have indicated unmistakably to the defendants what their action was to be-if they were intending to cross, to act at once to do so; but if, on the other hand, it was not right to cross, and they determined to stop where they were, to indicate that in an unmistakable way. If the ship in the dock entrance was stationary, the up-coming ship could say, "I can go on and pass her," but if she was not stationary, having regard to this narrow waterway, then I think she should indicate properly what she was going to do. The proper way to do it was to have given three short blasts at once, and reversed her engines and kept in the lock or near the lock entrance. If it is said that might have tended with the tide to cant her head to starboard, it is not of much moment, because it would only have been for a short time, and it could have been counteracted by dropping the anchor while the other ship passed. She neither went across nor did she indicate with any definiteness what she was going to do. I think the defendants first blew a short blast, and then the Vernon blew two, but that would be contrary to the general spirit of the rules. Failure to indicate distinctly that she was going to stop where she was and not cross the river is really the cause of this trouble, because it leaves the upcoming ship, which was being navigated carefully and properly, and on which it is difficult to find any negligence or defect of management, in the position of thinking, "Well, I am Lot sure whether this ship means to stop or to cross. I think from her motion ahead she is going to cross, and she is not indicating properly that she is not going to do so." On that the Skipsea ports slightly and reverses her engines-there is some discrepancy as to that, and possibly at the end the engines were stopped because the vessel was canting so much to the northward; but I do not think that those on the Skipsea could have adopted any other manœuvres, and the result is that the Vernon is alone to blame for the collision. Solicitor for the plaintiffs, Charles E. Harvey. Solicitors for the defendants, Botterell and Roche. Monday, Dec. 19, 1904. THE ANDRÉ THÉODORE. (a) Necessaries-Insurance premiums-Payment by brokers-Right of broker and underwriter to recover by action in rem-Admiralty Court Act 1840 (3 & 4 Vict. c. 65), s. 6. Sums paid by a broker as insurance premiums for the purpose of effecting insurances on the hull and safe arrival of a vessel or sums due to underwriters as premiums cannot be recovered by the broker or by the underwriters as necessaries within the meaning of sect. 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1840; and, as such sums are not necessaries, the broker and underwriters have no right to proceed against the ship in rem. ACTION brought by Charles J. Adams and Eugene Fimbel and La Compagnie d'Assurance Maritime la Gironde against the owners of the ship or vessel André Théodore to recover a sum due for necessaries supplied-namely, the amount (a) Reported by L. F. C. DARBY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. [ADM. of premiums due for the insurance of ship and freight on a voyage policy. The proceedings were in rem, and the writ was issued on the 25th July 1904. The action was originally instituted and the writ issued in the names of Charles J. Adams and Eugene Fimbel against the ship or vessel André Theodore, and the indorsement on the writ was originally as follows: Plaintiffs, as agents of underwriters, claim against the André Théodore the sum of 37001. for necessaries supplied namely, the amount of premiums due for the insurance of ship and freight on a voyage policy. On the 19th Aug. 1904 the writ was amended, and the name of La Compagnie d'Assurance Maritime la Gironde was added as a plaintiff, and the words "as agents of underwriters" were struck out of the indorsement, and the amended writ was served upon the ship on the 22nd Aug. 1904. The André Théodore having been arrested and no appearance having been entered by her owners, on the 14th Sept. 1904 the plaintiffs moved before the Vacation judge that the vessel should be sold, and that order was, with the assent of the first mortgagees, made. The sale took place, and the amount of the proceeds were brought into the registry. On the 4th Oct. 1904 the plaintiffs filed their statement of claim in which they alleged that the plaintiffs Adams and Fimbel were sworn insurance brokers carrying on business at Bordeaux, and at the request of the defendants effected insurances on the André Théodore, a French vessel then at Rouen, a French port, and that the other plaintiffs, La Compagnie d'Assurance Maritime la Gironde, underwrote the policies for the sums mentioned in the claim. The claim then proceeded : 2. In respect of the said insurances, premiums of insurance became due and payable by the defendants to the plaintiffs, or one of them. 3. The said premiums of insurance were necessaries and expenses necesssarily incurred for the benefit of the defendants to enable the said vessel to proceed to sea. 4. The following are the particulars Policy No. 108,893, dated the 23rd July 1902, underwritten by the plaintiffs La Maritime Compagnie d'Assurance la Gironde for 5000 francs, the premium at 8 per cent. being Extension thereof No. 125,432, dated the 16th June 1904, the additional premium on amount underwritten by the said plaintiffs Policy No. 108,894, dated the 23rd July 1902, on safe arrival underwritten by the said plaintiffs for 25,700 francs and 3000 francs, in all 28,700 francs, the premium at 6 per cent. being Extension thereof No. 125,433, dated the 16th June 1904, the additional premium on the amount underwritten by the plaintiffs Francs. 