disposed of. The Act has said that the defendantshall" be dealt with summarily, but the magistrate has said that he shall be dealt with summarily only at his option; and the Act has said that the offence shall be prosecuted

دو

[K.B. Div.

summarily. "Prosecution means a great deal more than charging a person, as the magistrate has found; it includes everything up to the final result. [Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J.-If your contention is correct, then I do not see the necessity of having both clauses (a) and (b).] There are cases on this point as to the summary jurisdiction, but they do not throw much light on the question, as the word used is " may"; but in sect. 144 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1901, we have an instance of the word "shall being used.

Colam for the respondent.-The decision of the magistrate was right. If a statute merely prohibits an act, then the proceeding is by indictment, and not by summary conviction, as summary conviction is merely a creature of statute. There is the contrast between the use of the words "may" and "shall" in clauses (a) and (b), and whereas under clause (a) the proceedings may be begun under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, under clause (b) they must be begun under these Acts. To the words in clause (b): "shall be prosecuted summarily in manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts," the learned Attorney-General wants to read in the words "with the exception of sect. 17 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1879." If the Legislature had meant or intended that sect. 17 should not apply in this case, then they would have put in some such words as with the exception of sect. 17 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879," which they have not done. [He was stopped.]

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Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J.-The point raised in this case is certainly one of importance, and I can see many grounds for supposing that it is a very desirable thing to legislate from the point of view that at any rate many of the offences under the Merchant Shipping Act should be dealt with in a summary manner; but it seems to me that to effect that object requires clearer language than is used in this section-sect. 680. There existed at the time the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 was passed, and had been existing for some fifteen years before that Act was passed, the procedure of the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1879, which, in sect. 17, gives a right to any person charged before a court of summary jurisdiction with an offence, for the commission of which he is liable on summary conviction to be imprisoned for more than three months, with certain exceptions, a right to demand trial by jury. Before the charge is gone into in respect of an offence to which that section applies, the defendant must be addressed by the court of summary jurisdiction for the purpose of informing him of his right to be tried by a jury in pursuance of that section, and we have had to decide in accordance with previous cases, that if the defendant is not so addressed by the court, and is convicted by the court of summary jurisdiction, the conviction is bad. In the year 1894 the Legislature, in sect. 680 of this Act, adopted somewhat new language, because I do not think that any argument can be founded upon the comparison of this section with the corresponding section-sect. 518, sub-sect. 3-of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, and in sub-sect. 1 (a) of sect. 680, said that an offence under the Act, declared to be a misdemeanour, should be punishable with a punishment not exceeding two years'

imprisonment, but might, instead of being prosecuted as a misdemeanour, be prosecuted summarily in manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, in which case the punishment should be brought down to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months.

Then the

section provides in general terms in clause (b) that an offence under the Act punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding 100l., shall be prosecuted summarily in manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts; or, in other words, that the proceedings in such cases shall be commenced in the way contemplated by those Summary Jurisdiction Acts. The AttorneyGeneral has pressed upon the court that the words "prosecuted summarily" mean that the prisoner or the person charged with the offence shall be prosecuted summarily to the final result, and shall not get the benefit of sect. 17 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, but that the prosecution must go on to the end summarily. However desirable that result may be, and I do not deny that it may be desirable, I think in a matter relating to a code of criminal prosecution or procedure, which is imported by reference, and properly so, it would require stronger words than are used in sect. 680 to deprive a person of a right to be tried by a jury, which he only has in case of offences where the punishment exceeds three months' im. prisonment. I cannot myself think that the words in sect. 681 enable us to limit or rather to give to the word "shall" the meaning which the learned Attorney-General contends for; but I think that that section is clearly required for the purpose of applying the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to certain classes of offences and proceedings and trials which require special legislation. In my opinion, therefore, the language of subsect. 1(b) of sect. 680 is not sufficient to prevent sect. 17 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1879 from applying to summary prosecutions under that sub-section. I bear in mind the answer given-no doubt properly by the Attorney-General in answer to a question put by me, that sub-sect. (b) was required in order to make these offences triable by a court of summary jurisdiction. Therefore I think that the words" shall be prosecuted summarily" are no sufficient to deprive the prisoner of the right to be tried by a jury, which the learned magistrate decided he had in this case. opinion, therefore, the case has been properly dealt with in being sent to be tried at quarter

sessions.