4000 1500 1722 645.75 Francs 7867.75 Which, at 25 francs per pound, equals 314l. 14s. 3d. 5. The said 314l. 14s. 3d. is still unpaid and owing to the plaintiffs for necessaries as aforesaid. 6. The said policies of insurance are all French contracts made in France regarding a French ship registered at the port of Bordeaux, a French port, and by French law the plaintiffs are entitled to priority for the aforesaid unpaid premium over other debts due by the defendants. The claim ended with a prayer for judgment against the ship, her tackle, apparel, and furniture for the sum of 3141. 14s. 3d. and costs. The first and second mortgagees filed affidavits showing an interest in the res under arrest or the fund in court, and intervened in this suit. The first mortgagees after intervening in the suit did not further contest the claims, as the sale of the vessel realised sufficient to satisfy their claim on their mortgage and the claim of the plaintiffs in this action. The second mortgagees, the Société Anonyme des Chantier et Ateliers de St. Nazaire (Penhoet), after intervening in the suit, proceeded to contest the plaintiffs' claim, and on the 5th Dec. 1904 delivered a defence. By their defence they admitted that Adams and Fimbel, at the request of the Société de Navigation du Sud Ouest Société Anonyme, caused insurance policies to be effected for the sums mentioned in the claim on the André Theodore, and that the other plaintiffs underwrote such policies. They denied that the premiums were necessaries or expenses incurred for the benefit of the defendants to enable the André Théodore to proceed to sea, or that any sum was owing to the plaintiffs which gave them a cause of action against the ship or the proceeds of sale. They further denied that the court had any jurisdiction under 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, or otherwise, to deal with the plaintiffs' claim, and did not admit that the law of France gave the plaintiffs' claim any priority over the claim of the mortgagees, and denied that the law of France governed any question of priority. The following are the material parts of the sections of the Admiralty Court Acts which were referred to during the progress of the case. Admiralty Court Act 1840, s. 6: 6. And be it enacted, that the High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction to decide all claims and demands whatsoever for necessaries supplied to any foreign ship or sea-going vessel, and to enforce payment thereof, whether such ship or vessel may have been within the body of a county or upon the high seas at the time when the necessaries were furnished in respect of which such claim is made. Admiralty Court Act 1861, s. 5: 5. The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdic. tion over any claim for necessaries supplied to any ship elsewhere than in the port to which the ship belongs, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that at the time of the institution of the cause any owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales provided always, that if in any such cause the plaintiff do not recover twenty pounds he shall not be entitled to any costs, charges, or expenses incurred by him therein, unless the judge shall certify that the cause was a fit one to be tried in the said court. Carver, K.C. and D. C. Leck for the plaintiffs. The premiums of insurance are necessaries within the meaning of sect. 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1840: The Riga, 26 L. T. Rep. 202; 1 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 246; L. Rep. 3 A. & E. 516. GORELL BARNES, J.-Can the paying of a [ADM. premium be said to be a necessary supplied to a ship?] There is no distinction between necessaries supplied to the ship and necessaries for the voyage: The Riga (ubi sup.). The vessel could not sail unless she was insured. [GORELL BARNES, J.-These sums were not paid to enable the vessel to sail; they were only payments which were necessary to protect her owner.] The test of what is a necessary is what would a prudent man order under the circumstances of any particular voyage. Whatever is fit and proper for the service on which a vessel is engaged, and whatever expense is incurred if a prudent man would have incurred it, is within the meaning of the word " necessary": Webster v. Seekamp, 4 B. & Ald. 352. No owner who is prudent would send his ship to sea uninsured. It is true that insurance premiums paid to effect insurances for the benefit of shipbrokers have been held not to be necessaries : The Heinrich Bjorn, 49 L. T. Rep. 465; 5 Asp. But the facts in that case show they were not made for the owner's benefit or made in respect of the ship. Under the French code moneys advanced to pay premiums are a privileged debt. [GORELL BARNES, J.-Assume that to be so, how can you recover in this country by this action against the ship?] The court has sold the property on which these plaintiffs have got a charge, and they are entitled to ask that their interests should be protected. Laing, K.C. and Denis O'Conor for the interveners, the second mortgagees.-The Riga (ubi sup) is not an authority which is in favour of the plaintiffs. That case is difficult to understand, for the insurance was on freight, and was only effected on the authority of letters written after the vessel had sailed; so the insurance was not effected to enable her to sail, and it is difficult to see how on the principles laid down in the judgment the insurance premiums were recoverable. In The Heinrich Bjorn (ubi sup.) the matter was considered, and it was decided in that case that the word "necessaries" means something supplied or furnished to the ship, or something needed for the requirements of the vessel, and does not include payments made for the protection of the owner. That case is very strong in the interveners' favour, for there the money was advanced to buy necessaries, and the insurance premiums might have been said to have been part of the cost of the necessaries. Nothing that is not expended for the use of the ship can be said to be a necessary: The Marianne, 64 L. T. Rep. 539; 7 Asp. Mar. No matter what rights the plaintiffs have under the French code, they have no right to proceed in rem against this vessel in this country for necessaries, and this suit should be dismissed. The dismissal of this suit does not prevent these plaintiffs from intervening in the mortgagees' action, only they will not be able to do so as necessaries men; they can in that intervention prove their alleged right to priority against the fund which they allege they possess under the code. GORELL BARNES, J.-This is a suit by the plaintiffs against the ship or vessel André Théodore, and the writ appears to have been issued on the 25th July 1904. Under that writ the ship was arrested, and was ultimately sold under an order of the 14th Sept. 1904, which was in these terms: "Upon the application of counsel for the plaintiffs, counsel for interveners being present and consenting, and no one having appeared for the owners of the ship André Théodore, the judge ordered that a commission do issue for the appraisement and sale by the marshal of the said ship, such sale to be either by public auction or by private tender as shall appear to be more advantageous." I gather that order was made upon an affidavit which was made by the plaintiffs' solicitors showing the reasonableness of an early sale of this ship, having regard to the claims against her and the expense of keeping her. The writ to which I have referred was in the name of Charles James Adams and Eugene Fimbel against the ship or vessel André Théodore. Upon that writ the indorsement is this: "Plaintiffs, as agents of underwriters, claim against the ship André Théodore the sum of 37001. for necessaries supplied-namely, the amount of premiums due for the insurance of ship and freight on a voyage policy." That writ was afterwards amended, and the name of La Compagnie d'Assurance Maritime la Gironde was added as a plaintiff, and the indorsement was slightly altered by striking out the words "as agents of underwriters," leaving the claim otherwise as I have said, and the usual proceedings in default were taken. The second mortgagees, or those parties who at the present moment are said to be second mortgagees, intervened, and the first mortgagees also intervened, and they were apparently the persons present who consented to the order for the sale of the vessel. The plaintiffs then filed a statement of claim in this suit, which alleges : "The plaintiffs Adams and Fimbel are sworn insurance brokers, carrying on business at Bordeaux, and at the request of the defendants effected insurances on the André Théodore, a French vessel then at Rouen, a French port, and the plaintiffs La Compagnie d'Assurance Maritime la Gironde underwrote the policies for the sums hereinafter mentioned. 2. In respect of the said insurances, premiums of insurance became due and payable by the defendants to the plaintiffs, or one of them. 3. The said premiums of insurance were necessaries and expenses necessarily incurred for the benefit of the defendants to enable the said vessel to proceed to sea." And then the particulars of the insurances are given: One of them is headed an insurance policy, dated the 23rd July 1902, underwritten by the plaintiff company for 50,000 francs, at a premium of 8 per cent. I should gather that it was a policy for a year. Then there is "extension thereof," dated the 16th June 1904, the additional premium on amount underwritten by the said plaintiffs. The policies apparently were extended. Then there is another policy, dated the 23rd July 1902, on safe arrival underwritten by the said plaintiffs for 25,700 francs and 3000 francs, in all 28,700 francs, at a premium of 6 per cent.; and an extension, also dated the 16th June 1904, for an additional premium, the total amount of the premiums being 7867.75 francs, which in English money amounts to 3141. 148. 3d. The amount claimed on the writ [ADM. was 37001.-that is explained by the fact that it was thought other premiums for other underwriters would be included-but the action is now confined to the particular premiums relating to the policies to which I have referred. The statement of claim then continues: "5. The said 3141. 148. 3d. is still unpaid and owing to the plaintiffs for necessaries as aforesaid. 