In my

KENNEDY, J.-I am of the same opinion. PHILLIMORE, J.—I agree. Appeal dismissed. Solicitor for the appellant, Solicitor to the Board of Trade.

Solicitors for the respondent, C. V. Young and Son.

Thursday, July 14, 1904.

(Before Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J., KENNEDY and PHILLIMORE, JJ.)

SOLICITOR TO THE BOARD OF TRADE (app.) v. ABRAHAMS (resp.). (a)

Crimping - Foreign ship-Unauthorised person going on board-Foreign ship arriving at British port, though not at end of voyage-" End of their voyage"-Order in Council-Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), ss. 218, 219. Sect. 218 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 makes it an offence, where a ship is about to arrive, is arriving, or has arrived at the end of her voyage, for any unauthorised person to go on board the ship, without the permission of the master," before the seamen lawfully leave the ship at the end of their engagement or are discharged"; and sect. 219 enables the Crown, where an arrangement has been made between this country and a foreign country whose government is desirous that the provisions of sect. 218 should apply to unauthorised persons going on board ships of that foreign country within the British territorial jurisdiction, by an Order in Council to order that those provisions shall apply to the ships of that foreign country, and have effect "as if the ships of that country arriving, about to arrive, or having arrived at the end of their voyage, were British ships."

Held, that a foreign ship to which the above provisions have been applied by an Order in Council, arrives at the end of her voyage within the meaning of the section and comes within the above provisions, when in the course of her voyage she arrives at any British port, although that may not be the end of the voyage for which the crew signed articles.

CASE stated by the metropolitan police magistrate sitting at Thames Police-court.

On the 22nd Dec. 1903 complaint was made by the Solicitor to the Board of Trade (hereinafter called the appellant), on behalf of that board against Frank Abrahams (the respondent) for that the respondent at the Regent's Canal Dock, otherwise known as the Limehouse Basin, not then being in His Majesty's service and not being duly authorised by law for the purpose, unlawfully did go on board the Norwegian ship the Sognedalen, then being within British territorial jurisdiction, without the permission of the master of the ship, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, to wit, the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, ss. 218 and 219, and an Order

in Council dated the 25th Oct. 1881.

The cause was duly heard and determined by the magistrate, who upon such hearing, dismissed the complaint.

Upon the hearing of the complaint the magistrate found the following facts:

(1) The Norwegian ship Sognedalen of Frederikstad arrived from that port at the Regent's Canal Dock, or Limehouse Basin, in the port of London, within British territorial jurisdiction on the 18th Dec. 1903.

(2) On the same day the respondent, who was not a person in His Majesty's service, nor was duly authorised by law for the purpose, went on board the ship without the permission of the master before the seamen lawfully left the ship at the end of their engagement, or were discharged.

(a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

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(3) The agreement relating to the service of the crew on board the ship rendered into the English language was as follows: "Crew list for barque Sognedalen belonging to Frederikstad, of 596 tons register, bound from here to London and further."

(4) An Order in Council, dated the 25th Oct. 1881, reciting sects. 5 and 6 of the Merchant Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act 1880, and declaring that the 5th section of that Act should apply to Swedish and Norwegian ships was proved. A copy of the order was attached to and was part of this case.

(5) By sect. 5 of the Merchant Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act 1880, it was enacted as follows: "Where a ship is about to arrive, is arriving, or has arrived at the end of her voyage, every person not being in Her Majesty's service, or not being duly authorised by law for the purpose, who goes on board the ship without the permission of the master before the seamen lawfully leave the ship at the end of their engagement or are discharged, shall for every such offence be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds, or, at the discretion of the court, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months."