6. The said policies of insurance are all French contracts made in France regarding a French ship registered at the port of Bordeaux, a French port, and by French law the plaintiffs are entitled to priority for the aforesaid unpaid premiums over other debts due by the defendants.' And then they claim judgment against the defendants for the amount and costs. The writ appears to have been amended on the 19th Aug. pursuant to an order dated the 12th Aug. The order for the sale of the vessel was dated the 14th Sept. The amended writ was served on the ship on the 22nd Aug., and it is upon that amended writ that the action has now proceeded. Up to the present time the owners of the ship have not appeared; the only persons who have appeared are the first and second mortgagees; the first mortgagees are not, apparently, troubling very much to contest the claims. How far they have done so I do not know, but I gather the proceeds of sale are sufficient to pay them, and the contest which has arisen in the present matter is raised by the second mortgagees. The way it arises is this, the second mortgagees, finding that the ship was under arrest in the present case, instituted a suit under the 3rd section of the Admiralty Court Act of 1840 to enforce their second mortgage. That section would enable them to do so when the ship was under arrest, or the proceeds of the vessel after arrest are in court, and the second mortgagees proceeded with their mortgage suit, but, when it came on, an objection was raised by the present plaintiffs, as they wished to get rid of this second mortgage so as to come ahead of it, that the second mortgage was an invalid one. Then it was said that, if the present plaintiffs have no valid claim, they would have no locus standi to contest the second mortgage, and that the court had better determine, in the first instance, whether the plaintiffs had a valid claim against the proceeds, and then, if they had none, there would be an end of their suit; if they had a valid claim, then they would be in a position to fight out their priorities as between themselves and the second mortgagees, and question in that contest the validity of the second mortgage. The matter stood over, therefore, in order that the present plaintiffs might bring on their default action, which they have done, and they have filed a statement of claim which has been delivered to the second mortgagees. To that statement of claim the second mortgagees have filed a defence, in which they admit that the plaintiffs, the insurance brokers, "at the request of the Société de Navigation du Sud Ouest Société Anonyme caused insurance policies to be effected for the sums mentioned in the statement of claim on the said André Théodore, and that the plaintiffs La Compagnie d'Assurance Maritime la Gironde underwrote such policies." Then they deny the other allega. tions and that the premiums were necessaries, or expenses incurred for the benefit of the defen. dants to enable the said vessel to proceed to sea; and they allege that the plaintiffs' claim discloses no cause of action, and they traverse the sugges tion that the plaintiffs have a priority by the law of France over other debts. The evidence which has been put before me on the part of the plaintiffs is the affidavit of Mr. Eugene Fimbel, which seems to state substantially what is found in the statement of claim, apart from this question of privileged debts in France. In the first paragraph of the affidavit he says that at the request of the defendants he effected insurances on the André Théodore, then at Rouen, a French port, and that other plaintiffs underwrote the policies. Then he states this: "The said premiums of insurance were necessaries, and expenses necessarily incurred for the benefit of the defendants to enable the said vessel to proceed to sea. Also the maritime insurance was compulsorily made in July 1902 in order to enable the defendants to obtain on the ship mortgages which were impossible to obtain without said formality being previously performed, and the insurance was effected for twelve months from leaving Rouen with the continuation clause." Then he produces the policies which are exhibited to the affidavit. He says the money is unpaid, and par. 7 of the affidavit is to this effect: "At the time the insurances were effected the André Théodore was being built at Rouen, where she was fitted out, and she left that port in the month of Jan. 1903 on a round voyage for Antwerp to ballast, and Puget Sound with general cargo, and from thence with lumber to Cardiff, where she arrived in June 1904." So that at the time the policies were taken out in July 1902, the ship was not yet built; she was not built until somewhere about Jan. 1903, and these policies appear to have been anticipatory policies, possibly, with a view of getting mortgages in anticipation; and those extensions were extensions upon those same two policies which I have referred to, carrying those policies on for a certain length of time. That is the position of the matter so far as it is necessary to state it, with one exception, and that is this: I have referred to the paragraph of the statement of claim, which alleges that these policies are French contracts made in France in regard to a French ship registered at the port of Bordeaux, a French port, and that by French law the plaintiffs are entitled to priority for the aforesaid unpaid premiums over other debts due by the defendants. At present no evidence has been offered upon that head, though it was contended that, if this matter were gone into, it could be shown that by French law there was a privilege of some kind attaching to these premiums; that matter has not at present been proved or gone into. The point