(6) Sect. 6 of the same Act was as follows: "Whenever it is made to appear to Her Majesty (1) that the Government of any foreign country has provided that unauthorised persons going on board of British ships which are about to arrive or have arrived within its territorial jurisdiction shall be subject to provisions similar to the provisions contained in the last preceding section as applicable to persons going on board British ships at the end of their voyages; and (2) that the Government of such foreign country is desirous that the provisions of the said section shall apply to unauthorised persons going on board of ships belonging to such foreign country within the limits of British territorial jurisdiction, Her Majesty may by Order in Council declare that the provisions of the said last preceding section shall apply to ships of such country, and thereupon, so long as the order remaius in force, those provisions shall apply and have effect as if the ships of such country were British ships arriving, about to arrive, or which had arrived at the end of their voyage." The Order in Council, dated the 25th Oct. 1881, was as follows:

"Whereas by sect. 5 of the Merchant Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act 1880 it is provided that where [the section was then set out.]

"And whereas by sect. 6 of the said Act it is further provided that [sect. 6 was then set out.]

"And whereas it has been made to appear to Her Majesty-That the Government of Sweden and Norway has provided as aforesaid, and is desirous that the provisions of the said fifth section shall apply to unauthorised persons going on board of Swedish and Norwegian ships within the limits of British territorial jurisdiction;

"Now therefore, Her Majesty, by virtue of the power vested in her by the said recited Act, and by and with the advice of her Privy Council, is pleased to declare that the provisions of the said recited 5th section of the Merchant Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act 1880 shall apply to Swedish and Norwegian ships."

(7) The above recited sections have been repealed by the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, but by sect. 745 thereof the aforesaid Order in Council continues in force as if it had been made under the last-mentioned Act.

(8) Sects. 218 and 219 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 are to the same effect and almost in the same words as sects. 5 and 6 of the repealed sections of the aforesaid Act of 1880, save that the concluding words of sect. 219 read: "Her Majesty in Council may order that those provisions shall apply to the ships of that foreign country and have effect as if the ships of that country arriving, about to arrive, or having arrived at the end of their voyage were British ships."

[K.B. DIV.

(9) It was contended on behalf of the respondent that as the crew had signed for a voyage to London and further, the Sognedalen had not arrived at the end of her voyage within the meaning of sects. 218 and 219 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, for that the voyage therein mentioned must be construed to mean the fall or round voyage for which the crew had agreed to serve, and on the completion of which they would be paid off and not as the ship's passage from one port to another, and that therefore no offence had been committed by the respondent.

(10) It was contended by counsel on behalf of the appellant: (a) That the word "voyage must be construed to mean the voyage or passage of a ship from one port to another, and that the arrival of a ship, whether British or foreign, at one port from another was the end of the voyage contemplated by sects. 218 and 219 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, irrespective of the voyage in relation to which the crew had signed articles; (b) that as regards foreign ships, at all events, the Legislature intended the word "voyage" to bave the aforesaid meaning, otherwise, as a foreign ship never or rarely finished her round voyage within the territorial jurisdiction, the Act with regard to them would be inoperative. Further, that such intention was manifest from the words of the aforesaid Order in Council-to wit: "Those provisions shall apply and have effect as if the ships of such country were British ships arriving, about to arrive, or which had arrived at the end of their voyage." (c) That having regard to sect. 219 (a) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, where the words territorial jurisdiction are mentioned, and that the same words appeared in sect. 6, sub-sect. 1, of the Merchant Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act 1880, and also that the Act of 1894 was one for consolidating and not for amending the Acts relating to merchant shipping, and as by the aforesaid Act the validity of the aforesaid Order in Council was saved, it was the intention of the Legislature to have re-enacted verbatim the concluding words of sect. 6 of the Act of 1880-to wit the words "as if the ships of that country were British ships arriving, about to arrive, or which had arrived at the end of their voyage," and that the concluding words of sect. 219 of the Act of 1894 should be construed accordingly, that is to say, by reading the words "were British ships" before the word "arriving." (d) That the respondent had committed an offence within the meaning of sect. 218 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894.

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The magistrate was of opinion that the words end of their voyage" in sect. 219 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 must be held to mean, both as regards British and foreign ships, the completion of that voyage for which the crew had signed articles, and on the completion of which they would be paid off, and as the crew of the Sognedalen had signed articles "for a voyage to London and further," the arrival of that vessel at the Regent's Canal Dock, although within British territorial jurisdiction, was not an arrival at the end of her voyage within the meaning of sect. 219 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, and that consequently no offence had been committed contrary to the provisions of sect. 218 of that Act, and he accordingly dismissed the complaint, as herein before mentioned.

The question for the opinion of the court was whether the determination of the magistrate based on his construction of the aforesaid sections of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 was correct in point of law.

If the court should answer this question in the affirmative, his determination was to stand; otherwise the case was to be remitted to him to convict the respondent.

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The Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60)-which was an Act to consolidate Enactments relating to Merchant Shipping "provides :

Sect. 218. Where a ship is about to arrive, is arriving, or has arrived at the end of her voyage, and any person, not being in Her Majesty's service or not being duly authorised by law for the purpose, (a) goes on board the ship, without the permission of the master, before the seamen lawfully leave the ship at the end of their engagement, or are discharged (whichever last happens); or, (b) being on board the ship, remains there after being warned to leave by the master, or by a police officer, or by any officer of the Board of Trade or of the customs, that person shall for each offence be liable to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds, or, at the discretion of the court, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months; and the master of the ship or any officer of the Board of Trade may take him into custody, and deliver him up forthwith to a constable to be taken before a court capable of taking cognisance of the offence.

Sect. 219. Whenever it is made to appear to Her Majesty that the Government of a foreign country (a) has provided that unauthorised persons going on board British ships which are about to arrive or have arrived within its territorial jurisdiction shall be subject to provisions similar to those of the last preceding section which are applicable to persons going on board British ships at the end of their voyages; and (b) is desirous that the provisions of the said section shall apply to unauthorised persons going on board ships of that foreign country within British territorial jurisdiction, Her Majesty in Council may order that those provisions shall apply to the ships of that foreign country, and have effect as if the ships of that country arriving, about to arrive, or having arrived at the end of their voyage were British ships.

Sect. 745 (1). The Acts mentioned in the twenty-second schedule to this Act-amongst them being the Merchant Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act 1880-are hereby repealed to the extent specified in the third column of that schedule. Provided that (a) any Order in Council, licence, certificate, by-law, rule, or regulation made or granted under any enactment hereby repealed shall continue in force as if it had been made or granted under this Act. (c) Any document referring to any Act or enactment hereby repealed shall be construed to refer to this Act, or to the corresponding enactment of this Act.

The Attorney-General (Sir Robert B. Finlay, K.C.) (Henry Sutton and Howard Smith with him), for the appellant.-The case raises an important question under sect. 219 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, which supplements the 218th section, for the purpose of applying the provisions of the latter section to foreign ships; and also a question as to the effect of an Order in Council made under the Merchant Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act 1880, before the Act of 1894 was passed, which it is important to observe was merely a consolidation Act. It is necessary to refer to the terms of the Act of 1880, of the Order in Council, and of the Act of 1894. The charge was one of improperly boarding a foreign ship and crimping on board a foreign ship; and if the contention of the respondent that the offence can be committed with regard to a foreign ship only if the foreign ship is going to end its voyage in this country is sustained, it will reduce sect. 219 to a nullity. The Act of 1880 was repealed by the Act of 1894, but it is necessary to refer to sects. 5 and 6 of that Act. Sect. 5 simply refers to British ships,