that is taken on the part of the defendants is that the plaintiffs' claim as appears on the writ is for necessaries supplied to this ship, and, mainly, the amount of premiums due for insurances on ship and freight on a round voyage policy covering her for a certain period of the voyage and then extended, and that this is a suit which, by the terms of the writ, is confined to necessaries, and that, under the Act or Acts giving them the right to proceed, a suit so framed can only be a suit for necessaries within the sections which apply to this matter. The two sections which are material to refer to are sect. 6 of the Admiralty Court Act of 1840, which enacts: "The High Court of Admiralty VOL. X., N. S. [ADM. shall have jurisdiction to decide all claims and demands whatsoever . . for necessaries supplied to any foreign ship or sea-going vessel, and to enforce the payment thereof, whether such ship or vessel may have been within the body of a county or upon the high seas at the time when the necessaries were furnished in respect of which such claim is made." There is also sect. 5 of the Admiralty Court Act of 1861, which runs thus: "The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim for necessaries supplied to any ship elsewhere than in the port to which the ship belongs, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that at the time of the institution of the cause any owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales." Those are the two sections dealing with the matter. I am not sure, on referring to sect. 5, whether, strictly speaking, it can be said that, if these were necessaries, they come within this section, because the ship appeared to be registered at Bordeaux, and these insurances, as far as I can make out from the somewhat meagre evidence before me, were effected at Bordeaux, so that possibly sect. 5, which relates to necessaries supplied elsewhere than a port to which the ship belongs, might exclude that suggestion; but the earlier section in the Act of 1840 which I have referred to is not in the same terms when it applies to a foreign ship, which this ship was. The result of this rather full statement of the position of the matter is that one has to consider whether this claim for the insurance premiums is a claim for necessaries within the meaning of the Act. It is contended on the part of the plaintiffs that these were necessaries supplied to this ship. On the other side it is said that they are not necessaries supplied to the ship within the meaning of the sections, and that they are to be treated as claims which give rise to no right to arrest this ship. Now, the words of the section are, "for necessaries supplied to any foreign ship or seagoing vessel," and then there come these words later on, or necessaries furnished." Ordinarily speaking, those words mean, as was mentioned in several of the cases, matters which are necessary for the ship herself, and in order that she should perform her service. The words of the 5th section of the Act of 1861 are, "necessaries supplied to any ship," but I do not think it necessary to consider that section further for the reason I have mentioned. The cases which have been cited are two; the first is The Riga (ubi sup.), in which Sir Robert Phillimore gave a judgment fully considering the principles which govern this question, and I think the paragraph in his judgment which I am about to read gives a clear view of what he intended to express at that time. What he says is this: 6. It appears to me on a review of these cases in which the court seems to have proceeded tentatively, so to speak, with the new jurisdiction, and on a consideration of the language of both the statutes, that I must come to the conclusion that there is no distinction as to necessaries between the cases in which by the common law a master has been holden to bind his owner and suits for necessaries instituted in this court. This seems to have been Dr. Lushington's original opinion in The Alexander, and it seems to me strengthened by the language in the ADM.] THE ANDRÉ THÉODORE. subsequent statute, and was, I think, also the foundation of my decision in The Underwriter in 1868. I am unable to draw any solid distinction (especially since the last statute) between necessaries for the ship and necessaries for the voyage; and I shall follow the doctrine of the common law as laid down by the high authority of Lord Tenterden in the case of Webster v. Seekamp. In that case he says: The general rule is that the master may bind his owners for necessary repairs done, or supplies provided for the ship. It was contended at the trial that this liability of the owners was confined to what was absolutely necessary. I think that rule too narrow, for it would be extremely difficult to decide, and often impossible in many cases, what is absolutely necessary. If, however, the jury are to inquire only what is necessary, there is no better rule to ascertain that than by considering what a prudent man, if present, would do under the circumstances in which the agent in his absence is called upon to act. I am of opinion that whatever is fit and proper for the service on which a vessel is engaged, whatever the owner of that vessel as a prudent man would have ordered, if present at the time, comes within the meaning of the term " necessaries as applied to those repairs done or things provided for the ship by order of the master, for which the owners are