66

and it was in the case of foreign ships that the Order in Council was made under sect. 6, and under that section it is expressly said that so long as an Order made under that section remains in force, the foreign ships of that country are to be treated in the same way as British ships arriving at the end of their voyage. Under subsect. 1 of sect. 6, which deals with British ships arriving in foreign countries, it is obvious that that cannot relate to the end of their voyage; it is the case of a British ship going to a foreign port, and the words of the sub-section are, British ships which are about to arrive or have arrived within its territorial jurisdiction," and under that sub-section British ships which have arrived "within the territorial jurisdiction" of the foreign country are to be dealt with as if they were British ships arriving "at the end of their voyages," which are the words used in sect. 5. The Order in Council being made under sect. 6, it is perfectly clear that under that Order, until the Act of 1894, as soon as the foreign ships, to which the Order applied, got within British territorial waters, they were dealt with as if they were British ships arriving at the end of their voyage. Then coming to the Act of 1894, it is submitted that the Act of 1894 has not altered the law in this respect. The title of the Act is an "Act to consolidate enactments relating to merchant shipping." It was not an Act to consolidate and amend, but it was an Act to consolidate simply. Sect. 218 is for all purposes identical with sect. 5 of the Act of 1880; and sect. 219 is in substance the same as sect. 6 until the last sentence is reached. The last sentence runs thus: As if the ships of that country arriving,

at the end of their The last sentence

were

voyage, were British ships." in sect. 6, sub-sect. 2, of the Act of 1880, ran thus: "As if the ships of such country were British ships arriving, . at the end of their voyage." There is thus a transposition of the words " British ships"; and instead of having the words "as if the ships of such country were British ships arriving at the end of their voyage," we now have in the Act of 1894 "as if the ships of that country arriving at the end of their voyage were British ships," the words "were British ships" coming at the end of the sentence. It is said that this transposition has the effect of preventing the Order in Council from applying unless the foreign ships arriving at the British port are there ending their voyage. It is submitted that the transposition of those words has made no difference, and that the two sentences mean the same thing; and the Order in Council has been continued in force by sect. 745, sub-sect. 1 (a), no further Order in Council being made. We have still got in sect. 219, sub-sect. (b) the words "shall apply to unauthorised persons going on board ships of that foreign country within British territorial jurisdiction." The words "within British territorial jurisdiction" are a governing test as to the meaning of the latter part. It is impossible, having regard to what is left in the earlier part of sect. 219, to read that incidental allusion at the end of the section as having entirely emasculated the section, and as having cut down the effect of the earlier part of the section, to a class of foreign ships which were arriving or were about to arrive at the end of their voyage. It is submitted, first, that to giv such effect to that transposition would be t

K.B. Div.]

nullify all that has gone before in the section, and that the section must be read so as to make sense of it, and that the transposition cannot have the far-reaching effect attributed to it in contradiction to the earlier part of it; and, secondly, even if we are to read it so as to give the fullest effect to the transposition, we are forced to the conclusion that the word "voyage " is not used in this section in the sense of a complete voyage, but merely in its popular sense, say, of a voyage between two places.

mean

Colam for the respondent. The words "at the end of their voyage" at the latter end of sect. 219, must have reference to sub-sect. (a) of sect. 218, which creates the offence. The very essence of sub-sect. (a) is that the person is unlawfully going on board at the end of the engagement of the seamen and just before the seamen are paid off, and are therefore about to receive their wages, and so going on board to induce the seamen to enter into unfair contracts. Sub-sect. (b) deals with the case of a man who stays on board and refuses to go off when requested. The very essence of the whole of these provisions is that the seamen are about to receive their wages at the end of their engagement, and the object was to prevent persons from unlawfully going on board ships at the end of their voyage, and so obtaining by unfair means the wages of the seamen. In this case we have to bear in mind the fact that these seamen were not being paid off in London, and there is no reason why in the case of a foreign ship, where the seamen are not going to get their wages in this country, the seamen should require any protection. That point is quite independent of the Order in Council, and that was the point which the magistrate meant to make. The words "end of the voyage the place where the seamen are going to be paid off and discharged; and seamen do not need protection at intermediate ports if they are not going to receive their wages there. The object of the statute is perfectly satisfied, and the seamen fully protected by the construction the magistrate has put upon it. The offence really is not the going on board at the end of the voyage, but unlawfully "before going on board at the end of the voyage the seamen have left the ship at the end of their engagement, or are discharged"; and what the statute means to do is to protect the seamen at the end of the voyage where they will be discharged, and where the crimps can have power over them. If British ships are within foreign jurisdiction, and if the seamen are there paid off and discharged, then the protection of the statute applies, but if they are not discharged there they do not require protection, and the sections do not apply. With regard to the Order in Council, no doubt, sect. 745 has kept it alive, but only subject to the modification or the transposition of the language in sect. 219. The effect of the section and of the order is to place British and foreign ships on the same footing, and as regards foreign ships the only offence is going on board at the time when the men are about to be discharged at the end of their voyage.

The Attorney-General was not called upon to reply.

Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J.—I am of opinion that the view taken by the learned magistrate in this particular case is too narrow. I think a great

[K.B. DIV.

deal might be said on the point that, whatever view we might take with regard to sect. 219, the Order in Council, made by an agreement between the two countries under a statute then existing namely, the Merchant Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act 1880-and kept alive by sect. 745 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, was a perfectly good Order in Council, and ought to be applied for the purposes of this statute. I do not understand that counsel for the respondent really did contest or could contest that point, but what he says is that the construction of sect. 219, being narrower than the Order in Council, the Order in Council must in some way or other be construed in reference to the narrower construction in sect. 219. I am desirous of not putting my decision on the Order in Council only, because I think the Attorney-General is right upon the construction of sect. 219. But at the same time I do not want to be understood as saying that I should have acceded to the contention that, for the purpose of applying the Act of 1880, an Order in Council validly made, and having the effect of a statute when made for the purpose of dealing with foreign ships, would be a bad Order, because there had been subsequent legislation in the year 1894 dealing with the matter. That does not arise on this case, but I only wish to guard myself against it being thought that I acceded to the argument that the Order in Council could be got rid of in that way. If the language of this section-sect. 219-in the Consolidation Act of 1894 had been quite clear, the Attorney-General does not contend that we are allowed to construe it differently because the Act is a consolidation Act; but what he says is, and to that extent he is well-founded, that in a consolidation Act you are entitled, at any rate where there are doubtful expressions, to look at the previous Act of Parliament in pari materiâ, and see how the matter was there dealt with; and all I say with regard to sect. 6 of the Act of 1880 is that I do not think there is any doubt about the matter, so far as that section is concerned, that a foreign ship, coming into British territorial waters was to be deemed to be a British ship which was ending her voyage.

Now

it is said that the latter part of sect. 219 of the Act of 1894 has altered that view of the law. I need not read sub-sect. (a) and sub-sect. (b) of that section, because they correspond to sub-sects. 1 and 2 of sect. 6 of the Act of 1880. I only desire to point out that in sub-sect. (a) we have still got the enactment which was contained in sub-sect. 1 of sect. 6 of the Act of 1880 as to a foreign country making provision that unauthorised persons going on board British ships which are about to arrive or have arrived within its territorial jurisdiction should be subject to the provisions of the preceding section, which are applicable to persons going on board British ships at the end of their voyages. And we have got the provision in sub-sect. (b) of sect. 219 that the foreign country is desirous that " the provisions of the said section shall apply to unauthorised persons going on board ships of that foreign country within British territorial jurisdiction." Those being the governing principles of both sections-sect. 6 of the Act of 1880 and sect. 219 of the Act of 1894-we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that vessels go to and call at various ports, and that that has been and was a common