liable.' Nobody in arguing this case has dissented, nor can I myself see any reason to dissent, from a single word which is there said, and, to my mind, that excludes the claim for necessaries in this case The argument addressed to me is that Sir Robert Phillimore, after laying down the law in the way that he did, proceeded to apply the principles, and, in so applying them, included a sum for insurance upon the freight, which is mentioned in certain articles in the petition, in the report of The Riga. I confess myself, on reading that case, that I am not able to understand, if the case is correctly reported, why he allowed, on the principles which he laid down, the premiums for insuring freight, because they do not appear to me to come within the principles which are laid down, or to come within the language of the statute, to which those principles are being applied. The other case which has been much referred to is the case of The Heinrich Bjorn (ubi sup) when it came before Lord Hannen in the first instance. It is not necessary to follow that case through its sub. sequent history, because this point about necessaries did not arise in the subsequent consideration of the case. What Lord Hannen said in that case is this, and I think it was a very strong case for allowing the premiums if they could be allowed: "The plaintiffs effected this insurance and paid premiums amounting to 681. 68. 8d., and this is the first item in the claim for necessaries. I am, however, of opinion that premiums for insurance cannot be regarded as necessaries. The expression necessaries supplied' in 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, s. 6, which gives the Admiralty Court jurisdiction over foreign ships, though it is not to be restricted to things absolutely and immediately necessary for a ship in order to put out to sea (see The Perla), must still be confined to things directly belonging to the ship's equipment necessary at the time, and, under the then existing circumstances, for the service in which the ship is engaged (see The Alexander). But the insurance [ADM. of a vessel is something quite extraneous to this equipment for sea." I suppose the learned judge was excluding from the term " equipment for sea" such necessary expense incurred for moving the ship about for going to sea, such as port expenses, and so forth. Then he goes on: "And however prudent it may be for an owner to insure, it is a prudence exercised for his own protection, and not for the requirements of the vessel in the sense in which the word 'necessaries' is used in the statute." As I said, that was a strong case, because if I follow that case correctly, and without going into the somewhat complicated transaction which resulted in a certain position in that case, the net result of that position was that the plaintiffs advanced a certain sum to pay for necessaries, and they were authorised to cover the amount for insurances on the ship out and home at the owner's cost, and I should have thought it might have been put in that case that the cost of necessaries would include the cost of insuring, if it were a term upon which they were to be advanced that they were to be insured, because then it would be clearly, as it were, added to the price of the advances, or the recoupment for the advances; but the view that Lord Hannen took, which seems to me to be quite right, was that there is a broad distinction between money expended on actually fitting the ship out and working her and moving her, and dealing with her for the purpose of her navigation, and moneys which are merely expended for the purposes of protecting a shipowner in the event of her being lost. They are not in the least necessary for the ship; they are not supplied or furnished to the ship; they are mere moneys which are paid to insure the shipowner against his being out of pocket in case the ship is lost. He may or may not effect those policies; of course as a rule he does. Where the ship is one of a number in a fleet so numerous that the owners of the fleet can take their own line, and have their own underwriting account, they do not require to insure in the ordinary sense at all. It appears to me, therefore, that, applying the principles which Sir Robert Phillimore referred to in The Riga (ubi sup), and applying what Lord Hannen said in the case of The Heinrich Bjorn, it cannot be contended successfully that premiums of insurance such as those in this case are to be considered as necessaries supplied to or furnished to the ship. And the case is remarkable as illustrating to what extent the matter can be carried if they were to be so treated, because, as I have pointed out, these policies were effected long before the ship was completely built, and apparently were effected for the purpose of enabling the mortgages to be obtained, and had no relation, strictly speaking, to whether it was necessary for the purpose of providing, or fitting, or equipping the ship. What follows from that view of this case? I think that the plaintiffs have entirely failed to support the claim which they made by their writ in this matter, which is for necessaries supplied, and that, therefore, they have no right of action in these present proceedings as framed against this vessel. It is said that they can make some sort of a case for a charge upon the ship by French law, and I am asked to allow this matter to stand over until they do so. The matter appears to have been |